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# Prime Ministers and Public Expectations: A Study of Institutional Change

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**Abstract**

This study concerns the institutional bases of prime ministerial power and leadership. Specifically, it investigates institutional development in the prime ministerial civil service organizations in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, from the 1970s to the present. The study asks two basic questions. First, to what extent, and how, have the institutional bases of prime ministerial power grown? Second, what explanations can account for the institutional change observed?

The study is framed theoretically in two ways. In terms of general approach, the study adopts the lens of historical institutionalism, and especially Mahoney and Thelen's (2010) characterization of patterns of change over time. In terms of specific empirical theory, I construct and test an original theory called the Theory of Public Expectations. This theory locates the impetus for institutional change in the gradual but transformative shift in public values since the 1970s, captured in the notion of "assertive citizenship". Assertive citizenship generates increased public expectations of leaders which, in turn, incentivize prime ministers to centralize power through institutional enhancement. Methodologically, the study employs an innovative mixed methods approach to testing this theory, including quantitative modelling and qualitative case-study analysis.

Overall, the analysis demonstrates that, where the assumptions of both increasing assertive citizenship and institutional centralization are met, the Theory of Public Expectations receives some support. Thus, the study reveals the crucial role of the public in shaping prime ministerial leadership. As importantly, though, the study finds that the centralization of power in the prime ministership, at least vis-à-vis institutional development, is not a universal, consistent phenomenon. Contrary to prevailing accounts, it varies greatly across cases and over time, and is often contingent on the agency of

leaders. The study significantly advances the theoretical robustness and methodological rigour of the prime ministerial literature and vividly demonstrates the relationship between the public and prime ministerial power.

**Keywords**

Prime ministers; Prime ministerial branch; Political leadership; Institutional change; Canada; Great Britain; Australia; New Zealand; Political values; Assertive citizenship; Institutional theory; Public administration

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Kenny William Ie
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# PART ONE: CONTEXT AND THEORY

# Chapter 1
# Prime Ministers and Modern Politics

I make no apology for having a strong centre... in today's world there is a lot more that needs to be done at the prime ministerial level. I am saying this is the right thing to do.

Tony Blair, 2002

This study is about institutional change in prime ministerial organizations in four Westminster countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. It focuses on the centre of government bureaucracies that advise and support prime ministers in their role as chief executives: the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia and New Zealand, the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom. A key focus concerns how these institutions have responded to the transformations of modern democratic politics.

The study is motivated by the broader question of how institutional change reflects change in the nature of prime ministerial leadership. Prime ministers are the central figures in modern politics; what they do matters a great deal. This centrality is a good reason to care about the enhancement of prime ministerial leadership as suggested in the epigraph above. Prime Minister Blair's candid defence of centralization reflects a common assessment that prime ministerial power has grown significantly in recent years. If this claim is accurate, what is driving these changes? My answer in this study is predicated on four key suppositions that are neatly captured in Blair's argument.

The first supposition is that the "job description" of prime ministers has changed in recent decades. Prime ministers face more difficult tasks and obligations than ever before. Policy issues are more complex and policy problems are more intractable. Traditional levers of power are often ineffective in bringing about change. Governments deal with problems that are often not amenable to direct state intervention. They face the

scrutiny of an aggressive media and sceptical public. In these headwinds, the effectiveness of prime ministers depends greatly on the institutional resources at their command. The idiosyncratic personal qualities of prime ministers - leadership skills, personality traits, experiences, and so on – always partly determine success and failure. However, institutional capacity can increase opportunities for leadership success. Such capacity is relatively stable and enduring, and it is passed to successive prime ministers. Thus, one response to the changing job description facing modern leaders is to build the capacity of organizations that support them. This makes an incredibly difficult job somewhat more manageable.

The second supposition posits that change in the prime ministerial job description is a reflection and consequence of the politics of "today's world". First, politics has never been as inclusive, in a sense, as it is now. Although the democratic bona fides of modern politics are more open to question than ever before, the number and the intensity of voices in the political discourse are greater than ever before. Moreover, this inclusivity is accompanied by an 'individuation' of politics: group political identities are more fluid and groups themselves, as a channeling and filtering factor between citizens and elites, have lost much of their authority. Thus, prime ministers face a cacophony of heterogeneous opinion, creating extraordinary, yet diffused, demands on leaders. The inclusivity and individuation of modern politics is aided and abetted by dramatic innovations in media and communications technologies, such as the rise of the continuous news cycle and, more recently, social media.

A second characteristic of modern politics that has transformed the prime ministerial job description is the structural change within national economies. Since

World War II, national economies have undergone profound shifts and dislocations associated with the rise of the welfare state and globalization. Modern economies are more dependent on each other and on international financial flows. This has generated great wealth and raised standards of living, but it has also 'hollowed out' entire economic sectors and regions as well as the state's capacity to intervene in the economy.[1] At the same time, post-war prosperity and the expanded role of government in ensuring economic stability and 'cradle to grave' social safety nets generate greater expectations for what government can and should do. However, governments often may not have access to the tools or capacities necessary to meet those expectations. These economic changes make the prime minister's job of driving meaningful change more resource-intensive, the tools for doing that job less effective, and the prospects for success less certain.

The third supposition in Prime Minister Blair's remarks is that the prime minister, uniquely among other contending actors, needs "to do a lot more" than was the case heretofore. This disruption in traditional arrangements of power vis-à-vis actors such as political parties, cabinets, legislatures, and the civil service is troubling to democrats who value restraints on power and collective decision-making. As prime ministers do more, other actors not only do less but *expect* to do less, and are perceived as doing less: the norms and expectations of actor behaviour change.

This is most evident in concerns about the concentration of power and the shift from cabinet government to 'prime ministerial' government. Cabinet government was the byword of Westminster government: in Walter Bagehot's famous expression, cabinet was

[1] There is, of course, a voluminous literature on globalization and serious disagreements about its positive and negative effects. I give only the broad characterization here and do not necessarily endorse the validity of any particular effect.

"the buckle that fastens" the legislative power to the executive power. The prime minister's role in this system was to constitute cabinets and oversee the cabinet decision-making process. Some prime ministers, such as Mackenzie King or Robert Menzies, led through consensus or expertise, while leaders like David Lloyd George in Great Britain or R.B. Bennett in Canada were perceived as autocratic and domineering. However, the language and practice of government was collective, and cabinet had a central role in decision-making. Legislatures and the civil service also played important roles. In addition to policy-making itself, these other actors played representative and informational roles. They were the primary means by which the opinions of diverse societal interests could be aggregated and communicated to the political executive. As tasks are moved to "the prime ministerial level", however, the importance of cabinet and other actors in policy-making, representation, and informational support has declined.

Against this decline stands the fourth supposition: the normative case for a "strong centre". Rather than seeing a strong centre as an understandable but undesirable outgrowth of modern politics, it should be seen as a positive development. A strong centre is conducive to effective, responsible, and responsive governance, while a weaker centre undermines it. Governments should be able to generate and implement a policy agenda that addresses public needs, for which they can be held accountable. Doing so in the face of the centrifugal forces of modern politics is extraordinarily burdensome. In this view, the concentration of power in the prime minister and the centre is a way to counter these tendencies and enable greater policy coordination, oversight, and active intervention. It does not guarantee good governance but it makes ineffective governance less likely. A rational prime minister should thus seek to centralize power where they can.

*Not* seeking out these means is an abdication of responsibility for which the prime minister, most of all, will be blamed.

These four suppositions form the backdrop of ideas upon which I paint a portrait of the prime ministerships in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. This study comparatively examines institutional change in these prime ministerships, and investigates two simple questions. First, to what extent have these institutions changed? Second, what systematic factors of modern politics account for change in prime ministerships?

To answer these questions feasibly within this study, I narrow its scope in two ways. First, I limit the concept of the prime ministership by focusing on what I call the "prime ministerial branch", an explicit analog with the concept of the "executive branch" in the United States. This choice of term is deliberate: it directs our attention away from the prime minister as an individual and towards the institutional extensions of the prime minister. These are what Anne Tiernan calls prime ministers' "deep structure" of support and advice (2006, 311): organizations surrounding prime ministers which are directly subordinate to them and which support them predominantly, if not exclusively.

This "deep structure" includes both political and bureaucratic extensions of the prime minister. The former refers to an office, generically referred to as the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), which is staffed mostly by partisan advisors, chosen by the prime minister and not subject to merit appointment. The PMO's primary role is to support the prime minister in her political capacity: much of its work involves political strategizing and issues management. Where it deals with public policy, its role is to provide "policy-sensitive" political advice. The bureaucratic extension of the prime

minister is the civil service office that provides administrative and policy support to the prime minister. It serves the prime minister in her executive capacity: it provides advice on and management of the machinery of government and policy-making support. Career civil servants mostly staff these offices. Although political neutrality of civil servants is a strong Westminster convention, the fact that civil servants in the prime ministerial branch serve a political master means that they must account for political considerations: they are said to provide "politically-sensitive" policy advice.

In this study, the "prime ministerial branch" refers almost exclusively to bureaucratic extensions of prime ministers, specifically, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) in Australia and New Zealand, the Privy Council Office (PCO) in Canada, and the Cabinet Office (CO) in the UK. In practice, this is justified methodologically, as explained later in chapter four, but is also reasonable conceptually. As Lee et al. note in the case of the UK Cabinet Office, these organizations are "the prime minister's instrument for enabling government to reach collective decisions" (1998, 37). They are central to how prime ministers govern, if not central to how they campaign. Thus, while this study is about prime ministers and political leadership broadly, its empirical scope is more focused. It is a study of the prime ministerial branch, not of particular prime ministers, decisions, or leadership styles: it is about the ship, not just the captain. Within that scope, it focuses on the bureaucratic engines of prime ministerial power, that is, the civil service offices that support them, rather than their political support.

Second, the analytical scope is narrowed in terms of the kind of change it examines. My focus is on concrete institutional change, structured around the concept of

*institutionalization*. In its original sociological guise, institutionalization explained the persistence of social institutions as effective responses to a collectively perceived need. Samuel Huntington imported the concept to characterize large-scale processes of political development, defining it as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (1965, 394). Huntington elaborated the concept without the structural-functionalism embedded in its sociological origins. Political institutionalization, in this view, is deeply subject to contestation and choice, and thus is not inevitable or irreversible. Political context and actors' preferences matter. This is embedded in the perspective of this study that institutionalization is a rational choice of individuals, namely, prime ministers.

Thus, the study conceives of centralization and intensification of prime ministerial power in terms of the bureaucratic institutional capacity attached to the prime minister's position. This is a very well-established, if debatable, notion in the literature. Heffernan (2003) and Bennister (2007) make this argument adroitly in their discussion of the actual exercise of prime ministerial power being related to the effective combination of 'personal' and 'institutional' power resources. Clearly, institutional capacity is not the be-all and end-all of prime ministerial power, but the effect that an institutionalized base of support can have on a leader's ability to project power should not be underestimated. Institutional resources can allow an 'unassuming', personally passive prime minister to strengthen their grip on the levers of power. Moreover, when such resources are directly associated with prime ministers rather than other, perhaps rival, power centres, they inherently strengthen the hand of the prime minister against competing actors.

Finally, the concern that institutional change in the prime ministerial branches reflects not centralization in the prime ministership but bureaucratic aegis is, in my view, unfounded. If there is evidence that bureaucrats in the prime ministerial branches are systematically enlarging their 'empires' without regard to prime ministerial intentions, this study does not uncover it. Rather, this study shows that prime ministers have used their bureaucratic offices intentionally and explicitly to pursue their substantive and governance goals as a regular matter of course. Moreover, I would argue that senior officials in prime ministerial branches, as a rule, do not face the same kinds of incentives that the typical bureaucrat in the 'budget-maximizing' mold face. They do not administer spending programs to any significant degree, and as "centre of government" actors they are already at the apex of 'status' and 'prestige' that the 'budget-maximizing' model suggests are reasons for bureaucratic empire-building. In my view, bureaucrats in prime ministerial branches are as close to ideal agents for prime ministerial principals as is likely to be achieved in government.

The study's second overarching question elucidates the factors that foster institutionalization in the prime ministerial branches. As its starting point, it takes James Simeon's claim that "[t]he rise of the welfare state and the commensurate growth in the size and scope of government, coupled with growing public demands and expectations facilitated the emergence of the political executive as the dominating force in government" (1991, 559). Simeon identifies two key factors: growth in government activity and public attitudes. This study builds a robust theory around the second of these factors. In chapter three I develop a *Theory of Public Expectations* that arises from the observation of two seemingly opposite, yet contemporaneous, transformations: in the

advanced democratic political culture where modern citizens are more critical, dissatisfied, and elite-challenging; and in the growing institutional concentration of power in centres of government. I argue that a shift from “allegiant” to “assertive” citizenship increases expectations about what government can deliver, and how it should do so. This causes prime ministers to respond by strengthening their own institutional capacity.

As well, this study also considers alternative explanations to the main theory. The first looks to the significant economic transformations in post-war advanced economies, owing notably to globalization and the social welfare state, which have markedly increased the role of governments in national economic activity. In different ways, both trends generate incentives for prime ministers to bolster the centres of government in pursuit of greater control over policy-making. The second alternative emphasizes short-term variation in political contexts. It looks to political factors, such as legislative support and ideology, as potentially enabling or constraining the decision space for prime ministers, thus conditioning their institutionalization choices.

### *1.1 Contributions of the Study*

Within this broad analytical scope, this study systematically compares prime ministerial branch institutionalization in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. In doing so, it makes four notable contributions. The existing literature is impressive in many ways, but it is largely anecdotal and focused on single cases. Comparisons are synthetic and impressionistic. There is a richness of information, but a lack of rigorous comparative investigation. We do not have robust answers to address how these prime ministerships have changed, and why. In taking on these questions, my

dissertation informs some trenchant theoretical and methodological gaps in the literature and contributes grounded knowledge to public discourse about fundamental issues such as the operation of executive power, the expectations democratic citizens have of leaders, and the institutional consequences of contemporary democratic behaviour.

My first contribution is theoretical. The study contributes to the theorization of prime ministerships at the conceptual level by treating institutional change in prime ministerships as general phenomena with general causes. In addressing the possibility of systematic effects, I treat these prime ministerships not as unique but as cross-cultural phenomena that can be studied comparatively. We begin from the premise that the Westminster prime minsterships are essentially similar, not just in form but in function, and that they are all subject to comparable cultural, economic, and political forces and so change in similar ways. While this perspective is not entirely new, this study takes more seriously the notion that executives in different national contexts are not *sui generis*. While the extant literature tends to begin from the premise that national contexts are unique and then proceeds to find shared elements of comparability, this study proceeds in the reverse order.

In terms of theoretical paradigms, my elaboration of a cultural explanation for institutional change also locates the study at the intersection of two different lines of inquiry. Scholars of value and attitude change in publics have generally not engaged questions of how such changes bear on institutional outcomes, focusing instead on other effects. In the other camp, institutional theorists have struggled to explain institutional change, which is challenging because most institutional theories expect institutional stability. It has been difficult for institutional theory to capture the kind of diffuse,

contextual impact that long-term changes in political culture represent. These theories have missed an opportunity to have a useful conversation, especially considering the meaningful, sustained links between citizen and elite behaviour in democracies.

This study also makes a significant contribution to existing knowledge with regard to methodology and research objectives. This involves three specific elements. First, the "custom built" datasets constructed for this project are themselves valuable to future researchers studying executives, political leadership, and the effects of executive power on other political outcomes. Specifically, chapters five and six are based on a dataset containing yearly observations of budget appropriations and staff resources in each country, along with relevant explanatory variables. Chapters seven and eight are based on both qualitative and quantitative data tracking internal organizational changes within prime ministerships. These datasets do not presently exist in an organized, coherent form. The hope is that, in addition to their use here, they will be used to advance the comparative analysis of prime ministerships in future research.

As well, the specific relationships examined in this study provide benchmarks for elaboration, refutation and replication using other data. The field lacks a coherent research agenda with a clear set of research questions, so the identification and assessment of clearly testable hypotheses is ideal fodder for building such an agenda. In this way, it builds a foundation for tying together the disparate literatures on executive governance, modern public management and democratic leadership. Finally, the methodological ambition of this study also contributes to the literature by expanding the scope and standards for future work. The research design invokes a 'mixed-methods' strategy of using different but complementary methodological approaches in one study.

My particular innovation is to employ serious quantitative methods to the comparative study of prime ministerships, which results in new kinds of knowledge in the field. This is a substantial contribution to the literature on prime ministers and prime ministerial power, which is overly dominated by qualitative methodologies.

The third area in which my study contributes is in its concrete empirical results. The study goes beyond simple descriptive arguments about institutional change in prime ministerships to identify and test specific theories of the causes of change: the Theory of Public Expectations and its alternatives. Finally, the study contributes to the broader public discourse about prime ministerial power and the practice of political leadership in modern politics. It draws attention to the ways in which modern politics has transformed how prime ministers do their job. It invites discussion about how citizen expectations and the broader political culture shape institutions and motivate political leaders. My study urges a broader consideration of the role that citizens play in conditioning how leaders behave: the kinds of demands and expectations we place upon leaders and what kinds of political leadership these pressures produce. The contributions of this study are manifold and significant.

*1.2 Plan of the Study*

The study is organized in three main parts, and nine individual chapters. This introduction and the next three chapters constitute Part I, which set out the context and theory of the work. Chapter two reviews the historical and institutional context of the Westminster prime ministership and the relevant literature. The first two sections of the chapter trace the evolution of the prime ministership in the United Kingdom historically, and identify the major roles played by prime ministers in Westminster systems. I then

highlight major themes in the broader literature on prime ministers and executives and review work on prime ministerships in the four Westminster cases. Finally, since my primary theoretical explanation, the Theory of Public Expectations, is premised on theories of social and cultural change, particularly the rise of post-materialism and shift from "allegiant" to "assertive" citizens, in this chapter I review the literature which describes these trends and identifies their effects.

Chapters three and four set out the theory and methodology of the study. In chapter three, I elaborate the key theoretical aspects. First, I discuss institutionalization in greater depth, and the study's framing of institutional change, which adapts Streeck and Thelen's (2005) typology of incremental change. Second, the Theory of Public Expectations is introduced. I trace its theoretical antecedents, narrative logic, and implications. Finally, the chapter discusses alternative theories of prime ministerial institutionalization. In chapter four, I discuss the methodology of the study: the overall research design, data sources and variable construction, and the analytical techniques of the empirics in subsequent chapters. In summary, Part I of the study sets out the theoretical and analytical foundations for the rest of the work.

Part II of this study, chapters five through eight, empirically assesses the theories discussed in Part I. These chapters investigate two dimensions of institutional change in prime ministerial branches: institutional autonomy and complexity. Chapters five and six examine autonomy. I measure autonomy using the budgetary resources (chapter five) and the staff resources (chapter six) of the prime ministerial branches, two measures that accurately reflect institutional capacity. This capacity is a crucial component of the growing independence of prime ministers from other political actors. The chapters use

both descriptive statistics and time series regression to investigate the particular hypotheses.

Chapters seven and eight continue empirical assessment of the theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization. They do so by examining the institutional complexity of the prime ministerial branches, and tracing changes in the organizational structures of the branches over time, in a series of small case studies. Chapter seven examines the two branches where change has been least evident: New Zealand and Canada. Chapter eight examines the more robust change found in the United Kingdom and Australia. My approach here is to identify trends in the proliferation and specialization of units within these branches and qualitatively analyze the relationships between the theoretical factors and these measures of institutional complexity. Thus, chapters five through eight offer an analytically varied and mixed-methods study of how and why prime ministerial branches have changed over time.

In Part III I summarize the results. Chapter nine summarizes and discusses the findings of the empirical chapters, and presents an overall evaluation of the core theory and its alternatives. After the sustained theoretical and empirical explorations of the first two parts of the study, the concluding chapter returns to some of the broader themes discussed in this introduction. I discuss the more general implications of my study's arguments and findings for studying public discourse and political leadership. I reiterate the contributions of the study to the literature and acknowledge several issues in the study's design and analysis. Lastly, some promising avenues for future research are discussed. Turning now to the next chapter, Two, I review the historical and institutional contexts of the Westminster prime ministership and the scholarly literature.

# Chapter 2
# Context and Literature

> The executive power is the moving force of a government. It represents in the political system that mysterious principle which, in moral man, unites action to the will... [T]he adjustments of its limits, and the accurate adaptation of its means to its end, offer to the human mind one of the most comprehensive subjects of reflection.
>
> Jacques Necker, Chief Minister and Director General of Finance to Louis XVI (1792)

The study's comparative analysis of the prime ministerships in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom is situated in deep historical and analytical contexts. The chapter sets out these contexts in three ways. First, it sets out the historical and institutional foundations of the Westminster prime ministership. It gives a brief account of its long evolution in the United Kingdom and its adaptation to colonial contexts. The section also describes the institutional roles that prime ministers play within these systems. In the second section of the chapter, I explicate the literature pertaining to prime ministerial power and institutional growth. Two central themes in the broader prime ministerial literature - the core executive, and the concept of presidentialization - are discussed. Building on these concepts, I review work on the prime ministerships in the four countries.

The third way in which this chapter elaborates the study's context is a discussion of the shift towards more "assertive" political cultures evident in many modern advanced democracies. This shift is the basis for the study's primary theoretical explanation for institutional change in prime ministerial branches: the Theory of Public Expectations. This theory, explicated at length in chapter three, begins with the premise that there has been a transformation in the values and attitudes of democratic citizens, one that has been

well-documented by scholars such as Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, Neil Nevitte, and Russell Dalton. I discuss this literature generally and, more specifically, Dalton and Welzel's (2014) characterization of "allegiant" versus "assertive" citizens. I explicate these fundamentally different notions of democratic citizenship and their wide-ranging effects on political behaviour in modern advanced democracies. The contribution of the Theory of Public Expectations is to extend the scope of these effects to include institutional change in the Westminster prime ministerships, to which we now turn.

*2.1 A Primer on Westminster and the Westminster Prime Ministership*

This section explores the rich historical and institutional context of the Westminster prime ministership, giving an account of its evolution and its various roles within these political systems. First, however, it would be well to explicate the terms *Westminster* and *prime ministership*. Each involves a deep set of cultural traditions, understandings, and practices. Westminster systems are a subset of parliamentary systems and specifically refer to institutional arrangements modelled on British conventions and traditions, exported to the British colonies.[2] The classification of political systems into presidential and parliamentary types is based on the relationship between the legislative and executive powers. In presidential systems, legislative and executive members are elected separately to fixed terms. In parliamentary systems, only the legislature is directly elected; the executive is then selected from and by the legislature. Terms are not fixed: because the legislature chooses the executive, it can also withdraw its support, resulting in either a change of government or an election. The most salient aspect of this distinction is that its implications for heads of government (that is, presidents or prime ministers) are

[2] The term 'Westminster' itself is a metonym, referring to the Palace of Westminster, where the UK Parliament meets, within the city of Westminster, an area of London.

different. Presidential systems create separation between the executive and legislative branches and induce conflict between them; presidential power is primarily a reflection of this relationship. Parliamentary systems create a fusion between the branches and induce conflict between government and opposition, and between prime ministers and other political executive actors.

Westminster's defining characteristics are surprisingly elusive. The term delimits a set of countries which are culturally and institutionally similar to each other, and dissimilar to other countries with parliamentary systems. Used in this way it is a common basis for comparison in a diverse set of studies.[3] Rhodes et al. (2009) identify five very different senses of 'Westminster': 1) a "narrative" arising from a common heritage which provides precedent for action and a source for nostalgic appeal, 2) a political instrument for defending oneself and denigrating opponents, 3) a set of norms and practices which legitimate the roles and powers of actors, 4) a cluster of institutional arrangements, and 5) a byword for efficient, decisive government (222-232). As a set of institutional arrangements, Arend Lijphart equates the Westminster model with majoritarian democracy, as opposed to consensus democracy, and produces a set of ten characteristics which differentiate the two forms (2012, 9).[4] Palmer and Palmer associate it with Walter Bagehot's "efficient secret of the English Constitution": the near complete fusion of

[3] For example, Kam (2009) looks at determinants of legislative dissent while Aucoin (2012) examines changing relationships between ministers and public servants. It serves as a scope-defining term in non-institutional work as well: for instance, Ailsa Henderson's (2008) work on citizen satisfaction with democracy and Sawer et al.'s (2006) volume on women's legislative representation. In other studies, one of these countries is taken as an exemplar of the model, with the implication that findings extend to the other Westminster cases (e.g., Eichbaum and Shaw 2008, Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011). Finally, Weller's (1985) seminal work on prime ministerships also uses Westminster to define its comparative context.

[4] Concentration of executive power in a one-party cabinet, cabinet dominance over parliament, a two-party system, a single member plurality electoral system, interest group pluralism (vs. corporatism), a unitary government (vs. federal), unicameralism, constitutional flexibility, i.e., an unwritten or largely conventional constitutional framework, parliamentary sovereignty, and a central bank controlled by the political executive.

executive and legislative power in the cabinet (2004, 9). At other times, it is equated simply with broad traditions of parliamentary sovereignty.

However, institutional divergences among the Westminster countries also are significant. Australia and Canada are federal states, while New Zealand is a unitary state. The United Kingdom is also a unitary state although recent governments have increasingly devolved power to its constituent countries. One reason for this difference is that Australia and Canada are much larger and diverse in area than New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and have different founding histories.[5] Canada and the United Kingdom have strictly adhered to the single member plurality electoral system to select their lower houses, the House of Commons, and have retained appointed upper houses (the Senate and the House of Lords, respectively). In contrast, Australia and New Zealand have moved to forms of proportional representation. Australia's House of Representatives has single member districts but uses preferential balloting, while its Senate is elected under a single transferable vote system. After significant electoral reform in 1993, New Zealand's unicameral legislature now employs a mixed member proportional system.

So, to employ the term 'Westminster' to denote a coherent cluster of institutions is problematic. What separates Australia, Canada, and New Zealand from other Westminster systems such as India and South Africa? Rhodes et al. (2009) argue that the crucial difference is whether the system was "transplanted" or "implanted" (11). The transplanted Westminster systems are those in which British-originating settler societies deliberately adopted British institutions and conventions. Implanted systems were imposed by the British as colonizers on a non-British population. Australia, Canada, and

[5] In both Australia and Canada, the country's constitutional union was a result of agreement among pre-existing, self-governing colonies (Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in Canada, all six current states in Australia).

New Zealand belong to the first type as predominantly English-speaking settler societies with relatively long and stable democratic traditions and cultural understandings inherited from the United Kingdom. India and many of the other commonwealth countries belong to the second type. Although Rhodes et al. consider South Africa to be a case of transplantation, its comparability with the other transplanted cases is suspect. On a host of dimensions from levels of economic and democratic development to demography, South Africa is simply too different to provide any reasonable basis for comparison.

The Westminster prime ministership historically and constitutionally is rooted in the absolute power of the British crown, an often forgotten fact in our more democratic age. The place of the prime ministership in the constitutional order is in historical terms an outcome of a *democratizing* process in which the unbounded authority of an unelected monarch gradually passed to elected persons responsible to Parliament. Walter Bagehot proclaimed in 1867 that the monarch was the "dignified" element of the executive while the prime minister was the head of the "efficient" element (1867, 80). This was not always the case. The monarch ruled absolutely until parliamentarians challenged this authority, leading to the English Civil War (1642-1651). The parliamentarian victory ultimately secured the right of Parliament to be consulted and its consent, particularly in financial matters such as the raising of revenue through taxation, was required. These parliamentary gains were cemented in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the passage of the Bill of Rights in 1689.[6]

Notwithstanding this shifting of power towards parliament, executive power was retained by the monarch prior to the 18th century. The monarch would employ ministers

[6] The basis for much of this historical discussion is the chapter "Historical Development of the Office of Prime Minister" in Carter (1956, 13-41). The historical outline is necessarily condensed and simplified.

as their agents and advisors for as long as they retained their confidence (Hughes 1976, 3). However, at times the monarch was simply too young or weak to effectively govern, allowing ministers the opportunity for greater influence. On occasion, monarchs and particularly favoured advisors would form mutually beneficial relationships of counsel and trust, as with Elizabeth I and William Cecil (Baron Burghley).[7] Indeed, F.W.G. Benemy argues that the office of prime minister essentially begins with Cecil's time as chief advisor (1965, 3). When the monarchy was restored in 1660, Edward Hyde (Lord Clarendon) became "chief minister", and was instrumental in developing the institution of the Privy Council as a smaller committee of the body of royal advisors that separated the "active" part, which became the cabinet, from the larger, honorific part (Carter 1956, 17). Under Queen Anne (1702-1714), ministerial meetings became regularized if embryonic: she decided whom to invite and what to discuss, while retaining the right to decide on public matters without ministerial consultation.

Robert Walpole served as First Lord of the Treasury from 1721 to 1742, and from this position he dominated Westminster. Although Walpole is regarded by many to be the first prime minister, the job was still in the mould of William Cecil: serving at the pleasure of the monarch. As Bagehot notes, Walpole had still to "manage the palace" (1963, 11). In Walpole's case, however, prime ministerial power was reinforced by the convergence of an indifferent monarch with his own talent and personality. It was therefore an "accident of history" that allowed Walpole to become the prototype first minister (Thomas 1998, 1).

[7] Clive Bigham's *The Chief Ministers of England, 920-1720* (1923) suggests an unexpectedly long historical lineage of such relationships.

George I (1714-1727), the first Hanoverian monarch, of which Queen Victoria was the last, spent much of his time in his native Germany and was not otherwise disposed to actively exercise sovereign power in a 'foreign' country (whose native language he could not speak). By necessity, then, Walpole and his allies guided the ordinary activities and made decisions of government. His brilliance in managing party and parliament, and his control over the purse strings, generated the job description for future prime ministers. The prime ministership receded in importance after Walpole left the post in 1742, although practices continued to evolve.[8] Lord North's resignation in 1782, over the loss of the American colonies, resulted in the resignation of the entire ministry, cementing the precedent of collective responsibility and the notion that the "supervision" of ministers was the prime minister's duty, not the monarch's (Berkeley 1968, 28). By and large, though, the office remained relatively unchanged and unimportant until further developments in the 19th century.

The great change in the Westminster prime ministership in the 19th century is a manifestation of what has been called the "first wave of democratization" (Huntington, 1993). In the United Kingdom, this took the form of mass enfranchisement through the *Reform Acts* of 1832 and 1867 and the *Representation of the People Act 1884*. The average Member of Parliament in 1830 represented only 330 voters; by 1966, the number was 56,000 (Berkeley 1968, 31).[9] With the expansion of the franchise, political parties

[8] In leaving, Walpole also set the precedent that the prime minister should resign after losing a vote of confidence in the House of Commons, and his tenure also strengthened the status of the Commons vis-à-vis the Lords (Carter 1956, 24).

[9] Among other measures, the 1832 act eliminated most of the 'rotten boroughs', constituencies which had been centres of population but whose populations were now so small that there was no electoral competition, either because of simple bribery or because the constituency was essentially the 'personal property' of a landowner. The 1867 and 1884 acts progressively extended the franchise to adult males of some property qualification, first in towns, then in rural areas.

became more significant, and parties began to operate outside of the narrow corridors of the House of Commons. The nationalization of parties had two important effects.

First, appealing to a broader electorate necessitated some centralization of party operations, which increased the power of the leadership of the party, including the prime minister, at the expense of party Members of Parliament. The second effect of the nationalization of parties was that mass politics magnified the role of the leader. As Berkeley writes, "from the moment the electorate achieved any significant size, one man came in the mind of the nation to represent an entire government and that man had of course to be the Prime Minister" (1968, 38). This personalization of politics was intensified by the larger than life rivalry between William Gladstone and Benjamin Disraeli, the great Liberal and Conservative archetypes, respectively (Carter 1956, 37). Disraeli himself recognized that the real source of power in the British system was shifting from the monarch to the people, and that it involved a relationship of delegation: "all power is a trust that we are accountable for its exercise – that from the people and for the people, all power springs and all must exist" (Berkeley 1968, 37).[10] The prime ministership of Robert Peel (1834-1835; 1841-1846) also established the prerogative of the prime minister to intervene in any portfolio that she wishes, although certainly prime ministers must be cautious in doing so.

By the end of the 19th century, the basic template of the prime ministerial job had been established, its constitutional position and customary practices largely settled, its centrality to electoral campaigning increasing. However, as Carter concludes, the position had not yet made "complete use of all facets of its latent powers" because the political

[10] This is actually a quote from *Vivian Grey*, Disraeli's first novel, published in 1826, but it illustrates the point well.

environment did not provide the pressure to do so (1956, 40). Government did relatively little and policy issues were relatively simple, the means of adducing public political opinion still rudimentary and indirect. In the 20th century, the Westminster prime ministership would evolve from a personal office into an institutional one.

The first step in this development was the creation of the Cabinet Office, necessitated by the administrative burdens of World War I. Just as Robert Walpole is the generally agreed 'first prime minister', David Lloyd George's prime ministership (1916-1922) is seen by some as the beginning of prime ministerial government and the eclipse of collective cabinet government (Thomas 1998, 4). Exigencies of the war effort – the tremendous amount of information processing, coordination, and decision-making involved – caused Lloyd George to attach the Committee of Imperial Defence Secretariat to the cabinet as a whole, creating the Cabinet Secretariat and eventually the Cabinet Office. Under Lloyd George also came the first stirrings of a 'prime minister's department': the 'Garden Suburb' of a handful of political aides who met in the garden of no. 10 Downing Street. This set the precedent for the expanding role for special advisors in the latter half of the century.

Thus, under David Lloyd George, the institutional capacities of the prime ministership, through the creation of the Cabinet Secretariat, became a permanent part of the machinery of government. This development set the power of the prime minister on a more secure institutional footing. Before this point, prime ministerial dominance had largely been based on personal strength and ability. Henceforth, as Berkeley suggests,

"even an apparently unassuming Prime Minister like Attlee possessed immense powers… by virtue of the office which he held and the staff which serviced it" (1968, 47).[11]

As with many "temporary" measures whose permanent usefulness becomes apparent, the Cabinet Office was not only institutionalized but grew in importance. Its coordination and information roles proved themselves in the crises of war and post-war state expansion. And, of course, though nominally the support system for the cabinet, the Office had always in fact answered to the prime minister as the "chairman" of cabinet. The agglomeration of institutional capacities continued through the latter 20th century, particularly in terms of its policy support and implementation roles. Prime ministers continued to create mechanisms through which they could better fulfill their duties. This is seen in the continual creation of policy support centres, such as the Central Policy Review Staff by Prime Minister Heath in 1971 and the Policy Units of recent prime ministers, to implementation-focused groups such as the Cabinet Office's Implementation Unit and the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit established by Tony Blair.

Thus, the development of the modern Westminster prime ministership is a long, historical agglomeration of sources of prime ministerial power, stretching from the confidence of monarchs to the confidence of Parliament, to popularity among the people as electorally expressed, to enhanced institutional support within government. This institutional lineage was transplanted to the distant colonies in British North America and the Pacific. As in the original British case, the role and powers of the prime ministerships in the colonies are based on convention and tradition. Neither the British government nor the colonial founders felt any need to write down the explicit constitutional rules defining the prime ministerial position. Indeed, they had the opportunity to do so when each

[11] Clement Attlee was the Labour prime minister of the United Kingdom from 1945 to 1951.

country was established formally with a written constitution, unlike the essentially unwritten fundamental law of the UK.

In Australia and Canada, whose constitutions were written by colonial delegates at series of founding conferences, neither the prime minister nor the cabinet are mentioned in the clauses defining executive power in the *Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900* (ss. 61-70) or the *British North America Act 1867* (ss. 9-16). In New Zealand neither the *Constitution Act 1986*, nor the British statute it replaced, the *New Zealand Constitution Act 1852,* mention those terms. Thus, the prime ministership in each of these countries is a distinct combination of the inheritance of British practice and adaptation to local cultural, political, and geographical contexts.[12]

[12] Hughes describes the Australian prime ministership as being shaped by two historical factors: the lack of party structure which feeds factionalism; and the lack of aristocracy (1976, 6-7). We see the first reflected in the strength of internal party factions and the second in a political culture of egalitarianism, the idea of "mateship". This idea of a social cohesion borne of "self-recognition of [Australians'] dependence upon one another" is one of the central tenets of the Australian radical tradition (Curran 2004, 180, 244). This tradition is one Hartz (1964) described in fragment theory as arising from the settlement pattern of Australia: the peculiar mix of literal prisoners, social reformers dedicated to the Chartist movement of mid-19th century England, and gold prospectors. The lack of an established aristocracy also meant that Australian reform politics did not have to "struggle" in the same way it did elsewhere, creating a more utilitarian "socialisme sans doctrine" that emphasized pragmatism and consensus building (Rosecrance 1964; Collins 1985). Bennister argues that the Australian prime ministership is characterized by its constraints: federalism, a strong Senate, the size of Parliament, and the leadership election process which is heavily influenced by the factionalism described above (2007, 329).
In Canada, the British North America Act's (1867) guarantee of a constitution "similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom" formalizes the inheritance of British practice. The prime ministership that Canada acquired in 1867 was also essentially a continuation of the same pre-Confederation role in the province of Canada, present day Ontario and Quebec. The experience of governing the pre-confederation Province of Canada reflects the distinctiveness of the Canadian prime ministership in one special respect: the significance of the prime minister in managing French and English relations, and regional difference more generally. Historically, successful prime ministers have been those who were able to maintain national unity. Those prime ministers and parties who could, mostly the Liberal party, were rewarded with long tenures in office, periodically punctuated in a pattern Leduc et al. (2010) call "dynasties and interludes". In no other Westminster country is the significance of regionalism as profound or as impactful on the prime ministership as in Canada.
It is more difficult to characterize the prime ministership in New Zealand because it has received relatively little attention. Johansson and Levine (2013) argue that an important element of New Zealand's political culture is its emphasis on collective decision making. McLeay argues that it is precisely because of its smallness that New Zealand has a distinctive "culture of consultation" (2003, 94). In addition, some of the features that support executive pre-eminence in the other cases, such as federalism, are not present here. Arguably, New Zealand is the only Westminster case where one could say that "once out of office [prime ministers] tend largely to be forgotten, becoming obscure figures little remembered" (Johansson and Levine

*2.2 Prime Ministerial Roles and Powers*

The last section traced the evolution of the Westminster prime ministership in the United Kingdom. In doing so, it touched on the office's roles and powers, enshrined in convention and historical practice. So now this section explicates these roles and powers in some detail. It considers the extent to which there is a standard job description for the Westminster prime ministership. What are the roles that prime ministers are expected to play? There is a view that "the prime ministership is what the prime minister does". This view suggests that there is no fixed job description: that there are very few things the prime minister *must* do and many things they may choose to do. The task is to identify what they want to do and how to do those things most effectively. I argue that the modern prime ministership is expected to do much, and its true discretion is limited. Prime ministers cannot simply ignore what they have no interest in engaging, if they wish to be successful. These heightened expectations are not formal or constitutional ones, since these have not significantly changed in the modern prime ministerial era. Rather, they are public and political expectations, arising from a confluence of factors which tends to increase the prominence of prime ministers.

What are these expectations that bear upon prime ministers? I identify seven distinct yet interrelated constitutional, administrative, and political roles that prime ministers play in Westminster systems.[13] The constitutional expectations of the prime ministerial institution have not changed significantly since the emergence of the modern Westminster prime ministership, as recounted above. First, by constitutional convention

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2013, 292). Given these considerations, the New Zealand case offers a distinctive contrast both in terms of the empirical story of prime ministerial institutionalization and an opportunity to fill a significant gap in the literature.

[13] The foregoing discussion is roughly inspired by chapter five of Thomas (1998, 92-113), "The Functions of the Prime Minister". The synthesis presented is the author's own.

the prime minister is the principal advisor to the sovereign, and as such, de facto exercises most of the royal prerogative powers.[14] In particular, the prime ministership is the only position with authority to request the summoning, dissolution and prorogation of parliament, and hence the prime minister is the only individual who can 'call' a general election, subject to constitutionally mandated time limits (five years in the UK and Canada, three years in Australia and New Zealand).[15] Historically, this is an important role because it guarantees the personal monarch's non-interference in the sitting of Parliament. Politically, it offers prime ministers the ability to call elections when they are most electorally advantageous, although statutes in the UK (the *Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011*) and Canada (a 2007 amendment to the *Canada Elections Act*) and the shorter period limit in Australia and New Zealand have somewhat constrained prime ministerial discretion in this matter.

Second, as an implication of the prime minister's position as principal advisor to the sovereign, the prime minister recommends appointments to and dismissals from the ministry and cabinet and, within cabinet, is the "rule-maker, referee and judge" (Weller 2007, 251). While it is in fact cabinet, as the 'active' or 'efficient' part of the sovereign's

[14] The Power Inquiry presents an 'official' list of royal prerogatives exercised by the prime minister (2006, 138). The only significant prerogative power that the prime minister does not de facto exercise is the appointment and dismissal of prime ministers, for obvious reasons. That does not imply, however, that the sovereign is unfettered in their exercise of this prerogative. The constitutional convention holds that the individual who can command the confidence of the lower chamber of Parliament must be appointed prime minister, which in the presence of parties also means that party leadership selection is given quasi-constitutional status. That is, the outcome of a leadership contest essentially is binding on the sovereign's prime ministerial appointment power. She cannot simply appoint any individual she believes has the confidence of the House. To my knowledge, a situation in which this has arisen has not occurred in the modern party era.

[15] Of course, this does not mean that prime ministers have discretion to advise, or not advise, the Crown to dissolve, summon, or prorogue parliament. Rather, it means that no other actor can exercise these powers. In particular, individual cabinet ministers, or cabinet itself, cannot do so in the absence of the prime minister's consent. Nor can parliament except indirectly through withdrawal of confidence. See Hicks (2010) for a brief analysis of the royal prerogative in these areas. A large Canadian literature has arisen out of the experience of the prorogation 'crisis' of 2008.

advisory body, which holds constitutional authority to advise the sovereign, prime ministers control who is in and out of the political executive, how that political executive operates, and what its 'decisions', as such, are.[16] All of these roles are crucial elements contributing to the prime minister's ability to control and direct cabinet. Of course, the appointment power is incredibly powerful.[17] Generally, ministers will seek to make their views accord with the prime minister's wishes or face the loss of status that comes with cabinet membership. Control over the operations and decisions of cabinet are, however, equally powerful. The latter can sometimes be overstated. Prime ministers "can lead only up to the point that the Cabinet will follow" (Thomas 1998, 99).

However, given their informational advantages and ability to set cabinet agendas and procedures, prime ministers generally need not rule by fiat in order to get their way. These roles are not arbitrary but instead are a direct consequence of the prime minister's privileged constitutional position as the sovereign's principal advisor. This unique responsibility to the sovereign implies that the final say over governmental decisions should be the prime ministers' alone. Similarly, the prime minister's responsibility to

[16] These advisory bodies, formally Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council in the UK, the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, the Federal Executive Council in Australia, and the Executive Council in New Zealand, are primarily made up of current and former ministers, justices, and sometimes opposition leaders. In the UK case, various archbishops and members of the House of Lords are also appointed.

[17] The constitutional prerogative to appoint cabinet ministers is essentially the same in each country (the Australia and New Zealand constitutions expressly dictate that ministers must sit in parliament, while this requirement is left to convention in Canada and the UK). However, political practices vary. British prime ministers are relatively unconstrained, although there seems to be an entrenched practice of new prime ministers, coming from opposition, appointing ministers to the equivalent positions they held in the 'shadow cabinet'. Canadian prime ministers face the 'representational imperative' of ensuring that all regions of the country are represented in cabinet, but are otherwise relatively unfettered. The Australian Labor and New Zealand Labour parties elect members to cabinet, though the allocation of portfolios is left to the prime minister and their ability to dismiss ministers is limited. In the New Zealand coalition governments since 1993 and the coalition government in the UK from 2010 to 2015 coalition agreements have played a large role in determining cabinet composition. Of course, in all cases prime ministers are wise to pay due attention to the ambitions, personality, and support within the party of potential ministers, which has often meant appointing their closest rivals to important ministerial positions.

parliament for expressing and defending the direction of her government creates a structural imperative for government decisions to accord with her wishes.

A third expectation bearing on the prime minister is that, beyond cabinet, prime ministers are the chief architects and engineers of the machinery of government, i.e., the organization and procedures of the civil service. As Davis et al. (1999) show, this is not trivial; the reorganization of government is perpetual.[18] Prime ministers have tremendous ability to create, reorganize, transfer, and abolish departments and government agencies, despite the separation of politics and administration typical of the Westminster administrative style.[19] Westminster prime ministers are always the 'minister of the civil service', in fact if not in name. Working through central agencies such as the Cabinet Office in the UK, the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia and New Zealand, prime ministers have a great deal of capacity to shape administrative processes and, increasingly, oversee policy implementation in detail.

A fourth role for prime ministers is to exercise a wide range of appointment powers outside of cabinet. These include appointments to a staggering array of agencies: government-sponsored enterprises, crown corporations, commissions, boards, and central banks among them. In Canada and the UK, appointment of members to the upper chamber (Senate and House of Lords, respectively) is effectively the prerogative of the prime minister; not so in Australia, where the Senate is elected, or New Zealand, which

[18] They find that from 1950 to 1997 there were 247 departmental changes in Australia, 96 in Canada, and 100 in the UK (Davis et al. 1999, 28).

[19] This style is called the "Whitehall model" (after the street on which many of the British civil service departments are located). The model is defined by limits on the politicization of civil service staffing with regard to appointments, that is, only senior positions are appointed, political neutrality of civil servants, and a "bargain" between civil servants and ministers which sees loyalty and competence of the former exchanged for responsibility for decisions of the latter (see Bourgault and Dion 1990; Savoie 2003).

has no upper chamber. Such appointment powers, in particular, are the "mother's milk" of patronage, the practice of rewarding partisan or personal supporters with government jobs. While this still serves its traditional purpose of building party loyalty, arguably it increasingly serves an ideological purpose.[20]

Other appointment powers are less entangled in partisanship, but are not always less contentious. The prime minister's advice results in the appointment of governors general, the Queen's representative in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and their subnational counterparts, governors of Australian states and lieutenant governors in Canadian provinces. Federal judges, including those on the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada, are also prime ministerial appointees. Appointments to the recently created Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (2009) and Supreme Court of New Zealand (2003) also are made by the prime minister.

Fifth, although prime ministers need not necessarily have a substantive portfolio of their own, in practice they do. Ordinary statutes and administrative actions can and do confer legal responsibility over certain matters to the prime minister *qua* prime minister. These can include ministerial titles or portfolios in addition to that of prime minister and responsibility for specific statutes or agencies. The British prime minister has the additional titles of First Lord of the Treasury, a mostly symbolic role, and Minister for the

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[20] For example, there has been some controversy over governments attempting to influence the decisions of arms-length independent, non-political bodies such as the BBC or Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission by appointing ideologically friendly persons to their governing boards. The Harper government appointed Tom Pentefountas to a vice-chairmanship of the CRTC in 2011. Pentefountas was a conservative partisan and acquaintance of high-ranking members of the Prime Minister's Office; the NDP considered him "unqualified" and implied the appointment was purely ideological.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/crtc-undermined-by-appointment-changes-ndp-1.1042873
The House of Lords in the UK produced a 2007 report on appointments to the BBC. It recognized that there were substantive problems with ministerial interference in the appointments process. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldcomuni/171/17102.htm

Civil Service.[21] In the modern era until 2015, the Canadian prime minister had no additional ministerial titles, but their legal responsibilities extend to the Office of the Secretary to the Governor General, the Privy Council Office, the Public Appointments Commission Secretariat, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee.[22] They are officially responsible as prime minister for carrying out duties set out in seven Acts of Parliament.[23] The current prime minister, Justin Trudeau, has also named himself Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs.

By comparison, the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand have many more legal responsibilities. The prime minister of Australia is officially responsible for forty-nine acts, though many of the duties involved overlap.[24] Australia also has a ministerial system in which several ministers can serve 'under' a senior minister, while being responsible for some matter. In this way, four ministers serve within the prime minister's portfolio (i.e., for which the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is the administering agency): the Minister for Indigenous Affairs; the ministers assisting the Prime Minister for the Public Service; Counter-Terrorism; and Women. The prime minister of New Zealand is currently also Minister for National Security and Intelligence,

[21] No. 10 Downing Street, the Prime Minister's residence, is in fact the official residence of the First Lord of the Treasury (as no. 11 Downing Street is the residence of the Second Lord of the Treasury, who is the Chancellor of the Exchequer). The title was not always mostly symbolic: as discussed earlier, Walpole's position was due to his being First Lord of the Treasury, since the title Prime Minister had neither formal recognition nor much informal meaning.

[22] Previous prime ministers have held additional portfolios. Notably, Prime Ministers Borden, Meighen, and King (and St. Laurent and Diefenbaker for short periods) were also the External Affairs Minister ('Secretary of State for External Affairs'). Prime Ministers Macdonald and Thompson also held the Minister of Justice portfolio.

[23] These are the Constitution Act, 1867, Governor-General's Act – R.S., 1985, c. G-9, Inquiries Act – R.S., 1985, c. I-11, Ministries and Ministers of State Act – R.S. 1985, c. M-8, Public Service Rearrangement and Transfer of Duties Act – R.S., 1985, c. P-34, Royal Style and Titles Act – R.S., 1985, c. R-12, Salaries Act – R.S., 1985, c. S-3.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Compilations/FederalGovernment/MinisterialResponsabilities.aspx

[24] According to the most recent Administrative Arrangements Order, Dec. 23, 2014.

Minister of Tourism, and Minister Responsible for Ministerial Services, and has a list of statutory responsibilities similar to those of the Canadian prime minister.[25]

Turning to the more overtly political roles of the Westminster prime ministership, the sixth expectation bearing upon prime ministers is that they are the leaders and chief spokespersons for the government of the day. This is another direct implication of their role as principal advisor to the sovereign, but this also has a number of practical political manifestations. For instance, the institution of Prime Minister's Questions, called "Question Period" in Canada and "Question Time" in Australia and New Zealand, where opposition and backbench members can ask questions of the prime minister, is the most high-profile way for opposition and backbenchers to hold the executive accountable for its decisions.[26] Prime ministers ultimately are responsible for the parliamentary agenda and for what happens under the government's imprimatur. While there is a tradition of government budgets being written, presented and defended by the minister responsible for finances, prime ministerial institutions play a central role in the process, and budgets must be acceptable to the prime minister.[27] As its head, the prime minister represents,

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[25] Civil List Act¸1979, Governor-General Act, 2010, Intelligence and Security Committee Act, 1996, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act, 1996, International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act, 1987, Royal Titles Act, 1974, Seal of New Zealand Act, 1977. http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/ministers/ministerial-list
**http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/portfolios/prime-minister**

[26] There are subtle differences in format among the countries which influence the effectiveness of Question Period as an accountability mechanism. Arguably, Prime Minister's Questions in the UK is the most effective because it consists of a weekly half-hour session during which the PM personally answers questions from the opposition leader *and* all other members who are chosen by the Speaker to ask questions. Party control over the content of questions is comparatively limited. In the other cases, while prime ministers answer questions more frequently (every sitting day), prime ministerial involvement is lower. In general, especially in Canada, prime ministers only answer questions from other party leaders, while ministers answer the remaining questions, even when the questioner puts the question to the prime minister. Party control of both who gets to ask and what they get to ask is stricter.
I would argue that the answers given by the British prime minister are much more informative, less political, and project a greater sense that the prime minister is engaged in detailed, substantive policy work than those given in the other cases.

[27] Unusual circumstances may create exceptions. Andrew Rawnsley's (2010) account of Labour governments after 2001 notes a number of budgets where Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,

conducts negotiations, and speaks for the government abroad as the nation's "chief diplomat" and domestically in heads of government meetings (particularly in Australia and Canada because of federalism). As well, although prime ministers are not heads of state as are presidents in presidential systems, they act as the symbol of government for many ceremonial purposes, essentially sharing the duties of embodying the state with the monarch and the monarch's representatives.

The final role that prime ministers play is as leader of a political party, and indeed is prime minister essentially in virtue of that fact. It is always a primary task for prime ministers, and other party leaders, to consider the views and political standing of their parties. This has three important implications for the prime ministerial job description. First, in parliament the prime minister must maintain a system of party discipline by whatever sticks and carrots they have: whip systems, patronage, caucus consultation, committee assignments, and so on. It is as true now as in 1965 that the "power of the contemporary Prime Minister is largely based" on their ability to maintain party discipline in the legislature (Benemy 1965, 9). The burden of maintaining the support of their party in the legislature is increased in Australia and New Zealand, where the major parties' parliamentary caucuses are still the sole selectorate for party leader. That is, the caucus has the exclusive authority to remove leaders from power, and so leaders must constantly monitor their support in caucus and be attentive to potential leadership rivals. As recent Australian history has demonstrated, such selectorate rules can create a climate

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'surprised' the prime minister by announcing new measures without consultation. According to Rawnsley, Brown would not even allow Blair to see budgets until they were already finalized.

of tension, unease and instability that makes the prime ministerial job much more difficult.[28]

Another implication of prime ministers as party leaders is that, outside of the parliamentary setting, all parties have their own constitutions that formally set out responsibilities of the leader, and laws governing electoral procedure enumerate certain duties. For example, the current Liberal Party of Canada constitution specifies that the leader of the party, Justin Trudeau, sits on the National Board of Directors, the party's governing body, and the National Management Committee, the smaller, 'active' part of the National Board.[29] The leader also designates the members of the National Campaign Committee, which oversees party readiness and candidate nominations.[30]

The final and most important implication of prime ministers as party leaders is that, as discussed earlier in relation to the mass enfranchisement of the 19th century, the prime minister and other party leaders also are the face and voice of the party in electoral campaigning. This has taken on singular importance since the rise of mass media and new technologies such as the internet, since now party leaders can communicate directly to citizens on a large scale, which only strengthens the position of leaders in relation to other political actors. Arguably, we have also seen a shift to the 'permanent campaign', where the kinds of electoral strategy and communication approaches that have typically

[28] This history is replete with leadership changes. Kevin Rudd won the leadership of the Australian Labour Party and the election in 2007, only to be replaced by Julia Gillard, his deputy prime minister, in 2010. Gillard went on to win the 2010 election but was toppled by Rudd in 2013, prior to that year's election, which the ALP lost. The winner of that election, Tony Abbott, the Liberal party leader, was himself dethroned by Malcolm Turnbull in September 2015. Turnbull himself had been replaced by Abbott in 2009. These changes are only part of this story.

[29] Part D, Sec. 15, Liberal Party of Canada Constitution, adopted May 28, 2016. https://www.liberal.ca/files/2016/07/constitution-en.pdf

[30] Part G, Sec. 28.

been restricted to campaign periods have become a regular part of ordinary governance between elections.

This section identified seven distinct roles that prime ministers play in Westminster systems and the expectations that bear upon them in these roles. Clearly, the 'job description' of prime ministers is extensive and varied, ranging over formal, administrative, and political matters. The prime minister is the heart of the governmental process in these systems and is expected to generate energy and purpose to the slowly turning gears of the machinery of government and their parties. The nature of the configuration of political power in these systems is essential to prime ministers' ability to fulfill these great expectations. The next section reviews the literature concerned with characterizing these configurations.

*2.3 Prime Ministers and Executive Power*

This section reviews work on categorizing and assessing the institutional environment within which prime ministers operate, and explicates two key concepts that pervade the prime ministerial and executive literature: the core executive and presidentialization. As the epigraph at the start of this chapter suggests, to study executives is to contemplate the power to act. Executives make things happen in a political system. The predominant concern in the literature has been to characterize how power is distributed within political executives and the relationship between their various parts: prime minister and cabinet, prime minister and civil service. Patrick Weller's important study of prime ministers in Westminster systems aimed to assess their "comparative power" in terms of their structural features: vulnerability to being

overthrown, control of party, control over cabinet committees, patronage powers, ministerial selection, level of policy advice, and control over Parliament.

Among his conclusions, he argued that Conservative prime ministers in the UK are the least constrained. In Weller's estimation, they lead a comparatively unified, ideologically coherent party in a unitary state, which means that there are neither rival centres of power nor regional representational imperatives in cabinet and policy-making. By contrast, leaders of the ALP and Labour parties in Australia and New Zealand lead fragmented parties with greater ties to societal actors (e.g., unions). On average, Weller finds that Canadian and British prime ministers are more powerful than their counterparts in Australia and New Zealand, primarily because they are less vulnerable to challenge and more in control of their parties (1985, 201-202).

Building on Weller's work, further efforts have attempted to identify general categories of the environments in which prime ministers operate and how they reflect and enable prime ministerial power. Anthony King (1994), for example, categorized Western European prime ministers into "strong, medium, and weak" executives. Robert Elgie (1997) constructed 'models of executive politics' according to where the central decision-making power is located and the roles of the chief executive, cabinet, ministers (individually), and the civil service (222-225). Erwin Hargrove distinguished between collegial and dominant executives in arguing that both British and American chief executives have moved towards a dominant model, conditional on individual leadership style (2009, 14-15). Eoin O'Malley's work (2005, 2007) builds on this literature by examining the positive relationship between the power of prime ministers and their power

to structure the conditions in which decisions are made, especially in terms of agenda control and selection of veto players (see Tsebelis 2002).

Other scholars have characterized the processes within the executive. Peter Aucoin (1997) and Rudy Andeweg (1997) theorized about executive decision-making processes, the former in terms of centralization and integration, the latter on collegiality and collectivity. This concern with executive decision-making processes also is evident in the literature on new democracies. For instance, Blondel et al. classified prime ministers' offices in post-Communist countries by the type of coordination (political versus policy) and by the direction of support (cabinet versus prime minister) (2007, 134). Brusis and Dimitrov specifically examine the extent to which budget policy-making is centralized in these cases (2001, 895-896). This classificatory work is motivated by normative assumptions about the desirability of centralized prime ministerial government versus decentralized cabinet government and underlying beliefs about the deleterious nature of concentrated power.

This concern with characterizing relationships of power in parliamentary systems comes to fruition in the concept of the *core executive*, a central concept in contemporary executive studies.[31] At its heart is a resource-dependency approach in which power is inherently relational and dynamic, rather than 'fixed' by type or model. It replaces what was seen as an excessively static and positional theoretical paradigm. Patrick Dunleavy and R.A.W. Rhodes' original formulation defines the term functionally as "all those organizations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and integrate central

[31] Elgie (2011) gives a comprehensive review of the history and state of core executive studies "two decades on". It should also be noted that many of the analyses explicating the concept are volumes in a single research programme, the Economic and Social Research Council Whitehall Programme, and specifically the 'Transforming Government' series. See Weller et al. (1997), Peters et al. (2000).

government policies, or act as final arbiters of conflicts within the executive" (1990, 4). The notion is that instead of seeing the executive as a hierarchy in which the prime minister commands cabinet and the civil service, core executive actors each have particular resources that other parts of the core executive need in order to 'get their way'. This picture is of a "barter economy" of exchange, negotiation, and strategic manoeuvring, in which "actors exercise power through possessing and deploying the correct combination of different resources" (Blick and Jones 2010, 172). Power is seen not as a static feature of a system but the outcome of exchange between actors.

This reconceptualization of the executive has been adopted by much of the literature. It is predominant in the study of European executives, especially (Goetz and Wollmann 2001; Hayward and Wright 2002; Wright and Hayward 2000). It is central, for example, to accounts of the democratic transitions of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in terms of the 'building' of core executive capacity after communism (Dimitrov et al. 2006, Zubek 2008). Most of the major edited volumes in the study of executives take the concept as given, so it should not be ignored (see Peters et al. 2000; Poguntke and Webb 2005; Dahlstrom et al. 2011).

The key contribution of the core executive literature is its important argument that prime ministers are embedded in a web of relationships in which the answer to 'who has power' is often contingent and uncertain. Prime ministers perform their roles and seek to fulfill expectations within a complex, dynamic environment, and so context is essential to understanding the prime ministerial institution. These are reasonable arguments. However, it is also true that the literature has threatened to 'collapse' in on itself as

progressive explications have eroded the original notion of power as strictly relational (Elgie 2011).

It is evident that prime ministers do indeed hold privileged positions. They have institutional resources that other core executive actors simply do not have, in virtue of their location at the centre. In other words, prime ministerial power is not just an accident of how power relations happen to occur: it is structural. This study's perspective emphasizes the role that institutional resources play in structuring prime ministerial power. I argue that characterizing the distribution of power in the core executive as a 'barter economy' is misleading because it implies a relatively equal, mutually beneficial distribution of resources. Prime ministers are not simply one among many actors. Rather, I view the core executive as a network of principal-agent relationships, where cabinet and civil service actors are agents to prime ministers as principals. This implies both that there are clear inequalities in the distribution of resources but also that both principals and agents have resources that they can deploy.

The other prevalent concept in the prime ministerial literature is "presidentialization". In contrast to the core executive literature, studies of presidentialization emphasize the enhanced roles of prime ministers within the executive, in relation to political party organizations, and in election campaigns. These are the "faces" of presidentialization identified by Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb. The first two faces refer to "the development of increasing leadership power resources and autonomy within the party and the political executive", while the electoral face is manifest in "increasingly leadership-centred electoral processes" (2005, 5).

The analogy is with the position of presidencies in presidential systems based on the American model. In such systems, presidents constitutionally are the sole holders of executive authority. They may be partisans but are not party leaders, as are prime ministers. They generally have loose ties to the party organization and face rival party leaders in the legislature with independent mandates. Their decision-making is more autonomous of the party organization but potentially faces greater contestation. In electoral terms, presidential candidates in such systems generally run on party tickets but in practice run on their own: their campaign teams are their own and campaigns are almost entirely centered on the candidate. Thus, the presidentialization perspective views prime ministers in parliamentary systems as becoming more like presidents in the sense of enhanced executive authority, autonomy from party organizations, and electoral campaigning increasingly focused on prime ministerial 'candidates' (Poguntke and Webb 2005). The presidentialization thesis is essentially a broader, modern version of the long-standing debate over the shift from collegial cabinet and party government to prime ministerial government.

As conceptualized in this study, prime ministerial branch institutionalization accords with the presidentialization thesis. It focuses on the building of prime ministerships as institutions that contribute to all three faces of presidentialization: executive, party, and electoral. It should be noted, though, that some prime ministerial scholars have been critical of the presidentialization concept. Keith Dowding, for instance, evinces scepticism close to ridicule about the notion, writing that it "should be expunged from political science vocabulary" (2013, 617). He argues that it misidentifies the nature of political change that it is trying to capture. Increasing prime ministerial

power, he suggests, are a move *away* from presidentialization. The prime minister has been and always will be much *more* powerful than a president; 'presidentialization' is the opposite of what is in fact occurring. This is not a new observation. Denis Smith, in the Canadian case, noted that even in 1977 parliamentary government had become "presidential government without its congressional advantages", i.e., not presidential at all (1977).

As an alternative, Heffernan (2012) and Dowding (2013) prefer to call prime ministers 'prime ministerial' and the trend 'prime ministerialization'. This is patently unhelpful if in the first place we are grappling with what exactly the prime minister(ship) means. While their basic argument is legitimate, the presidentialization perspective has the virtue of suggesting a clear direction to the institutional changes that the Westminster prime ministerships have undergone. If presidentialization is a misnomer, then it is a useful one. So, prime ministerial institutionalization presents a picture of change in the direction of prime ministers becoming more autonomous from cabinet, civil service, and parties and increasingly central to electoral campaigning. In other words, they are becoming more presidential. It can suggest this perspective without the separate claim relating these changes to power itself.

*2.4 Prime Ministerial Change in Westminster and Beyond*

This section builds on the foregoing explication to review work on how prime ministerships have changed, both in the Westminster systems and in other parliamentary systems. In the last section, I discussed characterizations of power relations within the executive and the core executive and presidentialization concepts. These literatures demonstrate an overarching concern with tracing political shifts of power among actors:

from cabinets to chief executives, among executive actors within the core executive, from national governments to transnational governmental and private institutions, and from parties and formal institutions to individuals. In the Westminster systems, such questions form the dominant thread in the prime ministerial literature.

Observers of British politics have been debating 'cabinet' versus 'prime ministerial' government for decades, but R.H.S. Crossman's assertion in 1963 that prime ministerial government was a permanent feature of British politics remains the touchstone for the debate. Benemy (1965) and Berkeley (1968) concurred with this assessment: the title of the 1965 volume is *The Elected Monarch*, a theme which has run through the prime ministerial scholarship. G.W. Jones took an opposing position in a series of studies at the time and since (1964, 1973; Blick and Jones 2010). In his original piece, he gave five counterarguments: the evidence for importance of leaders to electoral outcomes is thin, the power or threat of dissolution did not really enforce party discipline, factions within parties could not be ignored, mass media did as much to enhance the stature of rivals in government and opposition, control over cabinet procedure and composition did not mean that the prime minister could simply go against the majority of cabinet (1964, 174-182). In short, Jones suggested that prime ministers were seriously constrained by the necessity of consultation and consideration of party opinion and rivals' positions. In later work, his main goal appears to be to show continuity in the prime ministership rather than change.

Despite Jones' efforts, the presidentialization argument gathered steam in decades since, particularly with Labour's victory in 1997 and the onset of the 'Blair presidency' (Allen 2003; Foley 2000; Heffernan 2003, 2005; Dowding 2013). It is inarguable that the

first two terms of the Blair prime ministership (1997-2001, 2001-2005) featured constant efforts at institutional innovation designed to strengthen capacity at the centre of government. For instance, the creation of the policy directorate in no. 10 and then the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit, was charged with setting and achieving targets in policy implementation (Richards and Smith 2006). As discussed in chapter one, Prime Minister Blair was outspoken about his views that a strong centre was required in the face of modern political realities. Similarly, Prime Minister Cameron's change of heart on the need for a robust capacity for policy-making and implementation at the centre speaks to its inexorable pull (Bennister and Heffernan 2012). The period also featured an increase in the number of 'special advisors', political appointees within ministries, across government (Yong and Hazell 2014). It is important to also recognize, though, that efforts to strengthen the centre's capacity did not begin with Prime Minister Blair. In particular, the Central Policy Review Staff, established in the Cabinet Office by Prime Minister Heath in 1971, constituted the most notable of such efforts. It ultimately failed, largely because it did not have *enough* authority, being more an advisory 'think-tank' to government than an institutionalized part of the machinery with the prime minister's authority behind it (Blackstone and Plowden 1988).

Even those who dismiss the presidentialization thesis as overstated acknowledge that power relationships within the core executive have undergone change, if not transformation (Blick and Jones 2010; Dowding 2013). Blick and Jones' (2010) work on the development of the British prime ministership accepts that there have been changes in recent decades leading to some potential increases in power but that in historical context it is less clear that prime ministers are now more powerful than before, or that there is any

kind of permanent trend. The experience of coalition government from 2010-2015 has also tempered the enthusiastic trumpeting of the presidentialization thesis in Britain, but it seems clear that along some dimensions of institutionalization the British prime ministership has undergone change.

In Australia, notice has been taken of changes to cabinet government but the thesis of overly dominant prime ministers has been less evident (Weller 2007, 249). Walter and Strangio (2007) and Ward (2014) find that there has been a general trend towards leader predominance within and outside of the cabinet and core executive. Hart also found that the "trappings" of presidentialism had grown in Australia, particularly the rise of staff in the prime minister's office and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and in the enhanced role of prime ministers in the media (1993, 193-194). However, he notes an important distinction in the Australian case: the ability of party caucuses to remove party leaders, which discourages prime ministers from disregarding cabinet and caucus colleagues entirely.

Spurred by the claims of Crossman (1963) of the coming of prime ministerial government and the ensuing debate, several scholars examined the extent and effectiveness of the prime minister's bureaucratic support (Crisp 1967; Mediansky and Nockles 1975; Yeend 1979). Crisp was generally supportive of increasing the coordination capacity of the prime minister, arguing that the prime minister's "relatively minor role in inter-departmental coordination… is bound to become more acutely fraught with difficulties" (1967, 53). Mediansky and Nockles (1975) and Yeend (1979) respond, in particular, to the innovations of the Gough Whitlam prime ministership (1972-1975). This period saw a build-up of organizations outside of the bureaucracy designed to

provide advice and support to a government with "high policy ambitions" and a "lack of confidence in the Public Service" (Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 217), one that they conclude was ultimately ineffective.

Some recent work has focused on the growth of ministerial staffers in the last two decades (Maley 2010; Tiernan 2007). In particular, Anne Tiernan's (2007) thorough analysis demonstrates the potential dangers of the tremendous growth in the number and power of ministerial staffers in Australia and, in particular, the prime minister's support system. Tiernan concluded that John Howard's prime ministership (1996-2007) is a turning point in the institutionalization of the Australian office, setting a precedent for successors. As she notes, Prime Minister Howard's support system was "large, active, interventionist and personalised", and she argued that these changes reflected "institutional pressures and demands on leaders more generally… Howard has learned through experience that modern leaders must work with and through organisational structures to achieve results" (2006, 322-323). As in the British case, it seems clear that the prime ministership in Australia has undergone significant changes.

In Canada, the argument that the prime ministership has a "large, active, interventionist and personalized" support system would surprise no one. The thesis of a dominant, almost dictatorial, prime ministership has become the received wisdom, particularly since Donald Savoie's detailed examinations of the workings of the centre of government (1999; 2010). The enhanced power of the prime minister's office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO) have received much popular and scholarly attention. The argument that power increasingly and excessively has been concentrated within the prime minister and central agencies has gained wide currency (Smith 1977; Aucoin et al. 2011;

White 2005). This phenomenon has been traced to at least the prime ministership of Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984). It seems to have been exacerbated in the public mind by Stephen Harper (2006-2015), under whom the interventionism of the PMO in controlling government messaging and 'politicizing' the civil service, especially, arguably reached extreme levels (Martin 2010; Wells 2013; Harris 2014).

Like George Jones vis-à-vis the British prime ministership, some scholars argue that the notion of an overly dominant prime minister is overblown, that there are "counterweights to prime ministerial power" such as other levels of government and an aggressive, scrutinizing media (Bakvis 2001, 76). However, at least from the perspective of prime ministerial branch institutionalization, prime ministerial power in Canada arguably is the most advanced of the Westminster countries. The Canadian prime minister has at his disposal large, well-developed political and civil service offices and faces fewer constraints which are operative in other cases.

As we discussed earlier, the New Zealand prime ministership has not been a focus of sustained inquiry because of the strength of the notion of collective government, and the 'smallness' of its political culture. Nevertheless, it has also "continued along the path to a more presidential style of government" (Henderson 2003, 106). Two changes in particular should be noted. First, the electoral reform of 1993, which saw New Zealand shift from a single-member plurality to a mixed member proportional system, should, in the traditional understanding of Westminster, have undermined the power of the prime minister. However, Henderson argues that under MMP there is an increased need for coordination at the centre, partly as a response to the inherent centrifugal tendencies of a more fragmented party system. Mulgan also argued that the prime minister's exercise of

the right to call an election is actually enhanced under MMP because it can be used as a "major bargaining weapon for keeping other parties in line" (1997, 91-92). The other major change is the creation of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet itself in the late 1980s, about which more is said in later chapters.

These trends are also evident in non-Westminster parliamentary regimes, to varying degrees (Arter 2004; Dahlstrom et al. 2011; Poguntke and Webb 2005). A number of comparative studies of chief executives and centres of government have been conducted. Across parliamentary systems, the studies demonstrate consistent evidence for increased 'presidentialization' in all cases, though at different intensities (Webb and Poguntke 2005, 338), utilizing types of 'steering' strategies in the effort to provide "central direction to governance" (Dahlstrom et al. 2011, 272), and the build-up of resources in chief executive offices (Peters et al. 2000). Although the character and intensity of these shifts in power toward the chief executive certainly vary, they seem to constitute a general trend. Certainly, in no case has the opposite trend been realized: cabinets and political parties gaining power at the expense of the chief executive.[32]

Observations of increasing executive power are especially telling in cases where it is not expected. The Scandinavian countries of Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, for instance, are good test cases given the robustness of social democracy and collective orientations in addition to their proportional electoral systems. In Sweden and Denmark, the shift towards the executive has been pronounced (Aylott 2005; Pedersen and Knudsen 2005; Sundstrom 2009; Jensen 2011). Kolltveit (2012) argues that Norwegian prime ministers, traditionally seen as more collegial than other Scandinavian chief executives,

[32] I should emphasize strongly that this discussion, and the dissertation in general, is about *trends* in prime ministerial institutionalization: relatively long-term, sustained patterns of change. There are always exceptions arising from unique events which disrupt overall trends.

have followed this trend in recent decades: between 1986 and 2006, the growth rate in the prime minister's office exceeded all other ministries, jumping from twenty-five to almost seventy full-time equivalent positions (385). Paloheimo (2003) argues that prime ministerial power has increased in Finland such that a formally semi-presidential system, in which the president retained important prerogatives and constitutional duties, has given way to a "a new kind of prime-ministerial governance" (241). It has become a parliamentary system in practice, where prime ministers lead the political executive and the president retains only symbolic powers.

On the whole, then, the literature reports a consistent pattern: prime ministers in advanced democracies have become more powerful. Existing explanations of how and where this pattern occurs point to four general factors: changes in media and communications, sociocultural trends, the effects of structural and constitutional factors, and economic and international forces.

The first explanation is a changing media environment and advances in communications technologies. New media tends to emphasize leaders as individuals over institutions and processes, enhancing their visibility and creating new mechanisms of pursuing policy and political goals, such as direct appeal to the public rather than through traditional means such as political parties (Webb and Poguntke 2005, 349). Because politics has become increasingly 'mediated', the media has a large role to play in many processes of institutional change. As Helms notes, "the mainstream perception of government–mass media relations in the West European parliamentary democracies... considers the media [to be] powerful catalysts of a gradual concentration of political power in the hands of governments and chief executives more particularly" (2008, 27).

New communications technologies contribute greatly to the extent to which leaders can assert themselves directly within citizens' 'spheres' of political information and the extent to which they can learn about citizen preferences without the mediation of parties, legislatures, or established media. Savoie notes that the power of the media has arguably been the largest change in democratic politics in recent decades, and that the "end of deference, capacity for self-projection, and a more aggressive approach" has created immense pressures for chief executives, especially, to respond by building robust systems of image control and message management (2010, 13). Indeed, much of the growth in the institutional resources of chief executives has been in communications operations.

In turn, these factors play a role in sociocultural trends as an explanation for prime ministerial institutionalization. At the broadest level, some analysts argue that as public expectations of chief executives have increased, their incentives to centralize power have correspondingly grown (Hargrove 2009). This is an important insight which is explicated in detail in chapter three. Wright and Hayward point to the proliferation of new social actors and policy networks as crucial to understanding increased coordination requirements for core executives (2000, 32). They also argue that the "weakening" of "traditional props of governance" – parties, unions, sociocultural cleavages, deference to elites, and so on – has had similar effects, a claim echoed by Webb and Poguntke (2005, 348-349).

An alternative sociocultural perspective looks to cultural tradition or national histories (Rose and Suleiman 1980). The basic idea is that countries have 'ways of doing things', shaped by their culture and history, that condition how their political institutions undergo change. Some political cultures are seen as emphasizing collective over

individualist orientations, for instance. Some characteristically value stability and continuity over change and disruption. In the United States, a broadly held suspicion of entrenched, undivided power is reflected both in the structural weakness of the executive and the much greater politicization of public administration, relative to other Anglo-American countries. One perspective that applies directly to prime ministerial power is the concept of an 'administrative tradition'. This refers to "an historically based set of values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate public administration within society" (Peters 2008, 118). A country's administrative tradition thus directly affects how power is distributed within the core executive. Dahlstrom et al. (2011), for example, find that "recentring", the restoration of power to the centre of government after the "decentring" of New Public Management in the 1980s, has been strongest in Anglo-American countries, less evident in the Scandinavian states, and quite weak in the Napoleonic and Germanic countries (364).[33]

A third category of explanations for enhanced prime ministerial power invokes the role of structural and constitutional factors. For example, Muller et al.'s analysis of ministerial survey responses in Western Europe suggests that in terms of cross-case variation, "the structural distinction that plays the greatest part is that between single-party and coalition cabinets", with the former generally demonstrating more centralized prime ministerial institutions (1993, 253).[34] Comparing the Westminster cases with cases in western Europe, O'Malley (2007) argues that a government's legislative support and

[33] These are standard divisions in the public administration literature (see Painter and Peters 2010).

[34] The Post-communist cases illuminate the continuing legacy of structural arrangements. The common theme in this literature is to overcome the Soviet-era style in which the challenge is to 'governmentalize' the core executive (Blondel et al. 2007; Dimitrov et al. 2006; Zubek 2001). Constitutional reform strengthened the prime minister's position vis-à-vis the president and cabinet in both Hungary and Poland, while in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria constitutional structures have maintained and reinforced a more collegial governing environment and stillborn institutionalization of policy-making (Goetz and Wollmann 2001, 872-873).

relationship with other parties conditions the likelihood of prime ministerial institutionalization. In the Westminster 'majoritarian' cases, where power is not generally shared between parties and majority governments are common, prime ministers have greater ability to choose to increase resources, while in 'consensus' systems, the lack of majority support and coalitional arrangements between parties constrain the discretion of prime ministers over executive organization. In such systems, the choices of prime ministers are subject to more veto points, an arrangement that favours the status quo.

Finally, economic and international forces are seen as a fourth significant factor. The growth of state activity as a cause of changing executive power is a pervasive theme in the literature (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 14; Wright and Hayward 2000, 32). Increasing state activity contributes to a fragmented and more complex environment where coordination across sectors becomes more essential. Coordination is functionally a key component of the core executive, and especially the centre of the core executive; thus, it "generates attempts to enhance the power and autonomy of the state's chief executive" (Webb and Poguntke 2005, 350). Internationalization of policy-making is also seen to have increased incentives for executive power because it has increased coordination requirements, provided greater visibility and stature to chief executives, and strengthened the positions of chief executives as against other domestic political actors.

There is a large literature concerning the effects of Europeanization on the core executive, both in terms of accession to the European Union in post-Communist Central and Eastern European countries (Olsen 2002, Fink-Hafner 2007), and on how western European states have adjusted organizationally. Back et al. find that as a result of increasing European integration, prime ministers "appear to have gained autonomy from

parliament and from their parties" (2009, 247). In fact, in their case study of Sweden, the transfer of responsibility over EU affairs from the foreign ministry to a bureau within the prime minister's office in 2005 represents a concrete manifestation of this phenomenon. Johansson and Tallberg (2010) argue that in general EU 'summitry', primarily taking place within the European Council, is an important explanatory factor in the empowerment of European chief executives.[35] Thus, it is apparent that the extent to which a state is tied into the international political and economic system can significantly affect domestic executive power: as political and economic ties increase, chief executives have become more powerful.[36]

To summarize, in this section I reviewed work on how prime ministerships in Westminster and other parliamentary systems have changed in recent decades. Four potential explanations for the presidentializing trends in these prime ministerships were discussed: changes in media and communications technologies, sociocultural factors, structural and constitutional features, and the influence of economic and international forces. However, these explanations of prime ministerial institutionalization have not

[35] The Council is composed of all EU heads of state and government as well as the president of the European Commission. As Johansson and Tallberg (2010) argue, the "European Council today constitutes the supreme political body of the EU" (215).

[36] A related explanation for prime ministerial institutionalization is the increasing fragmentation of policy-making and the difficulties in exercising leadership from the centre (Weller et al. 1997; Campbell and Halligan 1992; Campbell 1983). The "hollow crown" thesis, for example, asks the question of what has happened to the executive as a result of the introduction of new techniques and ideologies in public administration, primarily New Public Management, and internationalization of decision-making (Saward 1997; Peters 1991). They argue that governments, and especially core executives, have lost or willingly given capacities to societal actors, control over other state actors, and supra-state organizations as a response to governmental overload. Downloading of responsibilities to subnational governments and private actors, moving to alternative delivery systems for public services, 'horizontal management' of bureaucracy and a focus on efficiency and accountability are the order of the day (Peters 1991, 57-84). At the institutional level, responses to these apparent losses of capacity have taken different forms (Dahlstrom et al. 2011). The focus has shifted to finding ways to strengthen political control over the policy-making, leading to reconfigurations of core executives. The relevance of this stream in the literature is that it suggests one rationale for prime ministerial institutionalization: in order to cope with the increasing complexity of the public policy process or to meet public demands for effective public action, prime ministers have often viewed centralized mechanisms of policy control and oversight as desirable.

been rigorously examined in the literature, nor have they been deeply theorized. The rest of this study aims to do so. In particular, it builds and tests a sociocultural theory of prime ministerial institutionalization, the Theory of Public Expectations.

*2.5 From "Allegiant" to "Assertive" Citizenship*

The Theory of Public Expectations argues that change in the political cultures of advanced democracies, particularly the Westminster systems of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, drives institutional change in prime ministerships. This theory is elaborated in detail in the next chapter. As a precursor to the explication of the theory, though, now I review in this section the claims that democratic political cultures have changed in transformative ways in the last half-century. These claims are important to understand because, taken together, they are the central empirical premise in the argument for the Theory of Public Expectations. That is, the theory hangs on at least the presumptive validity of the claim that there have been significant shifts in public attitudes and values.

This claim is captured in Dalton and Welzel's (2014) notion of "allegiant" and "assertive" citizenship orientations. They argue that a number of salient aspects of the relationship between citizens and the state can be encapsulated in these two overarching orientations, and there has been a gradual shift from one to the other across democracies. As they put it conclusively, "[t]he transition from allegiant to assertive cultures is real" (305). These orientations are summarized in table 2.1, below.

Table 2.1
*Allegiant and Assertive Citizenship Orientations*

| Domain | Allegiant Citizens | Assertive Citizens |
|---|---|---|
| Value Priorities | Output priorities with an emphasis on order and security limit input priorities that emphasize voice and participation; materialist/protective values predominate | Input priorities with an emphasis on voice and participation grow stronger at the expense of output priorities with an emphasis on order and security; postmaterialist/emancipative values prevail over materialist/protective values |
| Authority Orientations | Deference to authority in the family, at the workplace, and in politics | Distance to authority in the family, at the workplace, and in politics |
| Institutional Trust | High trust in institutions | Low trust in institutions |
| Democratic Support | Support for both the principles of democracy and its practice (satisfied democrats) | Strong support for the principles of democracy but weak support for its practice (dissatisfied democrats) |
| Democracy Notion | Input-oriented notions of democracy as a means of voice and participation mix with output-oriented notions of democracy as a tool of delivering social goods | Input-oriented notions of democracy as a means of voice and participation become clearly dominant |
| Political Activism | Voting and other conventional forms of legitimacy-granting activity | Strong affinity to nonviolent, elite-challenging activity |
| Expected Systemic Consequences | More effective and accountable governance? | |

*Source:* Dalton and Welzel (2014, 11)

The other areas highlighted in table 2.1 - authority orientations, institutional trust, support for and concept of democracy, and political activism – reflect the shift in value priorities from allegiant to assertive citizens. Most scholars seem to agree that post-

material value change has had significant effects on these and other attitudinal indicators.[37] Allegiant citizens tend to be socially and politically deferential. Their orientation to authority is characterized by respect and an internalized recognition of the legitimacy of social and political institutions. Assertive citizens, on the other hand, are 'distant' from authority and they do not share the recognition of legitimacy that allegiant citizens hold. The shift in authority orientations is captured in the 'decline of deference' thesis, most clearly associated with Neil Nevitte's work (1996; 2014). Nevitte argues that deference to authority within the family, in the economy, and in politics are in decline because authority orientations are a product of familial socialization (2014, 55). As value priorities shift, individuals are increasingly socialized to disregard authority. This decline in deference, Nevitte argues, is evident across a broad sample of advanced democracies.

Institutional trust has also been on a long decline (Dalton 2005; Hetherington 2005). Indeed, this decline was diagnosed as early as 1974 (Miller 1974; Citrin 1974), and led to a report on a perceived 'crisis of governability' (Crozier et al. 1975). The allegiant predisposition is to view institutions positively; they trusted that, generally speaking, institutions 'do the right thing' and have the public interest at heart. Assertive citizens, however, have low trust in institutions. They view institutions as dysfunctional,

[37] However, the effects of post-materialism are by no means universally significant. In two studies within the Canadian context, the hypothesized effects were not found. Erickson and Laycock's (2002) study of opinion among social democrats (members of the New Democratic Party) found no evidence that post-material issues were 'crowding out' material issues. Butovsky (2002) found, more broadly, that post-material issues had not replaced material issues among Canadians in general, and actually, that from the 1988 to 1997 elections post-material issues had become *less* favoured. Both Janssen (1991) and Vreese et al. (2005) find no support for the idea that post-materialists would be more in favour of EU integration. Darren Davis, in a series of articles (Davis and Davenport 1999, Davis et al. 1999, Davis 2000) questions both the validity of Inglehart's measure of post-materialism and its effects on a wide range of attitudinal indicators, such as tolerance, racial attitudes, and environmentalism. The empirical status of the post-materialism thesis, and especially its effects on political attitudes, is still contested.

not responsive to citizens' voices and the public interest, and they see institutional actors as having ulterior motives for what they do.

The decline of deference and trust in institutions can be linked with a number of other troubling trends. There is increased disengagement and cynicism, a 'turning away' from politics (Hay 2007; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Individuals in most advanced democracies increasingly are apathetic or actively repulsed by politicians and formal institutions. As Hay notes, there is a "near universal disdain for 'politics' and the 'political'" in contemporary democracies (2007, 1). This manifests itself, for instance, in the problem of falling voter turnout (Gray and Caul 2000; Blais and Rubenson 2013) and a pervasive distancing from, and contempt for, politicians, who are seen as ineffective, duplicitous, and unsympathetic and unconcerned with the public good (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Dalton 2008). Arguably, the 2016 election of controversial American President Donald Trump is a direct consequence of these attitudes. Others have pointed to declines in feelings of political efficacy and the ability of ordinary citizens to interpret and effect change in the political world, as governance becomes increasingly complex and power increasingly dispersed (Savoie 2010; Kane et al. 2009).

Dalton and Welzel's characterization of allegiant and assertive orientations, summarized in table 2.1, also includes how individuals think about democracy itself and about their place in politics. The contrast between allegiant and assertive orientations is evident in terms of support for democratic practice, notions of democracy, and political activism. At the same time that traditional politics is a 'turn-off' to many, publics are more sophisticated, expect more of government than previous generations, and remain committed to democratic ideals but think of democracy in a much 'thicker way than the

more allegiant publics of earlier periods. As would be expected, this is especially true of younger generations, who are much more likely to engage in non-electoral political participation but less likely to vote (Dalton 2008). This disjunction is a key driver of what Pippa Norris calls the 'democratic deficit': what occurs when "satisfaction with the performance of democracy diverges from public aspirations" (2011, 5). This deep dissatisfaction with democratic practice expresses itself in many ways.

For instance, Jakobsen and Listhaug (2014), among others, find that there is greater willingness to engage in protest, boycotting, and other elite-challenging activities. It is also reflected in the the rise of new social issues to the political agenda, for example, the rise of 'political consumerism' (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005), concern about the environment (Franzen and Meyer 2010; Rohrschneider et al. 2014), the increasing salience of cultural and environmental issues (Achterberg 2006), and entrepreneurial activity (Uhlaner et al. 2002). It affects even something as simple as personal happiness: Jan Dehley's (2010) study shows that post-materialism generates a different "happiness recipe" than materialism; happiness means something different to individuals in more post-material societies than to those in less post-material (poorer) societies.

Allegiant citizens are 'satisfied democrats' who have lower expectations for both the output of government and the ability of government to recognize their individual voice. Thus, their political activity will tend to be limited to voting and other relatively passive ways of expressing support. Their assertive counterparts, however, have heightened expectations for what government can deliver and how much input citizens ought to have. When governments fail to deliver according to expectations or to recognize sufficiently citizens' voice, they become dissatisfied and disillusioned. For

some this means disengagement. For others, it means political activity in more active, elite-challenging ways; voting becomes almost antithetical in the assertive orientation because it implicitly expresses support for the way democracy is working.

Therefore, there is substantial evidence, if not consensus, around a general picture in which a gradual shift in value priorities, from materialist to post-materialist values, has dramatically altered the nature of citizen politics in modern advanced democracies. This shift in value priorities has shifted citizen orientations across a spectrum of political values and attitudes. The shift is captured in Dalton and Welzel's notion of allegiant and assertive orientations. My central claim is that if there has been a shift from allegiant to assertive orientations, it should have noticeable institutional consequences. Political institutions do not exist apart from the political cultures in which they operate. As discussed in chapter three, these consequences may not be entirely as promising as Dalton and Welzel suggest. They argue that assertive citizenship "bring[s] us closer to realizing democracy's key inspirational promise: empowering people to make their own decisions and to make their preferences heard and counted" (2014, 306). It may well do this. However, it may also contribute to the centralization of executive power through the institutionalization of prime ministerships, as discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

To conclude, this chapter had four important goals. First, it described the historical and institutional context of the study by tracing the evolution of the Westminster prime ministership and its roles and powers in the contemporary political process. Second, I reviewed the literature on the structures of power in which prime ministers operate and introduced the core executive and presidentialization concepts as key elements of this literature. Third, I discussed work on how prime ministerships have

undergone change in Westminster systems, and elsewhere, and it outlined existing explanations for this change. Finally, this chapter explicated the literature underlying the central empirical premise of the primary theory of this study, the Theory of Public Expectations. The premise is that there has been a shift from allegiant citizenship orientations to assertive orientations, driven by shifts in value priorities and reflected in salient political values and attitudes, from deference to trust to activism. The review in this chapter sets the stage for chapter three. In the next chapter, I introduce and elaborate, in some detail, the Theory of Public Expectations and two alternative sets of explanations for changes in the institutionalization of prime ministerial branches.

# Chapter 3
# Prime Ministers and Public Expectations: A Theory

Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government... A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist no. 70*, 1788

The public expects governments to deliver policies and services to a high standard, regardless of structural or organisational divisions within government. These expectations are vastly higher than they were one to two generations ago and continue to increase. The pervasiveness and rapidity of media coverage gives political effect to high public expectations, even as it increases them. As the media constantly seek to expose any lack of cohesiveness in a government, there is more pressure for coordinating mechanisms that increase that cohesiveness. The prime minister above all other ministers is expected to respond to that pressure.

Peter Hamburger, et al. (2011, 379)

This chapter presents the study's primary explanation for institutional change in prime ministerial branches: the Theory of Public Expectations. This theory builds on four themes emphasized in the previous chapter. The first theme is that the story of prime ministerial power is the story of a historical democratizing process. In tracing the development of the Westminster prime ministership earlier, I stressed the extent to which power once held by monarchs, legislatures, and parties flowed towards the prime minister because of such innovations as responsible government and mass enfranchisement. Second, I described the basic 'job description' of the modern prime minister and its sources of power and authority. The take-away here is that prime ministerial power comes from a mix of formal and informal rules, conventions, and practices that uniquely locate prime ministers at the centre of government.

The third theme discussed in chapter two involves the debate about presidentialization and centralization of power around prime ministers. These phenomena are evident in many parliamentary democracies, suggesting that there are broader, general forces driving these shifts in power. Finally, I introduced the concept of allegiant and assertive citizens and its literature, which argues that contemporary democratic citizens are more likely to be distrustful, politically active, critical and elite-challenging than their more trustful, passive, and deferential counterparts in earlier periods. The empirical observation of this shift from allegiant to assertive citizenship orientations is central to the theory presented in this chapter.

These four themes, then, are drawn together in the primary theoretical argument of this dissertation, the *Theory of Public Expectations*. The theory is an original and general explanation for the institutionalization of prime ministerships in parliamentary democracies. The theory locates the drivers of institutional change in the rise of "assertive" citizens who challenge government, increasing expectations about what government can deliver and how it should do so. These heightened expectations generate incentives for prime ministers to respond by augmenting the institutional capacity of their offices. The rest of this chapter elaborates the theoretical foundations of this explanation and sets out the logic of the argument in detail.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I set out the theoretical framework of the study by situating it within prevailing theories of institutions and institutional change. I then revisit the concept of institutionalization introduced in chapter one. I define the components of institutionalization that structure the study's empirical investigation: autonomy and internal complexity. The second section of this chapter explicates my

original explanation for prime ministerial institutionalization, the Theory of Public Expectations. I discuss its theoretical antecedents prior to setting out the logic of the theory. I explain the mechanisms through which, the theory argues, cultural change and prime ministerial institutionalization are linked. I also set out the empirical predictions of the theory, and explore some of its most pressing implications. Finally, I discuss two sets of alternative explanations for institutionalization: economic factors and political conditions. Briefly, I also identify a 'null' hypothesis to the Theory of Public Expectations and its alternatives. This is the idea that prime ministerial institutionalization is not primarily the product of systematic factors but idiosyncratic factors which have to do, for instance, with individual leaders and leadership styles.

*3.1 Institutionalization and Institutional Theory*

This section explicates the theoretical perspective of the study. It has two purposes. First, it situates the study's general perspective within the various domains of institutional theory, in particular, the three strands identified by Hall and Taylor (1996): sociological, historical, and rational choice institutionalism. The study synthesizes important elements from all three perspectives, although the historical institutionalist paradigm provides the underlying approach of examining institutional change as a function of temporal processes. The second purpose of this section is to define and explain the components of institutionalization, the lens through which the theory and empirical data of the study are viewed. I discuss the notions of institutional autonomy and complexity, which together structure Part II of the study.

There are many ways to approach the study of political institutions. Scholars have grouped these into perspectives that share basic assumptions. These assumptions concern

what institutions are, how and why they are created, perpetuated, and changed, and what consequences they have. Since the rise of the "new institutionalism", three perspectives in particular have accrued much theoretical and empirical development. These are sociological, historical, and rational choice institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996).[38]

Sociological institutionalism, most identified with March and Olsen's (1984, 1989) seminal work, emphasizes the role of socially constructed norms, identities and behaviours in explanations of institutional development and change. This perspective sees institutions as manifestations of these norms and conventions. Scholars in this tradition also contemplate how "logics of appropriateness" structure the contexts within which institutional actors operate. Thus, explaining institutional behaviour in the sociological institutionalism mode is typically a matter of showing how the sociocultural context enables and constrains choice.

Historical institutionalism, as the name implies, emphasizes the role of "concrete temporal processes" in shaping institutions (Thelen 1999, 369). When something happens is crucial to understanding why it happens. Historical institutionalists thus look to particular sequences of events. They emphasize, in concepts such as path dependence and critical junctures, how particular events and combinations of events determine institutional trajectories. In the broad outline, path dependence shapes institutional behaviour and outcomes by entrenching "increasing returns" from institutional configurations and rules in place, and increasing the costs of alternatives (Pierson 2000). These path-dependent processes often begin from "critical junctures": short periods where historical processes become 'open' to change through choice or circumstance

[38] This is, of course, not a universally accepted characterization, but it is the most widespread. In addition to these, other institutionalisms have arisen: discursive institutionalism, constructivist institutionalism, feminist institutionalism, and so on.

(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 348). Thus, historical institutionalism offers a clear theoretical paradigm for explaining institutional creation, stability, and change: critical junctures create particular institutional configurations, which become increasingly entrenched because they are self-reinforcing.

Finally, the distinctiveness of rational choice institutionalism is the idea that institutions are sets of rules that implement 'equilibria' among actors. Equilibria, in this context, are sets of rules for behaviour from which no rational actors should deviate. These sets of rules arise because actors want to try to capture gains from cooperation. Because these actors are seen as instrumentally rational, they will always make choices based on what alternatives offer the most utility according to their preferences. In social interactions, however, this behaviour sometimes leads to outcomes that are worse for everyone involved. Better solutions, however, require actors to cooperate. Institutions implement cooperation. Therefore, the basic determinants of institutional creation and change are the costs to measuring and enforcing cooperation, that is, "transaction costs" (North 1990, 27). In summary, these approaches to studying institutions emphasize different factors in explaining institutions and institutional change: sociocultural norms and contexts, temporal sequences of events, and equilibrium-enforcing rules among actors.

This study borrows elements from all three perspectives, although in the main the theory shares the historical institutionalists' particular concern with the development of institutions over time and the explanatory importance of concurrent temporal processes. Sociological institutionalism's emphasis on the role of cultural values and socially constructed expectations for behaviour informs the theory's appeal to expectations and

responsibilities that bear upon prime ministers. As the discussion in chapter two reveals, most of what prime ministers do is not mandated constitutionally, or legally. Thus, the roles and responsibilities of prime ministers are mostly a matter of the conventions and norms surrounding the institution and the expectations of the public, political parties, legislators, cabinet ministers, and so on. Because of this relative discretion, sociological institutionalism's focus on informal norms and logics of appropriate behaviour are especially relevant to studying prime ministers and prime ministerships. Although the study does not directly explicate these aspects in-depth, the theory assumes the salience of sociocultural context to prime ministerial behaviour.

The theory is also informed by the emphasis of rational choice institutionalism on the instrumental rationality of actors and the notion that institutions are in some sense bargains among actors for mutual benefit. Instrumental rationality is embedded in the theory as an explicit premise, the rational actor premise. The theory suggests that institutional change is the outcome of a rational response to changing public expectations. Prime ministers, as rational actors, choose to institutionalize power not because they desire it per se, although they might, but because it is the alternative most likely to accomplish their ends.

I identify these ends as concerned with the perception of leadership effectiveness and achievement. These are ends that are shared by both prime ministers and those they lead. In this way, prime ministerial leadership is the result of an implicit bargain, in which prime ministers are *agents* for a number of *principals*: the government broadly, the cabinet, the legislature, and the public. This relationship is evident in many of the prime ministerial roles identified in chapter two. Thus, prime ministerial leadership, and

political leadership generally, is a "solution to a series of problems that groups face in trying to pursue common objectives" (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, 404). The delegation of power to prime ministers, however, is highly flexible, and thus prime ministers can act entrepreneurially in building institutional capacity towards effective leadership.

The Theory of Public Expectations, however, is most informed by historical institutionalism, although it does not set out to *exemplify* or *test* concepts such as path dependence or critical junctures. It is historical institutionalist in orientation in two senses. First, it views and assesses change in the prime ministerships as occurring over relatively long periods of time. This may seem trite, but it is by no means obvious. Neither rational choice nor sociological institutionalism invokes time explicitly as an important component of institutional behaviour or change. The time horizons in these perspectives – the "period of time over which meaningful change occurs" (Pierson 2004, 80) – are typically shorter than the time horizons in historical institutionalist accounts. Historical institutionalism typically sees change as occurring over decades, even centuries, often gradually and "invisibly", in Pierson's terms (2003), and it pays heed to cumulative effects of explanatory factors.

Second, the theory's particular conceptualization of institutional change is adapted from the discussion in Streeck and Thelen (2005), a discussion which falls squarely in the historical institutionalist approach.[39] These authors are concerned with explicating how incremental institutional change occurs. Their view is set against much

[39] The fit is not exact, however. Streeck and Thelen often seem to be speaking more about groups of institutions and changes in relationships between them, rather than change within one institution. As well, most of their examples are about public policy and policy systems; they view things like 'health care policy' or 'social security' as institutions. This is not quite the understanding of institutions in this study, as I discuss subsequently. However, Streeck and Thelen's labels for patterns of institutional change nicely capture the kinds of change that might be observed in prime ministerships.

of institutionalist theory, which they argue, "mostly locate significant change in convulsive historic ruptures or openings" (18). Given that concepts such as equilibria and path dependence necessarily imply stability in the absence of large external shocks to the system, explaining incremental yet potentially transformative change is actually a difficult task. Streeck and Thelen suggest that the gap between institutional rules and how those rules are actually enacted in the real world offer particular opportunities for incremental change (2005, 13). How does such change happen? They argue that:

> [F]undamental change ensues when a multitude of actors switch from one logic of action to another. This may happen in a variety of ways, and it certainly can happen gradually and continuously. For example, given that logics and institutional structures are not one-to-one related, enterprising actors often have enough 'play' to test new behaviors inside old institutions, perhaps in response to new and as yet incompletely understood external conditions, and encourage other actors to behave correspondingly. (2005, 18)

In their view, then, incremental institutional change involves a pattern of tension, conflict, or co-optation among competing institutional logics, which opens space for actors to rationalize and inculcate preferred alternatives. Streeck and Thelen identify four such patterns of institutional change over time: displacement, drift, layering, and conversion (2005, 18-30).[40]

Displacement is defined as the "slowly rising salience of subordinate relative to dominant institutions" (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31). Within institutions, displacement occurs when a predominant logic of institutional behaviour is gradually replaced by an alternative, often "suppressed", logic. Streeck and Thelen suggest that the major mechanism of displacement is defection: actors, intentionally or otherwise, slowly

[40] The authors also identify a fifth type, exhaustion: the gradual collapse of an institution over time (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 29). Given that none of the prime ministerships or prime ministerial branches has collapsed and that it is characteristic not so much of institutional change as de-institutionalization leading to breakdown, it is omitted for our purposes.

abandon an existing set of norms and rules until the alternative set becomes the prevailing logic.

The second pattern, drift, occurs when institutions do *not* adapt in the face of contextual changes that should change the way that institutional rules are enacted. As Streeck and Thelen suggest, "there is nothing automatic about institutional stability" (2005, 24). Institutions that are not 'actively maintained', therefore, may 'drift' into atrophy. Notably, this often occurs intentionally, as actors who want particular institutions to decay engage in "deliberate neglect" (31). For example, Hacker and Pierson (2010) argue that the dramatic decline in the institutional power of unions in the United States, as evidenced by the steep fall in membership from 30 percent in 1960 to 12 percent in 2005, is characterized by drift. Political actors, by a 'nondecision' to update industrial relations policy as the economy globalized and became more service-oriented, strengthened employers' positions and weakened labour's (189). Thus, while on the surface institutional rules were stable, the enactment of these rules and their effect in the real world changed significantly. Incremental yet transformational change can occur when institutions are allowed to drift, through inaction and neglect.

Layering, the third pattern of institutional change that Streeck and Thelen identify, involves the agglomeration or accrual of rules onto existing institutions. Whereas displacement suggests substitution of one institutional logic for another, layering suggests a slower process where many logics co-exist and new rules operate alongside 'core' institutional rules. The mechanism of layering, Streeck and Thelen suggest, is "differential growth" (2005, 23). As rules are layered onto institutions, some sets of rules will 'grow' more than other sets, possibly becoming entrenched and perhaps

predominant. An example of institutional layering is the reforms to federal arrangements in Australia and Canada in the 1990s and 2000s (Broschek 2015). In both cases, new institutional arrangements, such as the Council of Australian Governments in Australia and the Social Union Framework Agreement in Canada, were attached to existing intergovernmental and fiscal arrangements. These developments were narrow and not deeply structural, as opposed to the broader constitutional reform in the federal systems of Germany and Switzerland, which Broschek views as cases of institutional displacement (2015, 66).

Finally, institutional change can occur through conversion. Conversion occurs when institutional rules are "redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes" (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 26). In their reckoning, conversion is the most intentional of the patterns of institutional change. It occurs because existing institutional actors choose to redirect or reinterpret institutional rules or because new actors enter institutions and reorient them to new ends (26). While the entry of new actors or the process whereby existing actors decide to redirect institutions may be incremental, the conversion idea suggests a relatively rapid change when it does happen. Crucially, Streeck and Thelen argue that conversion can often come about because of the passage of time: institutions outlive and outgrow both the original institutional design and the sociocultural conditions in which they were designed (2005, 28). This 'gap' affords opportunities for existing or new actors to rationalize conversion of institutional rules to new realities.

I locate these four modes of institutional change – displacement, drift, layering, and conversion - within a typology of change, as shown in figure 3.1. The typology places each pattern of change on two dimensions: institutional continuity and extent of

institutionalization. Continuity refers to the trend of change over time. Is it relatively incremental or discontinuous and abrupt? Are there only relatively small changes from year to year or are there periods of rapid and fluctuating change? The second dimension refers to the actual outcome of change: over time, does the institution become more institutionalized? As I discuss below, in this study, institutionalization specifically refers to the autonomy and internal complexity of the prime ministerial branches. Higher levels of institutionalization mean more autonomy and more complexity.

Figure 3.1
*Patterns of Institutional Change: A Typology*




*Source:* Adapted from Streeck and Thelen (2005, 19-30). Typology by Author.

The location of each pattern within the typology is specific to the case of institutional change in the prime ministerships, the focus of this study, although it is possibly generalizable. I locate drift and displacement towards the low institutionalization end, with drift exhibiting high continuity and displacement low continuity. Almost by definition, drift implies high continuity, and since it suggests an absence of new rules, tends towards low institutionalization. Displacement suggests a greater degree of institutional disruption than drift. The concept does not imply the direction of

institutional change, so it could involve greater or lesser institutionalization, though typically less than either layering or conversion.

These two patterns of institutional change, layering and conversion, are expected to be the primary patterns of change in this study of the Westminster prime ministerships. The Theory of Public Expectations argues that changing sociocultural conditions drive institutional change. This change can occur more incrementally (i.e., with more institutional continuity) through the slow layering of new logics in response to these external changes, or can occur through a deliberate choice to convert prime ministerial branches towards these new purposes. Since, as we will see, the theory suggests a more gradual, cumulative pattern of change, the theory expects that institutional layering will be more evident than institutional conversion, although both may be present. Institutional layering in the prime ministerships involves the attachment and expansion of new roles and functions over traditional prime ministerial roles and functions, through the incremental accrual of institutional capacity. Alternatively, or in addition, intentional conversion of prime ministerial branches to new ends is expected in some measure. This pattern of institutional change would be demonstrated by more abrupt, rapid expansions of institutional capacity in the prime ministerships.

In summary, the central theory of the study, the Theory of Public Expectations, is situated within the historical institutionalist perspective because it focuses on examining patterns of change through time. However, it also borrows insights from other variants of institutional theory, specifically, sociological and rational choice institutionalism. This lens on institutional change, as incremental transformation through time, is also reflected

in the way that "institutionalization" is conceptualized in the study. This concept was introduced in chapter one but here is elaborated more concretely.

To reiterate, institutionalization is a description of a process whereby a system, organization, procedure, or event gains value and importance in itself. It does this by "acquir[ing] a definite way of performing its functions" which distinguishes it from its immediate environment, the individuals which inhabit it, and passing circumstances (Hibbing 1988, 682). Institutionalization thus defined is inherently 'architectural' in the sense that it posits an (often incremental) building of stable, enduring resource structures that enshrine and enable the operation of rules and norms. This represents a 'thick' notion of institutions, one associated more with historical institutionalism than other variants of institutional theory. Both rational choice and sociological variants of institutionalism are, to cite Thelen's dichotomy, "norm-oriented" (1999, 380). This 'thin' notion of institutions is evident in simple definitions. Douglass North, a rational choice scholar, defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (1990, 3). George Tsebelis, another rational choice scholar, identifies them as "the formal rules of a political or social game" (1990, 94). March and Olsen (2006) view institutions even less tangibly, as "relatively enduring collection[s] of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning" (3).

These norm-oriented views contrast with "materialist-oriented" views associated with historical institutionalism.[41] Institutionalization, at least as presented here, adopts this materialist perspective. Institutions, specifically prime ministerial branches, are material structures that have more or less formal-legal bases of existence (Lecours 2005,

[41] Lecours (2005) also adopts this association, but Mahoney and Thelen's (2010) explication of gradual institutional change is heavily dependent on the basic notion of institutions as rules, with rule change constituting institutional change. Thus, the picture becomes less clear.

6). They are ‘those things through which political power flows’: they contain norms and rules but are not exhausted by them. Institutions embed norms and rules within organizations. These organizations have an independent existence and are not constituted simply by their rules (Blondel 2006, 722).

This materialist conception of institutions is integral to my assumption that institutional development in the modern Westminster prime ministerships is qualitatively different than prior development, recounted in chapter two. This “pre-modern” development was primarily institutionalization of the foundational rules and conventions, and was thus more norm-oriented. The modern institutionalization of the prime ministership, by contrast, is an institutionalization of the concrete structures through which prime ministers exercise those rules and conventions. In this way, the study takes a more explicitly materialist view of institutions. It is in this materialist sense that the Westminster prime ministerships have arguably become ‘more’ institutionalized, despite the fact that it has been a distinct, important and valued part of the Westminster constitutional order for centuries. In particular, the study points to two aspects of the Westminster prime ministerships which have undergone change in this period. These are their autonomy and their internal complexity, characteristics of institutionalization that are consistently cited in the literature (see, e.g., Polsby 1968; Hibbing 1988; Squire 1992; Ragsdale and Theis 1997).

Autonomy is defined as the “extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behaviour” (Huntington 1965, 401). Applied to prime ministerships, autonomy is defined as the extent to which these institutions have independent and exclusive sources of information

and means of acting politically. A prime ministership that is highly dependent on other political actors for information, advice and decision-making legitimacy is less autonomous than one which is less dependent on such actors. A high level of dependence on other political actors means that prime ministers are more constrained in their ability to pursue their own interests. If prime ministers must act solely through other actors, they must accept the way in which others provide information and advice, which may not be conducive to the prime ministerial interest. Even if prime ministers have a clear sense of their own interests, they must negotiate and compromise with other actors who may have opposing interests.

Thus, one way through which prime ministers can enhance their autonomy over time is to bolster their institutional support in terms of both budgetary and staff resources. All else equal, larger budgets and more staff give prime ministers greater capacity to generate and pursue their own interests, independently of other actors. It reflects a greater ability to produce and control the flow of information through the decision-making process.[42] And, to put it bluntly, greater budgetary and staff resources allows prime ministers to do more, to expand their scope of activity. So, in chapters five and six we link our theories of prime ministerial institutionalization to the budget and staff resources of the Westminster prime ministerships.

Our second component of institutionalization is the internal complexity of prime ministerships. Nelson Polsby defines complexity as organizational functions being separated within a division of labour in which there are regularized and specified roles

[42] The 'all else equal' and 'capacity' are important here. A capacity for greater autonomy does not mean that all prime ministers will use this capacity, nor does it mean that there are no other forces constraining autonomy in some particular circumstance. I refute this notion too prevalent in the literature that citing counterexamples is good evidence that the institutionalization thesis is overblown. The world is a complex place.

(1968, 145). In the prime ministerial context, it refers to a shift from generalist and universalist support structures to specialized and differentiated structures within the prime ministership. The more internal parts that prime minister's offices and civil service counterparts have, the more internally complex they are. As a simple example, the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1967 had a single deputy secretary and three basic divisions: cabinet and external relations, economic, and education (Crisp 1967, 42).The current DPMC is much more expansive, with five deputy secretaries, two 'heads of domestic policy', two associate secretaries of national security and international policy, and a counter-terrorism coordinator.[43] These senior officials oversee twenty-eight divisions, almost all subdivided themselves, and ranging widely from, for instance, the Office for Women to the Cyber Policy and Intelligence Division to the Indigenous Employment and Recognition division (DPMC 2015).[44]

Clearly, like the resources that strengthen the autonomy of prime ministerships, increasing internal complexity gives prime ministerships greater capacity to address specific policy, political, and administrative problems and oversee decision-making and policy implementation processes over a wider range of government activity in more comprehensive ways. Like increasing resources, increasing internal complexity is a way of expanding the personal capacities of the prime minister. Complexity is a reflection of prime ministerships 'coming into their own' as institutions valued in themselves. Institutional change with regard to the internal complexity of the Westminster prime ministerships is discussed in chapter seven.

[43] As of June 17, 2015.
[44] http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/pmc/Org_Chart_June_17_2015.pdf

*3.2 The Theory of Public Expectations*

The previous section described the theoretical approach of the study. In this section, I introduce and explicate an original argument, the *Theory of Public Expectations*. This theory is the study's primary explanation for prime ministerial branch institutionalization. To summarize, the theory argues that institutionalization in prime ministerial branches is in part a consequence of the broader sociocultural context, particularly the emergence of an assertive political culture across democracies. In this view, the shift from allegiant to assertive citizenship orientations, as described above in chapter two, generates a political culture of heightened public expectations of leaders. It creates a climate of extreme and constant, but short-term, accountability for outcomes. These trends contribute to an environment in which it is increasingly difficult for prime ministers to be effective leaders and for other political actors to remain effective checks on prime ministerial power.

In order to respond to public expectations, prime ministers as rational actors choose to increase their institutional capacities for policy, and political coordination and direction. In other words, prime ministers choose power because it is in their interest to do so. This theory provides a logical and compelling explanation for the effects of changing democratic political cultures on the extent of prime ministerial branch institutionalization.[45] The remainder of this section elaborates the theoretical antecedents and logic of this theory.

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[45] There are interesting parallels between this phenomenon and two other roughly concurrent trends: the "judicialization of politics" and the delegation of authority to non-majoritarian institutions such as central banks, supranational organizations, and independent, arms-length government agencies. In both of these cases there has been a weakening of traditional institutional roles, e.g., the legislature as the appropriate place where social conflict over rights and liberties is resolved, and a strengthening of the power of 'non-political' institutions.

3.2.1 Theoretical Antecedents

The Theory of Public Expectations is an original explanation for institutional change in prime ministerships. However, it is grounded in important theoretical ideas from the canon of political science and sociology. In particular, its characterization of citizens, leaders, and the linkages between them are informed by the work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) and Theodore Lowi (1985a, 1985b). The theory is also informed by the perspective of scholars such as Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber. Almond and Verba's (1963) landmark study of political culture, *The Civic Culture*, argues that increasing democratic participation and active citizenship is not an unalloyed good. While it undoubtedly has benefits, it surely also has unintended and possibly negative consequences. Their conception of the role of citizens and elites in a well-functioning civic culture, i.e., a stable, well-governed, democratic culture, is especially striking because it is rather 'undemocratic' in modern political discourse. Almond and Verba write that:

> If elites are to be powerful and make authoritative decisions, then the involvement, activity, and influence of the ordinary man must be limited. The ordinary citizen must turn power over to elites and let them rule. The need for elite power requires that the ordinary citizen be relatively passive, uninvolved, and deferential to elites… The comparative infrequency of political participation, its relative lack of importance for the individual, and the objective weakness of the ordinary man allow governmental elites to act… [decision makers] are free to act as [they] think best because the ordinary citizen is not pounding on his door with demands for action.
>
> (1963, 343, 346, 352)

Thus, Almond and Verba associate effective government action with the relative freedom of political elites from the assertion of citizens into the decision-making process. More concretely, Theodore Lowi's concept of the "plebiscitary presidency" in the United

States suggests that some of the problems which Almond and Verba feared from the rise of assertive citizens had come to pass (1985a; 1985b). Lowi diagnosed an “expectations gap”: a perpetual distance between the heightened expectations of the public for presidential action and the means through which presidents could meet these expectations. As the size and scope of governmental activity grew and new media technologies (television, primarily) amplified the direct relationship between president and public, presidents became increasingly “personally responsible and accountable for the performance of the government” (1985a, 99).

The incentives for presidents to try to control events and, equally importantly, the public perception of events, generated increasingly larger policy advice and implementation structures within the Executive Office of the President, accompanied by the expansion of communications, media, and strategic operations. This has had serious implications. For example, Lowi argues that these ‘pathologies’ of presidential government, more than personal hubris or moral failing, are responsible for the ‘imperial’ presidency and its most troubling manifestation, Watergate (1985b, 187-190).

Lowi also detected another change in the public’s expectations of the presidency and the role of citizens themselves. This change is the shift to a form of ‘consumer democracy’ in which individuals increasingly see themselves as market-like consumers of government service rather than citizens and where evaluation of presidential performance is not made in terms of representation, process, or effort, but results (1985a, 95). The operative question for consumers is “what have you done for me lately?” In this view, the individual as consumer is a maximizer of their individual preferences with a direct, transactional relationship with government, while the citizen is a contributor to a process

of collective deliberation and decision-making with a sense of civic duty and responsibility to government and other citizens. Arguably, consumer democracy is an inevitable outcome of the assertive citizen: the rise of post-materialist individualism, demands for empowerment, and cynicism about politics and institutions. Notions of civic duty and deference to existing structures of authority are gradually eroded by rights-claiming and de-legitimization of entrenched institutional arrangements. As such, consumer democracy is an expression of democratic progress, but one which may have unintended consequences. Lowi's arguments, although made within the American context, are reflective of broader changes in political cultures across democracies. His view of the "plebiscitary" nature of the presidency reflects the post-materialism and assertive citizenship discussed earlier, in chapter two. To the extent that prime ministers have become increasingly presidentialized, along many dimensions, his diagnosis is trenchant.

### 3.2.2 The Logic of the Theory

These theoretical antecedents highlight the basic puzzle at the heart of the Theory of Public Expectations. Almond and Verba's conception of the role of citizens and leaders expresses a political culture in which citizens were passive and deferential and leaders were 'left alone to lead'. Lowi's arguments suggest that a presidency enveloped in public accountability and blame, in which individuals are 'consumers' rather than 'citizens' in some ideal sense, is one which aggrandizes itself. As Kane et al. argue, the "desire of executives with a heavy burden of responsibilities would seem quite naturally to lean towards gathering more securely into their own hands the reins of effectual power" (2009, 309). In our cases, the greater expectations there are for prime ministers to act and

the stronger the corresponding accountability for success and failure, the more that prime ministers will seek to layer more effective institutional logics onto existing logics or redirect institutional rules towards meeting these expectations.

The Theory of Public Expectations, therefore, reconciles the consequences of assertive citizenship with the apparent concentration of power in centres of government. Assertive citizenship, as we saw in chapter two, is supposed to empower citizens and disperse power away from elites and institutional structures. That is, if it has an effect on political institutions, it should be the opposite of what is suggested in much of the prime ministerial literature. My basic theoretical insight is that this tension is not anomalous but is, in fact, a significant *cause* of institutionalization in the prime ministerial branches. This section explicates the logic of this theory. It begins with a description of the basic theoretical 'building blocks': citizens and leaders.

*Citizens.* As we have seen, the nature of citizens in the Theory of Public Expectations can be traced to antecedents such as Almond and Verba (1963) and Lowi (1985a, 1985b), and to the work on allegiant and assertive values discussed in chapter two. This work is cross-cultural. While citizens of different countries obviously differ in many ways, the basic, generic nature of citizens in the theory is the same across national contexts. 'Citizens' are conceived here as individuals who inhabit a state under a particular institutional regime, with particular rights to be represented in politics, and corresponding duties. These are the inhabitants of the state to which political leaders are most responsive. These individuals have two salient characteristics. First, they have distinct attitudes about their roles in political life and the institutional arrangements through which they are governed, and they act accordingly. This is to say that in a broad

sense they are political, not uninterested. These political values and attitudes shape citizens' expectations about what government ought to do and how they ought to act politically. Second, citizens are non-ideological in a specific sense. Although ideology certainly will inform attitudes about political life and institutions, the theory does not parse these ideological divisions. It does not assume anything about the ideological distribution of citizens, and it treats individuals as the same if they have the same values and attitudes about institutions. In the theory, therefore, citizens are simply bearers of certain political values and attitudes, without regard to other identities or distinctions.

The second aspect of the citizens' theoretical role is that their effect on politics is *aggregate* and *exogenous*. The political attitudes and behaviour of individual citizens impacts institutional change only in terms of these attitudes and behaviour being 'summed' or 'averaged' to create a prevailing political-cultural context. It is the context created through citizen attitudes, not the attitudes themselves, that shape institutional behaviour. This is important because it also means that the theory is non-pluralistic and suggests a uniform influence of citizens. In other words, citizens in the theory are not divided into political groups that contest for influence; they are individuals, each of whom contributes equally to the level of assertiveness in the political culture. It also means that the institutional behaviour generated by the context may be quite different to that suggested by the individual attitudes themselves.

Moreover, citizens are exogenous to institutional change in the prime ministerships, in the sense that their 'contribution' to the overall assertiveness of a political culture, via their attitudes and behaviour, is not itself affected by institutional change. To put it simply: individual citizens have certain assertive values and attitudes,

which when aggregated form a certain political-cultural context, which in turn stimulates institutional change. There is no 'feedback' from institutional change to attitudinal change; the latter is independent. This is a simplifying assumption for the purposes of theory-building and analysis, and is certainly artificial. However, as we saw in chapter two, the assertive citizenship transformation is supposed to have been driven by macro-level changes in cultural values, borne of large-scale material well-being and socialized at an early age. In the jargon, it is largely a 'generational' rather than a 'period' phenomenon. Thus, to assume that it would be largely independent of small-scale institutional change, especially gradual change, is plausible.

*Leaders and Democratic Responsiveness.* Political leaders and their responsiveness to democratic pressures are the second building block of the Theory of Public Expectations. Citizens produce aggregate demands and expectations on leaders in modern politics through their increasingly assertive orientations. But how are these expectations communicated to prime ministers and leaders generally? The theory assumes the robustness of standard democratic mechanisms that transmit signals from the public to leaders, such as the media, public and party officials, opposition parties, cabinet ministers, and not least, their own political and bureaucratic advisory system.

It also assumes that political leaders in democracies are inherently responsive to the demands of citizens, albeit unevenly and selectively in practice. It conceives of *democratic* political leadership as a process through which individuals and groups in politically authoritative roles make decisions under conditions of dispersed power, public scrutiny and accountability, and normative constraint. James MacGregor Burns' seminal conceptualization of leadership argued that leaders are "inseparable from followers'

needs and goals" (1978, 18-19). Thus, leaders by definition need to be responsive to something outside of themselves, through which they receive their status. In this theory, leaders are responsive to citizens, in the aggregate, and to the political-cultural context that is created by citizen values and attitudes. The theory assumes this basic level of democratic responsiveness. Leaders' actions are in some part driven by a desire to respond to public interests, at least as they perceive them.

Filip Teles (2015) identifies several aspects of political leadership in democracies that reflect this fundamental connection between leaders and the demands and expectations set upon by them by followers. First, unlike in other areas of leadership, followers are 'non-ascribed': they are not in a hierarchical or contractual relation with leaders. Thus, their demands and expectations do not come in the form of specified mutual obligations that leaders can unambiguously satisfy. Instead, leaders must continually demonstrate that they are acting to satisfy expectations. Second, democratic leaders are "follower dependent". This is most evident, Teles argues, in the paradigms of political accountability and transparency prevalent in modern politic (30).

Third, leaders in democracies must deal with the problem of "limited acceptance" of their leadership. This is to say that leaders' decisions are not automatically accepted by all followers all the time, and opposition is freely expressed. This means that effective democratic leaders must be attuned to the climate of public expectations and make decisions, in general, that are responsive to important public concerns. It also means that leaders must direct significant time and resources to cultivating public acceptance of decisions. These three aspects of democratic political leadership create strong and

constant ties between leaders and followers, and in particular, between prime ministers and the public.

Of course, democratic leaders have significant discretion to decide how they receive public pressure, who they listen to, and how to respond. They also play a significant part themselves in shaping and managing the demands on leaders. But the fundamental nature of democratic political leadership provides reasonable grounds to assume that prime ministers are receptive and responsive to public demands and expectations. At the prime ministerial level, this basic component of leadership is heightened because prime ministers are heads of government, not simply leaders of parties or smaller social groups: prime ministers are the only de facto national political leaders. As suggested earlier, one way to think about this responsiveness is in terms of leaders, particularly prime ministers, being a kind of 'agent', delegated by various 'principals' with power on their behalf. Indeed, this structure of delegation is a basic characteristic of parliamentary systems (Strøm 2000; Strøm et al. 2006).

Thus, the theory purposefully leaves unspecified the *exact* causal mechanism that conveys public expectations to leaders because the theory deliberately invokes the notion of a contextual or environmental 'background' effect rather than a direct, explicit effect. That is, the shift to assertive citizenship gradually builds an *environment* in which leadership takes place. The boundaries and contours of this environment shape prime ministerial leadership in ways that are indirect, often intangible, and diffuse. A descriptive analogy might be to the effects of climate change on natural disasters. For any particular natural disaster, it is difficult to draw a direct causal link between it and the incremental, long-term warming of global temperature levels. Taking all the instances of natural

disasters, one could conclude, erroneously, that there is no relationship between the occurrence of natural disaster and long-term climate change. Yet certainly there is a linkage between long-term climate change and natural disasters that originate in new weather patterns and deeper instabilities.

The theory also rejects the simple notion that assertive citizens communicate expectations to leaders clearly and unambiguously. Here, the mechanism is indirect and implied by the variegated and sometimes contradictory ways in which citizens act politically in ordinary life. They make demands of leaders by consuming the products of an aggressive media environment, by generating and receiving political complaints and criticisms on social media, by expressing views that leaders are not 'getting the job done', by demanding "responsive competence" from leaders (Hargrove 2009, 15), and so on. They are not submitting explicit statements of preference to leaders, and leaders generally do not solicit such statements. In other words, the public is not communicating "instructions" to prime ministers to institutionalize their offices, so the causal mechanism between change in public values and attitudes and institutionalization is not direct. The Theory of Public Expectations should, instead, be thought of as stating that aggregate increases in assertive citizenship cause change to the background conditions under which changes in institutional resources and structure are considered by leaders.

The Theory of Public Expectations builds on these concepts. Its logic is captured in three premises. The first premise is the *dispersion* premise. The theory begins with the shift from allegiant to assertive citizenship orientations, as discussed in chapter two. This shift both increases the pressure on, and expectations of, leaders. It also generates an expectation of dispersion of power because it undermines elite support and legitimacy.

This expectation, however, is in tension with the prevailing institutions of representative democracy. These institutions channel power to representative elites as a means of enabling collective action. There are simply no existing mechanisms through which a large, amorphous, and heterogeneous public can directly govern themselves, but through such institutions. Thus, the expectation of dispersion of power leads to a situation where power has to flow to *some* actor who might best manifest these expectations. The supposition is that power will concentrate to where there is the most legitimacy within the assertive citizenship context. The theory argues that, for a broad scope of political activity, this is the prime minister and the centre of government.

Finally, from the point of view of leaders and their desires, the theory argues that prime ministers are rational actors whose incentive structure is shaped by public expectations and their unique claim to legitimacy. Therefore, prime ministers choose to further institutionalize their office because doing so is instrumental to satisfying those expectations. The theory thus rests on three premises: the dispersion premise, the delegation premise, and the rational behaviour premise. These are now elaborated in turn.

From the perspective of the Theory of Public Expectations, the gradual transformation of democratic political culture from allegiant to assertive citizenship implies that citizens will have increasingly large expectations both that power will be dispersed more broadly and that leaders will be held accountable for outcomes. The older paradigm of allegiant citizenship was one in which citizens' political activity was mostly confined to simple, mostly passive democratic norms. They saw voting as both a duty and an effective way of providing input into the system. Allegiant citizens trusted that their representatives were working in their interest and that the outputs of the system would in

general be to the benefit of the public. They implicitly recognized that many political problems were complex, and the outcomes of compromises borne out of collective decision-making. They did not expect government to solve all of society's problems, and did not criticize it constantly for not doing so. In short, allegiant citizens were acquiescent to existing political structures and norms, not ignorant of their limits but confident that political systems were capable of reform and of addressing problems. They therefore allowed leaders the latitude to act as they thought best.

The gradual shift to assertive citizenship orientations erodes the old allegiant norms. Assertive citizenship creates a political culture of individual empowerment and expression, and the desire for more mechanisms of engagement and consultation. It rejects the allegiant paradigm of deference to authority and trust in mechanisms of elite deliberation. An assertive political culture is one in which voting in itself is neither a duty nor even necessarily a democratic good, since it expresses confidence and satisfaction in distrusted political institutions. Attitudinally, assertive citizens are cynical and disillusioned about government. This is reflected in media consumption, which feeds the sense that government can do no right and that leaders are corrupt, self-serving, and incompetent. At the same time, they expect government to be immediately and directly responsive to individual concerns. In sum, assertive citizenship creates a political-cultural climate in which elites should not be trusted with political power. If elites should not be trusted, the power to make collective decisions must therefore be dispersed more broadly throughout society, away from representative institutions and towards individuals. This expectation of dispersed power shapes the norms and practice of politics. It is a diffuse, gradual pattern of political-cultural change over time.

The theory thus sees expectations of a dispersion of power as a significant consequence of the shift to assertive citizenship in democratic political cultures. What happens to these expectations? The first premise of the theory, the dispersion premise, states that these expectations are not satisfiable in any modern, large-scale polity, at least not without fundamental transformations in the way government works. It is in tension with the foundations of representative democratic institutions that have developed over centuries, and have been rather successful. These institutions have been relatively effective solutions to problems of collective action and ensuring popular control over leaders.

Institutions arise when individuals recognize that their interests are often better pursued through rules regulating social relations and that delegating some of their power to such institutions is individually and collectively preferable. Society creates and entrenches further rules when it discovers ways within the social order in which seemingly reasonable individual actions have adverse consequences. Representative democracy is a product of this process: a democracy where citizens vote for representatives who are then empowered, through institutions, to govern on their behalf.[46] The expectation of dispersion of power away from these institutions threatens to undermine these arrangements. In mature democracies, political institutions have been structured which both legitimize rule by elected representatives and create institutional checks on power.

Assertive citizenship creates tendencies towards dispersion in many ways. It has changed the way that citizens and leaders relate to each other. For instance, politics has

[46] This is not to imply any kind of teleological argument that representative democracy is an end stage in human evolution, though we are open to such a claim.

become more individualized, rather than group-oriented. It has increasingly oriented towards individual demands and servicing citizens as consumers, Group representation, mediated through parties and legislatures, is replaced by direct relationships between individuals and elites, in which the role of individuals in holding government accountable is inflated. Politics becomes less about an ordered process of representation and accommodation, and more about short-term public responsiveness.

Political institutions suffer in the context of such dispersion, generated by assertive political cultures. The attitudinal changes that mark assertive citizenship – the decline of deference and trust in institutions, cynicism about politics - erode the standing of institutions. Assertive citizens are less likely to accept that their political voice is limited to electing representatives who govern on their behalf, and have less patience for elite-driven processes. One consequence of this dynamic is that some institutions and processes which had served as reliable checks on executive power can no longer do so. There are many striking illustrations of how trying to disperse power has unintended, arguably negative consequences.

For instance, when parliamentary caucuses choose party leaders, as they still do in Australia and New Zealand, the leader's primary responsibility is to caucus, and therefore they are more likely to consider its preferences. When chosen by members at large, they are less likely to do so because, not having been chosen by the caucus, they are not responsible to it. The leader's mandate to lead comes from members, not the caucus. However, party members cannot plausibly hold leaders accountable in the same way that caucus can because they are a large, disorganized group who have only intermittent engagement in politics. Thus, the dispersion of power to party members in party

leadership selection in Canada and the United Kingdom has had the effect of *enhancing* the power of the leader relative to her caucus and cabinet.

Expectations of the dispersion of power, generated by assertive political cultures, cannot really create plausible alternative institutional arrangements. This would not be a problem if representative institutions served no purpose: if dispersion of power somehow solved social problems more effectively. But the big questions that representative institutions answer – how do we collectively govern ourselves? How do we constrain those who govern? – do not find an answer in the large-scale dispersion of power. Stable, effective governance – "energy in the executive", to use Hamilton's phrase – is much more likely when there is a coherent, institutionalized locus of power. This reflects the "iron law of oligarchy", Robert Michels' (1915) key insight that where organization is possible, a group's desire for effectiveness will impose hierarchy and institutionalization to some extent and power will be delegated up the hierarchy.[47]

The first premise of the Theory of Public Expectations, the dispersion premise, posits that ultimately assertive citizenship does not succeed in dispersing power away from elites and institutions, towards individuals. It is not conducive to effective governance because, absent the representative institutions that are so distrusted, there are no institutional mechanisms allowing citizens to govern directly. In addition, the public is not a unitary, singularly identifiable actor, and thus cannot hold themselves accountable in any real way. The public does not vote on itself. The *raison d'etre* of representative institutions and elite-driven processes is to provide arenas for negotiation and compromise among interests, and to balance the need for popular input with the need for

[47] Michels' argument was formulated to explain why even socialist parties seemed to be as dominated by their leaders as traditional parties, when they were founded upon more 'democratic' bases.

effective, orderly governance. In summary, the dispersion of power implied by the rise of assertive citizenship cannot succeed in fulfilling expectations and erodes the ability of institutions to constrain prime ministerial power.

The second premise of the Theory of Public Expectations is the delegation premise. Taking the argument forward, this premise answers the question: what happens after it becomes clear that dispersion of power is untenable, and power must be delegated to some part of the system that has the legitimacy and ability to govern effectively? It argues that delegation is the source of power, and that prime ministers are uniquely placed to be delegated power and authority in the context of assertive citizenship. Thus, when power 're-concentrates', it does so towards the centre of government and especially its head, the prime minister.

The power of modern representative institutions ultimately is derived from the delegation of control over outcomes from citizens to these institutions. This delegation can be formal, as in constitutional delegation of functions to governmental branches, or informal, for example, claims to mandates or public demands for action. The overall shape of institutional power is a mixture of formal and informal delegation. This mixture can change through time because of changes in context, external shocks, and intentional choices made. Formal changes, however, occur rarely, and in the context of the Westminster prime ministerships, have been essentially absent. The action lies in changes to informal delegation. Historically, it has been largely through changes in practice, often codified in conventions, which have shifted the relative statuses of various institutions: prime ministers, cabinets, parliaments, and the like. In the theory, the changes in informal delegation are related to the extent to which political actors can best claim to fulfill the

expectations of assertive citizens. Different actors have different capacities to make compelling or authoritative claims. The theory argues that the prime minister is uniquely situated and has the most capacity to make such claims.

It is at the 'prime ministerial level', to use Prime Minister Blair's term, at which the whole of government comes into focus. As elaborated in chapter two, the roles of the prime minister in Westminster systems make it such that public expectations of government are most squarely heaped on the person at the head of government. Prime ministers are leaders of their parties, heads of government, chief legislators and administrators, primary communicators of government direction and policy, and representatives of their states in international forums. All of these roles combine to imbue them with symbolic and real standing to claim that they are delegated power, a claim which is simply unmatchable by other institutions. While representative institutions such as parliaments and political parties are widely distrusted and seen as unable to act effectively to address modern political realities, prime ministers, as singular actors with executive authority, are better positioned to project leadership and direction to the public.

Moreover, the power of the prime minister is much more directly related to popular support than its rivals.[48] As we have discussed, individuals tend to see politics in personalistic terms. Ideological contests become conflicts between leaders. Elections become contests between rival personalities. Leaders are indispensable to popular conceptions of politics. It is no surprise, then, that as politics becomes more democratic,

[48] Just to clarify, by popular support we do not really mean the term as expressed in polls or even elections, but the underlying expectation that the prime minister is responsible for the activities of government, not other actors. A particular prime minister might have quite low short-term popularity compared to opposition leaders or even other ministers, but this does not necessarily mean that they reject prime ministerial power but that the public would prefer those persons to be prime minister rather than the incumbent. In other words, they reject the person, not the institution.

as the ‘arena’ for political discourse expands to include more and more of society, the greater the potential for the aggrandizement of leaders claiming the mandate of the people, to the diminishment of more impersonal collective institutions, such as parties and legislatures. People readily identify with and respond to leaders. It takes considerable effort and wisdom to inculcate similar associations with the abstraction of the House of Commons or the Liberal party.[49] James Bryce argued essentially this when he noted that “the larger a community becomes the less does it seem to respect an assembly, the more is it attracted by an individual man... he might be a tyrant, not against the masses, but with the masses” (Lowi 1985a, 97). As political communities grow, both literally and figuratively, as in the democratizing implied in the rise of assertive citizenship, singular political leaders, such as prime ministers, are more likely to be entrusted with power than other institutions. In summary, then, the delegation premise posits that prime ministers are uniquely positioned to be delegated power when the expectations of the dispersion of power are not met.

The final premise of the Theory of Public Expectations is the rational behaviour premise. The premise simply connects the argument thus far to actual decisions by prime ministers to further institutionalize their offices. Thus far, the theory has stated that the rise of assertive citizenship generates an expectation of dispersion of power, and in many ways ‘pulls the legs out’ from under existing institutional arrangements. This situation is not conducive to effective governance, however, and so some alteration of institutions is required to redress the situation. Power needs to be delegated to an institution that has the

[49] Again, we stress that we are speaking institutionally; individuals may well have strong feelings about the House or the Liberal party which are likely generated by feelings about particular leaders. And as mentioned in chapter two, the decline of a cleavage-based politics in which parties were clearly associated with particular economic interests only adds to the decline of party as a meaningful referent outside of its leader.

ability and standing to meet the significant expectations of assertive citizens. I have argued that prime ministerships are uniquely positioned to do so. But prime ministers must be willing to accept the burdens of such great expectations. The rational behaviour premise simply suggests that prime ministers are rational actors who choose to further institutionalize their offices because of the incentives and opportunities generated by the assertive citizenship context. In other words, prime ministers 'choose power' because it is the rational course of action.

If this is the case, prime ministers must also bear the burden of succeeding (or appearing to succeed) in the eyes of an increasingly individualistic, cynical and disillusioned public. More than a personal "temptation to centralize the political executive", as Hargrove suggests, it is an imperative if prime ministers are to fulfill their responsibilities and expectations (2009, 33). Importantly, if prime ministers are uniquely burdened with fulfilling public expectations, they must have adequate resources at their disposal. Prime ministers need to be able to depend on resources which do not have to be negotiated with other actors with different interests, such as cabinets or parties. That they must succeed suggests that they need the policy advice, support, and resources at their disposal to generate and implement their agenda. That they must appear to succeed suggests that they need a robust communications strategy and staff. These are substantial incentives to institutionalize; there are few incentives not to do so.

This premise suggests that an important behavioural motivation for any political actor is to acquire power over other actors and over the political process commensurate with (their perceptions of) their roles, responsibilities, and expectations. Prime ministers will be motivated to gain power equal to the task of leadership in the extremely difficult

context of modern politics and assertive citizenship. As rational actors, they should not be indifferent to these pressures. I consider the institutionalization of prime ministerial branches to be a rational response to a more assertive political culture in which it is increasingly difficult to lead successfully. In theoretical terms, the Theory of Public Expectations explains a macro-level outcome, prime ministerial branch institutionalization in Westminster systems, through a micro-level process, the rational individual decision-making on the part of prime ministers.

The basic argument of the rational actor premise is that chief executives can be modeled as rational actors who choose power, in the form of building the institutional capacities of their offices, not for its own sake but as an instrumentality for maximizing their effectiveness as leaders in increasingly challenging leadership environments. The theory assumes that prime ministers want to be effective leaders. Prime ministers will prefer to be more effective, or perceived as more effective, than less effective. They thus seek power not for its own sake but because of its centrality to effective performance. Inadequate power implies ineffectiveness, and ineffectiveness in turn tends to create conditions for diminutions of power. Assertive citizenship undermines the legitimacy of political institutions and generates heightened expectations for what government can do. Prime ministers are best placed, as discussed earlier, to claim the public mandate. Prime ministers are thus most responsible and accountable for fulfilling the heightened expectations of assertive citizens. They therefore choose to institutionalize, in terms of building the capacities of their offices, as a means to being effective at fulfilling these expectations.

To recap, the study's primary explanation for prime ministerial branch institutionalization is the Theory of Public Expectations. The theory's logic is summarized in table 3.1, below. The broad theoretical argument is that one of the consequences of the shift from allegiant to assertive public values and attitudes is the further institutional growth of prime ministerships in Westminster systems, and thus centralization of power.

Table 3.1
*Summary of the Theory of Public Expectations*

| |
|---|
| The rise of assertive citizenship creates an expectation of dispersion of power. |
| *Dispersion Premise.* This expectation cannot be sufficiently met because dispersed power tends to be ineffective in satisfying both individual and collective preferences. It will concentrate in some more effective set of institutional rules. |
| *Delegation Premise.* Where it will concentrate depends on formal and informal structures of delegation of power. In relation to other political actors, particularly cabinet, party, parliament, and the civil service, prime ministers have a stronger claim to have been delegated power from citizens. |
| *Rational Actor Premise.* In addition to a stronger claim on delegated power, the incentive structure of prime ministers is such that institutionalization should generally be preferred. The effectiveness of prime ministerial leadership is strengthened through institutionalization. |
| Therefore, if prime ministers are rational actors who gain utility from leadership effectiveness, they should choose institutionalization, all else equal. |

A central and key assumption of the theory is that the literature has correctly observed that both assertive citizenship and institutional centralization have risen in modern politics. The goal of theory is to connect the two phenomena through a set of theoretical premises. First, the dispersion of power outwards into society, implied by the assertive paradigm, does not and cannot produce stable configurations of power. Instead, power will 're-concentrate' within institutions in some way. This was discussed at some length because it is the most counterintuitive suggestion, thus perhaps the hardest to

accept. The form that ‘re-concentration’ takes is a function of the delegation of power that institutions can claim. Second, the theory posits that prime ministers ‘receive’ a disproportionate amount of informally delegated power because of the unique roles that they play in the system and their status as ‘personified’ institutions. Finally, the theory claims that prime ministers will behave rationally to seek power equal to the expectations that an assertive, critical political culture places upon them. Therefore, modern prime ministers should seek to institutionalize.

### 3.2.3 Empirical Expectations

The theory just set out is tested empirically in part II of this study. Each chapter in part II states the hypotheses specific to that chapter’s institutional outcome of interest (budget appropriations in chapter five, staff resources in chapter six, and organizational structure in chapters seven and eight). In this section, I describe generally the empirical expectations for the above theory that inform the chapter-specific hypotheses.

The Theory of Public Expectations is an effort to connect two disparate phenomena: change in political-cultural values and attitudes and institutionalization of prime ministerial branches in parliamentary democracies. As discussed, the former consists of gradual change over time in the assertiveness of a political culture. This assertiveness is cumulative and aggregative over the values and attitudes of citizens. It is contextual and thus does not have a direct effect on prime ministerial institutionalization. The Theory of Public Expectations elaborates the indirect impact of this change over time. As stated earlier, this indirect impact is connected to institutionalization outcomes through the rational decisions of prime ministers to augment institutional capacity. Because the rise of assertive citizenship is gradual over time, I expect that prime

ministerial institutionalization is characterized more by a 'layering' process than by a 'conversion' process, although both will likely be evident. In response to the public expectations in assertive political cultures, prime ministers will incrementally add and strengthen institutional rules and capacities to their core functions. Over time, then, institutionalization will rise incrementally and consistently. At times, however, perhaps after periods of stagnation, institutionalization will occur more abruptly, indicative of institutional conversion.

Thus, the basic empirical expectation of this study is that measures of the aggregate assertiveness of publics over time will correspond with measures of prime ministerial branch institutionalization over time. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the latter involves measures of institutional autonomy and internal complexity. The empirical strategy is simple in concept if not execution: measure the assertiveness in the political culture and how it has changed over recent decades, measure institutionalization similarly over time, and assess the relationship between the two. Assertiveness is the independent variable, institutionalization the dependent variable. The broad empirical expectation arising from the Theory of Public Expectations is thus that:

> *As political cultures gradually become more assertive, prime ministerial branches become incrementally more institutionalized: they become more autonomous and more internally complex.*

This hypothesized relationship is made more specific in many different ways in the empirical testing of part II of this study. I look at three measures of assertiveness – political interest, strength of party identification, and an overall assertive index that I construct – and relate these measures to three measures of prime ministerial

institutionalization. These are budgetary and staff resources, which reflect prime ministerial autonomy, and changes in organizational structure, which reflect increasing institutional complexity.

### 3.2.4 Theoretical Implications

In the previous two sections, I explicated the Theory of Public Expectations in detail. Because it is an original, complex and counterintuitive explanation for prime ministerial branch institutionalization, a few remarks on its broader implications are in order. First, to reiterate, the theory specifies a contextual, aggregate effect, not a direct causal one. It claims that value and attitudinal changes at the level of individuals create a political culture that induces both the withdrawal of power from political institutions and elites in general and redistributes that power to prime ministers in particular. The political-cultural context generates this hypothesized relationship, not any particular individual or group of individuals. This is simply central to the theoretical contribution, since it implies an unintended and counterintuitive result: that individual values and attitudes pushing in the direction of 'more' democracy and dispersion of power actually result in greater centralization of power in prime ministers, a result which would undoubtedly be anathema to many if not most of those individuals.

Second, the argument is also counterintuitive in its rejection of the positive normative implications of assertive citizenship theorists. As explicated in chapter two, these theorists are optimistic about the changes that assertive citizenship represents. For them, assertive citizenship is an 'emancipative' development that empowers people and enables them to flourish. To their credit, Dalton and Welzel also recognize that assertive political culture introduces new challenges, demands, and conflicts into politics (2014,

306). These difficulties are not spelled out. They insist that political institutions need to be transformed to conform to new norms. The Theory of Public Expectations suggests that assertive citizenship may have *already* transformed institutions in unanticipated and, for many deleterious, directions. Thus, my theory represents a profound challenge to the optimism of these scholars.

Third, since the theory identifies a relationship between a cultural context and a specific, ongoing institutional change, it is reasonable to expect the effect to be both cumulative and lagged. It builds up over time and precedes the actual institutional change. Political cultures are big: they generally build and change over long periods of time. Ideas gain and lose support, and norms gradually accrue legitimacy and stability. Specific institutional and policy responses to changing contexts often lag behind social change because it takes time for such change to acquire standing as something that necessitates a response. After institutional or policy change occurs as a response, it may become an entrenched part of the status quo, and thus may be resistant to further change. As discussed earlier, there may be an element of path dependence. Indeed, the institutionalization concept suggests that as prime ministers learn the value of institutionalizing their offices, they will continue do so, or at least not reverse the trend, even if the cultural conditions which motivated the change are altered.

Fourth, the Theory of Public Expectations is a causal theory of prime ministerial institutionalization. It is not meant as an argument for the virtues of elite-centered politics. Nevertheless, it is clearly within the lineage of democratic elitist theories, such as those of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter (see Held 2006, 125-157). The core tenet of these theories is that democratic government works best when elites share power

competitively, but are held accountable to the public through regular means (i.e., elections). As we saw in Almond and Verba's (1963) conception of the well-functioning civic culture, publics should be deferential to authority and should play a limited role in governing or pressuring the political elite. In his time, Schumpeter evocatively stated that "the practice of bombarding [politicians] with letters and telegrams" should be prohibited (1976, 295). In democratic elitist theories, leaders should be free to determine public policy "unimpeded by back-seat driving" (Held 2006, 150).

While this indictment of the public's role is rather untenable in modern democracies, the Theory of Public Expectations suggests that there is some truth to the basic insight. Schumpeter may have been overly pessimistic about the rational capacities of the public and the feasibility of more inclusive institutional mechanisms. However, the theory shares the deep scepticism evident in democratic elitism. It is 'conservative' in that it recognizes that institutional change for the sake of change, or for the sake of responding to an increasingly assertive public, is not always beneficial. Relationships and ways of working among elites and between elites and the public are always fragile. To disrupt them is to invite unintended consequences. From a democratic elitist perspective, assertive political culture is counterproductive because it disturbs balanced arrangements of power among elites that have served to check the accumulation of power in any particular institution. This is to say that there is some value in some elements of the old "allegiant" citizenship. When trust in institutions and recognition of their positive aspects diminish, the consequence is not that power will be dispersed widely to the people, but that some elites, particularly those which are best positioned to claim popular support,

will gain power at the expense of others. This, it seems to me, is quite evident in the rise of populism of both right and left in recent years.

Fifth, the Theory of Public Expectations is a narrow empirical explanation for a specific phenomenon: the institutionalization of prime ministerships in the Westminster systems in the last half-century. While there is some historical support for the general statement that democratic movements also generate increases in executive power, we do not make that argument here.[50] Like any relationship between variables, the theory is vulnerable to events that create contradictory tendencies. It could well be that the theorized relationship is but a part of a broader, non-linear historical sweep. Kane et al. may be right that in the long run there is a "tug of war between dispersing and centralizing tendencies" (2007, 307). It may be that prime ministerships follow a "zig-zag" evolution in its large-scale historical development, as Blick and Jones (2010) argue. Just as the theory postulates that the shift from allegiant to assertive citizenship in the last half-century has encouraged prime ministerial power, further shifts could generate conditions undermining such power.

Finally, I recognize that the Theory of Public Expectations has shortcomings and challenges because of its breadth and originality. The theory is not merely an incremental variation on existing, well-established theoretical arguments, but proposes a new framework for conceptualizing and measuring the effects of political-cultural change on institutional change. There is a great deal of a priori uncertainty to the actual empirical

[50] In the United States, for instance, the era of Jacksonian democracy, the progressive movement of the early 20th century, the New Deal, and the height of liberalism in the 1960s all brought about significant expansion of presidential power, while 'conservative' eras, such as the pre-Jacksonian period of the limited franchise, the Gilded Age of the late 19th century, or the 1920s, are marked by a relatively weak presidency. Democratization processes in developing countries have often been leader-centered, often translating into strong executive institutions in the new regimes. There is something in the notion that democratizing projects are most successful when they are intimately associated with notable or charismatic leaders who can serve as 'embodiments' of political change.

observation of change on both the independent and dependent variable sides of the theory. While the literature review in chapter two certainly gives cause to expect that both assertive citizenship and prime ministerial branch institutionalization have trended in theoretically expected directions, the theory hypothesizes changes, and thus depends for its validity, on both of these trends simultaneously. Deviations from these theoretical expectations on either or both trends will significantly affect the degree to which the Theory of Public Expectations is supported. As well, the selection of the Westminster cases prior to theory-building means that the cases may not present the 'best' tests of the theory. While, as mentioned earlier, the theory is a general claim about why institutionalization occurs, this study assesses the theory with regard to a more fundamental interest in the prime ministerships of the Westminster systems. For this reason, the match of the cases to theory is less important than the match of the theory to these particular cases. The goal of the study is to develop and test a theory of how the Westminster prime ministerships have changed, not, in the first instance, to assess a general theory by choosing a representative, best set of cases.

*3.3 Alternative Theories of Prime Ministerial Institutionalization*

In addition to the Theory of Public Expectations, the study considers two alternative sets of theories for prime ministerial institutionalization: economic trends and political conditions. These are standard explanations and essentially derive from the existing literature, as described in chapter two, but neither of these sets of theories has been empirically tested in any real way. In this section, I briefly describe these theories. The first set of theories involves the relationship between long-term economic trends and prime ministerial institutionalization. Specifically, this perspective sees globalization and

the increasing role of governments in domestic economic activity in post-war democracies as significant contributors to institutionalization. The second set of theories posits that short-term political factors are associated with prime ministerial institutionalization. These factors relate to the timing of institutionalization decisions relative to prime ministerial terms and characteristics of governments, particularly its level of support in the legislature and its ideological orientations. These alternatives to the Theory of Public Expectations are explicated in this section.

### 3.3.1 Economic Trends

The first alternative set of explanations for prime ministerial branch institutionalization involves transformations in the patterns and structures of state economic activity in the post-war era. One of these transformations is globalization, the growing interconnectedness and integration of economies and peoples globally. The impact of globalization on institutional change in the prime ministerships is threefold. First, globalization makes policy-making more diffuse and fragmented. In less globalized economies, the set of actors that governments must respond to is limited to a handful of mostly domestic stakeholders, and policy issues are less likely to implicate actors across a range of sectors. As globalization increases, new external pressures arise and policies themselves become more interconnected because of international mechanisms such as trade agreements and treaties. In order to have the institutional capacity to coordinate activity and implement responses across many sectors and stakeholders, leaders may find it beneficial to centralize such capacity within their own institutional structures.

Second, globalization may provide *relative* gains for prime ministerial institutions over other political actors. While globalization may mean that prime ministers have less

‘absolute’ power to guarantee the policy results they desire, relative to other domestic political actors, prime ministers are in an advantaged position to retain and even gain power. Webb and Poguntke (2005, 350) argue that:

> [T]he very fact that many domestic decisions are now constrained by supra-national governance provides national chief executives with additional power resources and autonomy vis-à-vis potential sources of domestic political dissent (including their own cabinet or parties) precisely because they can argue that their freedom of action is constrained by international or supra-national governance.

Third, political globalization, in particular, raises ordinary heads of government such as prime ministers to the level of ‘world leaders’. As decisions are increasingly taken in world forums and summits instead of at the domestic level, power is shifted towards prime ministers and their advisors (Johansson and Tallberg 2010). Such summitry increases the likelihood and legitimacy of prime ministers negotiating far-reaching policy agreements, or at least plans of action, without consulting other domestic actors, and increases the incentives for prime ministers to ensure conformance of domestic policy implementation to international norms and agreements. These require robust information sources at the prime minister’s ready and the capacity at the centre to implement change.

The second transformation in the patterns and structures of national economies is the increasing role of government activity. The post-war building and entrenchment of large social welfare systems in all advanced democracies meant that governments came to be responsible for education, health, and social services at a higher level than they had been previously, and thus government spending came to constitute an increasingly higher share of domestic economic activity. The larger role for government in the economy

creates a greater need for policy coordination and implementation capacity at the centres of government. The policy-making process has become more complex and more fragmented within government, as policy issues cross sectors and involve ever more different departments and levels of government, and has come to involve a wider range of social and political actors.

In addition, the social and economic problems that the state has become increasingly responsible for are much more intractable. As we discussed in relation to the Theory of Public Expectations, responsibility breeds expectations, and expectations imply capacity to act to meet those expectations. The theory views the weight of expectations as arising from changing public values and attitudes. Here it arises from the changing nature of governance itself. In such an environment, it is reasonable to expect that prime ministers who aspire to success, or at least the perception of success, will want to increase their ability to both coordinate and steer policy-making and implementation from the centre. Again, prime ministers are uniquely placed to be the focal point for coordination, so they should bear the heaviest responsibility for doing so.

### 3.3.2 Political Conditions

Both the Theory of Public Expectations and the economic explanations just discussed look to systematic trends over time to explain prime ministerial branch institutionalization. However, shorter-term political factors could also have an impact on institutionalization, adjusting the level of institutionalization from what would be expected from just the temporal trends. Institutionalization takes place in a concrete political setting where politicians are strategic actors looking to immediate interests and

short-term calculations, so it would not be surprising to find that political conditions make a difference. What kinds of conditions might be expected to do so?

I identify three. The first involves the time scale of the prime ministerial term. Different decisions about institutional change may be made depending on when they are made in a term. The first political conditions explanation posits that institutionalization depends on where we are during a prime ministerial term: I call this a *term year effect*. This could work in two ways. The first is that institutionalization will increase as terms elapse. The idea is that prime ministers may need time in office to 'get their feet wet' and to figure out what they want to do. While prime ministers may be at their political peak at the outset of a new term, they may have less confidence when confronted by an entrenched public service and less able to steer through the complexity of the machinery of government and the policy problems they face. Thus, institutional change may be approached incrementally and steadily over the prime ministerial term.

Alternatively, institutionalization could decrease as prime ministerial terms elapse. This is a kind of mandate effect. New governments, and prime ministers, may want to quickly establish control over the political and policy direction of the machinery of government, bolstered by the salience of electoral or leadership promises and the political capital that a change or renewal of democratic legitimacy provides. One way of doing so is to build their own institutional capacity to steer the work of government and establish a prime ministerial agenda. As the term continues, however, there is less need and ability to engage in institutional change: mandates and political capital diminish, election promises fade (or are fulfilled), and the constant flow of new problems and contingent events put prime ministers into 'response' mode. This suggests that we will

observe lower institutional change in later years of a prime ministerial term than earlier years.

The second type of political condition that may have an impact on prime ministerial branch institutionalization involves characteristics of governments. In particular, I identify legislative support and ideology as salient. I expect that prime ministers with more legislative support will be able to generate more institutional change than those with less support. Majority governments are the norm in Westminster systems that use single-member plurality electoral systems (all except New Zealand since 1993). However, there are a small number of minority governments in these cases, and New Zealand has had permanent coalition government since electoral reform. In majority governments, the constraint of consultation or agreement with other parties or coalition partners is absent; the necessity of such negotiations might be both a substantive and procedural limit on the prime minister's capacity to engage in institutionalization. It is also reasonable that majority governments would perceive a greater mandate for political and policy change than governments with less legislative support. Prime ministers with more legislative support are thus freer to embark on change in the machinery of government, including the building of their own institutional capacities, and perceive a greater need to do so.

Finally, ideology may play a crucial role in conditioning the extent of prime ministerial branch institutionalization. Although prime ministers of all ideological stripes face similar pressures under the theories discussed thus far, ideology may mediate the extent to which prime ministers view growth in centralized government and thus their behaviour in inducing institutional change. As well, because ideological differences may

affect how active and ambitious a prime minister's policy agenda is, especially in terms of government programming, ideology may imply greater or lesser need for policy direction and coordination from the centre of government. As a generalization, more conservative ideologies favour smaller, more decentralized government in general, and limiting the growth or decreasing the size of the bureaucratic machinery in particular: they want government to do less and less government to do less with. Therefore, my theoretical expectation is that prime ministerial branch institutionalization will be lower under more conservative prime ministers than under more liberal prime ministers.

Finally, it is possible that the theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization presented in this chapter turn out to not provide much explanatory power, given the originality of the study's research questions, theoretical approach, and methodology. Unlike many empirical studies, this analysis does not have a deep, consistent set of prior empirical findings on which to rest its empirical expectations. The present chapter has described, in some detail, a primary theory of institutional change, the Theory of Public Expectations, and several alternatives. These theories posit systematic causes of prime ministerial branch institutionalization: causes that are exogenous to any particular persons.

The "null" alternative to these theories that seems the most plausible is that institutional change is more a function of the idiosyncratic goals and preferences of individual prime ministers.[51] Some prime ministers may desire a more autonomous and complex prime ministership with which to achieve personal goals. Others may have goals and preferences that do not necessarily imply strengthening prime ministerial capacity. If

[51] Assuming that any theory of institutionalization is required, i.e., that we actually observe prime ministerships institutionalizing by our measures of autonomy and complexity. This, of course, is something we investigate in the empirical chapters.

this were the case, explaining institutional change in the prime ministerships would be more a matter of 'thick' assessments of the ideas, beliefs, and circumstances of each prime minister than of broad structural, general causes. Factors such as leadership style, psychological traits, and belief systems – in short, the kinds of factors that studies of political leadership often look to - could be a part of such an explanation. In setting up our systematic theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization, I nonetheless recognize that these factors are likely to be significant in particular instances. A study investigating these factors would be a worthwhile analytical venture, but it is simply outside of the scope of this study. My goal is only to introduce and test these general theories; it is not to provide a complete and comprehensive account of all institutional change in the prime ministerships.

*3.4 Conclusion*

To conclude, this chapter elaborated the theoretical perspective of the study and the specific theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization that are evaluated in the empirical portion of the study. First, I discussed institutional theory and its application to institutional change in the prime ministerships, noting that the study is primarily historical institutionalist in approach. In particular, I elaborated Streeck and Thelen's (2005) characterization of patterns of institutional change, and suggested that institutional layering and, to a lesser extent, institutional conversion, are likely to be observed in the Westminster prime ministerial branches. I then explicated the dependent variable of the study, prime ministerial institutionalization, and the components of institutionalization that structure the analysis: autonomy and internal complexity.

In the second section, I introduced my original theory of prime ministerial institutionalization, the Theory of Public Expectations. In this view, the shift from allegiant to assertive citizenship has the unintended and counterintuitive consequence of incentivizing prime ministers to further institutionalize their offices. Assertive citizenship generates expectations of dispersion of power while raising expectations for what government must do. This is not conducive to stable, effective governance and so, in turn, a 're-concentration' of power is necessary. The theory then argues that prime ministers are uniquely positioned to be delegated this power, based on their claim to the mandate of the public and their structural advantages at the centre of government. In this context, prime ministers as rational actors will seek to maximize the effectiveness of their leadership by building the institutional resources of their offices. This allows them the greatest ability to fulfill the heightened expectations of the assertive public. The empirical expectations and broader implications of this theory were also discussed.

Finally, the chapter identified two alternative sets of theories about why prime ministerial branch institutionalization occurs. The first set looks to long-term economic changes – globalization and growth in government involvement in the economy – as significant contributors. Both trends have the similar effect of making policy-making more complex, more fragmented, and more difficult. The second set of alternatives looks to short-term political conditions, notably term effects, legislative support, and ideological orientations. These explanations suggest that institutionalization is significantly affected by the short-term political considerations of prime ministers in power, rather than by any long-term systematic trends. Assessing these theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization, above all the Theory of Public Expectations, is the

aim of the rest of this study. The next chapter discusses in detail the research design and methodological approach used to assess these theories.

# Chapter 4
# Research Design and Methodology

In chapter three, I explicated the theoretical framework of this study and my primary explanation for institutional change: the Theory of Public Expectations. Chapter four sets out the study's research design and the methodological choices made in the service of testing this theory. This discussion is important to understanding how the subsequent chapters translate the theory in chapter three into empirically testable models of prime ministerial branch institutionalization. Here I also mention some of the practical limitations and challenges encountered in setting up an empirical analysis of theoretical propositions.

This chapter begins by reviewing prevailing methodologies in the relevant literature. While the study's methodology is derived from the theoretical considerations in chapter three, it turns out that a further contribution of this study is the methodological approach itself. Since scholars of prime ministerships have largely avoided quantitative analysis, this absence encourages the research design and methodology of the study. The second section of the chapter explicates the overarching causal model guiding the study. This model posits that change over time in prime ministerial branches is a function of levels of assertive citizenship, economic change, and contemporaneous political conditions. This model is what operationalizes the theories described in chapter three. The study takes this causal model and applies it to three different indicators of prime ministerial branch institutionalization: budget appropriations, staff resources, and internal complexity. Doing so enables more tests of the model and allows for more differentiated conclusions about its veracity. Moreover, this structure allows for a 'parallel', multiple methods research design, in which both quantitative and qualitative data collection and

analysis are used. Next, I consider the question of case selection. Finally, because the public expectations framework is central to the study, the third section of the chapter describes how the study operationalizes the abstract concept of assertive citizenship through the construction of three concrete measures: political interest, strength of party identification, and an aggregate index of assertive values and attitudes. Finally, the chapter addresses some of the limitations of the research design.

*4.1 Methodology in the Literature*

I begin my explication of the study's research design by briefly reviewing approaches in the existing literature. While there is much insightful, impressionistic, contextually rich work, quantitative methodologies have been ignored and seen as inappropriate. Instead, the literature is dominated by other approaches, two in particular. The first approach focuses on individual political leaders and is either biographical or historical in nature (O'Malley 2005, 14-15). Even outside of prime ministerial biographies, which do not aim to be analytical per se, the essential characteristic of the academic literature is that it focuses on specific prime ministers as the unit of analysis and seeks to explain variation through that lens. The focus is often on prime ministers within a single country. For instance, Hargrove's (2009) account emphasizes the domineering, transformative visions of leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair as crucial to understanding why executive power varies across time. Blick and Jones (2010) also stress that the extent of prime ministerial power is significantly related to the goals and ambitions of particular prime ministers (155-162). Such studies provide engaging, illustrative case studies. However, as O'Malley points out, such evidence is always partial, and rarely generalizable (2007, 16). A focus on individual political leaders

potentially leads to ignoring or downplaying the presence of systemic factors affecting institutional change in prime ministerships, and lacks comparative insight.

The second methodological strand that dominates academic work on prime ministerships is historical or descriptive analysis. These studies are historical and descriptive in the sense that they focus on institutional development over time, but generally in an atheoretical and methodologically simple way. Such analyses tend to focus on how executives developed historically in one country (e.g., Punnett 1977; Milkis and Nelson 2008; Blick and Jones 2010) or are comparative studies of the executives of a small number of countries (e.g., Elgie 1995; Peters et al. 2000; Helms 2005). Both types of studies are qualitative and use observational data selectively. Moreover, the comparative studies lack systematic, consistent comparisons across the cases. Rather than combining data from a number of cases to generate conclusions of a general nature, these studies tend to provide informative but relatively narrow, "within-case" assessments. In short, the literature is characterized by an 'old institutionalist' approach to studying institutions (Rhodes 2006), rather than approaches developed in 'new institutionalist' work.

In this literature, analytical techniques are limited to descriptive and historical observation and anecdote, sometimes supplemented by interviews or expert surveys. Numbers are used illustratively and selectively, and collections of numerical data are often incomplete. There is generally not a great deal of concern for research design, a priori theory building, or explication of methodology. Because of this, the credibility of the work is highly dependent on perceptions of the author's expertise and depth of arguments, rather than on the strength of the research design and methodology. This does

not mean that it lacks substantive or methodological merit. Blick and Jones' (2010) account of the development of the British prime ministership is well argued and compelling. Diamond's (2014) extensive interview data sheds much light on the inner workings of the core executive in Britain. R.A.W. Rhodes and colleagues have adopted an interesting interpretive framework to the study of executives that is ethnographic in approach (Elgie 2011, 73; see Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2006, 2010; Rhodes 2011). However, the relative lack of attention to research design and methodology creates space for the literature on prime ministers and prime ministerships to engage with more exacting approaches.

It is unfortunate that there is little space for explicit theory building and quantitative methodologies, particularly, in the study of prime ministerships. Such methodologies have been argued to be beyond the scope of *any* study of executives (Webb and Poguntke 2005, 347). For instance, Graham White, in a discussion about the power of first ministers in Canada, invokes time series analysis only to say that quantifying a concept such as the "democratic deficit" is impossible (2012, 229). This is, in my view, an unnecessarily limited perspective. Quantification and analysis of such concepts as democracy and freedom, if certainly contestable, is the "bread and butter" of comparative politics. The institutional literature specifically has introduced many useful, generalizable concepts and approaches that are more rigorous and theory-driven than the historical-descriptive approach can provide. There are many aspects of prime ministerships, especially as institutions, that are conceivably quantifiable, and worth the effort. The comparative study of prime ministerships cannot make much progress if it writes off some of the best practices of modern political analysis. Certainly, there are

problems with applying alternative methods in a context where there are no definitive, pre-existing measures for crucial concepts, such as power or leadership success, and where only a relatively small universe of cases can be feasibly studied. However, this should not constrain scholars from trying to innovate theoretically and methodologically.

In this regard, the prime ministerial literature could learn from work on the American presidency, much of which is highly quantitative (e.g., Ragsdale and Theis 1997; Dickinson and Lebo 2007). Even though they are single-country studies, these analyses use statistical techniques such as time series analysis to identify the most significant determinants of changes in presidential staff and budget resources, i.e., the institutionalization of the US presidency. In doing so, they contribute the important insight that any executive institution is not simply one case but a series of observations over time. Combining this insight with a comparative lens provides us with a strong methodological rationale for collecting and analyzing cross-national time series datasets, something that other areas in political science regularly deal with. Such studies demonstrate "how one might go about testing, using quantitative data, theory that previously had strictly been the province of archival research" (Howell 2009, 16). The use of quantitative methods in the US case provides openings for innovative work in the prime ministerial literature, which the present study engages directly. The next section and remainder of this chapter outlines how the research design and methodology of this study addresses this opportunity.

*4.2 Research Design*

This section describes the overall research design of the study, that is, the overarching structure and approach of the empirical work in part II. It also discusses the

basic conceptual and operational choices of the study and case selection, and provides an overview of the analytical techniques used in subsequent chapters. Detailed discussion of the specific empirical models and variable operationalization are located in the individual chapters and in the study's appendices.

### 4.2.1 A Causal Model of Prime Ministerial Institutionalization

To remind the reader, the core aims of the research design in part II of the study are to elucidate the extent of institutional change, and to assess empirical evidence for or against the three theories of institutional change discussed above. As elaborated in chapter three, the study posits several different theories of why prime ministerial branches become more institutionalized over time. Taken together, these theories posit a set of independent variables and a multifaceted dependent variable, institutionalization. This causal structure is generalized across the four cases and over time. Thus, the research design is complex and has three key elements: the overall causal model, the analytical structure, and the methodology.

First, the basic causal structure throughout the analysis is the same. The causal model views change over time in the level of prime ministerial branch institutionalization as a product of two kinds of independent variables: 'time-varying covariates', assertive citizenship and economic trends, and 'mediating covariates' in the form of political conditions. This causal model is depicted in figure 4.1, below.

Figure 4.1

*Causal Model of Prime Ministerial Branch Institutionalization*




This model assumes that there are three significant, independent sources of institutional change in the prime ministerships. The time-varying covariates are assumed to have effects on institutionalization as a function of time. This means that variation in both assertive citizenship and economic trend variables is (expected to be) systematically related to time, and both co-vary with institutionalization, since the latter also varies across time. Political conditions, on the other hand, do not vary over time in any meaningful sense but, when included in the model, potentially alter the effects of the time-varying covariates as well as independently affect institutionalization.

The difference between these two sets of covariates extends to the treatment of the variables' time series properties. The time-varying covariates imply effects over time, such that their overall effects on institutionalization may be a mixture of instantaneous and past effects. The political conditions covariates, however, are assumed to have only instantaneous effects because they are direct, rather than contextual, and do not meaningfully co-vary with time. For example, imagine that there is an ideological effect such that prime ministers with greater legislative support are more likely to institutionalize their office. Theoretically, it makes little sense to include parameters for past legislative support along with the current value, for both theoretical and

methodological reasons.[52] Thus, for the purposes of model specification in subsequent chapters, the time-varying covariates are allowed to be included as both current values and past values, while the mediating political conditions covariates are constrained to having instantaneous effects (in the time series terminology, they are included as fixed regressors). To summarize, then, the causal model of the study is dynamic. It asserts that the level of prime ministerial branch institutionalization at any one point in time is a function of two exogenous sets of covariates: the levels of assertive citizenship and economic trends at that time and in previous time points, and the political conditions in place contemporaneously.

The second element of the research design is the analytical structure of the study. Given the causal model just described, the analytical structure guides the way in which the study breaks down this causal model into empirically tractable pieces. It does so by disaggregating the dependent variable, prime ministerial branch institutionalization, into three distinct indicators: budgetary appropriations, staff resources, and institutional complexity. Each indicator acts as an empirical proxy dependent variable for the conceptual dependent variable of institutionalization. Each of the sets of covariates is operationalized appropriately and entered into models of these empirical indicators of institutionalization. Structuring the analysis in terms of these measures of institutionalization has two advantages.

First, it enables more nuanced conclusions about the extent and causes of institutional change. The disaggregation of the dependent variable allows us to parse

[52] Theoretically, it is difficult to conceive of a causal process whereby last year's seat share, for instance, somehow has an independent effect on the present year's budgetary appropriations. The political conditions are assumed to be direct inputs into prime ministers' decision-making process, as it were, when selecting institutional resources. Methodologically, the political conditions variables are constant over a prime ministerial term, so recently past values of the variables are in most cases the same as the current value.

differences in the way the relationships play out. We might find, for example, that the rise of assertive citizenship has had a greater effect on budget appropriations than on institutional structure. This could point to a variety of interesting arguments. Perhaps appropriations are more responsive to public pressure than organizational change. Perhaps prime ministers face fewer constraints in manipulating financial resources than in altering bureaucratic structures and relationships, which are likely much more 'sticky' and difficult to pursue effectively. In short, the study's analytical structure allows for interesting variation along dimensions of institutional change. It also multiplies the number of different tests of the theories embedded in the causal model; given that expanding the number of cases is not a realistic option, examining different facets of the overall concept of institutionalization allows us to probe these theories from different angles.

Second, this analytical structure allows for more explicit, transparent comparative conclusions relative to the other plausible analytical structure that could have been adopted, the case study design. The case study design would structure the analysis by country, that is, separate chapters on Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Cross-national comparisons would be in the form of concluding synthesis; the empirical focus would be on the case rather than the theory. This design would serve the study's purposes poorly because the study is not interested in these cases purely in themselves. Rather, the study is more interested in institutional change in prime ministerships as a broad, general phenomenon rather than a case-specific one. My approach allows for direct comparisons between the cases to be drawn at multiple points in the study, not only synthetically but in analysis of the data as inherently cross-national.

The design choice of disaggregating institutional change into three distinct dimensions and structuring the analysis accordingly has implications for the methodology of the study. It allows for the use of multiple methods, a research design in which different kinds of data collection and analysis are employed to improve the evidentiary value of a study. Thus, the third key element in the study's research design is the use of a 'parallel', multiple methods approach. The research design uses both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis to investigate the same broad research question of prime ministerial branch institutionalization, although its primary emphasis is on quantitative analysis. Using multiple methods can be a way to mitigate perceived weaknesses in strictly quantitative or strictly qualitative approaches.

Creswell (2014) identifies three basic templates for mixed methods designs: convergent parallel, exploratory sequential, and explanatory sequential (219-227). This study's research design is closest to the first approach, although it is not a strict adaptation.[53] In the convergent parallel design, qualitative and quantitative data are collected and analyzed separately, with hopefully convergent findings: the two methods are connected only in comparison of results. This is similar to the process of 'triangulation', in which different methods are brought to bear on the same question, usually for reasons of poor or missing data (Tarrow 2004, 178-179).

[53] The exploratory sequential model begins with a qualitative or small-N phase in order to identify and develop concepts and measures within a sample with the intent of testing their external validity on a broader sample (or the population) in the quantitative phase. The explanatory sequential model involves a procedure whereby quantitative analysis informs selection of cases for qualitative explanation and elaboration. Crucially, though, this two-stage process, in which the qualitative data is not separate from but builds on the quantitative data, means that comparing the results is an invalid procedure. The quantitative results are independent of the subsequent qualitative stage and the qualitative stage cannot invalidate or confirm the quantitative modeling, although they certainly can inform future quantitative models (Lieberman 2005). The basic function of the qualitative case studies is to provide insight into the workings of mechanisms generating the relationships identified (or not) in the quantitative model (Creswell 2014, 224-225).

The disaggregated indicators of institutionalization are not only substantively different but imply different kinds of data. Analysis of the first two indicators, budget appropriations and staff resources, lends itself to statistical analysis because they are inherently quantifiable (they are literally numbers) and good, consistent numerical data over time can be more or less readily obtained. Thus, the chapters investigating these measures approach empirical analysis through the lens of quantitative methodology: specification and estimation of the causal model using regression techniques is the primary tool for causal inference.

However, analyzing change in institutional complexity is less amenable to quantitative approaches, at least in the way complexity is operationalized here. As discussed in chapter seven, complexity is operationalized in terms of tracing the number and types of organizational units within prime ministerial branches over time. These measures are both count and categorical data, but the analysis is primarily interested in tracing qualitative change over time rather than simple quantitative change. Further methodological reasons, discussed in the chapter, suggest that qualitative analysis is a more appropriate choice for the chapter's goals; in particular, regression is not used. Changes in institutional structure also have a more trenchant 'narrative' quality than appropriations or staff; since institutional structure is a more variegated outcome than appropriations or staff, explicating it in greater depth and detail is appropriate. In other words, comparing number of staff and comparing the scope of policy units in a prime ministerial branch should be different analytical processes. The study therefore presents primarily quantitative, statistical treatments of appropriations and staff, and a primarily qualitative, narrative assessment of changes in institutional complexity. It then

synthesizes the findings to form overall conclusions about the theories and patterns of institutional change introduced in chapter three.

4.2.2 Data Collection

The data collected and analyzed in this study is observational, primarily quantitative data. The assertive citizenship variables are constructed from survey data in the national election studies; this process is further described in section 4.3, below. Further details about the data source and construction, including summary statistics, are found in the study's appendices A2 and A3. The economic variables are drawn from two publicly accessible cross-national time-series data sets, the KOF Globalization Index, and the Penn World Tables 9.0.

The political variables come from a variety of public sources. For the most part, these data are simple historical facts. Prime ministerial terms, legislative support, and prime ministerial party are culled from sources such as tables of electoral histories from official electoral bodies (such as Elections Canada), as well as the author's prior knowledge. The only constructed variable is one measure of prime ministerial ideology, which is drawn from the coding of party manifestos by the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) project.[54]

The one area of discretion was in the demarcation of prime ministerial terms. For the purposes of this study, terms were demarcated according to three rules. First, any change of prime minister within a government term started a new prime ministerial term. Second, any general election, whether won by the incumbent prime minister or not,

[54] While the output of the MARPOR is not uncontroversial (see Gemenis 2013 for a summary of criticisms), the data set is widely used in comparative party research. My examination of the data for these four countries shows a sufficient degree of face validity: commonly perceived ideological differences among prime ministers are mostly reflected in these scores.

started a new term. Third, term starts and ends are pinned to the outcome under investigation. Thus, in chapters five and six, they are pinned to the passing of the relevant appropriation act. In other words, a prime minister's first year refers to the first budget for which they were in power. This makes a difference only in a few cases. For instance, John Major's government passed the budget for fiscal year 1997-98, not Tony Blair's, even though Blair took power in May 1997. The observations for this time point are thus considered the fifth year of Major's term, rather than the first of Blair's. The prime ministerial terms for the four countries since 1945 are listed in the study's Appendix A1.

4.2.3 Case Selection

In this section, I discuss the issue of case selection. This study focuses on the prime ministerships of four countries: the Westminster systems of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. These countries share a common cultural heritage and exhibit both institutional similarity and difference. However, as discussed earlier, our primary theoretical goal is not to assess these particular prime ministerial institutions per se, but to articulate and empirically assess general theories of institutional change in the branches of political chief executives. Indeed, the focus on these particular cases is a weaker test of these theories than is potentially achievable; as Westminster systems, they are only a subset of the systems in which the theories are intended to apply. The Theory of Public Expectations, in particular, is a general theory about how social change affects executive institutions in democratic systems. The ideal study would include all countries that fall within this scope. Such a study would have allowed for more variation in the data and the testing of further alternative explanations, such as the effect of constitutional type (presidential or parliamentary). However, this constraint is

somewhat mitigated by the fact that the analysis examines change over time. The unit of analysis, particularly for statistical purposes, is the "country-year", e.g., Canada 1985. This multiplies the number of observations considerably, although obviously the observations exhibit dependence within countries.

The choice of limiting the study to these Westminster cases is justified practically and, more importantly, theoretically.[55] The justification for our focus on these Westminster systems is the notion of Most Similar Systems (MSS) design. MSS is a method of selecting cases designed to overcome the "many variables, small N" problem that is particularly acute in macro-comparative research. Such research is often concerned with comparing countries, which vary in essentially infinite ways but are limited in number.[56] There is thus a need for some methodologically sound way of limiting the number of cases while retaining the ability to make causal claims about a general phenomenon.

The MSS design depends for its causal authority on finding systems that are very similar on many dimensions, particularly those that are relevant to explaining variation on the dependent variable, and then identifying differences among these systems. The logic of MSS is twofold. First, observed similarities among cases imply latent similarities and thus unobservable, or unobserved, factors are implicitly controlled. There is thus no

[55] Practical considerations include the limited availability and accessibility of data for a large number of countries, many of which are not English speaking. The resources in time and effort required to find and process these data means that this data collection is simply infeasible for the current project. Given this, in the first instance the scope is narrowed to cases familiar to the researcher, where data is readily available, and which have comparable prime ministerial institutions, political systems, and social contexts.

[56] The problem is that causality cannot be established when the theory of the causal relationship is underdetermined or when there are not enough cases to disentangle the independent effects of explanatory variables when there is high multicollinearity between them (King et al. 1994, 119). Many questions of interest to comparativists also imply restrictions on the number of applicable cases. A further concern is that efforts to compare countries through detailed case study or historical narrative are costly and become impractical as the number of cases increases.

need to include all of the potential control variables in the cases, which is often impossible. Second, similarities cannot explain differences. We can choose a small number of cases where we know that there are relevant similarities but on which there are differences in outcomes. Then we look for theoretically interesting explanatory variables on which these cases differ. If differences in outcome among cases correspond to the differences on the explanatory variables, while other variables are the same among cases, we can infer that only the differing explanatory variables are causally related to the outcome.

MSS requires each variable to be independent and dichotomous (Gerring 2008, 669). While the first is more a problem of model specification than fundamental, the second presents an underappreciated problem. If variables are not dichotomous, the notions of similarity and difference are undermined.[57] Of the variables in this study, only a few of the political conditions variables are inherently dichotomous. More importantly, the outcome of institutionalization is not dichotomous and dichotomizing it (e.g., into high and low institutionalization) is not an option in this study. Thus, the case selection in this study is in the spirit of MSS without following it to the letter. It relies on the idea that "if two countries can be assumed to have similar cultural heritages one needn't worry" about explicitly measuring these similarities in order to assert that a host of background factors are actually being controlled for (Gerring 2008, 670). In any case, we are as or more concerned with temporal dynamics within each country as with comparing the countries as single observations. The study's selection of the Westminster countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom is therefore merited for both

[57] This is one reason for the development of methodologies like qualitative comparative analysis, which uses things like "fuzzy sets" so that variables can be continuous rather than dichotomous.

practical and theoretical reasons. As discussed earlier, the choice of limiting cases to these Westminster systems is a common one; the framing is well established.

*4.3 Measuring the Dynamics in Assertive Citizenship*

Thus far, this chapter has explicated in general terms the research design and methodology of the study. In the final section of this chapter, I focus on a more specific design choice: the measurement of changes in assertive citizenship. This is the key explanatory factor in the Theory of Public Expectations. Here, I explain the basic construction of the variables, while a detailed explanation is found in appendices A3, which describes the construction process, and A4, which lists the survey items used.

Assertive citizenship refers to a set of particular values and attitudes that are measured at the individual level but are theorized to be salient only as an aggregate. They generate a sociocultural context to which prime ministers are responsive. The underlying set of values and attitudes constituting assertive citizenship is adapted from the work of Dalton and Welzel (2014), as discussed in chapter two, but its operationalization in this study is original. For the purposes of this study, there is no readily importable data with which to measure assertive citizenship. Existing work probing the concept of assertive citizenship and related concepts is mostly based on the World Values Survey (WVS). While the WVS is a useful tool for studying social values cross-culturally and cross-regionally, as a tool for studying temporal change, especially in our cases, it is limited.[58]

[58] Only Australia has been surveyed in all six waves. Canada is included in four waves (1982, 1990, 2000, 2005), New Zealand in three (1998, 2004, 2011) and the United Kingdom in four (1981, 1990, 1998, 2005). Thus, the WVS data is consistent, comprehensive and tailored to examination of changing values, but the lack of temporal data points is a serious problem in terms of analyzing relationships over time. We do not have the option of expanding our scope of cases to the larger set of countries that the WVS covers. Filling in the missing data simply by interpolation and extrapolation is not an option when there are so few 'real' data points. If we 'fill in' these missing entries with other sources of data, we face issues of comparability of questions and samples.

Thus, this study uses survey data from national election studies: the Australian Election Study (AES), Canadian Election Study (CES), New Zealand Election Study (NZES), and the British Election Study (BES).[59] These series of election studies provide regular, relatively long-running and consistent sets of data and contain many similar questions to those on the WVS.[60] Years for all sources of data used are given in Table 4.1. The election studies data is supplemented with earlier projects that were forerunners to the 'official' election studies and in some cases involved similar teams of researchers.

Table 4.1
*Sources of Data for Assertive Citizenship Measures*

| Year | AES | CES | NZES | BES | Year | AES | CES | NZES | BES |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1963 | | | | X^ | 1990 | X | | X | |
| 1964 | | | | X^ | 1991 | | | | |
| 1965 | | X | | | 1992 | | | | X |
| 1966 | | | | X^ | 1993 | X | X | X | |
| 1967 | X* | | | | 1994 | | | | |
| 1968 | | X | | | 1995 | | | | |
| 1969 | X* | | | | 1996 | X | | X | |
| 1970 | | | | X^ | 1997 | | X | | X |
| 1971 | | | | | 1998 | X | | | |
| 1972 | | | | | 1999 | | | X | |
| 1973 | | | | | 2000 | | X | | |

An additional problem is that when use of the WVS is limited to the Westminster countries, many of the measures of assertive citizenship do not vary much across time or cases. This is because the primary purpose of the WVS is to assess broad cross-cultural patterns. Thus, its questions are more useful in differentiating between large differences in context, such as between the Central and Eastern European post-communist countries and Western Europe or between two distant points in time, than when "zooming in" to advanced democracies, much less our cases.

[59] Election studies for academic purposes began in the United States, where the first American National Election Study (ANES) was conducted in 1948 by the Survey Research Centre at the University of Michigan. The ANES model wherein a small group of principal investigators would conduct pre-election and post-election surveys, sometimes supplemented by panel data, mailback surveys and, more recently, internet surveys, on a core set of questions related to vote choice, political attitudes and beliefs, political engagement, and demographic characteristics, was highly influential. It formed the basis for the other national election studies, on which much political behaviour research has been grounded.

[60] Although we considered combining WVS and election studies data, initial explorations made it clear that they are not comparable. Tranter and Western (2003, 244) also show this in the Australian case, where the WVS data anomalously show the proportion of postmaterialists twice that of other sources. They suggest sampling and question wording differences. Another intriguing possibility is that there is an "in-election/out-election" effect, such that asking even the same questions within the context of an election campaign period introduces bias relative to asking them outside of elections. The heightened political environment of elections may have a significant effect on the kinds of associations and saliency of issues that form the heuristic context of respondents' choices.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1974 | | X | | X | 2001 | X | | | X |
| 1975 | | | X | | 2002 | | | X | |
| 1976 | | | | | 2003 | | | | |
| 1977 | | | | | 2004 | X | X | | |
| 1978 | | | X | | 2005 | | | X | X |
| 1979 | X* | X | | X | 2006 | | X | | |
| 1980 | | X | | | 2007 | X | | | |
| 1981 | | | X | | 2008 | | X | X | |
| 1982 | | | | | 2009 | | | | |
| 1983 | | | | X | 2010 | X | | | X |
| 1984 | | X | | | 2011 | | X | X | |
| 1985 | | | | | 2012 | | | | |
| 1986 | | | | | 2013 | X | | | |
| 1987 | X | | X | X | 2014 | | | X | |
| 1988 | | X | | | 2015 | | X | | X |
| 1989 | | | | | | | | | |

AES: Australian Election Study; CES: Canadian Election Study; NZES: New Zealand Election Survey/Study; BES: British Election Study .
* Australian Political Attitudes Survey. ^ Political Change in Britain.

My basic goal is to construct variables that measure the prevalence of allegiant and assertive orientations at different points in time in order to track change in these orientations over time. WVS data is inadequate for this purpose. However, the election study data also are not ideal. The surveys exhibit a high degree of variation in question wording and response coding, both between countries and within each country series. Questions enter and exit the surveys from study to study, understandably so; these broader value and attitude questions are of secondary importance to questions probing more immediate electoral behaviour. Thus, there is no simple way to measure these orientations using a consistent set of questions across time in one country, let alone among the four.[61]

[61] I also argue, contrary to what is implied in the Dalton et al. approach, that what *constitutes* allegiant and assertive orientations changes over time as broader norms and expectations change. We should not expect a priori that the same questions measure the same underlying concepts over time. Indeed, there are many examples of changes in the questions themselves that reveal broader changes in sociocultural norms and which distinguish the election studies from the WVS. For instance, in the WVS the same question measuring attitudes towards homosexuality is asked every wave: whether homosexuality is justifiable. In the CES, though, changes in the questions reflect contemporary societal concerns. The 1968 CES asked

The study operationalizes the concept of assertive citizenship in three variables: aggregate levels of political interest, strength of party identification, and an index aggregating many values and attitudes related to assertiveness. We operationalize assertive citizenship in three different ways because we want to have as strong a test of the Theory of Public Expectations as possible given other constraints and because we want to use as much of the data available as possible. Each of these indicators is a plausible measure of assertive citizenship, as discussed in previous chapters. The more assertive citizens are, the more politically interested they are likely to be. However, this increased level of political interest is accompanied by a growing lack of attachment to and trust in institutions; strength of party identification is a reasonable proxy for citizens' attachment to parties and its decline has been widely remarked upon. A further methodological consideration is that political interest and party identification are among the few questions that have been asked more or less consistently across the series of election studies in all four countries. The assertive index, by construction, aggregates all survey items that are a priori relevant to assertive citizenship.

Constructing the assertive citizenship variables is a four-step procedure. First, we identify and extract data on assertive values from election survey data sets. For the political interest and party identification variable this is simple, since these are single questions for each data set. For the assertive index, drawing on Dalton and Welzel (2014) and Dalton (2004), I identified potential measures of allegiant and assertive orientations

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whether homosexuals should be imprisoned. In 1984, respondents were asked whether homosexuals should be permitted to be teachers. In 1988, the question was about the effects of giving equal rights to homosexuals. The 1993, 1997, and 2000 surveys asked whether homosexual couples should be allowed to legally marry, and from 2004 whether the respondent favoured or opposed same-sex marriage, which had become a constitutional right. Thus, the WVS approach is ill-suited for present purposes.

in each election study. Any items associated with institutional confidence and trust, belief in democracy, general social trust, norm compliance (e.g., duty to vote), beliefs about individual liberties (particularly homosexuality and abortion) and equal opportunity, individual voice, expression and political efficacy, and democratic participation and activism were included. In total, the number of unique identical questions and the number of times the questions are asked in each country are, respectively: Australia, 44 and 173, Canada, 37 and 175, New Zealand, 29 and 139, and the UK, 42 and 160. Questions were considered identical when they had the same or nearly the same wording and the same response options. All of the survey items are listed in appendix A4.

The second step is to aggregate this data. For political interest and strength of party identification, the aggregated values for each survey are simply the mean response. The assertive index is much more complicated. I adapt Stimson's (1999, 2015) 'dyad ratios' approach to creating a smoothed time trend when aggregating partial data collected over time. The mathematical details of this method are given in the study's appendix A3. Briefly, each item's responses are recoded into a binary categorization for assertive and non-assertive responses. For instance, the Likert scale responses to the statement "Generally those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people" are recoded so that 'agree' and 'strongly agree' are assertive and other responses not assertive. Then the proportion of assertive responses for each question administration is calculated. The dyad ratios algorithm takes these proportions and calculates changes in proportions between identical question administrations in succeeding and preceding election studies. It then calculates the average change across all survey items for a particular year, with each item's contribution to this average weighted according to its

correlation with the overall measure. The method produces a time series for an underlying concept, assertive citizenship, for which there is only partial, inconsistent data.

The third step in the procedure is to fill in the missing data for the years between election studies. This is an acute issue here because the election study surveys are conducted only periodically. There are more missing observations on country-years than not, but using only the years in which elections were held reduces the number of observations drastically and eliminates the possibility of testing some of the political conditions variables; the low degrees of freedom would not allow for meaningful statistical inference. Having as complete a time series as possible is thus important, even if it means including imputed values. I impute values for the missing observations using Honaker et al.'s (2012) software program Amelia II, which has been used even in studies with large amounts of missing data (e.g., Denny and Doyle 2009, Ross 2006). Amelia II performs a "multiple imputation" procedure in which all variables that appear in the regression model are used to produce a posterior distribution for the complete data set via maximum likelihood. Multiple draws from this distribution are then taken to produce a specified number of complete data sets, which are then combined. This produces a more data-driven approach to imputation of missing values, as compared to mean or linear imputation. While this is not ideal, it is a next-best solution.

Finally, the data are transformed in order to better differentiate the trends in assertive citizenship from the irregular components of the time series. This is done through exponential smoothing of the time series. This variable construction procedure

results in a time series of country-year observations for the three variables: political interest, strength of party identification, and an overall assertive values index.

*4.4 Research Design: Limitations*

This section identifies several important limitations of the study's research design; I return to these more fully in my concluding remarks. As in any good empirical study, the research design makes subsequent analysis possible while also precluding alternative approaches and creating its own "built-in" difficulties for inference. Indeed, because of the theoretical and empirical originality of the study, its limitations are arguably more apparent. I discuss, briefly, three in particular: the treatment of context, the constraints on both case and conceptual scope, and the difficulty of establishing the veracity of time-dependent relationships.

The first limitation pertains to the treatment of context in the study. Each country is treated abstractly and somewhat superficially, especially in the more quantitative analyses in chapters five and six. The rich political histories and cultures of these very different cases are reduced to "observations on variables" in the interest of producing generalizable and statistically analyzable hypotheses. To be sure, this is a strength of the study, but many scholars of each of these countries' politics will find the relative absence of historical and political case-specific context to be a flaw. In the same vein, the study's design precludes full attention to the ideational context of prime ministerial leadership: the norms, values, and internalized understandings of salient actors in shaping prime ministerial power. Instead, the dissertation is explicitly 'objective' in the sense that it assesses institutional change using concrete, measurable factors.

Second, clearly the scope of the study is constrained by the research design and methodology, in two important ways. The first is that limitations of data and resources lead to constrained tests of the theories of institutionalization. The Theory of Public Expectations is a general theory of institutional change, relevant in many more countries than the four Westminster cases. Indeed, parliamentary cases that have not demonstrably presidentialized could also be included as 'negative' cases. Moreover, there is no reason that the scope of the theory could not include presidential systems. Comparing executive branch institutionalization with "parliamentary versus presidential" as an explanatory variable would be a tremendously valuable exercise. Widening the scope of analysis would also increase the number of cases, which is usually a benefit statistically. Therefore, in selecting this set of similar Westminster systems, the study does not capture all sorts of interesting variation in both the extent of executive branch institutionalization and in the explanatory factors.

The second limitation is the gap between the full concept of the "prime ministerial branch" and its operationalization in this study. For methodological reasons, the study focuses only on the bureaucratic extensions of prime ministers, and further, on their material aspects. The prime ministerial branches have changed in many ways that are not addressed in the study. For instance, the bureaucratic extensions of prime ministers have arguably undergone politicization. Peter Aucoin's (2012) New Political Governance thesis argues that there have been systematic efforts to undermine the impartiality and professionalism of the civil service which, "at best… constitutes sleazy governance; at worst, is a form of political corruption" (178). In this view, the traditional role of the prime minister's civil service offices in providing "politically-sensitive policy advice"

has become more “promiscuously partisan”, as Aucoin suggests (179). The extent to which prime ministerial branches are increasingly the locus of control for all government and party messaging is not explored here.

The third limitation is that in exploring relationships between trends over time it is somewhat difficult to disentangle ‘true’ relationships from spurious relationships that are only apparent because variables share a common trend with time itself, rather than each other. This problem is mitigated in a technical way by the particular form of time series modelling, error correction models, that is used in chapters five and six. However, this only corrects for time within the model estimation itself, i.e., it makes the model conform with assumptions about error distributions, independent observations, and so on. It does not directly answer the broader question of temporal causality or if there are other over-time trends that should be included. Moreover, the qualitative explication in chapters seven and eight depends on the assumption that corresponding temporal trends is evidence for an association. Unfortunately, in the absence of a more rigorous way of establishing causality such as an experimental setup or, perhaps, evidence from interviews with salient actors, this is clearly a limitation of the study. In my concluding chapter, I articulate several directions for future research that could address some of these limitations.

The first part of this study frames the empirical analysis to follow in part II. The present chapter concludes this framing by explaining the research design and methodology of the study. I first discussed the dominant methodological orientations in the literature on prime ministers and noted opportunities for methodological innovation. In the second section, the overall causal model and the multiple methods analytical

structure designed to assess it were discussed. As well, I discussed the sources of data and case selection. I then described the construction of the primary explanatory variables, those capturing assertive citizenship. Finally, I identified key limitations of the study's design. The next four chapters constitute the empirical portion of the study, beginning in chapter five with an assessment of autonomy of the prime ministerial branches, as measured by budget appropriations. We now turn to these empirical studies.

# PART TWO: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

# Chapter 5
# Prime Ministerial Branches and Budget Appropriations

The first part of this study, chapters one through four, explicated the context, theoretical approach, and research design that frames its empirical investigation of institutional change. Part II, chapters five through eight, forms the core of this investigation. The following chapters draw on both quantitative and qualitative approaches to assess empirically both the patterns of institutional change in each of the four countries and the extent to which the Theory of Public Expectations and its alternatives are supported. The analysis has a two-part structure. This chapter and the next explore and assess change in the institutional autonomy of prime ministerial branches, operationalized as their budget appropriations in chapter five and staff resources in chapter six. These analyses are predominantly quantitative in approach. In chapters seven and eight, I explore the institutional complexity of prime ministerial branches, using a case study approach. I discuss short case studies of New Zealand and Canada in chapter seven, and the United Kingdom and Australia in chapter eight.

Chapters five and six examine the Westminster prime ministerial branches from the perspective of institutional autonomy. The "big picture" analytical goal is to assess the extent and causes of the development of prime ministerial branches from small, personal offices into large bureaucracies with significant budgets and staff resources. The development of more robust institutional support allows them to act increasingly independently of other political actors. I apply the theories discussed in chapter three to the putative adaptation and reinvention of prime ministerships as autonomous actors in Westminster systems.

The present chapter analyzes budget appropriations to the prime ministerial branches in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. It proceeds as follows. The first section, 5.1, discusses these appropriations as a measure of autonomy and then examines the trends in appropriations in these cases, aiming to provide an overall assessment of trends over time. Section 5.2 articulates the hypotheses that capture the specific empirical expectations under investigation. Section 5.3 provides brief descriptive assessments of these hypotheses. In section 5.4, I describe the regression model specification and estimation and discuss issues specific to time series analysis. Section 5.5 presents and discusses the results, and section 5.6 returns to the broader question of patterns of institutional change.

*5.1 Appropriations to the Prime Ministerial Branches*

The core of this chapter is budget appropriations to prime ministerial branches. This section describes the conceptualization and operationalization of this outcome as an indicator of institutional autonomy. Appropriations in this context are monetary resources that are statutorily allocated to government departments and programs from government accounts, in the form of appropriation acts for particular fiscal years.[62] These acts are the outcomes of budget processes that begin long before the acts are given royal assent. Because of the general tendency to executive dominance and single-party government in Westminster systems, appropriations are highly reflective of government priorities. The budget process is highly controlled and appropriations as enacted are essentially unchanged from the budget estimates presented by the government, since they are treated

[62] The Fiscal Year in Canada and the United Kingdom runs from April 1 to March 31. In Australia and New Zealand, the Fiscal Year runs from July 1 to June 30.

as matters of confidence.[63] Even in a separation of powers presidential system, wherein budgets are contests of negotiation and compromise between the legislature and executive, scholars have taken appropriations to be indicative of institutionalization, so this indicator is well established (Krause 2002; Dickinson and Lebo 2007).[64]

Appropriations have three important characteristics that make them useful as indicators. First, they are intentional, well-scrutinized government decisions. In other words, they reflect deliberate choices on the part of decision makers, not accidents or ad-hoc responses to contingent events.[65] Second, they are clear, considered manifestations of what prime ministers value and prioritize. Third, appropriations are communicated as precise, concrete numbers, formalized in legislation and publicly available. As quantitative data, this increases their validity and reliability from an operationalization standpoint. Other than a few minor issues requiring analyst choice, explained in more detail below, subjective researcher interpretation of the measure is minimized.

Appropriations are also meaningful, if imperfect, proxies for institutional autonomy. In general, more resources enable actors to do more; this is almost inherent in the term 'resources'. Autonomy is closely linked to this freedom of action. Johan Olsen, for instance, describes autonomy as both the absence of external interference and the "capability… to exploit available spaces to manoeuvre" (2010, 152). Prime ministers in

[63] This allows us to substitute estimates for final appropriated amounts in the few instances where appropriations data were missing.

[64] The US Congress has the legislative authority to appropriate funds, and, specifically, the House of Representatives has the sole constitutional authority to originate spending bills. The president has veto power. Presidential authority to unilaterally alter or amend appropriations has been the subject of constitutional debate. The so-called impoundment power, i.e., simply not spending funds that had been appropriated, was considered to be within presidential authority until the Supreme Court found President Nixon's use of it unconstitutional. The Line-Item Veto, which in 1996 had granted the president the authority to nullify individual provisions of a legislative act, was found unconstitutional in 1998; presidents since, and a number of legislators, have advocated for it in some modified form.

[65] Of course, they often are responsive to exogenous events but they go through a legislative procedure that makes them different from spontaneous, "knee-jerk" choices.

Westminster systems have evolved to be increasingly autonomous; this evolution has minimized potential sources of external interference.

However, arguably prime ministers have not always had the means "to exploit available spaces to manoeuvre" independently from other political actors, whose interests may not always align with the head of government's. Even if prime ministers were always more than *primus inter pares*, the heart of collective cabinet government lies in the fact that prime ministers had to work through and with the cabinet to achieve their goals. And the Whitehall model that grew out of civil service reforms in Britain in the 1850s created a neutral, professional, and departmentalized civil service. Thus, before the advent and institutionalization of full-fledged, well-resourced prime ministerial branches, prime ministers were often dependent on such external actors for the kind of authority that comes from control over procedure, information, and advice. Prime ministers have not always been able to counterweigh the authority of other actors who possessed superior institutional resources or representative legitimacy. Thus, increasing the financial resources of prime ministerial branches strengthens the capacity of prime ministers to act on their own to "exploit" opportunities for political action.

The specific operationalization of the measure is the total budgetary appropriation, in the main Appropriation Act for each year, to each prime ministerial branch: the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia and New Zealand, the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom. The data are collected from fiscal years 1946 to 2015, although the foregoing analyses

generally extend only to the 1960s or 1970s.[66] However, three case-specific issues in collecting these data required adjustments.

First, in the appropriations acts for the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office appropriations are reported separately only beginning in FY1969-70.[67] Therefore, to obtain the amounts for years previous, I reconstructed the amounts from partial data.[68] Although I include these data in showing the appropriations trends in figure 5.1, they are not included in the actual analyses in subsequent sections, since most of the data on the explanatory time series post-date 1968. A second UK-specific issue is that there are five years in which there are two main appropriations acts for the same fiscal year, before and after general elections.[69] In all of these cases the appropriations figures were added because it became clear that the sum is more consistent with the prime ministerial appropriations in the years before and after.[70]

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[66] These appropriations set out the allowable expenditures of each department and are the statutory manifestation of the government's budget statements. Thus, they are a reasonable reflection of the government's priorities in particular years. It should also be noted that the annual appropriations bills only account for 25-30% of the government's total expenditures; the majority of spending is incurred by standing or special appropriations set out by prior statute, e.g., pensions, benefits, and continuing payments to states or provinces.

[67] In prior years, the appropriations for the Cabinet Office are included under "Treasury and Subordinate Departments", but without differentiation.

[68] In a few years (1952, 1953, 1955, 1964) Cabinet Office appropriations were stated in reply to parliamentary questions. In order to reconstruct the other amounts, I searched Hansard for statements of the cost of the Treasury excluding subordinate departments. This was found in the House of Commons Debates of March 17, 1953. These costs were £1280000 in 1951-52 and £1248000 in 1952-53. This allows us to have an approximation of the ratio between the Treasury and Cabinet Office budgets for the above years. I then linearly interpolated (and extrapolated) these ratios for the missing years and multiplied the interpolated ratios by the treasury budget. The imputed years are 1946 to 1951, 1954, 1956-1963, and 1965-1968.

[69] 1966, 1974, 1979, 2005, and 2010. For instance, in 1974, 1.021 million pounds was appropriated to the Cabinet Office in the February Appropriations Act and another 1.568 million pounds in Appropriations Act (no. 2) in July (both for FY1975).

[70] To continue the example, Cabinet Office appropriations for FY1974 are 2.270 million, FY1975 2.589 million, FY1976 3.381 million. In gathering the data on the total amount of appropriations (as a control variable), the more consistent amount differed. In 1966, 1974, and 1979, the amount chosen is the post-election appropriation. The latter two cases involved changes of both prime minister and party in power. In 2005 and 2010 the total amount is the more consistent in the time series.

The final issue in collecting the appropriations data was particularly acute in Australia. The inclusion of temporary, ad-hoc line items within the DPMC clearly skews the trend of the variable in some cases.[71] Excluding these items from the appropriations total creates a more consistent time series, and the items are arguably not indicative of the building of institutional capacity and autonomy that is theoretically relevant.[72] While they do certainly speak to the role of DPMC as a central coordinating body and a key 'go-to' agency for running politically sensitive and urgent policy processes, they do not inherently represent institutionalized, stable resource structures serving Australian prime ministers.

The appropriations data are transformed in certain ways to facilitate proper analysis. First, to account for inflation, I transformed appropriations using a Consumer Price Index inflator with 2003 as the reference point (that is, 2003 = 1). Second, for both comparative and ease of interpretation reasons, I standardize appropriations in many instances, particularly in regression analysis.[73] Since the actual amounts are quite varied

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[71] For instance, the raw data shows a very large increase from FY1993 to FY1994: from 173.21 million to 1.08 billion. It remained in the billions until FY2002, when it dropped back to 170 million. This is due to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, which accounts for as much as eighty percent of the total in some years.
This Commission was established in 1990 and was intended to provide robust and meaningful advice, advocacy, and service delivery functions to government concerning indigenous issues. It consisted of elected officials (representatives and an elected board) and an administrative section of civil servants. http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib0203/03cib29
Other examples of this include the National Water Commission (FY2006 and 2007) and one-time payments to *Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act* Bodies. These are bodies under the Act which are set up by statute as separate legal and financial entities from the government or corporations in which the government has controlling interest. Examples from FY2012 include the Australian Sports Commission, the National Library of Australia, and the Australian Film, Television, and Radio School.

[72] In chapter seven, we do return to this question in discussing units within prime ministerial institutions.

[73] More precisely, each fiscal year's appropriation is divided by the CPI Index value for that year, where 2003 = 1. For example, the unadjusted PMI appropriation for FY1972-73 in Canada is $10,832,700. The adjusted PMI appropriation is $\frac{1}{cpi2003} \times pmiapp = \frac{1}{0.219} \times 10{,}832{,}700 = \$49{,}464{,}180$. This reflects inflation and allows within-country comparisons. For across-case comparisons, this value is then standardized within-country because the adjusted appropriations level is not comparable across countries.

among the cases, directly comparing the unstandardized trends and interpreting the unstandardized regression coefficients across cases is problematic. As well, because the inflation-adjusted appropriations amounts are relative to 2003, their actual values are meaningless; standardizing the measure creates a more meaningful comparator.

The discussion thus far explicates conceptual and methodological issues in utilizing appropriations to prime ministerial branches as a measure of institutional autonomy. Finally, then, I present the appropriations trends over time for each case. Figure 5.1, below, plots the appropriations time series for each country from 1946 to 2015, adjusted for inflation as described earlier. For visualization purposes, both New Zealand and the United Kingdom trends are split into two periods. Dramatic shifts in these series, at 1990 in New Zealand and 2000 in the UK, make graphs of the whole trends visually misleading. These trends reveal significant variation in appropriations to prime ministerial branches across cases and over time. One of the key findings in this chapter is that the simple story of gradually increasing institutional resources is belied by the more complex patterns of change seen in the appropriations trends.

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The standardized version outputs the z-score, where $= \frac{x_i - \bar{x}}{sd(x)}$ . This is the variable expressed in terms of standard deviations from the mean. So, the FY1972-73 CPI indexed and standardized appropriation is -0.015.

Figure 5.1

*Appropriations to Prime Ministerial Branches, All Countries, 1946-2015*




*Note:* Figure shows budgeted appropriations to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia and New Zealand), the Privy Council Office (Canada), and the Cabinet Office (UK). Amounts are in millions of the respective currencies, inflation-adjusted within country using a Consumer Price Index measure, with 2003 as the benchmark, i.e., amounts are relative to 2003 values.

In Australia, no overall trend in appropriations emerges. Two different patterns are evident. First, there are periods where extreme spikes in appropriations occur: the mid-1960s, early to mid-1970s, and the most recent two years. The earlier periods correspond to moments of extensive machinery of government change, especially in the 1970s, with dramatic economic and social policy upheaval undertaken by Gough Whitlam's Labor government from 1972 to 1975. To recall, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

itself was only established in 1971. In recent years, the DPMC has established new and institutionally expansive structures dealing with indigenous affairs (see chapter 8). Second, between these spikes, DPMC appropriations seem to follow a cyclical pattern in which appropriations are stable or incrementally increasing, reach a peak, then fall abruptly. This cycle characterizes much of the period from the mid-1970s to 2010.

The New Zealand appropriations are divided into two periods in figure 5.1, from 1946 to 1989 and from 1990 to 2015. This periodization reflects the establishment of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1990, replacing the Prime Minister's Department. In the pre-DPMC period, the post-war department was extraordinarily well-resourced because of the significant burdens of transitioning to peacetime and inertia from the wartime context itself. From 1950 to the early 1970s, appropriations consistently remain very low. This changes in the 1970s and 1980s; appropriations in 1982, for instance, are almost seven times what they were ten years earlier. The establishment of the DPMC in 1990 produces another dramatic increase in appropriations. From 1990 to 1993, they grow more than eight-fold. There is then a reduction in appropriations of almost forty percent, to a level which is relatively stable until the mid to late-2000s. Thus, while the prime ministerial branches in these countries are certainly better resourced and more institutionally autonomous than they were in 1946, the patterns of appropriations in Australia and New Zealand are much more volatile than our initial expectation of a more incremental process of institutionalization.

In contrast, the Canadian case exhibits an appropriations trend that conforms more to expectations of gradual institutionalization. Appropriations to the Privy Council Office remain relatively low until the mid-1960s, after which they follow an incremental upward

trajectory.[74] Although the trend fluctuates slightly and appears to have some periodic component, the overall direction is positive and there are no dramatic changes as seen in the Australian and New Zealand cases. The PCO at its peak of appropriations, from 2005 to 2007, is *eighteen* times larger compared to forty years prior. Thus, the Canadian PCO presents in many ways the "model" case for institutional change in the prime ministerial branches: incremental yet, accumulated over time, of extraordinary magnitude.

Finally, appropriations to the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom follow a similar pattern to that observed in Canada, with one major exception. As the figure shows, appropriations in the UK remain at low levels until the early 1970s, and increase steadily afterwards.[75] However, appropriations increase dramatically from 1999 to 2000 (from 42.5 million GBP to 219.8 million, in nominal terms), so much so that the trends had to be plotted separately for ease of visualization.[76] After 2000, the trend is still positive but the correlation between year and appropriations decreases (from 0.87 to 0.70). As above, testing for structural breaks supports these observations. Thus, on the basis only of visual inspection of the appropriations trends, one should expect that the Canadian and UK cases will generally provide stronger support for the dynamic theories involving longer-term change over time: the public expectations and economic trends

[74] This observation is borne out by a statistical test for structural breaks in a regression, the Chow Test, in this case of appropriations on year. With 1967 as the break point, the test result is statistically significant: the year coefficient is statistically different in the period to 1967 from the period after ($F = 7.88$, $p = 0.006$). The post-1967 coefficient is five times larger than the pre-1967 coefficient (1678.1 versus 346.7).

[75] It should be noted that the consistency of the trend before 1969 is due to the linear imputation of many of the values, as described above. Nonetheless, all of the 'actual' data points in this series support this interpretation of the overall trend.

[76] This dramatic increase is not reflected, however, in all of the information sources. The Cabinet Office departmental reports, for instance, indicate that expenditure outturn figures were 167 million for 1999 and 170 million for 2000. Indeed, there are many discrepancies even between the annual department reports, reporting for the same periods. In the interest of consistency, the line-item appropriation figure is used here, even though it shows this considerable disjunction.

theories. The Australian and New Zealand cases should conform less strongly with expectations because they lack a clear longer-term positive trend over time.

It is important to have a clear picture of how appropriations to the Westminster prime ministerial branches have varied over time. However, the above discussion does not necessarily reveal whether these appropriations have changed in relative terms. It could be the case that they simply reflect changes in government spending over time. That is, prime ministerial branch appropriations could simply be tracking overall spending trends. This is accounted for in the regression analysis below by controlling for both "government consumption" as a measure of central government activity, and total annual budget appropriations. Here, I demonstrate graphically that branch appropriations are not simply reflections of total appropriations. Figure 5.2 shows branch appropriations as a percentage of total budgetary appropriations for all four countries between 1946 and 2015.

Figure 5.2

*Appropriations to Prime Ministerial Branches, Percent of Total, All Countries, 1946-2015*



If branch appropriations were simply a function of total appropriations, the percentage of the latter that the former constitutes would remain constant over time. For example, if branch appropriations constituted one percent of total appropriations consistently for a period even as they increase by twenty percent during the period, one would conclude that the increase is due entirely to increasing total appropriations, not specifically prime ministerial branch appropriations. If these were distinct phenomena, however, the percentage would change over time in some meaningful way (presumably, related to the branch appropriations trend). The graphs clearly indicate that this is not the case in any of the countries. Indeed, the percentage trends mirror closely the appropriations trends presented in figure 5.1. The static and dynamic periods in the appropriations trends correspond in time with static and dynamic periods in the relative proportion that branch appropriations constitutes. The two are distinct phenomena, suggesting that they are driven by distinctive sets of factors.

*5.2 Empirical Expectations*

In chapter three, I presented several broad, theoretical expectations about how assertive citizenship, economic trends, and political conditions are related to prime ministerial branch institutionalization. In order to assess these theories empirically, I restate these expectations as they apply specifically to appropriations to prime ministerial branches. These hypotheses are summarized in table 5.1, and elaborated below.

Table 5.1
*Summary of Hypotheses for Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations*

| |
|---|
| Theory of Public Expectations |
| H1. As aggregate interest in politics increases, appropriations to prime ministerial branches increase. |
| H2. As aggregate identification with political parties weakens, appropriations to prime ministerial branches increase. |

H3. As the aggregate assertiveness of political cultures increases, appropriations to prime ministerial branches increase.

Economic Factors

H4. As a country's level of globalization increases, appropriations to its prime ministerial branch increases.

H5. As central government activity increases, appropriations to prime ministerial branches increase.

Political Conditions

H6a. Prime ministerial branch appropriations decrease as terms continue.

H6b. Prime ministerial branch appropriations increase as terms continue.

H7. The more legislative support a prime minister has, the greater the appropriations to prime ministerial branches.

H8. Prime ministerial branch appropriations are lower under more conservative prime ministers than under more liberal prime ministers.

First, the core proposition of the Theory of Public Expectations is that assertive political citizenship creates conditions that incentivize prime ministerial branch institutionalization. As assertive citizenship becomes more predominant, the power of prime ministers to control political messaging, advance a political and policy agenda, and deliver on policy change declines. Coupled with a growing lack of trust in and perceived legitimacy of political actors generally, prime ministers face significant, new pressures to build their institutional capacity in response. One way they do so is to augment the budgetary resources of their support structures.

As discussed in chapter four, I operationalize assertive citizenship in three indicators, using electoral survey data. The process of constructing these variables was discussed in the previous chapter and, in further detail, in appendix A3. These three variables are levels of interest in politics, where high interest reflects more assertiveness; second, strength of party identification, where lower (weaker) identification reflects a

higher assertive orientation; and third, a constructed index of assertiveness, where by construction higher index values indicate higher assertiveness. In this chapter, then, the hypothesized relationships between these measures and appropriations to prime ministerial branches are as follows:

> *H1. As aggregate interest in politics increases, appropriations to prime ministerial branches increase.*
> *H2. As aggregate identification with political parties weakens, appropriations to prime ministerial branches increase.*
> *H3. As the aggregate assertiveness of political cultures increases, appropriations to prime ministerial branches increase.*

I also articulate several sets of alternatives to the Public Expectations hypotheses, drawn from the literature and the discussion in chapter three. The first looks to change over time in macroeconomic structures in advanced democracies. In particular, I assess the institutional impact of two significant trends of the post-war period: globalization and growth in government economic activity. Globalization, the increasing social, economic, and political integration and interdependence of countries and economies, arguably drives institutionalization because it pressures prime ministers to respond to and countermand the "withering of the state", generates new pressures to coordinate and implement policy decisions, and raises the symbolic stature of prime ministers on the international stage.

Second, all advanced economies took on new responsibilities for social welfare and maintaining economic growth in the post-second world war period (though unevenly and to varying extents). In fiscal terms, this implies that a larger proportion of a country's total economic output would be taken up by government spending. This change generates a significantly more complex, more contested and more difficult public policy process requiring greater coordination, oversight, and attention to outcomes. To the extent that the centre of government is inherently best positioned to perform these functions, the

institutional impact of growth in government activity is growth in the centre's resources. These relationships are expressed as follows:

> *H4. As a country's level of globalization increases, appropriations to its prime ministerial branch increases.*
> *H5. As central government activity increases, appropriations to prime ministerial branches increase.*

Finally, because prime ministers are political actors it is reasonable to expect that short-term political considerations would enter into their decisional calculus. I identified three aspects of the political context in which prime ministers make decisions that seem directly relevant to appropriations to prime ministerial branches: term effects, legislative support, and ideology.[77] Term effects refer to when, during a prime ministerial term, the appropriations decision occurs. On the one hand, experience suggests that new governments usually seek to establish control over the political and policy direction of government, bolstered by the salience of electoral or leadership promises and the political capital that a change or renewal of democratic legitimacy provides. Prime ministers will want to 'put their stamp' on government for both substantive and symbolic purposes. However, as the term continues, the decreased salience of promises, the diminishment of political capital, and the constant flow of new issues and problems to be dealt with will erode the ability and willingness of prime ministers to make significant institutional change. This suggests a diminishing relationship between years in a prime ministerial term and appropriations, as follows:

> *H6a. Prime ministerial branch appropriations decrease as terms continue.*

[77] By short-term we mean effects that do not systematically vary with time across our time period (1946-2015), but with the cycles of political events, e.g., elections.

Alternatively, prime ministers may need some time in office to assess the conditions for prime ministerial leadership, and their own position. While prime ministers may be at their political peak at the outset of a term, they may have less confidence when confronted by an entrenched public service, and risk being overwhelmed by the complexity of the machinery of government and the public policy problems facing them. While incumbent prime ministers may not share these issues, it may still be the case that policy change, rather than institutional change, is prioritized in the beginning of a prime ministerial term, with institutional change only considered once governments settle into office. Thus, rather than declining, appropriations might instead increase as terms continue. An alternative sixth hypothesis is thus that:

*H6b. Prime ministerial branch appropriations increase as terms continue.*

A second political condition is the legislative support that a government has. I expect that governments with greater seat share or majority status appropriate more resources to prime ministerial institutions.[78] Unlike in the US case, where legislative bargaining with Congress is seen as the key driver of presidential institutionalization (Dickinson and Lebo 2007), prime ministers in Westminster systems are structurally more legislatively secure; their 'fight' is with the civil service, other actors in the political executive, and the public at large. Regardless of the legislative support they have, all prime ministers confront the difficulties of complex, entrenched, and often unwieldy bureaucracies, and the imperatives of pushing a government agenda forward and communicating this agenda to the public. However, more highly supported prime

[78] The latter we test only in Canada because in Australia and the UK there are not enough non-majority observations and in New Zealand majority status is perfectly correlated with the 'structural break' of electoral reform in 1993. Even in Canada the minority observations are low and associated with particular periods, creating a lack of variation. Thus, in the analysis we strongly emphasize the seat share measure.

ministers are less constrained by the need to satisfy other parties, coalition partners, or their own caucus. Thus, they are arguably freer to embark on change in the machinery of government, including the building of their own institutional capacities. These considerations are captured in hypothesis 7:

> *H7. The more legislative support a prime minister has, the greater the appropriations to prime ministerial branches.*

Finally, ideology is expected to play an important role. I probe whether there is a significant relationship between ideology and appropriations, whereby conservative prime ministers will appropriate resources less than their liberal counterparts. While the above logic about pressures on prime ministers applies equally to left and right, right-of-centre ideologies favour smaller government in general (at least in practice), and limiting the growth or decreasing the size of the bureaucratic machinery in particular. They want government to do less, and less government to do less with. Thus, more conservative prime ministers have ideological and pragmatic reasons to be somewhat less enthusiastic about growing the prime ministerial branch. In such cases they will not choose to increase appropriations, or will do so at lower levels than other prime ministers. This proposition is captured in hypothesis 8.

> *H8. Prime ministerial branch appropriations are lower under more conservative prime ministers than under more liberal prime ministers*.

In sum, these eight hypotheses represent the core of my inquiry, and form the foundation for the empirical analysis below.

### *5.3 Preliminary Assessments*

I turn now to examining the evidence for these eight fundamental hypotheses. This section sets up the primary analysis in later sections of the chapter by exploring the

data and presenting some preliminary assessments of the hypotheses. It uses basic descriptive statistical techniques and visualization. This serves two purposes. First, it relates information about the summary characteristics of variables and their relationship with appropriations. This is, in my view, an underappreciated step in analysis because it offers readers greater ability to assess how variable distributions affect their estimated impacts. Simply offering a table of summary statistics (which is additionally included in the study's appendix A2) sometimes underplays the extent to which variables may be skewed or otherwise distributed non-normally.

The second reason for engaging in preliminary exploration is to provide a 'first cut' at determining whether these hypotheses are supported by the data. Although the effects of other variables are not controlled for, the apparent relationships demonstrated in this section serve to provide a comparative baseline for further analysis. The theories and hypotheses in this study are highly original; they do not directly build from previous empirical tests in the literature. Because of this study's exploratory aspect, descriptive analysis is helpful in building expectations against which more rigorous investigation can be set.

As the Theory of Public Expectations is the primary theory, I focus on its associated hypotheses. I briefly examine the alternative explanations concerning economic trends and political conditions. The first Public Expectations hypothesis associates political interest, as a measure of assertive citizenship, with prime ministerial branch appropriations. Higher levels of political interest indicate higher assertiveness, so we expect a positive relationship. Bivariate correlations for this and the other assertive measures are given in appendix table A5.1, and visualizations of these associations are

plotted in appendix figures A5.1 through A5.3. This evidence suggests that the expected relationship between interest and appropriations, where high values of political interest correspond to high appropriations, is not evident in all cases; Canada is the most positive case. In both Canada, as a whole, and in the United Kingdom prior to 2000, the relationships are relatively linear and in the hypothesized positive direction: the correlations for the two cases are $r = 0.72$ and $r = 0.76$, respectively. However, after 2000, the linearity of the points is not very strong; this is confirmed by the lack of a statistically significant correlation ($r = 0.21$, $p = 0.44$).[79]

Thus, in only one case, Canada, is there a strong prima facie for the hypothesis connecting political interest and appropriations. In the United Kingdom, the relationship is evident in the pre-Blair period, while the last fifteen years, since 2000, do not provide such evidence. In the other cases, the relationship is far less evident. For Australia, the association between interest and appropriations appears to be absent. The same conclusion can be made for New Zealand both over the whole period, and before and after the establishment of the DPMC in 1990. Bear in mind, however, that the plots only visualize the contemporaneous association of the variables, without dynamic elements such as lags and long-run effects.

Is party identification associated with prime ministerial branch appropriations? Hypothesis H2 posits a negative relationship, so weaker party identification should be associated with greater appropriations and vice versa. Again, the Canadian and pre-2000 UK cases exhibit the strongest evidence for such a relationship. In Canada, there is a clear negative association, although the observations are not tightly clustered around a linear fit line, were one drawn; the correlation statistic is moderate (-0.56). The pre-2000

[79] That is, the average error between the points and a best linear fit line is relatively large.

UK plot also demonstrates an apparent negative association between party identification and appropriations, although more ‘curvilinear’ than in Canada. Weaker levels of party identification have a strong linear negative association with appropriations while stronger levels exhibit a ‘flatter’ relationship, suggesting an asymmetric effect. The association, however, is not present in the post-2000 period ($r = -0.38$).

In Australia, the bivariate relationship between party identification and appropriations is not demonstrated. In New Zealand, while the overall association is strongly negative, this is driven by clustering of pre- and post-1990 observations. After the establishment of the DPMC in 1990, the association between strength of party identification and appropriations is not evident. Thus, support for the party identification hypothesis shows a similar pattern to political interest: clearly supportive in the Canada and pre-2000 UK data and not supportive in Australia and the UK since 2000. In New Zealand, the evidence favours a relationship between party identification and appropriations before 1990 but not since.

A third indicator of assertive citizenship is the Assertive Index, constructed from surveys over time. The index aggregates many values and attitudes that represent the range of areas where assertive citizenship differs from allegiant citizenship. Once again, observations of the Canadian prime ministerial branch show unequivocal support for the hypothesis. A linear, positive relationship is definitively shown, although the dispersion in the observations suggests a degree of heteroskedasticity. The evidence also suggests that in Australia there is a small but meaningful positive association between appropriations and the index; the correlation is moderately strong ($r = 0.51$, $p = 0.00$). By contrast, the New Zealand plot shows no evidence that the two are related.

Finally, the plots and correlations of UK Cabinet Office appropriations against the assertive index present an interesting counterpoint. In contrast to what we observed for the political interest and party identification measures, the pre-2000 period shows a relationship opposite to expectations. The association has a clear negative direction; the correlation of -0.59 is robust. Meanwhile, the post-2000 plot suggests a positive association, but one or two of the observations seem to have strong influence on the correlation. As with the other UK measures, then, differential effects of assertive citizenship on appropriations based on period are suggested. I assess this in the regression analysis below through various means, including a period dummy variable, interaction of this dummy with the assertive measures, and separate models.

The preceding observations do not directly reflect the temporality of the Theory of Public Expectations. At its core, the theory concerns the effects of social change on institutional change. These changes take place over time, and so the theory is a story about how social change generates institutional change as a function of time. How do the assertive citizenship measures and prime ministerial branch appropriations change as functions over time? The regression models account for these dynamics in certain ways. Here, I examine whether these trends move together over time, based on the time series plots in the chapter's appendix, figure A5.4.

These visualizations of change over time largely support the observations above. Political interest increases together with appropriations relatively closely in the Canadian case and in the United Kingdom, prior to 2000. The congruence of the trends in Canada is especially evident since the mid-1980s; in the latter, since the early 1980s. Over the whole period, both political interest and appropriations begin relatively low and end at or

near their peaks. In Australia, political interest rises markedly in the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, fluctuating since, but appropriations have not consistently trended until, perhaps, the mid-2000s. In New Zealand, again, there is little evidence of covariance across time; indeed, New Zealanders have not become noticeably more politically interested over time.

Party identification is a more complex story, perhaps because of the three measures it is the most tied up in electoral politics. While in all of the countries, party identification has weakened overall since the 1960s or 1970s, the trends are not as straightforward. In Canada, for instance, the period in which party identification drops the most noticeably, from about 1980 to 2005, is also a period in which appropriations generally trend upward. However, the identification trend is erratic so it is unlikely to be strongly temporally covarying with appropriations. Outside of this period, party identification appears to show a positive relationship with appropriations, contrary to expectations. Australia is a similar case: party identification weakens considerably until after 2000, a period in which appropriations do not trend much either way; both trends increase after this point. Clear associations between party identification and appropriations in the expected negative direction are not shown in New Zealand or the UK, either. Thus, in accounting for time, it appears the party identification hypothesis is not well supported.

The time series plots for the Assertive Index support earlier observations: the index and appropriations trend together very closely in Canada and relatively closely in Australia. In the UK, the earlier finding of a differential association between the pre- and post-2000 period is confirmed here. Assertiveness and appropriations diverge from about

1980: Britons became less assertive for the next two decades, while appropriations increased. In New Zealand, there is no visual evidence of a temporal co-variance between assertiveness and appropriations. To summarize, then, the evidence in this section provides both supporting and contrary evidence for the public expectations hypotheses. Only in the Canadian case is there strong supporting evidence for the hypotheses broadly. Among the other cases the evidence is much more mixed, and in New Zealand there is little to substantiate the hypotheses, especially in terms of the post-1990 period.

Finally, I briefly examine the alternative hypotheses identified earlier. In chapter three, I identified and described two sets of explanations as alternatives to the Theory of Public Expectations, economic trends and political conditions, and articulated specific hypotheses earlier in this chapter. The first, H4, is that globalization is positively associated with prime ministerial branch appropriations. The second, H5, posits that government activity is also positively associated with appropriations to prime ministerial branches. The second set of explanations considers the effects of the short-term political conditions under which prime ministers operate on appropriations decisions, specifically, time of occurrence in a prime minister's term, legislative support, and ideology.

Is globalization positively associated with prime ministerial branch appropriations? Like the assertive measures, both globalization and appropriations should vary systematically over time. Both measures of globalization, the KOF Index and trade openness, trend upward over time, although the index plateaus after 2000 in all cases. This suggests that the two cases where the upward trend in appropriations is most evident, Canada and the UK, should be the most supportive. Indeed, the correlations for Canada and the UK are quite high ($r = 0.82$ and $0.70$, respectively), and the

correspondence between the trends over time is especially striking in the Canadian case. In Australia, the correlation is negative and not statistically significant. Excluding outliers in the Australian data reduces the magnitude of the negative association but it remains anomalous. The correlations between trade openness and appropriations tell a similar story, though in Australia the correlation is still relatively low (r = 0.36) but now significant, likely a result of more (earlier) observations. Finally, in New Zealand the correlation is again affected by clustering; in the period since the DPMC was established, the association is not significant. Thus, the theoretical expectations for the globalization hypothesis are better met in the Canadian and UK cases than in Australia and New Zealand.

The government activity hypothesis posits that government spending will be positively associated with prime ministerial branch appropriations: as activity increases, appropriations increase in similar fashion. The descriptive evidence for this is mixed. In two cases, Australia and Canada, there are positive, statistically significant associations (Australia, r = 0.31, Canada, r = 0.84). However, in New Zealand the correlation is positive (0.11) but not significant, while in the UK the correlation is negative (-0.12) but also not significant. In these two cases, there is clear clustering of points. These findings reflect the fact that government activity in Australia and Canada follows the expected increasing trend over time with only slight departures, while the trends in New Zealand and the UK follow a much different pattern. In both, activity rises sharply between 1960 and 1980 but falls just as sharply in the next two decades. One reason for this is that both cases adopted aspects of new public management and budget austerity to an extent not

evident in Australia and Canada. Thus, there should be government activity effects in the latter but not in New Zealand or the UK.

Then, I turn to the political conditions hypotheses. These hypotheses set out ways in which prime ministerial branch appropriations are impacted by aspects of the political contexts within which prime ministers operate. H6, the term effect hypothesis, posits that appropriations are a function of the elapsing of prime ministerial terms, either increasing or decreasing during terms. Descriptively, neither directional hypothesis is unequivocally supported; there does not appear to be any consistent, systematic relationship. Analysis of variance tests show that in three of the four cases, excepting New Zealand, the differences between term years is statistically significant at different significance levels.[80] This tells us that change in prime ministerial branch appropriations is not equal across the term on average in these cases, but does not provide evidence for any directionality. Thus, the evidence supports neither of the term effect hypotheses.

The second political conditions hypothesis posits that legislative support is positively associated with change in prime ministerial branch appropriations. However, there does not appear to be any relationship between the two in terms of seat share. Correlations are very low to negligible; none are statistically significant. An alternative measure of legislative support, the dichotomous measure of whether a government has a majority, is assessed only in the Canadian case, where a difference of means test shows no significant difference between average change in appropriations in majority versus non-majority governments.

[80] Australia, F = 3.70, p = 0.02; Canada, F = 2.22, p = 0.08; UK, F = 4.68, p = 0.00; UK w/o imputed results, F = 2.97, 0.04

Finally, H8 proposes that conservative prime ministers will appropriate resources at lower levels than liberal prime ministers. This hypothesis is tested with two different measures. The first uses Manifesto Research on Political Representation data on party election platforms. Matching this data against change in appropriations suggests that ideology is not meaningfully related to change in appropriations. This is confirmed by the correlations, which are low and not significant for any of the cases. The second measure is a dichotomous indicator of whether the prime minister's party is a "centre-left" party or a "centre-right" party.[81] However, none of the mean differences between party types is significant and, in three of the four cases, the centre-right average is actually higher than the centre-left average. Therefore, the political conditions hypotheses are not supported by the descriptive analysis here.

*5.4 Regression Model Specification and Estimation*

This section and the next constitute the main empirical test of the hypotheses about determinants of prime ministerial branch appropriations. In this section, I explain and justify the model specification and estimation process for the regression analyses in the subsequent section (and those in chapter six). These are the main tests of the model of prime ministerial branch institutionalization elaborated in previous chapters.

Thus far, I have introduced the Theory of Public Expectations, and two alternative views, framed them in terms of a dynamic causal model, and derived specific empirical hypotheses about determinants of appropriations. This is about as far as theory can go in terms of specifying regression models. While theory guides the basic choices of variables

[81] The centre-left parties are the Australian Labor Party in Australia, the Liberal Party in Canada, the Labour Party in New Zealand, and the UK Labour Party. The centre-right parties are the Liberal Party in Australia, the Progressive Conservative or Conservative parties in Canada, the National Party in New Zealand, and the Conservative Party in the UK.

to include and the basic modeling setup, it is often not an adequate guide for specification, especially in time series setups. As de Boef and Keele (2008, 186) argue, theories "typically tell us only generally how inputs relate to processes we care about". In dynamic specifications, the role of theory is to focus attention on the idea that the "past matters". It is difficult to envision a theory of politics so precise as to dictate "which lags matter, whether levels or changes drive $Y_t$, what characterizes equilibrium behaviour, or what effects are likely to be biggest in the long run" (186). This is not unique to dynamic specifications, although it may be more acute; analysts always make certain modeling decisions that are not strictly theory-driven but responses to violations of statistical assumptions.[82]

The most important characteristic of the study's data is that many of the crucial variables are time-variant, that is, they form time series. This is incorporated in our causal model, in which we treat these variables differently from variables that are not time series. Time series data poses particular problems for analysis. Analysts must "take time seriously" by modeling the dynamics in the first place (de Boef and Keele 2008). As well, key assumptions of the classical linear model, particularly error independence and constant error variance, are likely to be violated in time series data.[83] Additionally, the correlation between two variables that vary over time may appear strong, but is in fact spurious; there is no true relationship between the variables but they share an association with time so they appear related. In order to make valid inferences about dynamic

[82] For example, aggregating or dropping variables because of multicollinearity, transforming variables to account for non-linearity, or excluding outliers. These decisions are sometimes retroactively given a theoretical interpretation but often they are clearly based on statistical necessity.

[83] These violations generally do not bias the coefficients themselves but do underestimate standard errors, which causes incorrect significance tests on those coefficients.

relationships, these issues should be accounted for. The rest of this section describes this accounting.

The first issue is serial correlation. Serial correlation is simply when errors are correlated across time: a common case is when error at one time point is correlated with error at the next time point (Pickup 2015, 12). This is called 'first-order' autocorrelation.[84] In time series data, serial correlation is often not due to measurement error but has substantive meaning (Pickup 2015, 92). The correlation occurs because the value of variables at one point in time is a function of their values at other (previous) points in time. Thus, we can *model* the correlation by using lagged terms such as lagged dependent variables (which often minimizes residual autocorrelation), introducing a dynamic element, rather than simply 'fixing' it.

Time series analysis also encounters the issue of stationarity. A stationary variable is one whose mean and variance are constant over time and in which the covariance between two time points depends only on the distance of lag (potentially) and not on the actual time (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 125). A stationary time series has no memory; by definition, changes cannot persist because the series must return to equilibrium. Conversely, for a nonstationary, or integrated, variable, the mean and variance change over time; in theory, they wander infinitely far as time passes. The impact of changes in a time series can persist into the future. Stationarity is important for several reasons. Statistical tests used to determine the statistical significance of estimated coefficients, for

[84] Economic time series often have fourth-order autocorrelation in seasonal data or twelfth-order autocorrelation in monthly data. 'Autocorrelation' refers to a variable that correlates with itself, of which serial correlation is a specific type. One way of treating this issue is simply to 'ignore' it by correcting it post-hoc. However, an opportunity is missed by treating misspecification errors like serial correlation as "nuisances" to be corrected by alternative estimation techniques or by manipulating standard errors in a static model (e.g., Prais-Winsten regression or OLS with Newey-West standard errors). As Beck and Katz (2011, 341) note, doing so is both inefficient and still produces incorrect standard errors.

instance, depend on certain asymptotic properties that are not satisfied under non-stationarity. Stationarity is also important because regressing one nonstationary variable on another without accounting for it can lead to spurious inferences about their relationship. In the time series context, two variables can 'move together' across time without actually being related. To substantiate proper inferences about the long-run relationship between two nonstationary variables, one needs to test for and include a model term that renders the relationship between them stationary.

The analysis below, and in the next chapter, uses error correction models (ECMs) to specify and estimate the parameters of interest. "Error correction" means that the model provides a direct estimate of how quickly the long-term equilibrium relationship between outcome and explanatory variables is restored after the short-term impact of a change in explanatory variables (de Boef and Keele 2008, 189). These models are general in that they can be applied to both stationary and non-stationary data (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 171; Pickup 2015, 191), although they have traditionally been limited to situations where cointegration exists (de Boef and Keele 2008). ECMs are designed to "account for the nonstationary nature of the data by allowing for the possibility of a long-run relationship, while also investigating whether short-term perturbations are related" (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 157). They allow analysts to estimate both the instantaneous effects of variables and the amount of persistence in a variable's effect after the instantaneous effect; together, these effects constitute a variable's total impact on the dependent variable. The general form of the ECM for one independent variable is as follows, from Pickup (2015, 185):

$$\Delta y_t = \alpha_0 + \gamma(y_{t-1} - \kappa_1 x_{t-1}) + \kappa_0 \Delta x_t + \varepsilon_t$$

In this form, the estimate of $\gamma$ is the error correction rate, $\kappa_0$is the short-run (instantaneous) effect of the variable, and $\kappa_1$the long-run impact of the variable. Note that the ECM is a differenced model: the dependent variable and the short-run effects are differences, not levels. This is because of the non-stationarity of the variables; tests for stationarity of the dependent variable, prime ministerial branch appropriations, show that in none of the four countries is the variable stationary.[85] The model's dynamic variables are also all non-stationary. As long as the error correction model satisfactorily eliminates residual autocorrelation and heteroskedastic errors, estimates can be obtained via ordinary least squares regression. The models thus estimate three parameters of interest.

First, they produce estimates of the error correction rate. Recall that the error correction model posits a long-term equilibrium relationship between the dependent variable, appropriations, and the dynamic independent variables included in the model. However, short-run changes in the independent variables can produce 'shocks' to the dependent variable such that the equilibrium relationship is disturbed. The error correction rate is an estimate of how much of the divergence from equilibrium is corrected or eliminated in each period (year). Theoretically, it suggests the 'stickiness' of the variable relationships. Normally, it should fall between 0 and -1, where -1 indicates that 100 percent of the disequilibrium is corrected in one year. A slower rate of error correction, for example, -0.5, indicates that the adjustment to equilibrium occurs over multiple years. A very slow error correction rate, close to 0, means that shocks caused by independent variable changes persist for many years, which is indicative of a 'sluggish' process. An estimate less than -1 may mean that the system 'overcorrects', i.e., that the

[85] Results are given in the study's appendix table A5.1.

return to equilibrium occurs in a fractional period, or that the variables actually do not converge on a long-term equilibrium.

Second, the short-run effects are the instantaneous (or lagged) impact of changes in the independent variables on the dependent variable. Since the short-run variables are period-differenced, the estimated coefficients indicate how much a one-unit difference in the year-on-year change in independent variables affects year-on-year change in the dependent variable, on average. For instance, if the short-run coefficient on $\Delta x_t$ is 0.5, $y_t$ changes 0.5 units per year on average for every one unit change in $\Delta x_t$ , e.g., the difference between an increase of four units of *x* per year versus three units of *x* per year. In the models, there are also 'exogenous' parameters, the political conditions, that are constrained to having only short-run effects because the theory expects them to not have long-run, persistent effects; they are not time-variant but periodic. Since they are stationary by definition, they are not differenced. Thus, these short-run effects can be interpreted much as normal regression coefficients are.

Finally, the long-run effects of the dynamic variables indicate the 'total' effect of the variables distributed across time. These effects indicate the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable in equilibrium, in *level* form. In other words, while short-run effects are about year-on-year change, long-run effects more directly attest to the question of whether high levels of assertive citizenship, for example, are significantly related to high levels of branch appropriations, or vice versa. This is precisely the advantage of error correction models in dealing with time series: they

produce estimates of both short and long-run effects, as well as the speed with which the long-run equilibrium is restored after short-run disturbances.[86]

I estimate separate error correction models for each of the three public expectations variables of political interest, party identification, and the assertive index, for all four countries. In each model, I include the economic trend and total appropriations variables. As well, each model includes the political conditions variables as 'exogenous', deterministic variables. In the models for New Zealand and the United Kingdom, I include dummy variables to account for the discontinuity in the appropriations trend, at 1990 and 2000, respectively, where applicable. Although I did not specify hypotheses for any interaction effects in the models, for interest's sake I also estimate models that include variables interacting public expectations with political conditions. This would indicate whether the effects of assertive citizenship are different in different political contexts such as ideology. As mentioned earlier, I also estimate the interaction between the public expectations variables and the period dummy variable in the UK case to assess if their effects are significantly different before and after 2000.

As post-estimation checks, I run various tests for heteroskedasticity and residual autocorrelation, the results of which are given in the chapter appendix table A5.6. Additionally, I report a number of model goodness of fit measures and the results of the

[86] Modeling the process of appropriations change in error correction form also has the advantage of minimizing multicollinearity. In level form, many of the dynamic regressors – that is, assertive citizenship, globalization, government activity, and total appropriations – exhibit very high collinearity. When this is the case, inferences about the independent effects of regressors are incorrect because the standard errors of coefficient estimates are inflated (though not biased), increasing the probability of Type II errors. Essentially, disentangling the effects of highly intercorrelated variables is difficult because they share the proportion of the dependent variable explained. However, in difference form, correlations among variables are drastically reduced. For example, in the Canada data, several of the pairwise correlations between variables are in the 0.70-0.80 range, while the highest correlation in difference form is -0.56, and most are much smaller. This greatly simplifies model specification and presentation because it reduces the number of separate models needed.

Bounds Test procedure of Pesaran et al. (2000). This is a significance test of whether, in an error correction model, there is in fact a long-run relationship among all of the independent variables and the dependent variable in level form: the null hypothesis is no such relationship. The models were estimated in Stata, a statistical program, with the user-written command *ardl*, which has an option to estimate in error correction form. As above, since we do not have sufficient theory to specify variable lags, the optimal lag structure is found using the Akaike Information Criterion.[87] Time trend variables were included only in the Canadian and the pre-2000 UK cases, the only appropriations time series that seemed to suggest a clear linear trend.

*5.5 Regression Results*

To what extent are prime ministerial branch appropriations determined by public expectations, economic trends, and political conditions? To answer this question, this section presents the results from the model estimation process described in the previous section. The results are extracted from the full regression results tables provided in the chapter's appendix tables A5.2 through A5.5, by country. I explicate the overall performance of the models and then examine the results pertaining to the specific hypotheses.

In terms of overall model performance, there is a great deal of variability in how well the models explain change in prime ministerial branch appropriations and the extent to which dynamics are present. Overall, all of the models explain a relatively large proportion of variation in the dependent variable, but this is to be expected given the inclusion of lagged dependent variables. In examining the goodness of fit measures, no single type of model performs better than the other models across the board. In Australia,

[87] The optimal lag structure is the one that minimizes this criterion.

both the political interest and assertive index models perform better than the party identification model. In Canada, the party identification and assertive index models perform marginally better than the political interest model, but the results are nearly identical. For the post-1990 New Zealand models, the political interest model performs best, but the assertive index model performs best overall. Finally, in the UK the assertive index model produces the best overall fit, but performs worse than the party identification model in the pre-2000 models. Overall, the models that measure public expectations through the assertive index exhibit greater model fit than the others, but not markedly so.

For the most part, the choice of the error correction structure to model appropriations is supported by post-estimation tests and tests for the existence of long-run relationships. In most cases, the model residuals are serially uncorrelated and show constant error variance, within statistical significance levels. However, the overall United Kingdom models exhibited statistically significant heteroskedasticity, attributable to the larger error variance after 2000: in the pre-2000 models, the errors are unproblematic. In a few models, tests for serial correlation conflicted, but in only one model was serial correlation clearly evident; in New Zealand model (5), additional lags were included to reduce the statistic to insignificance. Finally, the Bounds Test for long-run relationships introduced by Pesaran et al. (2001) is conclusive in many models and inconclusive in some others.[88]

To recall, the error correction coefficient estimates the 'speed of adjustment' in the model: how quickly the long-term equilibrium relationship between independent and

[88] The test provides upper and lower critical values in an F-distribution depending on the number of long-run parameters in the model. If the F-statistic is greater than the upper critical value at a chosen level of statistical significance, one rejects the null hypothesis that there is no long-run levels relationship. If it falls below the lower critical value, one accepts the null hypothesis that all variables have only short-run effects. If it falls between the two, the test is inconclusive.

dependent variables is restored after short-term shocks caused by changes in independent variables. While many of the estimated error correction terms are within the nominal range of 0 to -1, and nearly all are statistically significant, there are indications of overcorrection in several models. This means that instead of converging to equilibrium, there is 'cyclic divergence'; the system does not directly return to a steady state but "fluctuates around the long-run value in a dampening manner" (Narayan and Smyth 2005, 339). This is evident in New Zealand and the pre-2000 United Kingdom models especially. Additional lags and more time points would possibly return these models to within nominal bounds, but this is not possible with the data at hand. In Canada, the error correction coefficients suggest a well-behaved process in which about 50 percent of the effects of short-term shocks are corrected in one year. In Australia, the speed of adjustment is much faster: 90 percent in the political interest model, 70 percent in the assertive index model. This suggests that appropriations are more 'sticky' and incrementally responsive to short-term changes in Canada than in Australia, where shocks are more quickly absorbed.

The long-run and short-run coefficient estimates for the public expectations indicators – political interest, party identification, and the assertive index – are reproduced from the appendix tables in table 5.2, below. Even though we observed strong bivariate correlations for political interest in Canada and in the UK before 2000 above, this is not borne out in the regression estimates. Political interest does not appear to have any long-run relationship with prime ministerial branch appropriations. Short-run effects of political interest are significant in Australia (-0.41, $p < 0.05$) and in the overall New Zealand model (-0.37, $p < 0.05$). The signs on these coefficients do not indicate negative

effects but that the short-run effects are larger than the cumulative long-run effect (Kennedy 2005, 82). The short-run effects indicate that in both Australia and New Zealand, moving from, say, the mean yearly difference in interest to a one standard deviation's difference in interest is expected to increase change in appropriations by about four-tenths of a standard deviation. However, the overall impact of political interest is not significant.

Table 5.2

*Effects of Assertive Citizenship on Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations*

| | *Australia* | *Canada* | *New Zealand* | | *United Kingdom* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *All* | *Post-1990* | *All* | *Pre-2000* |
| *Long-Run* | | | | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.10 | 0.41 | 0.16 | -0.19 | -0.34 | -0.32* |
| | (0.25) | (0.33) | (0.11) | (0.23) | (0.19) | (0.11) |
| Strength PID | -0.21* | -0.31** | -0.78** | 0.53 | -7.62 | 0.18 |
| | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.26) | (0.32) | (21.26) | (1.47) |
| Assertive Index | -0.18 | 0.57** | | -0.19 | 0.25* | 0.01 |
| | (0.30) | (0.15) | | (0.17) | (0.12) | (0.10) |
| *Short-Run* | | | | | | |
| ΔPolitical Interest | -0.41* | -0.19 | -0.37* | | 0.32* | 0.37 |
| | (0.19) | (0.14) | (0.15) | | (0.15) | (0.23) |
| L.ΔPolitical Interest | -0.22 | | -0.21 | | | |
| | (0.18) | | (0.13) | | | |
| L2.ΔPolitical Interest | | | -0.18 | | | |
| | | | (0.13) | | | |
| ΔStrength PID | | | | | 0.59 | 1.08 |
| | | | | | (0.33) | (1.32) |
| L.ΔStrength PID | | | | | | -0.37 |
| | | | | | | (0.74) |
| L2.ΔStrength PID | | | | | | -1.23 |
| | | | | | | (0.83) |
| ΔAssertive Index | -0.28 | -0.14 | -0.32 | | | -0.09 |
| | (0.24) | (0.11) | (0.30) | | | (0.19) |
| L.ΔAssertive Index | 0.67* | | | | | 0.47 |
| | (0.25) | | | | | (0.22) |

Note: Entries are OLS coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Extracted from tables A5.2 – A5.5 in the chapter appendix.

There is comparably more substantial evidence that our second measure of assertive citizenship, strength of party identification, is significantly related to branch appropriations. In both Australia and Canada, the long-run relationship between party

identification and appropriations is negative and statistically significant. In Australia, the estimated long-run impact is -0.21 and statistically significant at the 5% level, which means that in equilibrium a one standard deviation increase in party identification decreases appropriations by one-fifth of a standard deviation. The negative impact of party identification is larger in magnitude in Canada (-0.31) and statistically significant at the 1% level. These effects are shown visually in figure 5.3, below, which plots the predicted marginal effects of party identification on appropriations in the two countries. While there is a significant negative coefficient for party identification in the full New Zealand model, the effect disappears in the post-1990 model, suggesting that it is driven by the discontinuity in the appropriations trend rather than being a true effect.

Figure 5.3
*Marginal Effects of Party Identification, Australia and Canada*




However, no short-run effects for party identification were found; indeed, the model selection process excluded them from the estimates produced. This suggests that short-term changes in the strength of party identification do not immediately, or with lag, produce corresponding changes in the extent to which prime ministers increase or decrease appropriations, but that over a stretch of time weakening party identification is a

significant determinant of increasing branch appropriations. That is, in the long run, as citizens' attachment to parties weakens in Australia and Canada, appropriations are likely to increase, but change in the level of appropriations does not significantly respond to change in the level of party identification.

Meaningful long-run impacts of assertive value change on prime ministerial branch appropriations, as measured by the assertive index, are evident only in Canada. This is not surprising given the descriptive observations earlier in the chapter. The long-run effect of assertiveness in Canada is quite large and statistically significant at the 1% level. The size of the coefficient, 0.57, indicates that appropriations is estimated to be more than half a standard deviation higher when the assertive index increases from its mean to one standard deviation away. In context, this is quite a large effect. For example, the difference between the 25$^{th}$ percentile and the 75$^{th}$ percentile of assertiveness is $44 million (in nominal 2003 dollars), which in 2003 was more than 40 percent of the entire PCO budget. However, as in the party identification case, the models did not produce statistically significant short-run effects for the assertive index in Canada. Again, this suggests that the equilibrium relationship between assertiveness and branch appropriations is not short-run responsive to changes in assertiveness; the effect is not significant year to year but is cumulatively powerful. Finally, there appears to be a short-run, lagged effect for assertiveness in Australia; the coefficient is relatively large, positive, and statistically significant (0.67, $p < 0.05$). This suggests that changes in assertiveness produce a lagged increased response in change in appropriations, but have no ongoing cumulative effect.

Despite the presence of only a few notable short-run effects for assertive citizenship, I also ran models to test for any interaction effects between the assertive citizenship variables, short-term political conditions and, in the New Zealand and UK cases, the period dummy variables. The interaction terms were entered into the models as exogenous parameters since they involve exogenous (non-dynamic) political conditions variables. These estimates are provided in appendix table A5.7, and offer several interesting results. The effects of several assertive citizenship variables do seem to depend on political conditions. In Australia, the negative short-run impact of political interest that we found earlier is conditional on both term year and on seat share, but in opposite directions: as prime ministerial terms continue, the effect of political interest weakens, while greater legislative support increases the effect of interest. We observe the same statistically significant interaction effect between interest and legislative support in Canada. The effect of party identification on branch appropriations appears to be conditional on the party in power in Canada and New Zealand but in different ways. The negative effect of party identification is stronger under more conservative prime ministers in Canada than under more liberal prime ministers, while the opposite is true in New Zealand. Lastly, the UK models exhibit several interaction effects. Of particular interest, all of the interactions between the assertive variables and the period dummy (separating pre and post-2000 observations) are positive and statistically significant. This confirms that there is a structural break in the UK model, i.e., that the magnitudes of regression coefficients change between the two periods, and that the effect of assertive citizenship appears to be greater in the post-2000 period than in the pre-2000 period.

I turn now to testing the hypotheses concerning alternative explanations for change: economic trends and political conditions. To recall, the economic hypotheses posit that both globalization and government activity are positively associated with prime ministerial branch appropriations. There was mixed evidence for these hypotheses in the descriptive assessment earlier in the chapter. The results of regression model estimation present an interesting counterpoint to the assertive results: there are few long-run impacts but several short-run economic effects. This could be due to the difficulty of distinguishing the long-run effects among the dynamic variables or it could be the case that the economic trends do produce more immediate but not persistent responses in the appropriations variable.

In any case, the short-run effects for the globalization measures are consistent but vary in direction across cases. In Australia, change in levels of trade openness has a negative short-run effect (-0.88 in the interest model, -0.81 in the assertive index model), not immediately but lagged two years. The same effects are found in both New Zealand and the UK, except at different lags: change in trade openness has both an instantaneous effect on change in appropriations, and a one-year lagged effect. However, trade openness exhibits the hypothesized positive effect (0.31, $p < 0.05$) in one of the Canadian models. The alternative measure of globalization, using the KOF Index, does not offer any statistically significant results except in Canada, where it is estimated to have a negative short-run effect on appropriations. These results provide minimal evidence for the globalization hypothesis H4: globalization does not appear to drive prime ministerial branch appropriations, either short-term or long-term.

The effects of government activity posited in hypothesis H5 are somewhat more apparent but very case-dependent. In both Australia and Canada, government activity has short-run positive impacts on change in appropriations. The effect is quite large in Australia (1.90, $p < 0.01$), while it has a smaller effect (0.33) in Canada in the political interest model, significant at the 5% level. In both cases, the effect is instantaneous, not lagged. In New Zealand, government activity appears to be negatively associated with appropriations. This is unsurprising given the deviations from the expected trends that both government activity and appropriations exhibit in this case. Overall, then, I conclude that the regression models do not provide significant support for the economic hypotheses. Neither globalization nor government activity has notable long-run relationships with appropriations, and the short-run impacts of economic changes are as contrary to expectations as they are conforming.

The second set of alternative explanations, political conditions, also does not receive strong, consistent support from the model estimates. The effects of legislative support and ideology on appropriations are not apparent. Term effects are evident in Australia and Canada, but they pull in opposite directions. In Australia, term year effects in two models are negative and statistically significant. This suggests that Australian prime ministers change appropriations at a lower rate as the term elapses; conversely, the predicted change in appropriations is highest at the start of terms, decreasing through the term. In Canada, however, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant, suggesting the opposite pattern: higher levels of change in appropriations are more likely as prime ministerial terms continue. I posit two reasons for this difference. First, Australian prime ministers serve shorter terms; elections are held every three years, as

opposed to four, conventionally, in Canada. Second, differences in party leadership selection processes means that Australian prime ministers are generally less secure in their positions. These factors could lead prime ministers in Australia to push for institutional change more immediately, while Canadian prime ministers have more time and less political pressure to embark on institutionalization.

### 5.5.1 Discussion

In this section, I summarize and discuss the results of this chapter's regression analysis. How do the core hypotheses about determinants of prime ministerial branch appropriations fare? Table 5.3, below, lists the hypotheses and gives an overall assessment of their empirical support. First, and most importantly, do public expectations drive prime ministers to increase the institutional resources of their offices? The regression results are equivocal on the question. While the evidence is not consistent across the board, all three public expectations hypotheses received some support. For political interest, H1, there is 'limited' support in that we found only short-run effects, and only in Australia and New Zealand. The party identification hypothesis, H2, is 'partially' supported: there are meaningful long-run effects on appropriations in two cases, Australia and Canada. Finally, H3, which utilizes the assertive index of values and attitudes, also receives partial support, though only in Canada.

Clearly, there is tremendous variation in how the cases accord with our theoretical expectations. Given the descriptive results observed earlier, overall the Canadian case offers the best evidence that public expectations indeed drive prime ministerial branch appropriations. Two of the three measures were demonstrated to have statistically significant long-run effects in expected directions. The analysis suggests, by and large,

that assertive citizenship is not a universal determinant of long-run change over time in prime ministerial branch appropriations in most cases, but that it has certain case-contextual effects. Overall, the economic trends and political conditions hypotheses do not prove to be satisfactory alternative explanations for institutional change, either not being supported at all or, for the term effect hypothesis, receiving partial (and contradictory) support.

Table 5.3
*Summary of Findings: Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations*

| Hypothesis | | Finding |
|---|---|---|
| H1 | Political Interest (+) | Limited Support |
| H2 | Party Identification (-) | Partial Support |
| H3 | Assertive Political Culture (+) | Partial Support |
| H4 | Globalization (+) | Not Supported |
| H5 | Government Activity (+) | Not Supported |
| H6 | Term Effect (+/-) | Partial Support |
| H7 | Legislative Support (+) | Not Supported |
| H8 | Ideology (-) | Not Supported |

Note: The (+) and (–) signs indicate the hypothesized direction of the relationship between the factor and appropriations.

In addition to the cross-case variation, another reason for the mixed empirical evidence is the difficulty of modeling time series, and especially multiple time series in single models. In order to avoid spurious correlations and potential violations of classical linear regression using ordinary least squares, these models must transform the simple theoretical setup into more complicated dynamic models. For instance, instead of models of appropriations per se, the dependent variable of the error correction models is *change* in appropriations from year to year, and the short run effects are year to year change in the dynamic independent variables, themselves differenced. The presence of multiple

dynamic variables also increases the complexity of the models. The dynamics in these models are thus necessary but make clear, consistent results difficult to achieve.

In addition, the appropriations time series themselves, as discussed earlier in the chapter, are not particularly well behaved. Instead of the smooth, incrementally increasing appropriations trends that were theoretically expected, three of the four cases exhibit more fluctuating, unstable patterns of change over time. In two cases, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, there are readily identifiable structural breaks in the time series that, again, induce complications in analysis. These patterns of change reflect interesting differences among the Westminster countries but make support for these general theories difficult to find. The only appropriations trend that conforms reasonably well with prior theoretical expectations is that of the Privy Council Office in Canada. This is reflected in how well the models perform and the greater degree of evidence these models generate for our theories of institutionalization.

### *5.6 Patterns of Institutional Change*

The previous section presented and discussed the results of estimating several time series models of prime ministerial branch appropriations. In this section, I characterize each case in terms of the typology of institutional change introduced in chapter three. To recall, this typology, adapted from Streeck and Thelen's (2005) work, and Mahoney and Thelen's (2010) elaboration, posits four distinctive patterns of endogenous, incremental institutional change: layering, drift, displacement, and conversion. I borrowed these terms to characterize how institutions change along dimensions of institutionalization and continuity. This typology is reproduced in figure

5.4, below, along with my assessment of where the cases fall given the evidence in this chapter.

Figure 5.4
*Patterns of Institutional Change: Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations*




I characterize both Australia and Canada as cases of institutional layering. The latter is a clear case. The gradual, incremental, but nonetheless dramatic pattern of change in appropriations over time in the Canadian case attests to a high degree of continuity and institutionalization. Moreover, the fact that the Canadian case offers relatively strong support for the Theory of Public Expectations also contributes to the characterization. As values and attitudes gradually shift from more allegiant to more assertive orientations, the evidence suggests that the Canadian prime ministerial branch has responded by incrementally accruing institutional capacity. Australia, however, is a borderline case. Its appropriation trend has been more periodic than incrementally increasing, but it would be misleading to place it in the lower half on the institutionalization dimension because it is clear that, while volatile, the institutional capacity of the Australian DPMC is well entrenched. The fact that there was little evidence that DPMC appropriations are driven

by systematic, long-term changes, at least those tested here, also suggests a significant role for individual prime ministers in shaping the institution. Thus, in Australia, the pattern of institutional change is what might be called "periodic layering". This process is characterized by a cycle of institutional growth and retrenchment, more unstable than the normal incremental layering but not marked by abrupt changes that create entirely new institutional capacity quickly. I return to this theme in subsequent chapters.

As a case, New Zealand stands apart from the other cases, particularly in its level of institutionalization. After an initial growth in appropriations after the department was established in 1990, the financial resources of the DPMC remained relatively unchanging until 2008 or so. In recent years, appropriations have increased again, after falling from 2011 to 2012. This relative stasis for much of its existence is a typical pattern of institutional drift. However, if we consider the transition from the pre-1990 to post-1990 period, there is significant discontinuity, which brings the New Zealand case close to the conversion quadrant. It is not clear, though, that the transition from the Prime Minister's Department to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1990 constituted a conversion in the institutional capacity of the office. While it had increased resources, this growth was not sustained. The regression results also do not suggest, overall, that appropriations in the post-1990 DPMC are driven by different sets of factors than had been the case. Arguably, the substantial growth in appropriations observed in the mid-1970s marks the true turning point for the New Zealand prime ministerial branch. Since that point, it is characterized by institutional drift.

Finally, I characterize the UK case as institutional conversion. This is clear both from the appropriations trend itself and from evidence in the regression results that there

is a structural break in the model. While Cabinet Office appropriations were incrementally increasing from 1946 to the end of the 1990s, the first term of Prime Minister Blair brought dramatic institutional change. While this level of upheaval has not, and could not, persist after 2000, the conversion of the office into a tremendously well-resourced institution at the centre of government must be the defining feature of its pattern of change. The UK prime ministerial branch has undergone tremendous institutionalization in terms of budgetary resources, but in contrast to other cases where institutionalization has been gradual or cyclical, the process was abrupt and discontinuous.

This chapter assessed appropriations to prime ministerial branches as a measure of the institutional autonomy of the prime ministerships in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. In chapter three, I introduced and argued in detail for the Theory of Public Expectations, a theory that ties changes in democratic political citizenship, from predominantly 'allegiant' to predominantly 'assertive', to a context which incentivizes prime ministerial institutionalization. I also set out alternative explanations: economic trends and political conditions.

In this chapter, I tested these theories in relation to one aspect of that institutionalization: budgetary appropriations to prime ministerial branches. First, I set out a series of hypotheses specifying expectations about the relationships between the explanatory factors and appropriations. I then examined these relationships in descriptive terms. Finally, I specified, conducted, and presented results from a set of time series regression models of prime ministerial branch appropriations. These models did not produce widespread, consistent support for the hypotheses: the appropriations trends are

too dissimilar across the cases, and too volatile in some cases, for general theories to be consistently confirmed. Still, the analysis uncovered meaningful evidence that assertive citizenship is a significant driver of institutionalization with regard to appropriations, particularly in the long run. The Canadian case proves to be the most robust in terms of according with theoretical expectations. It does not appear that economic trends and political conditions have consistent effects on institutional change. These results attest to the difficulty and complexity of assessing change over time, particularly when incorporating many variables across dissimilar cases. In chapter six, I continue to test the case for the Theory of Public Expectations and its alternatives, examining a second indicator of institutional autonomy: staff resources.

*Appendix to Chapter 5*

Table A5.1

*Assertive Citizenship and Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, Correlations*

| | Political Interest | Party Identification | Assertive Index |
|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 0.22 | -0.12 | 0.51** |
| Canada | 0.72** | -0.56** | 0.76** |
| New Zealand | 0.17 | -0.79** | 0.12 |
| Pre-1990 | 0.37 | -0.84** | |
| Post-1990 | -0.37 | -0.26 | 0.12 |
| United Kingdom | 0.59** | -0.70** | 0.74** |
| Pre-2000 | 0.76** | -0.73** | -0.59** |
| Post-2000 | 0.21 | -0.38 | 0.54* |

*Note*: Entries are Pearson's r correlation values between the variable and prime ministerial branch appropriations. Asterisks indicate statistical significance levels (that coefficient is different from zero), * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5.2

*Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, Australia*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EC | -0.92** | -1.91** | -0.71** |
| | (0.18) | (0.41) | (0.18) |
| *Long-Run* | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.10 | | |
| | (0.25) | | |
| Strength PID | | -0.21* | |
| | | (0.09) | |
| Assertive Index | | | -0.18 |
| | | | (0.30) |
| KOF Index | | -0.67* | |
| | | (0.25) | |
| Trade Openness | 0.37 | | 0.55 |
| | (0.28) | | (0.42) |
| Govt Activity | -0.42 | -0.25 | -0.25 |
| | (0.85) | (0.26) | (0.39) |
| Total Apps | 0.24 | 1.45** | 0.52 |
| | (0.73) | (0.24) | (0.58) |
| *Short-Run* | | | |
| LD.App | | 0.63 | |
| | | (0.36) | |
| D1.Interest | -0.41* | | |
| | (0.19) | | |
| LD.Interest | -0.22 | | |
| | (0.25) | | |
| D1.Assertive Index | | | -0.28 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | (0.24) |
| LD.Assertive Index | | | 0.67* |
| | | | (0.25) |
| D1.KOF | | 0.94 | |
| | | (0.73) | |
| LD.KOF | | 2.17 | |
| | | (1.05) | |
| D1.Openness | 0.22 | | -0.18 |
| | (0.35) | | (0.42) |
| LD.Openness | -0.22 | | -0.11 |
| | (0.36) | | (0.39) |
| L2D.Openness | -0.88** | | -0.81* |
| | (0.27) | | (0.28) |
| D1.Govt Activity | 1.34 | | 1.90** |
| | (0.77) | | (0.52) |
| LD.Govt Activity | 1.79* | | 0.57 |
| | (0.65) | | (0.60) |
| L2D.Govt Activity | 0.96 | | 0.90 |
| | (0.49) | | (0.48) |
| D1.Total | -0.39 | -2.55** | -0.44 |
| | (0.48) | (0.76) | (0.36) |
| LD.Total | -0.33 | -2.02* | |
| | (0.48) | (0.73) | |
| L2D.Total | 0.67 | -0.77 | |
| | (0.39) | (0.60) | |
| *Exogenous* | | | |
| Term Year | -0.09 | -0.19* | -0.24** |
| | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Seat Share | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Party | 0.01 | | 0.19 |
| | (0.16) | | (0.15) |
| Ideology | | 0.07 | |
| | | (0.14) | |
| Constant | 0.07 | -0.93 | -0.03 |
| | (0.41) | (0.45) | (0.27) |
| | | | |
| N | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.75 | 0.61 | 0.75 |
| AIC | 3.53 | 18.90 | 4.04 |
| BIC | 33.46 | 41.35 | 30.98 |
| RMSE | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.22 |
| Bounds Test F-Statistic | 6.61[r] | 4.42[r] | 3.77 |

*Notes:* Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The 'r' superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model's F-statistic was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels relationship.

Table A5.3

*Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, Canada*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EC | -0.40* | -0.51** | -0.49** |
| | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| *Long-Run* | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.41 | | |
| | (0.33) | | |
| Strength PID | | -0.31** | |
| | | (0.10) | |
| Assertive Index | | | 0.57** |
| | | | (0.15) |
| KOF Index | 0.31 | | |
| | (0.21) | | |
| Trade Openness | | -0.07 | -0.51 |
| | | (0.35) | (0.35) |
| Govt Activity | 0.36 | -0.01 | -0.25 |
| | (0.42) | (0.29) | (0.32) |
| Total Apps | -0.25 | 0.75** | 0.84** |
| | (0.46) | (0.19) | (0.22) |
| *Short-Run* | | | |
| D1.Interest | -0.19 | | |
| | (0.14) | | |
| D1.Assertive Index | | | -0.14 |
| | | | (0.11) |
| D1.KOF | -0.45* | | |
| | (0.19) | | |
| D1.Openness | | 0.23 | 0.25 |
| | | (0.15) | (0.16) |
| LD.Openness | | 0.31* | 0.18 |
| | | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| D1.Govt Activity | | 0.28 | 0.33* |
| | | (0.17) | (0.16) |
| D1.Total | 0.43 | | |
| | (0.22) | | |
| LD.Total | 0.38 | | |
| | (0.22) | | |
| *Exogenous* | | | |
| Term Year | 0.06* | 0.10** | 0.09** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Seat Share | -0.14* | -0.09 | -0.08 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Party | -0.03 | | -0.05 |
| | (0.10) | | (0.09) |
| Ideology | | -0.08 | |
| | | (0.08) | |
| Trend (Year) | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 22.55 | -17.61 | -25.24 |
| | (29.01) | (30.58) | (28.32) |
| N | 43 | 48 | 48 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.42 |
| AIC | -9.91 | -16.56 | -16.67 |
| BIC | 14.75 | 7.76 | 9.53 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| RMSE | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.18 |
| Bounds Test F-Statistic | 3.38 | 3.92 | 5.00[r] |

*Notes:* Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The 'r' superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model's F-statistic was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels relationship.

Table A5.4

*Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, New Zealand*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EC | -1.42** | -0.67** | -1.44** | -0.77** | -1.90** |
| | (0.26) | (0.10) | (0.23) | (0.16) | (0.24) |
| *Long-Run* | | | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.16 | | | -0.19 | |
| | (0.11) | | | (0.23) | |
| Strength PID | | -0.78** | | | 0.53 |
| | | (0.26) | | | (0.32) |
| Assertive Index | | | -0.19 | | |
| | | | (0.17) | | |
| KOF Index | 1.24** | | 0.41 | | 0.54* |
| | (0.37) | | (0.40) | | (0.19) |
| Trade Openness | | 0.14 | | 0.10 | |
| | | (0.40) | | (0.28) | |
| Govt Activity | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.92* | -0.14 | 0.70** |
| | (0.15) | (0.28) | (0.30) | (0.35) | (0.17) |
| Total Apps | -0.31 | -0.37 | -1.32 | 0.63 | -0.50 |
| | (0.26) | (0.31) | (0.61) | (0.45) | (0.25) |
| *Short-Run* | | | | | |
| LD.App | 0.63** | | 0.67** | 0.41* | 0.87** |
| | (0.17) | | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.13) |
| L2D.App | 0.21 | | | | 0.38** |
| | (0.16) | | | | (0.10) |
| D1.Interest | -0.37* | | | | |
| | (0.15) | | | | |
| LD.Interest | -0.21 | | | | |
| | (0.13) | | | | |
| L2D.Interest | -0.18 | | | | |
| | (0.13) | | | | |
| D1.Assertive Index | | | -0.32 | | |
| | | | (0.30) | | |
| LD.Assertive Index | | | | | |
| D1.KOF | | | | | -0.53 |
| | | | | | (0.46) |
| D1.Openness | | -0.73** | | -0.97** | |
| | | (0.19) | | (0.20) | |
| LD.Openness | | -0.91** | | -0.94** | |
| | | (0.15) | | (0.19) | |
| L2D.Openness | | | | | |
| D1.Govt Activity | -0.18 | 0.33 | -1.08 | 0.20 | -1.03 |
| | (0.31) | (0.20) | (0.47) | (0.37) | (0.62) |
| LD.Govt Activity | -0.71* | 0.08 | -0.91 | -0.56 | -2.06** |
| | (0.26) | (0.20) | (0.41) | (0.26) | (0.51) |
| L2D.Govt Activity | | 0.43 | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (0.21) | | | |
| D1.Total | | -0.62 | -0.61 | -1.03 | -0.60 |
| | | (0.39) | (0.80) | (0.53) | (0.55) |
| LD.Total | | -0.78* | 0.84 | 0.97 | |
| | | (0.35) | (0.60) | (0.54) | |
| L2D.Total | | -0.33 | | | |
| | | (0.30) | | | |
| *Exogenous* | | | | | |
| Term Year | -0.01 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 0.14 | -0.04 |
| | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| Seat Share | 0.28 | 0.33** | -0.18 | 0.22 | 0.60 |
| | (0.15) | (0.11) | (0.23) | (0.15) | (0.32) |
| Party | 1.26** | | | -0.03 | |
| | (0.32) | | | (0.21) | |
| Ideology | | -0.02 | 0.35** | | 0.76** |
| | | (0.07) | (0.08) | | (0.11) |
| Post-1990 Dummy | 0.37 | 0.94* | | | |
| | (0.60) | (0.41) | | | |
| Constant | -0.28 | 0.09 | 2.73** | 0.45 | 0.92 |
| | (0.35) | (0.39) | (0.68) | (0.26) | (0.45) |
| | | | | | |
| N | 37 | 37 | 23 | 25 | 22 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.62 | 0.83 | 0.85 | 0.91 | 0.92 |
| AIC | 41.44 | 11.51 | 8.04 | 1.67 | 10.24 |
| BIC | 68.82 | 40.51 | 25.07 | 21.18 | 26.61 |
| RMSE | 0.36 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.27 |
| Bounds Test F-Statistic | 7.23[r] | 10.01[r] | 9.65[r] | 5.63[r] | 17.70[r] |

*Notes:* Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Models (1) and (2) include all years. Models (3) to (5) are post-1990 only. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The 'r' superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model's F-statistic was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels relationship.

Table A5.5

*Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, United Kingdom*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EC | -0.64** | -0.12 | -0.84** | -1.28** | -2.36 | -1.38** |
| | (0.14) | (0.29) | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.79) | (0.37) |
| *Long-Run* | | | | | | |
| Political Interest | -0.34 | | | -0.32* | | |
| | (0.19) | | | (0.11) | | |
| Strength PID | | -7.62 | | | 0.18 | |
| | | (21.26) | | | (1.47) | |
| Assertive Index | | | 0.25* | | | 0.01 |
| | | | (0.12) | | | (0.10) |
| KOF Index | | -7.22 | | | -3.22 | |
| | | (20.30) | | | (1.38) | |
| Trade Openness | 0.72 | | 0.24 | 0.15 | | -0.98 |
| | (0.36) | | (0.13) | (0.18) | | (0.46) |
| Govt Activity | -0.04 | -2.72 | -0.10 | -0.06 | 0.28 | 0.15 |
| | (0.05) | (7.68) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.88) | (0.11) |
| Total Apps | 0.01 | -2.46 | 0.07 | 1.02* | 0.15 | -0.21 |
| | (0.19) | (7.80) | (0.13) | (0.41) | (0.39) | (0.27) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Short-Run* | | | | | | |
| LD.App | -0.45** | -0.67* | -0.32* | 0.42* | 1.02 | 0.60* |
| | (0.13) | (0.24) | (0.14) | (0.18) | (0.63) | (0.26) |
| L2D.App | -0.42** | -0.26 | -0.34** | | 0.63 | |
| | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.11) | | (0.46) | |
| D1.Interest | 0.32* | | | 0.37 | | |
| | (0.15) | | | (0.23) | | |
| D1.PID | | 0.59 | | | 1.08 | |
| | | (0.33) | | | (1.32) | |
| LD.PID | | | | | -0.37 | |
| | | | | | (0.74) | |
| L2D.PID | | | | | -1.23 | |
| | | | | | (0.83) | |
| D1.Assertive Index | | | | | | -0.09 |
| | | | | | | (0.19) |
| LD.Assertive Index | | | | | | 0.47 |
| | | | | | | (0.22) |
| D1.KOF | | 0.64 | | | 5.79 | |
| | | (0.43) | | | (1.95) | |
| LD.KOF | | | | | 3.11 | |
| | | | | | (1.11) | |
| D1.Openness | -0.82** | | -0.49** | | | 1.21* |
| | (0.26) | | (0.16) | | | (0.49) |
| LD.Openness | -0.77** | | -0.51** | | | 1.14** |
| | (0.23) | | (0.18) | | | (0.38) |
| L2D.Openness | -0.38* | | -0.24 | | | |
| | (0.17) | | (0.15) | | | |
| D1.Govt Activity | 0.16 | 0.50* | 0.24* | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.12 |
| | (0.11) | (0.19) | (0.11) | (0.20) | (1.44) | (0.23) |
| LD.Govt Activity | | 0.20 | | | 1.06 | 0.34 |
| | | (0.16) | | | (0.62) | (0.22) |
| L2D.Govt Activity | | | | | 0.94 | -0.46 |
| | | | | | (0.86) | (0.23) |
| D1.Total | -0.58** | -0.13 | -0.65** | -1.52** | -1.84 | -0.78 |
| | (0.16) | (0.31) | (0.16) | (0.45) | (0.89) | (0.40) |
| LD.Total | -0.68** | -0.61** | -0.76** | -0.76 | -1.45 | |
| | (0.15) | (0.21) | (0.15) | (0.38) | (1.01) | |
| L2D.Total | | | | -0.97* | -2.91 | |
| | | | | (0.37) | (1.88) | |
| *Exogenous* | | | | | | |
| Term Year | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.11* | -0.29 | 0.10 |
| | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.32) | (0.05) |
| Seat Share | 0.05 | -0.04 | 0.04 | 0.28** | 0.22 | -0.07 |
| | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.39) | (0.10) |
| Party | -0.09 | 0.09 | | | 0.30 | -0.42 |
| | (0.09) | (0.16) | | | (0.56) | (0.23) |
| Ideology | | | 0.00 | -0.12 | | |
| | | | (0.06) | (0.10) | | |
| Post-2000 Dummy | 1.17** | 1.20** | 1.31** | | | |
| | (0.24) | (0.31) | (0.24) | | | |
| Year | | | | 0.02 | 1.14 | 0.27* |
| | | | | (0.05) | (0.55) | (0.10) |
| Constant | -0.11 | -0.28 | -0.12 | -51.55 | -2263.32 | -534.11 |
| | (0.12) | (0.18) | (0.11) | (110.01) | (1110.40) | (191.82) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N | 49 | 42 | 49 | 33 | 26 | 33 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.76 | 0.67 | 0.75 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.47 |
| AIC | -0.06 | 20.02 | 1.77 | 17.40 | -8.17 | 20.07 |
| BIC | 35.89 | 51.29 | 35.82 | 41.35 | 20.77 | 48.50 |
| RMSE | 0.21 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.28 |
| Bounds Test (F-Statistic) | 5.32[r] | 3.53 | 5.38[r] | 7.05[r] | 4.44 | 4.16 |

*Notes:* Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Models (1) – (3) include all years. Models (4) – (6) are pre-2000 only. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The 'r' superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model's F-statistic was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels relationship.

Table A5.6

*Post-Estimation Tests*

| | Breusch-Godfrey LM Test (autocorrelation) | | Durbin's Alt Test (autocorrelation) | | ARCH LM Test (heteroskedasticity) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $\chi^2$ | p | $\chi^2$ | p | $\chi^2$ | p |
| *Australia* | | | | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.14 | 0.71 | 0.05 | 0.82 | 0.00 | 0.96 |
| Strength PID | 0.31 | 0.57 | 0.16 | 0.69 | 0.07 | 0.79 |
| Assertive Index | 0.81 | 0.37 | 0.35 | 0.55 | 0.40 | 0.52 |
| *Canada* | | | | | | |
| Political Interest | 1.60 | 0.20 | 1.08 | 0.30 | 0.02 | 0.89 |
| Strength PID | 0.02 | 0.89 | 0.01 | 0.90 | 1.35 | 0.24 |
| Assertive Index | 0.56 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.53 | 0.29 | 0.59 |
| *New Zealand* | | | | | | |
| Political Interest | 2.95 | 0.08 | 1.65 | 0.20 | 0.05 | 0.82 |
| Strength PID | 0.42 | 0.52 | 0.21 | 0.65 | 3.80 | 0.05 |
| Assertive Index | 0.01 | 0.91 | 0.00 | 0.95 | 0.00 | 0.99 |
| Interest (Post-1990) | 0.20 | 0.65 | 0.07 | 0.80 | 3.69 | 0.05 |
| PID (Post-1990) | 5.80 | 0.02 | 2.15 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.86 |
| *United Kingdom* | | | | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.15 | 0.70 | 0.09 | 0.77 | 6.47 | 0.01 |
| Strength PID | 0.78 | 0.37 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 10.77 | 0.00 |
| Assertive Index | 0.04 | 0.85 | 0.02 | 0.88 | 5.34 | 0.02 |
| Political Interest (Pre-2000) | 0.05 | 0.82 | 0.02 | 0.87 | 1.41 | 0.23 |
| Strength PID (Pre-2000) | 14.94 | 0.00 | 2.70 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.92 |
| Assertive Index (Pre-2000) | 0.79 | 0.37 | 0.32 | 0.57 | 0.69 | 0.41 |

*Note:* The Breusch-Godfrey and Durbin's Alternative Tests for autocorrelation have a null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Rejecting the null hypothesis ($p < 0.05$) indicates that there is residual autocorrelation. The null hypothesis for the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test is no heteroskedasticity. Rejecting the null hypothesis ($p < 0.05$) indicates the presence of heteroskedastic errors.

Table A5.7

*Interaction Effects for Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations*

| | *Australia* | *Canada* | *New Zealand* | *UK* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest*TermYear | -26.87** | 0.30 | 3.48 | -1.74 |
| | (8.29) | (1.97) | (6.27) | (5.47) |
| Interest*SeatShare | 343.50* | 57.99* | -23.68 | 30.43 |
| | (132.75) | (23.60) | (20.01) | (20.69) |
| Interest*Party | 16.37 | -3.48 | 2.74 | -4.58 |
| | (12.12) | (4.89) | (8.26) | (9.77) |
| Interest*Period | | | -9.00 | 2.28** |
| Dummy | | | (12.20) | (0.47) |
| PID*TermYear | -14.15 | 3.27 | 0.08 | -2.68 |
| | (8.17) | (1.82) | (5.21) | (2.40) |
| PID*SeatShare | 11.28 | 15.52 | -48.32 | 128.47** |
| | (22.00) | (10.62) | (41.38) | (43.56) |
| PID*Party | 20.28 | -8.48* | 16.80* | -10.78* |
| | (9.83) | (3.31) | (6.00) | (5.08) |
| PID*Period | | | 9.05 | 1.59** |
| Dummy | | | (9.65) | (0.53) |
| Assert*TermYear | 5.12 | 3.10 | -16.97 | -6.39* |
| | (8.18) | (4.52) | (15.04) | (3.00) |
| Assert*SeatShare | 113.77 | -29.29 | 403.18 | -122.14* |
| | (120.70) | (17.35) | (360.52) | (52.04) |
| Assert*Party | -3.31 | 22.06 | -95.46 | -16.75* |
| | (8.94) | (13.03) | (38.71) | (0.02) |
| Assert*Period | | | | 4.85** |
| Dummy | | | | (0.69) |

Notes: Entries are estimated OLS coefficients on interaction terms included as exogenous regressors in the main models, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A5.1

*Political Interest and Appropriations, All Countries*




*Note:* Figure excludes observations for Australia 2014 and 2015 because of the outlying appropriations values for these years. The UK case is split into pre- and post-2000 observations for ease of interpretation.

Figure A5.2

*Strength of Party Identification and Appropriations, All Countries*




*Note:* Figure excludes observations for Australia 2014 and 2015 because of the outlying appropriations values for these years. The UK case is split into pre- and post-2000 observations for ease of interpretation.

Figure A5.3

*Assertive Index and Appropriations, All Countries*




*Note:* Figure excludes observations for Australia 2014 and 2015 because of the outlying appropriations values for these years. The period for New Zealand is 1991-2015. The UK case is split into pre- and post-2000 observations for ease of interpretation.

Figure A5.4

*Assertive Citizenship and Appropriations Time Series, All Countries*

# Chapter 6
# Staff Resources in the Prime Ministerial Branches

In the previous chapter, I examined the financial resources allocated to the prime ministerial branches in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. I found substantial variation in both the patterns of institutional change and in the extent to which the cases accord with theoretical expectations. Broadly speaking, the budgets of the prime ministerial branches in the Westminster countries have grown in relative terms over the last five decades; today's branches are greatly expanded as compared to the 1960s. However, the process of change has been quite dissimilar among the cases.

In Canada, the Privy Council Office has grown incrementally and consistently since its substantial expansion in the late 1960s by Pierre Trudeau, with a few exceptions, the latter years of Prime Minister Harper's tenure among them. The Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom shares this incrementalism until the late 1990s, when, under Prime Minister Blair, its budget increased dramatically. In the last fifteen years, the resource level resulting from this extraordinary, abrupt growth has been maintained if not markedly increased.

The two oceanic countries also offer contrasting patterns of institutional change. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia has normally exhibited a pattern of 'cyclical' change where its budget increases for four or five years, declines, and repeats. Outside of the occasional spikes, notably under Prime Minister Menzies in the mid-1970s and in the most recent few years, this pattern suggests a well-entrenched baseline institutional capacity that is periodically enhanced, possibly driven by short-term considerations. Finally, the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has undergone two notable periods of abrupt institutional growth, outside of which the

department has exhibited relative stasis. In the mid-1980s, under Prime Minister Lange, the then-Prime Minister's Department's budget resources were significantly enhanced, but apparently insufficiently; it still lacked the resources to effectively coordinate policy (Boston 1992, 95). This realization eventually led to the creation of the DPMC in 1990, which received a substantial increase in resources. However, since 1990 the department, for the most part, has not built further upon this foundation in terms of budget resources. This suggests that external forces have not significantly impinged on perceptions of the prime ministerial job in New Zealand.

With respect to these resources, chapter five also assessed the Theory of Public Expectations and alternative theories of institutional change. In part because of the uneven growth in institutional resources across these countries and the uncertainty of the assertive citizenship shift itself, the fit between theory and empirics was modest. The hypotheses about how assertive citizenship impacts branch appropriations were partially supported in cases where the assumptions of the theory were met, which only was observed fully in one case. As expected, the Canadian case most accords with expectations. The analysis found that both strength of party identification and general assertive orientations drove appropriations within the Privy Council Office in the long-term. Party identification was also found to be significant in Australia. In the UK, the effects of assertive citizenship were found to depend on the period: they were evident in the 'post-conversion' Cabinet Office, since 2000, but not prior. Neither of the two alternative explanations, economic trends and political conditions, proved to be widely supported, although various significant effects were revealed.

In this chapter, I conduct a similarly structured assessment on a second measure of institutional autonomy: the staff resources of prime ministerial branches. As in the previous chapter, I assess the Theory of Public Expectations and economic and political explanations for institutional change. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss staff resources as a measure of autonomy, describe the sources of data, and examine the staff trends over time. Second, the hypotheses tested in the chapter, which are iterations of the hypotheses set out in chapter five, are identified. The third section briefly examines, in descriptive terms, the relationships between the explanatory factors and staff resources. Section 5.4 explicates regression model specification and estimation issues, and section 5.5 presents and discusses the results of regression analysis. Finally, I characterize the patterns of institutional change evident in the chapter and conclude.

*6.1 Staff Resources in the Prime Ministerial Branches*

This chapter examines staff resources in the prime ministerial branches of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Staff resources simply are the number of people employed in the respective institution.[89] I posit that staff resources, like financial resources, are an important indicator of institutional autonomy. This argument is supported both by the literature on prime ministerial power, and popular views. Staff are concrete manifestations of power and influence. While budget appropriations to prime ministerial branches are numbers on a page, not readily visible to the public eye, staff are living, breathing embodiments of prime ministerial activity. They personify the reach and scope of prime ministerial power. They are literally extensions of, and servants to, prime ministerial authority. There is an extensive literature on the growth of ministerial advisors

[89] Technically, the staff measure used in this analysis is in units of Full Time Equivalents (FTEs), as this is how the measure is generally reported.

and staff in central agencies in the Westminster countries (e.g., Maley 2000, 2011; Tiernan 2007; Yong and Hazell 2014). This literature is predicated on the assumption that staff resources and political power are inherently and intricately related to each other. Many studies of the US presidency, especially those that inspire this study, use growth in staff resources as a measure of institutionalization (e.g., Ragsdale and Theis 1997; Dickinson and Lebo 2007). In short, staff do things. They undertake activities the purpose of which is to further the goals of their principal in various ways. For prime ministers, staff resources provide, among other functions, policy advice, support, and expertise that increases their ability to manage and intervene in the policy process. Arguably, the more that prime ministers' own departments undertake these roles over time, the more the predominance of party functionaries and cabinets in these roles is eclipsed. This decreases the dependence of prime ministers on actors whose interests and incentives may not fully align with their own. Thus, it is reasonable to take staff resources as a measurable proxy for institutional autonomy in the Westminster prime ministerships.

The two measures of institutional autonomy, budget appropriations and staff resources, are of course connected inherently. Staff are compensated through appropriations to the prime ministerial branch and the use of and oversight over appropriated funds involves staff. Thus, a theoretical concern is whether this analysis is redundant, that is, whether the results of this chapter simply replicate those in the previous chapter. My justification for considering staff resources as a distinct measure is two-fold. First, considering the novel theoretical arguments and methodological approach of this work, showing that certain conclusions are consistent across different ways of measuring autonomy strengthens the case for the conceptual and operational decisions

made. Even if they are almost identical trends, that both appropriations and staff track closely with given explanations should increase our confidence that prime ministerial branch institutionalization is a robust phenomenon with robust theoretical explanations.

Second, the extent to which the two trends are correlated varies significantly among the cases. In Canada, the correlation between appropriations and staff is nearly perfect (0.97), but in Australia the correlation is only 0.72. In New Zealand, the correlation is lower (0.62), and in the UK it is much lower still (0.40). This suggests that while the appropriations and staff trends are clearly related, and move in generally the same directions across time, in three cases they are clearly distinct phenomena that may be driven by different sets of determinants. In Canada, where the nearly perfect correlation implies that the pattern of findings should be the same, it is still of substantive interest to determine what affects staff levels in its prime ministerial branch. Examining staff resources, then, enriches our picture of institutional autonomy in the prime ministerial branches and the extent to which different modes of institutional change are evident in otherwise similar institutional contexts.

The staff resource measure is a count of the number of staff employed in the respective prime ministerial branch (the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia and New Zealand, the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Cabinet Office in the UK), expressed in most cases as permanent ongoing full-time equivalents. The Australian staff data is extracted from the DPMC annual reports, which begin in 1978. The staff data for Canada comes from two sources: the annual budget estimates and the Privy Council Office's annual reports from 1997-98. The New Zealand staff data, like the appropriations data, is extracted from documents obtained directly from the DPMC and

from annual reports after 2002. Finally, the UK staff data comes from civil service statistics publications, Cabinet Office annual reports from 1998, and "government expenditure plans" from 1992 to 1997.

Unlike the appropriations measure used in chapter five, the staff resources measure is not affected by inflation. Thus, they need not be transformed to make them comparable over time. As well, the kinds of data issues encountered in the appropriations case were much less apparent in the staff case. The only data collection issue of note for the staff data is its comparative lack of availability further back in time. In Australia, the first annual DPMC report was produced in 1978. The author was unable to find staff data for earlier years. Similarly, in New Zealand, the staff data includes only staff of the DPMC, established in 1990, and not of the Prime Minister's Department, its predecessor. In the UK, the time series begins in the late 1960s. Only in Canada do we have a complete time series from 1946. This is not particularly problematic for analysis because the most theoretically important variables, those measuring assertive citizenship, do not extend further back in time than the staff data. However, for descriptive purposes, complete time series would have been of benefit.

Finally, as I have reiterated several times earlier in this work, the study's focus is firmly upon prime ministers' civil service offices. Staff level data over time for the political offices of prime ministers are sometimes available for recent years, but are too fragmentary and unreliable to be used as historical time series. This is unfortunate because political staff are often the flashpoint for critiques of prime ministerial power and presidentialization. They are among the prime ministers' closest advisors and have a great deal to do with the projection of prime ministerial leadership. However, while political

staff are, of course, central to the prime ministership as a political office, and to prime ministers as political and party leaders, they have not usurped the role of the civil service organizations examined here. The policy advisory, research, and implementation capacities of the political 'arm' of the prime ministerial branches are still limited, its role in enabling prime ministers to manage and control cabinet processes, much less the civil service machinery, still rudimentary. The mainstays of the political offices remain restricted to political strategy and communications. While the gradual agglomeration of policy capacities in political offices is interesting in its own right, the centrality of the civil service organizations in supporting prime ministers in these cases is fundamental.

The staff resources in the prime ministerial branch of each country over time are shown in figure 6.1, below. In Australia, the data suggests that staff levels do not vary significantly from 1978 to 2005, similar to the pattern observed for appropriations. During this time, the DPMC had an average staff count of 433 FTEs. This reflects the fact that the department had already achieved a significant degree of institutionalization by 1978. There had been a Prime Minister's Department since 1911, which had been transmuted into the DPMC in 1971. As we saw in chapter five, after an initial period of fluctuation under the Whitlam government (1972-1975), appropriations stabilized in the way that staff levels do here. Staff levels rise and peak during the first part of the Paul Keating government (1991-96), while they stay consistently lower during the subsequent Howard government. Overall, however, there is no discernible trend in staff in the DPMC during this period. The mean level of annual change in staff from 1978 to 2005 is only 2.53 percent, indicating that only small, incremental changes were made. Positive staff

growth is almost completely offset by negative growth, reflecting the lack of an overall directional trend.

After 2005, however, staff levels rise significantly under the Australian Labor Party governments of 2007-2013, and they take a dramatic leap coinciding with the Abbott Liberal government (2013-2015), not shown in the figure. In 2013, department staff totalled 798; in 2014, the total was 2141. This dramatic leap is specifically related, as the department's 2014 report notes, to "new functions... in the delivery of Indigenous affairs policy and programmes, reducing the burden of government regulation, and the delivery of women's policies and programmes" (Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2014, 6). In the analysis below, the time series is truncated at 2013.

Figure 6.1
*Staff in Prime Ministerial Branches, All Countries*



The staff trend in Canada shows that staff levels in the Privy Council Office have steadily increased over the period from 1946 to 2015. In 1946, there were only 30 employees in the PCO, and their work was mostly administrative in nature. Beginning in the mid-1960s, there is a significant increase in staff levels that continues until the 1980s and staff increasingly took on policy roles. This confirms the established view (e.g., Savoie 1999) that Pierre Trudeau's prime ministership (1968-1979, 1980-1984), and to a lesser extent, Lester Pearson's time as leader (1963-1968), is responsible for originating the modern prime ministerial office in Canada.

After relative stability through Brian Mulroney's administrations and the early government of Jean Chrétien, there is another phase of expansion around 1995. During the tenure of the Harper government (2006-2015), staff levels in the PCO rise and then fall. In 2015, the total number of staff, 884, is about the same as in 2007. The mean level of change from 1946 to 2015, 5.76 percent, is higher than in Australia and, tellingly, 65 percent of the annual changes in staff are positive, while only 26 percent negative. Overall, then, the staff level trend in Canada is indicative of a 'typical' institutionalizing process of staff growth and qualitative change from a mostly administrative office to a robust, sprawling, policy-oriented bureaucracy.

Staff levels in the New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) resemble the appropriations picture we encountered in chapter five. The time series runs from 1990, when the DPMC was formed, to 2015. There is a dramatic increase in staff in the first two years of the DPMC's existence, from less than 50 in 1990 to 171 employees in 1992. However, after 1992, staff levels begin a slight downward trend, to a low of 112 employees by 2001. Between 1992 and 2013, the average annual

change in staff levels is only -1.70 percent, suggesting a relatively stable period. The most recent years, from 2013, appear to be a period of renewed staff growth in the New Zealand DPMC. This pattern of initial increase, stabilization, then recent expansion, was also evident for appropriations, although the latter showed greater fluctuation. This is a distinctive pattern as compared to Australia and Canada. It could be indicative of a kind of typical institutionalization process as new organizations invent, entrench, and extend their capacities and roles. In this regard, then, the New Zealand prime ministerial branch serves as a useful counterpoint to the other cases. We will see this pattern again in the internal structure of the New Zealand DPMC later on, in chapter seven.

Finally, staff levels in the United Kingdom also show a distinctive pattern of change. The trend is quite volatile. Until 1983, the number of staff in the Cabinet Office is relatively stable at around 500 employees. The addition of the Management and Personnel Office to the Cabinet Office in 1983 increases the staff count by more than 1000. A similar increase in the mid-1990s, corresponding to the creation of the Office of Public Service and Science by John Major, brings the staff count to its peak, at close to 3000 employees. Reorganization then reduces the number of staff dramatically, to less than 1000, by 2009. It has since recovered somewhat; in 2015, 2100 people worked in the Cabinet Office. The relatively large annual changes in staff levels since the mid-1990s - the absolute value is 14.56 percent - testify to the manipulability of the office as a proxy for prime ministerial priorities and intentions. Because of the relatively low and essentially constant number of staff before 1984, subsequent analysis of the British case is of the period from 1984 to 2015.

Examining staff levels over time in each of the four cases presents quite different and somewhat unexpected institutional histories. However, as with appropriations in the previous chapter, it could be the case that staff resources are simply a function of overall civil service staff changes. If this were true, the trends shown in figure 6.1 are 'epiphenomenal' in the sense that, rather than reflecting real relative change in prime ministerial branches, they only reflect broader trends. Thus, I also assess whether there is change in the proportion of total civil service staff that prime ministerial branch staff constitute. This is plotted in figure 6.2, which shows staff in prime ministerial branches as a percentage of total civil service staff over time. This total includes only staff working in the core civil service, not, for instance, defence personnel, health care staff, or 'industrial' employees.[90]

Figure 6.2

*Staff in Prime Ministerial Branches, % of Total Civil Service, All Countries*




[90] A term used in the UK sources to refer to 'blue-collar' persons employed by the government.

These plots indicate whether staff levels increase or decrease in relation to overall growth in the public service of these countries. A constant proportional trend (i.e., a horizontal line) over a long time period suggests that staff levels in the prime ministerial branch are not growing or shrinking relative to the overall public service; they are more a function of change in general public service staff levels than of any unique process of institutionalization in the prime ministership. The figure suggests that the proportional trend tracks closely with the staff level trend, indicating a non-constant relationship between the two. In New Zealand, there is some divergence after the initial two years of the DPMC's establishment. Even though the staff trend declines, its proportion of the civil service remains high for the next few years. It should be noted, though, that in absolute terms these changes are small. Overall, the correlations between the staff level trends and the proportional trends are nearly perfect in three of the four cases and in New Zealand it is still very high (0.73). This gives credence to the notion that prime ministerial branch staff levels move independently of staff levels in the overall civil service; they are driven by distinct factors and are not simply reflective of overall changes in the broad administrative machinery of government.

*6.2 Empirical Expectations*

This section articulates the hypotheses relating public expectations, economic trends, and political conditions to staff resources in the prime ministerial branches. Table 6.1, below, summarizes these hypotheses, which are iterative of those in the previous chapter. The goal, then, is to test further the robustness of these explanations. For the Theory of Public Expectations, I set out three hypotheses. To reiterate briefly, the theory suggests that the shift from predominantly "allegiant" to "assertive" patterns of citizen

attitudes and orientations to politics and institutions creates conditions of heightened public expectations of leaders. These expectations stimulate leaders, especially prime ministers, to generate the institutional capacity to respond adequately, partly in the form of institutionalizing budgetary and staff resources. What we tested in chapter five and continue testing here are the impacts of specific observable indicators of assertive citizenship on concrete institutional outcomes.

Table 6.1
*Summary of Hypotheses for Prime Ministerial Branch Staff*

| |
|---|
| *Theory of Public Expectations* |
| H1. As overall interest in politics increases, staff resources in prime ministerial branches increase. |
| H2. As overall party identification weakens, staff resources in prime ministerial branches increase. |
| H3. As the level of assertive citizenship in a country increases staff resources in prime ministerial branches also increase. |
| *Economic Factors* |
| H4. Globalization is positively associated with staff resources. |
| H5. Central government activity is positively associated with staff resources. |
| *Political Conditions* |
| H6a. Staff resources decrease as a prime ministerial term continues. |
| H6b. Staff resources increase in successive term years. |
| H7. The more legislative support a prime minister has, the greater, on average, the staff resource growth in the prime ministerial branches. |
| H8. Growth in staff resources is lower under more conservative prime ministers than under more liberal prime ministers. |

The first public expectations hypothesis, H1, is that as overall interest in politics increases, staff resources in prime ministerial branches increase. The second hypothesis, H2, states that there is a negative relationship between overall levels of party identification strength and staff levels; high levels of the former are associated with low levels of the latter, and vice versa. The third and final public expectations hypothesis, H3,

states that political assertiveness, as measured by the constructed Assertive Index, is positively associated with staff resources in the prime ministerial branches. The public expectations hypotheses for staff resources, then, are:

> *H1. As overall interest in politics increases, staff resources in prime ministerial branches increase.*
>
> *H2. As overall party identification weakens, staff resources in prime ministerial branches increase.*
>
> *H3. As the level of assertive citizenship in a country increases staff resources in prime ministerial branches also increase.*

The analysis below also tests five other hypotheses related to economic trends and political conditions. As discussed in chapter three, we expect that globalization and the growth of central government activity contribute to prime ministerial branch institutionalization generally. Both of these trends can be seen as creating fertile conditions for staff level growth. They implicate new societal and transnational actors in domestic policy-making processes. In doing so, they attenuate the ability of prime ministers and governments generally to decide, coordinate and implement political and policy goals. The growth of government activity itself arguably has a similar "expectations-heightening" effect to the political-cultural shift. As governments do more, citizens, rather than being satisfied, come to expect more from government. These implications of globalization and government activity are likely to incentivize prime ministers to seek greater institutional capacity within their purview, and staff resources are one manifestation of this capacity. Thus, H4 and H5 are as follows:

> *H4. The level of globalization in a country is positively associated with the staff resources in its prime ministerial branch.*
>
> *H5. The level of government economic activity in a country is positively associated with the staff resources in its prime ministerial branch.*

Our second set of alternative explanations involves short-term political conditions. The theoretical rationale here is relatively straightforward: as political actors, prime ministers are highly sensitive to the political context of their decisions. They also bring certain preconceptions and expectations – their own and those of their supporters – that are political and ideological in nature. Prime ministers are not simply neutral actors rationally responding to exogenous cultural and economic forces; they are strategic actors considering what is politically feasible, advantageous, and desirable.

Thus, I identify three political conditions that could affect institutionalization of staff resources: a term effect, legislative support, and ideology. I expect that the location of an observation within a prime ministerial term matters, but do not have a strong, theoretically informed, sense of the directionality: staff levels might increase or decrease during a term. H7, the legislative support hypothesis, posits that higher levels of legislative support are associated with increases in staff levels. Finally, I hypothesize that ideology has an effect on staff level change: prime ministers that are more conservative will, on average, be associated with decreases, or at least smaller increases, in staff levels than more liberal prime ministers. The final three hypotheses are thus as follows:

> *H6. Staff levels are a function of the duration of prime ministerial terms. They either decrease or increase as a function of the amount of term elapsed.*
>
> *H7. The more legislative support a prime minister has, the greater the staff level increase in the prime ministerial branches.*
>
> *H8. Growth in staff resources is lower under more conservative prime ministers than under more liberal prime ministers.*

*6.3 Preliminary Assessments*

As in the previous chapter, I offer initial descriptive assessments of these hypotheses. As discussed above in chapter five, such descriptive investigation provides

context to further ground this analysis, and also helps to set our expectations about the fit between theory and empirics. First, I examine the bivariate associations and time series of the assertive citizenship variables and prime ministerial branch staff. Statistical correlations between the assertive citizenship variables and staff are provided in table A6.1 of the chapter's appendix, and scatterplots visualizing the associations are provided in appendix figures A6.1 to A6.3.

Preliminary analysis suggests that political interest does not have a uniform, positive association with staff resources as hypothesis H1 expects. Once again, the only case that strongly supports the hypothesis is the Privy Council Office in Canada. Higher values of political interest correspond with higher staff counts, and vice versa; the points are relatively closely clustered, and the correlation coefficient ($r = 0.76$, $p < 0.01$) confirms this apparent association. In the other cases, the relationship is not readily apparent. In Australia, several outlying points have outsized influence on the positive finding (these points correspond to the last three years in the data, 2011-2013). In New Zealand, there is no evident pattern. Finally, in the UK, a slight positive relationship exists but there is a great deal of heteroskedasticity (non-constant error variance). Therefore, the descriptive analysis does not suggest that the political interest hypothesis should be strongly supported in further testing.

For party identification, Canada proves to be the only case where the hypothesized negative relationship between party identification and staff appears to be true. Weaker party identification is associated with observations of more staff, while stronger identification is associated with fewer staff. The correlation is relatively strong and statistically significant ($r = -0.53$, $p < 0.01$). The associations in other cases are either

not significant (Australia), driven by outlying values (New Zealand), or opposite to expectations (United Kingdom).

Finally, I examine the strength of the relationships between aggregate assertive values and attitudes, as measured by the assertive index, and staff resources in the prime ministerial branches. By and large, these results are consistent with those of political interest and party identification in not demonstrating robust support for the hypotheses, except in the Canadian case. Once again, Canada seems to be the best case for the hypothesis. The association is relatively linear, positive, and statistically significant ($r = 0.76$, $p < 0.01$). In contrast, the relationship between assertiveness and staff is negative in the UK, though with a highly spread distribution. There is a positive correlation in Australia, but this is again driven by particularly high values on both variables; without which the relationship is null. These results suggest that the assertiveness hypothesis is not broadly supported in the cases.

The above evidence for the relationship between assertive citizenship and staff resources is inconsistent and generally scant. This attests to the fact that the staff resource trends over time, and to an extent the assertive trends themselves, are less straightforward than theory expects. The case that best conforms to expectations about incremental institutionalization and the pace and direction of value change, Canada, unsurprisingly produces the strongest support for the Theory of Public Expectations. The discussion heretofore, however, does not account for the temporality of the theory. It is not simply that assertive citizenship and institutional change are expected to be associated in certain directions; I also expect that they co-vary over time in theoretically congruent ways.

Thus, I also consider the association of their trends through time, based on the time series plots in appendix figure A6.4.

Examining these trends through time offers broadly similar findings to the bivariate associations. In Australia and Canada, the level of political interest roughly shifts with staff resources over time. In both cases, both interest and staff are at their lowest early in the observed period and are highest near the end of the period. During the period, they diverge at points and do not always exhibit similar rates of change, but broadly speaking, the over-time correlation is relatively strong. This is not the case in either New Zealand or the United Kingdom: branch staff levels seem to move independently of political interest entirely.

For party identification, the over-time relationships are not as clear even in the cases where significant bivariate associations were found. For instance, in Canada the party identification trend and the staff trend only share the characteristic that they are high and low, respectively, through the 1960s and 1970s and comparably lower (higher) in the 1990s and early 2000s. The staff trend exhibits gradual, incremental change over the period, while party identification is much more volatile, dropping precipitously in the late 1980s, and fluctuating until the mid-2000s. In New Zealand, the two trends parallel each other closely until the last three years, but this is due to both trends being relatively constant through most of the period. In neither Australia nor the UK is it evident that party identification and staff levels are related through time.

The third measure of assertive citizenship, the assertive index, shifts over time relatively closely with corresponding change in prime ministerial branch staff in the two cases where significant positive correlations were observed: Australia and Canada. In

Australia, assertiveness has increased steadily since 1990, which is not precisely matched by staff level changes early but does so in the 2000s. In Canada, the assertiveness trend actually closely follows the political interest trend, and thus also diverges from the staff level trend in the 1970s but converges in subsequent decades. Interestingly, assertiveness has fallen somewhat since the early 2000s, which precedes a corresponding change in staff levels: they reach a peak in 2005 and have not changed consistently since. In the UK, the negative correlation found earlier is reflected in the time series trends: assertiveness is lowest in the mid-1990s, when staff in the Cabinet Office is at its highest level; the subsequent shift to increased assertiveness from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s is not reflected in staff levels at all. Thus, the time series trends for assertive citizenship and staff levels generally accord with earlier evidence; in Australia and Canada, various measures of assertive citizenship co-vary through time with prime ministerial branch staff in theoretically expected ways, generally. In the two other countries, there is less evidence that this is the case.

Finally, this section briefly explores the alternative hypotheses positing economic trends and political conditions as important drivers of staff resource institutionalization. To recall, hypotheses four and five posit that globalization and central government activity, respectively, are positively associated with prime ministerial branch staff resources. As countries become more globalized, prime ministers require more institutional capacity to foster effective policy coordination. The two measures of globalization produce similar results: in Australia and Canada, the relationship between globalization and levels of prime ministerial branch staff appears to be relatively strong, although in Australia, a pattern like those found earlier is also evident here: the statistics

are driven by a small number of large variable values. However, the time series do generally correspond to expectations: staff increasing along with globalization levels over time. Neither of the two other cases suggests that globalization is a factor in driving institutionalization of their prime ministerial branches.

The government activity hypothesis predicts that higher levels of government activity (spending as a proportion of GDP) will be associated with higher levels of staff resources in the prime ministerial branches. Here, the associations are more ambiguous. While several of the correlations show the expected relationships, particularly in Australia and Canada, the time series do not suggest a close congruence between government spending and prime ministerial staff. For instance, government activity in Canada rises precipitously in the early to mid-1980s and falls as dramatically in the mid-1990s, while staff levels remain low throughout the 1980s and increase consistently from 1990 to 2005. Thus, in general the hypothesized relationships between economic change and prime ministerial branch staff change are not consistently supported. In both New Zealand and the UK, they are not apparent at all.

The second set of alternative explanations for staff levels in prime ministerial branches looks to the salience of political conditions, specifically, term effects, legislative support, and ideology. The descriptive evidence suggests that there are neither ‘new government’ nor ‘adjustment’ term effects for staff: changes in staff levels do not meaningfully vary through the course of prime ministerial terms. There are no discernible patterns in the changes from year to year, according to results of ANOVA tests on the mean change by term year in each country. There is simply too much variance within each term year, overwhelming between-year differences.

The seventh hypothesis states that greater legislative support will, on average, be associated with greater staff level change. This hypothesis is operationalized in terms of the relationship between seat share for the prime ministerial party and staff level change. However, descriptive analysis suggests that legislative support does not affect change in staff levels in the expected direction. In only one case, New Zealand, is a positive correlation found, but this is driven by two observations (1991 and 1992) in which, occurring before significant electoral reform in 1993, the prime minister controlled 69 percent of the legislative seats, obviously unequalled since. Thus, there is no evidence of a general legislative support effect.

The final political conditions hypothesis posits that ideology has an effect on staff level change in prime ministerial branches: the more conservative the prime minister, the lower rates of change in staff levels we expect. There is little evidence of systematic association between ideology and change in staff levels in any of the countries, on either measure of ideology (manifesto scores and party of the prime minister). Only in Canada are there significant, substantial associations in the negative direction between the two measures of ideology and staff levels, and these are over the period from 1946 to 2015. For the period tested in the regression models below, generally 1966 to 2015, the association is not significant.

To conclude, this section assessed descriptive evidence for the Public Expectations theories and its alternatives in terms of the staff resources of the prime ministerial branches in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The clearest conclusion is that two of the cases, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, offer little evidence that the staff levels in their prime ministerial branches are related to the

systematic factors identified. By contrast, the Canadian case demonstrated solid, consistent evidence that assertive citizenship and globalization are both related to staff, while there is some evidence of such relationships in the Australian case, particularly when considered between time series. Political conditions do not appear to significantly impact change in staff levels in any country. How robust are these findings? To find out, in the next two sections I turn to the second part of the empirical analysis in this chapter, which uses time-series regression techniques to model the determinants of staff levels in the prime ministerial branches.

*6.4 Regression Model Specification and Estimation*

The next section presents and discusses the results of estimating models of prime ministerial branch staff, with assertive citizenship, economic trends, and political conditions entered as regressors. These models are specified and estimated via the same process as employed for the models in chapter five. To reiterate briefly, in order to account for specific issues that time series data present, I use a form of time series regression known as error correction modeling.[91] The error correction specification allows estimation of the extent to which independent variable series and the dependent variable series are in a long-term equilibrium relationship, the short-term impact of

[91] Time series variables often exhibit serially correlated errors and, in political science applications, are often not stationary. A stationary variable is one whose mean, variance, and covariance do not depend on when it is observed, but many variables that have a trend over time violate this assumption. A variable that increases over time theoretically has infinite mean and variance, which creates problems for estimating distributional statistics that underlie significance tests. As well, regressing non-stationary variables on each other can result in spurious relationships; if they share a time trend, they will be highly correlated even if they are not actually related.
One way of addressing this is to difference all trending variables, but this throws out information about their levels in the long-run. Error correction models capture the long-run joint dynamics of multiple non-stationary series by positing that non-stationary variable time series are in an equilibrium relationship (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 151). The variables are said to be 'cointegrated', which means that a linear combination of their series is stationary.

changes in independent variables on change in the dependent variable, and the speed at which equilibrium is restored after short-term shocks.

As in chapter five, I estimate separate models for each of the three measures of assertive citizenship: political interest, strength of party identification, and the assertive index. Different combinations of the economic trend variables were included in each model, and a total staff variable was included in all models to control for overall civil service staff growth. To test for the effects of the political conditions, political variables were included in all models as 'exogenous' variables, meaning that they were not differenced (since they are constant during each prime ministerial term) and constrained to having instantaneous short-run effects.

Unlike the previous chapter, it was not necessary to estimate additional period-specific models for New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In New Zealand, this is because the available staff data begins in 1991 with the establishment of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Thus, the New Zealand models are estimated for the period 1991-2015. In the United Kingdom, the descriptive analysis indicates that pre-1984 staff levels were essentially constant and very low relative to post-1984 levels; including them would certainly generate dubious inferences about variable effects. As well, the structural break in 2000 that was a defining characteristic of the appropriations trend was not evident in staff levels. The UK models are thus estimated for 1984-2015.[92] The Australian models are estimated for 1978-2013 because, as was the case with appropriations, staff levels in the most recent two years are extreme outliers relative to

[92] In the UK, inclusion of the government activity variable resulted in many unintelligible, inordinately large estimated effects. This is probably because the variable is distributed very abnormally, in a 'v' shape. Excluding the variable produces more sensible estimates, so it was excluded from the main models. Its own effects were estimated separately.

the time series. The Canadian models are estimated for 1966-2015. However, in all of the models the particular variables and the inclusion of lagged values reduce the actual period length from these initial periods. The actual number of periods used is given in the full regression results in the chapter appendix tables A6.2 through A6.5.

*6.5 Regression Results*

In this section, I present and discuss the results of modeling prime ministerial branch staff as a function of trends in assertive citizenship, economic change, and political conditions. I first assess the overall performance of the models in terms of capturing variation in prime ministerial branch staff. This performance is indicated by the goodness of fit measures reported in the appendix tables. As expected because of the dynamics included in the model, such as lags of the dependent variable, the models generally capture a sizable proportion of the variation in branch staff. There are, however, substantial differences in how the models perform. The fit statistics generally agree that models including political interest perform the best in all countries, the exceptional case being the UK. The assertive index models also perform well, especially in Canada. Party identification performs least well in Australia and Canada. Although this model has the lowest average error and information criterion estimates in the UK, this is likely because, as described below, it includes dummies for two years that produced large residuals. Initially, the UK party identification model performed worse than the assertive index model. Thus, I conclude that, in terms of overall model performance, political interest and assertive index models best capture variation in prime ministerial branch staff.

The models also were subject to a statistical test, the Bounds Test (Pesaran et al. 2001), for the existence of a long-run relationship in levels between cointegrated

independent variables and dependent variables. The test produces a value that is compared to critical values on an F-distribution. Surpassing the upper critical value suggests that there is a long-run relationship, while falling within the lower and upper critical values is inconclusive. The test found that long-run relationships are evident in Canada and in two of the three models in the UK (excepting political interest). In both Australia and New Zealand, the political interest models were found to exhibit long-run relationships but the other models were inconclusive. This does not necessarily mean that there are no long-run relationships in these models but that the test cannot sufficiently determine the significance of the relationship.

In addition to the overall performance of the models in terms of explaining variation in prime ministerial branch staff, the results also provide information about how branch staff trends respond to changes in independent variables. The error correction specification estimates the rate at which equilibrium is restored after transient shocks (indeed, this is the meaning of "error correction"). A slow rate of correction, nearer to zero, indicates that shocks persist for many periods after they occur, while a value closer to one indicates that most of the disequilibrium is corrected after one period (year). This can be characterized as the 'memory' of the process; a long-memoried process has a slow error correction rate and means that changes in independent variables have long-lasting effects, while a short-memoried process means that changes in independent variables do not have persistent effects. Normally, estimates of error correction rates should fall between zero and one and be statistically significant.

Most of the models produce such estimates. The error correction is the slowest in the United Kingdom, although it is still relatively quick: only about 54 percent of the

divergence from equilibrium is corrected in one year. In Canada, the models estimate that between 71 and 87 percent of the effects of short-term shocks are corrected in one period. This indicates a relatively short-memoried process in which short-term changes do not have long-lasting, ongoing effects.[93] In both Australia and New Zealand, the error correction estimates vary significantly. In both cases, estimates below -1 were obtained in some models, indicating that the process overcorrects for short-term shocks, and thus that it may not converge to equilibrium but instead cycles above and below it. This is only the case for the political interest model in Australia; the other two models exhibit nominal, though fairly different rates of correction (63 and 92 percent). The best performing model in New Zealand, the political interest model, suggests a relatively fast error correction rate of 74 percent. These estimates suggest that, across the board, prime ministerial staff change is relatively short-memoried and malleable; immediate disruptions from the long-term equilibrium trend do not have persistent effects.

Post-estimation tests for residual autocorrelation and heteroskedastic errors generally show that the models adequately corrected for these violations. None of the Australian or Canadian models produced statistically significant chi-squared values (since the null hypotheses of the tests are no autocorrelation and no heteroskedastic errors, respectively, this is a good sign). In New Zealand, the party identification model produced conflicting results for autocorrelation, while the corresponding model in the UK showed evidence of heteroskedasticity. Inspection of residuals showed that the spike in staff in the mid-1990s was problematic; including a dummy variable for 1995 and 1996

[93] If the *changes* continue from year to year, obviously their effects persist because they will be 'new' effects; the error correction rate only estimates how the *effects* of change at time *t* are perpetuated in the time series at time *t+1, t+2,* etc.

eliminated the problem. Overall, then, the tests suggest that the models are properly specified.

I turn now to analysis of the covariates in the models of prime ministerial branch staff. First, I assess the strength of evidence for the covariates that capture the assertive citizenship hypotheses. These are aggregate political interest, strength of party identification, and the index of assertive values and attitudes. Overall, as might be expected given the descriptive results earlier, the assertive citizenship indicators are not found to have robust effects on prime ministerial branch staff consistently across the cases, either in the short- or long-run. Table 6.2, below, provides the model estimates of both the long-run and short-run effects of assertive citizenship on branch staff, extracted from the full regression results found in the chapter appendix tables A6.2 through A6.5.

Table 6.2
*Effects of Assertive Citizenship on Prime Ministerial Branch Staff*

| | *Australia* | *Canada* | *New Zealand* | *United Kingdom* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Long-Run* | | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.46* | 0.06 | 0.33 | 1.54* |
| | (0.19) | (0.10) | (0.30) | (0.64) |
| Strength PID | 0.58 | -0.05 | 0.12 | 0.57 |
| | (0.45) | (0.05) | (0.36) | (0.77) |
| Assertive Index | 0.37 | 0.19* | -0.10 | -2.72* |
| | (0.40) | (0.08) | (0.17) | (1.15) |
| *Short-Run* | | | | |
| ΔPolitical | -1.08** | -0.12 | 0.56* | -0.52 |
| Interest | (0.29) | (0.08) | (0.19) | (0.35) |
| L.ΔPolitical | -0.94** | | 0.51* | |
| Interest | (0.23) | | (0.20) | |
| ΔStrength PID | | 0.07 | -0.58 | -0.33 |
| | | (0.05) | (0.81) | (0.28) |
| L.ΔStrength | | | -1.92 | |
| PID | | | (0.96) | |
| ΔAssertive | 0.43 | -0.25** | | 0.58 |
| Index | (0.37) | (0.07) | | (0.51) |
| L.ΔAssertive | 0.48 | | | 1.24* |
| Index | (0.34) | | | (0.51) |

| | |
|---|---|
| L2.ΔAssertive Index | 1.81** (0.46) |

Note: Entries are OLS coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Extracted from tables A6.2 – A6.5 in the chapter appendix.

The estimated long-run impacts of our assertive citizenship measures produce partial, if not consistent, support for the idea that public expectations generate prime ministerial branch institutionalization via staff resource growth. Political interest is found to be correctly positive and statistically significant in two cases, Australia and the United Kingdom. In Australia, the estimated effect is substantively large (0.46) and significant at the 5% level, while the effect is even larger in the UK (1.54, $p < 0.05$). This means that an increase of one standard deviation in political interest increases branch staff by almost half a standard deviation in Australia and by one and a half standard deviations in the UK. I visualize these marginal effects of political interest on branch staff in figure 6.3, for all countries. The predicted standardized staff score for chosen percentiles of political interest, along with 95 percent confidence intervals for each point estimate, are shown. This demonstrates that in Canada and New Zealand, the predicted staff score increases with the level of political interest but the confidence intervals overlap significantly. In Australia and the United Kingdom, the confidence intervals do not all overlap, indicating that the positive effect is statistically significant.[94] To put these effects into concrete terms, consider that moving from the 25$^{th}$ to 75$^{th}$ percentiles of political interest is estimated to increase staff by 125 in Australia and more than 400 staff in the UK.

[94] Although this might not be evident in the graphs because of their size, consider that the y-axis scale is also different in the Australian and UK plots than in the others, running from -3 to 2 in the former and -2 to 2 in the latter. In Canada, the scale is actually in tenths, from -0.2 to 0.4; in New Zealand, the y-axis rungs from -1 to 1.

Figure 6.3

*Marginal Effects of Political Interest on Prime Ministerial Branch Staff*




The long-run effects of party identification are not borne out in the models, so we need not elaborate further. However, the impact of assertive values and attitudes on prime ministerial branch staff is noteworthy, though not entirely in accordance with our hypotheses. In Canada, the long-run impact of assertiveness, as measured by the assertive index, is correctly positive (0.19, $p < 0.05$), while in the United Kingdom, the impact is negative (-2.72, $p < 0.05$). This is not altogether surprising, considering the bivariate correlations and time series assessments earlier in the chapter. The long-run impact in Canada is, as expected, significant but relatively small, attesting to the incrementalism of branch staff change in the Privy Council Office since the 1960s. The estimate indicates that the difference between staff levels at the 25$^{th}$ percentile of assertiveness versus the 75$^{th}$ percentile is about 96 employees, which is larger than the PCO until the mid-1960s but less than ten percent of the staff complement at the office's peak in 2011. This effect is shown visually in figure 6.4, below, which plots all marginal effects at selected

percentile values of assertiveness on prime ministerial branch staff, with 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 6.4
*Marginal Effects of Assertiveness on Prime Ministerial Branch Staff*




As we have discovered, the UK case presents a challenge to theoretical expectations because its staff level trend does not 'look like' what it should look like: instead of gradual, incremental change, the trend is highly volatile and not increasing as a function of time, since the mid-1980s (i.e., it does not have a linear trend). In relation to assertiveness, then, the reason for the estimated negative effect is apparent. Staff levels are highest in the mid-1990s when assertiveness is at its lowest, while assertiveness increases considerably thereafter and staff levels decline. I would argue that the negative estimate for assertiveness in the UK Cabinet Office context thus does not so much disconfirm the hypothesis as provide a deviant case with which to consider the theory's limits.

The models also estimate the effect that changes in assertive citizenship have on changes in prime ministerial branch staff in the short run. These short-run effects generally correspond to the long-run effects in that they are statistically significant in the same models. Thus, political interest has both a long-run impact and short-run impacts on staff in Australia. The short-run impacts are both instantaneous (-1.08, $p < 0.01$) and lagged by one year (-0.94, $p < 0.01$).[95] In Canada, a standard deviation increase in assertiveness at one point in time would increase staff levels by a quarter of a standard deviation, equivalent to 81 FTE employees. In the UK, the long-run, negative impact of assertiveness is played out in the short-run as lagged effects, at a one year lag (1.24, $p < 0.05$) and a two year lag (1.81, $p < 0.01$). Finally, in New Zealand, political interest appears to have instantaneous and lagged short-run impacts on DPMC staff levels, but these impacts do not aggregate to a long-run effect.

The fourth and fifth hypotheses of the chapter posit that globalization and government activity, respectively, are significant determinants of change in prime ministerial branch staff. In terms of long-run impacts, the globalization hypothesis is supported to some extent in the Australian and Canadian models and not supported in the New Zealand and UK models. Both an aggregate indicator of globalization, the KOF index, and a purely economic measure, trade openness, have positive, statistically significant effects in Australia, while in Canada, only the trade openness factor is a significant determinant.

The effect sizes are also quite large. In real terms, for instance, the globalization effect in model (2) in Australia is equivalent to an increase of 287 employees, comparing

[95] The negative coefficients do not indicate a negative effect but, instead, that the short-run effects are larger than the long-run effect. The same applies to the fact that the short-run effects have opposite signs to the long-run impact in both Canada and the UK (Kennedy 2005, 82).

globalization at its 25th and 75th percentiles. This is almost thirty percent of the staff complement in the DPMC in 2012 (the peak year in the estimated period). By way of comparison, the political interest effect found earlier is equivalent to an increase of only 125 employees. This effect is the largest of the globalization effects, but all of the statistically significant effects in the Australian and Canadian models are substantively meaningful. In contrast, the hypothesized long-run effects of government activity on prime ministerial branch staff are not found in any model. Contrary to expectations, then, when government activity in the economy increases, there is no corresponding increase in prime ministerial branch staff, on average.

Short-run economic effects on prime ministerial branch staff follow the long-run effects, for the most part. In both Australia and Canada, trade openness is found to be a statistically significant determinant of change in branch staff. In Australia, the impact of trade openness on staff is not instantaneous but lagged one and two years, while in Canada, there is both an instantaneous effect of change in trade openness and a one-year lagged effect (coefficients are -0.27 and -0.20 respectively, significant at the 99% level).The short-run effect of overall globalization (i.e., the KOF index measure) in Australia is also lagged two years. Finally, there is some evidence, though not strong, that government activity has a short-run, though not long-run, impact on branch staff in New Zealand: one-year lagged change in government activity has a statistically significant effect (-1.26, $p < 0.05$). Overall, though, as with the estimated long-run effects, there is no clear indication that government activity drives institutional change in terms of prime ministerial branch staff.

Finally, the models provide little evidence that political conditions have direct effects on change in prime ministerial branch staff. Almost none of the estimated coefficients for term year, legislative support or ideology are found to be statistically significant. One exception is in the New Zealand political interest model, where prime ministerial party is found to have a positive, statistically significant effect ($b = 0.93$, $p < 0.01$). However, this is almost certainly because the few significant positive changes (increases) in staff levels in the New Zealand DPMC occurred in the last three years under John Key, a National party prime minister. Thus, the positive finding is not a particularly reliable indicator of a general effect. Overall, then, the models do not suggest a critical role for these political conditions in inducing staff change.

However, despite the lack of main effects for the political conditions variables, additional model estimates suggest that politics does have certain moderating effects on the relationship between assertive citizenship and change in prime ministerial branch staff. These were estimated as interactions between each political variable and measure of assertive citizenship. The results are provided in the appendix table A6.7, below. The most notable interaction effect is between assertive citizenship and prime ministerial party. In three of the four cases – Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – the interaction between the two is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates that, on average, assertiveness has a much weaker impact on branch staff when the prime minister belongs to the "centre-right" party than when she belongs to the "centre-left" party, and that the difference is meaningful. There is thus an ideological component to institutionalization, even if not a direct effect. It implies that, in general, more conservative prime ministers are less responsive to pressure from sociocultural changes

than more liberal prime ministers, which we probably would expect. It is reasonable to suggest that many of the values and attitudes that underlie assertive citizenship resonate more forcefully for liberals than for conservatives.

### 6.5.1 Discussion

In summary, then, this section assesses the hypotheses about determinants of prime ministerial branch staff by estimating and analyzing several dynamically specified models. Overall, the models performed well in terms of goodness of fit measures and post-estimation tests. For the most part, the error correction specification was found to be an appropriate way of accounting for the time series nature of the variables, and in most cases normal, statistically significant "error correction" rates were found. While there was variation in the speed of convergence back to equilibrium after short-term shocks, generally the branch staff processes appear to be relatively 'short-memoried': a substantial proportion of the changes induced by shocks is corrected in only one period. This suggests that the processes of institutional change in the prime ministerial branches are quite malleable and flexible, in that changes at one point in time do not have impacts that resonate for long periods thereafter.

In terms of substantive empirical theory, a summary of the findings for the chapter's hypotheses is provided in table 6.3. The table lists the eight hypotheses and gives an overall assessment of empirical support for each. Overall, the public expectations hypotheses were only partially supported by the analysis: supporting evidence was found in some cases but not in others. H1, the political interest hypothesis, was found to have significant, positive long-run impacts on prime ministerial branch staff in both Australia and the United Kingdom. This suggests that, on average in these cases,

increases in political interest generate corresponding increases in prime ministerial branch staff. However, an alternative measure of assertive citizenship, strength of party identification, was not found to have a significant relationship with staff in any country. As in the appropriations case, H3, the hypothesis relating assertive political culture broadly to institutionalization via branch staff, was supported only in Canada. The short-run effects of these factors correspond to the long-run effects in terms of where they are significant.

Table 6.3
*Summary of Findings: Prime Ministerial Branch Staff*

| Hypothesis | | Finding |
|---|---|---|
| H1 | Political Interest (+) | Partial Support |
| H2 | Party Identification (-) | Not Supported |
| H3 | Assertive Political Culture (+) | Partial Support |
| H4 | Globalization (+) | Partial Support |
| H5 | Government Activity (+) | Not Supported |
| H6 | Term Effect (+/-) | Not Supported |
| H7 | Legislative Support (+) | Not Supported |
| H8 | Ideology (-) | Not Supported |

Note: The (+) and (–) signs indicate the hypothesized direction of the relationship between the factor and staff.

I also found that the impact of the assertive citizenship measures is to some extent conditional on political contexts. In particular, ideology is a key moderating variable on the impact of assertiveness on institutional change: “centre-right” prime ministers are much less responsive to the expectations and pressures generated by increasing assertive values and attitudes than “centre-left” prime ministers are. While the results are obviously not clear and consistent across the cases, the analysis suggests that assertive citizenship plays a substantial role in determining prime ministerial branch staff in certain cases and

contexts. The alternative explanations, however, were not supported generally. The globalization hypothesis, H5, received some support in Australia and Canada, but the second economic explanation, the impact of government activity, was not supported. There was essentially no evidence to support the claims in hypotheses H6 through H8 that political conditions have independent effects on change in prime ministerial branch staff, although as noted, they evidently condition the impact of public expectations on staff.

More broadly, the results speak to the difficulty in precisely establishing the validity of relationships among processes over time. Although the error correction model specification is the appropriate choice in light of the violations of regression assumptions that are typical of time series data, it does create stringent tests for finding significant effects. In particular, disaggregating the long-term relationships of several time series variables is a difficult task, made more difficult by the relative shortness of the time periods under observation. Relatedly, the results also confront the fact that the theories discussed in chapter three depend, to a significant extent, on observing a 'normal' pattern of institutional change in the prime ministerial branches: slow and incrementally increasing. This pattern turned out not to be consistently exhibited here or, indeed, in the appropriations chapter. Thus, the extent to which the cases support the theoretically-derived hypotheses largely reflects the extent to which the case exhibits this normal process, with Canada as a prototypical case and New Zealand and the UK exhibiting problematic patterns, for analytical purposes. This also suggests that the selection of cases, while made for justifiable reasons as stated in chapter four, may not afford the most analytical leverage in assessing these theories of institutionalization.

*6.6 Patterns of Institutional Change*

The preceding discussion assessed the extent to which empirical evidence matches theoretical expectations. Perhaps the clearest overall thrust of the evidence is that institutional change has not been as straightforward and consistent as theory expected. This is good for distinguishing between the cases but makes it difficult to find across the board support for general theories. In this section, I consider directly the observed variations in branch institutionalization to characterize dominant patterns of institutional change in the cases, based both on their time series and on how they responded to external factors. To recall, in chapter three I introduced a typology adapted from historical- institutionalist work on incremental change (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This typology maps four general patterns of change - layering, drift, displacement, and conversion – onto dimensions of institutionalization and continuity in the process of change. This typology is reproduced in figure 6.5, below, and each case is characterized therein.

Figure 6.5
*Patterns of Institutional Change: Prime Ministerial Branch Staff*



As in the analysis of prime ministerial branch appropriations in the previous chapter, the Canadian case clearly can be characterized in terms of a process of institutional layering. Its time series exhibits both a high degree of continuity and a high degree of institutionalization: staff levels have grown steadily and incrementally, for the most part, since the late 1960s. The Canadian prime ministerial branch also is relatively responsive to the dynamics of shifting public expectations and economic trends; this response was always shown to be substantive but not extraordinary in magnitude, attesting to a smooth, gradual process of institutionalization.

The Australian case also is a case of layering with regard to prime ministerial branch staff, although it is much less continuous than the Canadian prime ministerial branch. Rather than a steady, incrementally increasing trend in staff levels, the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has only started to exhibit notable staff growth since the early 2000s. This growth has been significant but not expansionary in the way that we saw appropriations growth was in the UK in the late 1990s; thus, comparatively it cannot constitute a case of institutional conversion. In addition, like the Canadian case it exhibits a relatively strong but measured response to external factors such as levels of political interest and globalization. Therefore, Australia could be qualified as a case of ‘compressed’ layering relative to the slower, more spread out institutional layering evident in Canada.

The pattern observed in the previous chapter again is reflected here with regard to New Zealand. Excluding the most recent few years, staff growth in the New Zealand DPMC has been almost absent since the initial increase after the department was established in 1990. Thus, the case exhibits a high degree of continuity without a

significant degree of growth or evidence that the prime ministerial branch has undergone change. Moreover, the descriptive and regression analyses found minimal evidence that the New Zealand DPMC is particularly responsive to external factors; indeed, the patterns of change in the external factors themselves do not suggest that the department faces the same kinds of pressures and expectations bearing upon the branches in other cases. Thus, New Zealand is here, as in chapter five, a case of institutional drift.

Finally, the UK case offers an intriguing pattern of institutional change: I characterize it as being in between displacement and conversion. The time series of staff levels in the Cabinet Office is marked by abrupt, dramatic changes without necessarily demonstrating that it is more institutionalized than it was at points in the past. There is no structural break in the staff series, as there was in the appropriations series, which neatly splits it into distinct periods. Thus, in my view, there is no evidence to suggest a wholesale institutional conversion in the Cabinet Office, whereby fundamental institutional goals and norms are altered. Rather, at certain points there have been significant alterations in structure that have added a multitude of staff to the office, temporarily tilting the institutional balance from one set of functions to others (for details, see the discussion of structural change in the Cabinet Office in chapter eight). When these experiments in institutional structure were abandoned, the staff increases were not institutionalized. Thus, the UK case clearly exhibits less institutionalization, in terms of staff resources, than the Australian or Canadian cases, but probably more than in New Zealand. The UK's pattern of institutional change is not continuous, but not as extremely discontinuous as in the appropriations pattern in chapter five. It falls, therefore, at the

boundary of institutional displacement and conversion in our typology of institutional change.

This chapter investigated the extent and determinants of staff resources, as a measure of institutional autonomy, in the prime ministerial branches of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The next two chapters, chapters seven and eight, offer a different perspective on institutional change in the prime ministerial branches. The study moves from quantitative analysis to a case study approach that is more qualitatively oriented. It also moves from assessing the quantity of institutional capacity per se to assessing changes in how this capacity has been structured. Specifically, I examine the extent to which organizational units have proliferated and specialized in each of the prime ministerial branches. Chapter seven considers the cases of New Zealand and Canada, where structural change has been comparatively less evident, and chapter eight considers Australia and the United Kingdom, whose prime ministerial branches have exhibited much more robust change in unit structure.

*Appendix to Chapter 6*

Table A6.1

*Assertive Citizenship and Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, Correlations*

| | Political Interest | Party Identification | Assertive Index |
|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 0.35* | 0.11 | 0.46** |
| Canada | 0.76** | -0.53** | 0.76** |
| New Zealand | -0.03 | -0.50** | 0.38 |
| United Kingdom | 0.78** | -0.62** | -0.05 |
| Pre-1984 | 0.38 | -0.42 | 0.22 |
| Post-1984 | 0.28 | 0.35 | -0.42* |

Table A6.2

*Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, Australia*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EC | -1.72** | -0.63** | -0.92** |
| | (0.32) | (0.18) | (0.29) |
| *Long-Run* | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.46* | | |
| | (0.19) | | |
| Strength PID | | 0.58 | |
| | | (0.45) | |
| Assertive Index | | | 0.37 |
| | | | (0.40) |
| KOF Index | | 2.75** | |
| | | (0.97) | |
| Trade Openness | 0.92** | | 0.39 |
| | (0.12) | | (0.46) |
| Govt Activity | -1.06* | -1.40 | -0.15 |
| | (0.47) | (1.29) | (0.41) |
| Total Staff | 0.50** | 0.54* | 0.46 |
| | (0.11) | (0.22) | (0.22) |
| *Short-Run* | | | |
| LD.Staff | 0.85* | | 0.35 |
| | (0.30) | | (0.24) |
| L2D.Staff | 0.43 | | |
| | (0.27) | | |
| D1.Interest | -1.08** | | |
| | (0.29) | | |
| LD.Interest | -0.94** | | |
| | (0.23) | | |
| D1.Assertive Index | | | 0.43 |
| | | | (0.37) |
| LD.Assertive Index | | | 0.48 |
| | | | (0.34) |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1.KOF | | 0.24 | |
| | | (1.16) | |
| LD.KOF | | -0.31 | |
| | | (1.28) | |
| L2D.KOF | | -2.96* | |
| | | (1.38) | |
| D1.Openness | -0.83 | | 0.91 |
| | (0.54) | | (0.50) |
| LD.Openness | -1.38* | | |
| | (0.48) | | |
| L2D.Openness | -0.94* | | |
| | (0.41) | | |
| D1.Govt Activity | 0.76 | | |
| | (0.75) | | |
| D1.Total | -0.71* | | -0.41 |
| | (0.26) | | (0.31) |
| LD.Total | -0.46* | | -0.34 |
| | (0.21) | | (0.27) |
| L2D.Total | -0.61** | | -0.52* |
| | (0.19) | | (0.23) |
| *Exogenous* | | | |
| Term Year | -0.01 | -0.21 | -0.23 |
| | (0.10) | (0.15) | (0.12) |
| Seat Share | -0.32 | 0.11 | -0.08 |
| | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.18) |
| Party | -0.29 | | -0.30 |
| | (0.32) | | (0.38) |
| Ideology | | -0.23 | |
| | | (0.23) | |
| Constant | 0.99 | 0.74 | 0.36 |
| | (0.66) | (0.52) | (0.41) |
| | | | |
| N | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.72 | 0.25 | 0.51 |
| AIC | 22.57 | 55.42 | 42.51 |
| BIC | 52.50 | 73.37 | 66.45 |
| RMSE | 0.30 | 0.49 | 0.39 |
| Bounds Test F-Statistic | 7.99[r] | 3.32 | 3.86 |

*Notes:* Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The 'r' superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model's F-statistic was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels relationship.

Table A6.3

*Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, Canada*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EC | -0.77** | -0.71** | -0.87** |
| | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| *Long-Run* | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.06 | | |
| | (0.10) | | |
| Strength PID | | -0.05 | |
| | | (0.05) | |
| Assertive Index | | | 0.19* |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | (0.08) |
| KOF Index | | -0.02 | |
| | | (0.10) | |
| Trade Openness | 0.45** | | 0.28* |
| | (0.15) | | (0.14) |
| Govt Activity | 0.19 | -0.20 | 0.13 |
| | (0.10) | (0.14) | (0.09) |
| Total Staff | 0.09 | 0.22* | 0.23* |
| | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| | | | |
| *Short-Run* | | | |
| LD.Staff | 0.39** | 0.41* | 0.34* |
| | (0.14) | (0.16) | (0.14) |
| L2D.Staff | 0.22 | | 0.22 |
| | (0.16) | | (0.15) |
| D1.Interest | -0.12 | | |
| | (0.08) | | |
| D1.PID | | 0.07 | |
| | | (0.05) | |
| D1.Assertive Index | | | -0.25** |
| | | | (0.07) |
| D1.Openness | -0.27** | | -0.09 |
| | (0.10) | | (0.11) |
| LD.Openness | -0.20** | | -0.19* |
| | (0.09) | | (0.08) |
| L2D.Openness | -0.13 | | -0.14 |
| | (0.08) | | (0.07) |
| D1.Govt Activity | | 0.14 | 0.11 |
| | | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| LD.Govt Activity | | 0.18 | |
| | | (0.10) | |
| L2D.Govt Activity | | 0.16 | |
| | | (0.10) | |
| D1.Total | | | -0.06 |
| | | | (0.09) |
| LD.Total | | | -0.17 |
| | | | (0.09) |
| *Exogenous* | | | |
| Term Year | 0.01 | -0.02 | 0.01 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Majority | -0.22 | | -0.15 |
| | (0.07) | | (0.08) |
| Seat Share | | 0.06 | |
| | | (0.04) | |
| Party | -0.13 | | -0.10 |
| | (0.07) | | (0.07) |
| Ideology | | -0.06 | |
| | | (0.03) | |
| Year | 0.01 | 0.04** | 0.02 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | -18.21 | -86.87** | -32.65 |
| | (23.34) | (24.88) | (19.19) |
| | | | |
| N | 47 | 42 | 47 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.55 |
| AIC | -57.25 | -49.11 | -69.31 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| BIC | -27.64 | -23.04 | -34.16 |
| RMSE | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.10 |
| Bounds Test F-Statistic | 6.03[r] | 4.74[r] | 9.62[r] |

*Notes:* Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The 'r' superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model's F-statistic was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels relationship.

Table A6.4

*Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, New Zealand*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EC | -0.74* | -1.59 | -1.45* |
| | (0.30) | (0.71) | (0.50) |
| *Long-Run* | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.33 | | |
| | (0.30) | | |
| Strength PID | | 0.12 | |
| | | (0.36) | |
| Assertive Index | | | -0.10 |
| | | | (0.17) |
| KOF Index | -0.21 | | |
| | (0.29) | | |
| Trade Openness | | 0.46 | -0.12 |
| | | (0.49) | (0.23) |
| Govt Activity | 0.11 | -1.29 | -0.31 |
| | (0.38) | (0.62) | (0.25) |
| Total Staff | 1.31 | 2.42 | 1.25 |
| | (1.30) | (1.19) | (0.86) |
| *Short-Run* | | | |
| LD.Staff | | 0.56 | 0.41 |
| | | (0.35) | (0.24) |
| D1.Interest | 0.56* | | |
| | (0.19) | | |
| LD.Interest | 0.51* | | |
| | (0.20) | | |
| D1.PID | | -0.58 | |
| | | (0.81) | |
| LD.PID | | -1.92 | |
| | | (0.96) | |
| D1.KOF | 1.03 | | |
| | (0.58) | | |
| LD.KOF | 1.10 | | |
| | (0.65) | | |
| D1.Openness | | -0.96 | -0.39 |
| | | (0.47) | (0.28) |
| D1.Govt Activity | | -0.85 | -0.82 |
| | | (0.85) | (0.53) |
| LD.Govt Activity | | -1.58 | -1.26* |
| | | (0.65) | (0.55) |
| D1.Total | | -3.43* | -3.10* |
| | | (1.39) | (1.37) |
| LD.Total | | 2.03 | |
| | | (1.80) | |
| *Exogenous* | | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Term Year | 0.16 | -0.06 | 0.13 |
| | (0.09) | (0.16) | (0.13) |
| Seat Share | -0.45 | -1.75** | -0.91 |
| | (0.25) | (0.59) | (0.45) |
| Party | 0.93* | | -0.08 |
| | (0.37) | | (0.34) |
| Ideology | | 0.39 | |
| | | (0.27) | |
| Constant | -0.56 | 2.00 | 0.98 |
| | (0.52) | (0.08) | (0.80) |
| N | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.67 | 0.54 | 0.47 |
| AIC | 18.99 | 23.07 | 29.73 |
| BIC | 33.75 | 42.38 | 45.62 |
| RMSE | 0.31 | 0.37 | 0.40 |
| Bounds Test F-Statistic | 5.73[r] | 2.70 | 2.72 |

*Notes:* Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The 'r' superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model's F-statistic was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels relationship.

Table A6.5

*Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, United Kingdom*

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EC | -0.56** | -0.57** | -0.54** | -0.27 |
| | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.16) | (0.23) |
| *Long-Run* | | | | |
| Political Interest | 1.54* | | | |
| | (0.64) | | | |
| Strength PID | | 0.57 | | |
| | | (0.77) | | |
| Assertive Index | | | -2.72* | |
| | | | (1.15) | |
| KOF Index | | 1.50 | | |
| | | (0.80) | | |
| Trade Openness | 0.37 | | 3.24 | 0.98 |
| | (0.59) | | (2.01) | (1.78) |
| Govt Activity | | | | -0.40 |
| | | | | (0.90) |
| Total Staff | 0.12 | -0.02 | 0.69 | -0.26 |
| | (0.43) | (0.43) | (0.60) | (0.87) |
| *Short-Run* | | | | |
| D1.Interest | -0.52 | | | |
| | (0.35) | | | |
| D1.PID | | -0.33 | | |
| | | (0.28) | | |
| D1.Assertive Index | | | 0.58 | |
| | | | (0.51) | |
| LD.Assertive Index | | | 1.24* | |
| | | | (0.51) | |
| L2D.Assertive Index | | | 1.81** | |
| | | | (0.46) | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1.KOF | | -1.04 | | |
| | | (0.64) | | |
| D1.Openness | | | -1.43 | |
| | | | (0.79) | |
| LD.Openness | | | -0.67 | |
| | | | (0.46) | |
| D1.Govt Activity | | | | 0.85 |
| | | | | (0.64) |
| *Exogenous* | | | | |
| Term Year | -0.09 | 0.00 | 0.13 | -0.01 |
| | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.13) | (0.15) |
| Seat Share | 0.81 | 0.09 | 0.31 | 0.32 |
| | (0.43) | (0.33) | (0.44) | (0.36) |
| Party | 2.05* | | 2.00* | 1.32 |
| | (0.91) | | (0.95) | (0.87) |
| | (1.10) | | | |
| Ideology | | 0.73 | | |
| | | (0.52) | | |
| Constant | -1.06 | 0.02 | -1.67* | -0.78 |
| | (0.58) | (0.39) | (0.68) | (0.62) |
| N | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.39 | 0.00 |
| AIC | 74.37 | 73.36 | 65.49 | 78.27 |
| BIC | 86.68 | 87.03 | 83.26 | 90.58 |
| RMSE | 0.77 | 0.75 | 0.64 | 0.82 |
| Bounds Test F-Statistic | 2.66 | 2.55 | 4.92[r] | 0.78 |

*Notes:* Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The 'r' superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model's F-statistic was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels relationship.

Table A6.6

*Post-estimation Tests*

| | Breusch-Godfrey LM Test (autocorrelation) | | Durbin's Alt Test (autocorrelation) | | ARCH LM Test (heteroskedasticity) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $\chi^2$ | p | $\chi^2$ | p | $\chi^2$ | p |
| *Australia* | | | | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.93 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.55 | 0.45 | 0.50 |
| Strength PID | 0.04 | 0.83 | 0.03 | 0.87 | 0.16 | 0.69 |
| Assertive Index | 2.12 | 0.14 | 1.10 | 0.29 | 0.47 | 0.49 |
| *Canada* | | | | | | |
| Political Interest | 3.83 | 0.05 | 2.66 | 0.10 | 0.37 | 0.54 |
| Strength PID | 2.46 | 0.12 | 1.62 | 0.20 | 2.75 | 0.10 |
| Assertive Index | 0.58 | 0.44 | 0.34 | 0.56 | 0.38 | 0.54 |
| *New Zealand* | | | | | | |
| Political Interest | 0.20 | 0.65 | 0.08 | 0.78 | 0.20 | 0.65 |
| Strength PID | 5.91 | 0.02 | 1.73 | 0.19 | 1.11 | 0.29 |
| Assertive Index | 0.07 | 0.79 | 0.02 | 0.87 | 0.00 | 0.99 |
| *United Kingdom* | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Interest | 0.08 | 0.77 | 0.05 | 0.81 | 1.70 | 0.19 |
| Strength PID | 0.00 | 0.99 | 0.00 | 0.99 | 3.86 | 0.05 |
| Assertive Index | 0.57 | 0.45 | 0.30 | 0.58 | 1.54 | 0.21 |
| Govt Activity | 0.11 | 0.74 | 0.07 | 0.79 | 3.61 | 0.06 |

*Note:* The Breusch-Godfrey and Durbin's Alternative Tests for autocorrelation have a null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Rejecting the null hypothesis ($p < 0.05$) indicates that there is residual autocorrelation. The null hypothesis for the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test is no heteroskedasticity. Rejecting the null hypothesis ($p < 0.05$) indicates the presence of heteroskedastic errors.

Table A6.7

*Interaction Effects for Prime Ministerial Branch Staff*

| | *Australia* | *Canada* | *New Zealand* | *UK* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest*TermYear | -4.77 | -0.35 | 4.33 | 11.46 |
| | (5.18) | (0.24) | (5.09) | (10.29) |
| Interest*SeatShare | 10.53 | 3.74** | -167.69 | -1774.78* |
| | (110.45) | (0.91) | (253.42) | (602.63) |
| Interest*Party | 1.41 | -0.74 | -13.30 | 169.87 |
| | (8.48) | (0.96) | (17.66) | (76.60) |
| PID*TermYear | 4.07 | -0.40 | -11.96* | -0.36 |
| | (5.00) | (0.29) | (3.84) | (5.66) |
| PID*SeatShare | 67.19 | 4.63 | 390.33 | -104.67 |
| | (120.87) | (4.60) | (277.43) | (220.51) |
| PID*Party | -0.99 | 0.43* | 1.33 | 25.51 |
| | (0.97) | (0.17) | (22.48) | (34.94) |
| Assert*TermYear | -0.37 | -0.41 | -16.99** | 9.79** |
| | (3.10) | (0.60) | (3.25) | (1.92) |
| Assert*SeatShare | -19.90 | 4.09** | 1265.47** | 689.36** |
| | (123.94) | (0.84) | (272.38) | (219.63) |
| Assert*Party | -17.62* | -5.28* | -57.27* | 42.15* |
| | (6.91) | (2.34) | (17.19) | (17.70) |

Figure A6.1

*Political Interest and Staff Resources, All Countries*




Figure A6.2

*Party Identification and Staff Resources, All Countries*



Figure A6.3

*Assertive Index and Staff Resources, All Countries*




Figure A6.4

*Assertive Citizenship and Staff Time Series, All Countries*



# Chapter 7
# Institutional Complexity in New Zealand and Canada

The overarching question of this study concerns the extent to which prime ministers have pursued institutional responses to the problems of political leadership in modern democratic politics. The preceding chapters examined these responses through the lens of particular institutional resources: budget appropriations in chapter five; and staff levels in chapter six. I found that there was some evidence for the Theory of Public Expectations, although quite partial and limited to certain cases. The alternative theories of institutionalization received minimal support overall. Crucially, the Westminster cases also exhibited distinctive, and unexpected, patterns of institutional change. Change in Canada's Privy Council Office can be characterized as a case of institutional layering, while the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is marked by elements of institutional drift. The prime ministerial branches in Australia and the United Kingdom have tended to reflect both institutional layering and conversion; the latter is especially evident in the British case. Clearly, this suggests that prime ministers have not responded in the same way in all the cases across time. Rather than sharing a common tendency to institutionalization, the prime ministerial branches reflect more complex, contextual practices and understandings of prime ministerial power and the demands of citizens.

In this chapter and the next, I continue to probe this question in examining a second dimension of institutionalization, institutional complexity. As before, I also assess the role of public expectations and other factors in driving institutional change. Complexity is a characteristic of the internal organization of prime ministerial branches, specifically, the units and structures of units that constitute the branches. The core

assumption is that a more complex internal organization is indicative of a higher level of institutionalization.

I trace such change over time in the prime ministerial branches through short case studies of New Zealand and Canada, located in this chapter, and the United Kingdom and Australia, presented in the next chapter. The case studies are split into two chapters owing to length considerations, and for substantive, thematic reasons. As a pair, New Zealand and Canada exhibit contrasting institutional trends but a similar pace of change relative to the other cases. In New Zealand, which I characterize as a case of institutional drift, there has been very little institutional change in the direction of greater complexity since the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet was established in 1990. In the Canadian Privy Council Office, there has been a surprisingly sporadic and inconsistent layering of new and more specialized organizational units over the existing structure: the core structure of the PCO has remained largely intact and unchanged. Thus, in both of these cases there has been remarkably little institutional change with regard to complexity.

In contrast, the two studies in chapter eight concerning the United Kingdom and Australia exhibit a significantly greater degree of change in institutional complexity. Both the Cabinet Office and the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet have undergone robust structural change, in different ways. In the British case, the process of change was one of ‘conversion’, instigated by Prime Minister Blair in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In this short period, an explosion of units radically changed the institutional orientation of the office. Many of these units were different in kind to those in the Cabinet Office heretofore, and indeed, to centres of government internationally. In the Australian case, the robustness of institutional change is not abrupt but periodic:

extensive unit building and unit specialization has occurred in distinct periods of sustained, incremental institutional growth.

Because this analysis of institutional complexity is separated into two chapters, the first provides the conceptual and methodological framework guiding both chapters. It then develops the first two case studies, New Zealand and Canada. The succeeding chapter briefly reiterates the analytical framework before continuing the case study analysis with the British and Australian cases. The four case studies share a similar format, with some variation: they trace changes in the complexity of the prime ministerial branches in each country and assess the extent to which changes in complexity are associated with the explanatory factors of assertive citizenship, economic trends, and political conditions.

*7.1 Concepts and Methodology*

This section describes the concept and operationalization of institutional complexity, the dimension of institutional change at the heart of this chapter and the next. Complexity involves the basic idea that all institutions have parts, and configurations of roles, actors, and processes that can evolve over time. Indeed, institutional theory is in part an effort to address how these constituent elements work together, and how and why they change. Complexity is one way to characterize these institutional configurations. Many institutions begin with relatively low complexity and, as they adapt and adjust to changing contexts, gradually become more complex. If they do not, they risk institutional atrophy, exhaustion, or more radical transformation. This identification of complexity as a salient characteristic of institutions is a key element of Huntington's concept of

institutionalization. Huntington (1965) elaborates on the concept of complexity as follows:

> The more complicated an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is. Complexity may involve both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits. The greater the number and variety of subunits, the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members. In addition, an organization which has many purposes is better able to adjust itself to the loss of any one purpose than an organization which has only one purpose.
>
> The differentiation of subunits within an organization may or may not be along functional lines. If it is functional in character, the subunits themselves are less highly institutionalized than the whole of which they are a part. Changes in the functions of the whole, however, are fairly easily reflected by changes in the power and roles of its subunits. (399-400)

This description provides the framework and underlying logic in this chapter. Institutions become more complex when, within their organizational structure, there is proliferation, differentiation, and specialization of units. These three processes are the key aspects of institutional complexity investigated in this chapter. Proliferation occurs when the number of units within a given institution increases.

This is captured in our first measure of complexity: the number of distinct, formally established units within an institution. This is a very simple but profound measure. While it does not reveal anything about the nature of these units per se, it is telling: more units imply greater specialization and differentiation within prime ministerial institutions. Even if there are broad areas of overlapping responsibility among units, an institution with a greater number of non-identical parts is, by definition, more complex than one with fewer. Ragsdale and Theis (1997) use a measure of the number of units in the Executive Office of the President to measure complexity. They argue that

proliferation improves institutional stability and that it adds value by "developing an intricate internal identity – many offices doing many compartmentalized tasks" (1291). Thus, the "number of units" indicator of complexity tells a simple but revealing story about broad patterns of institutional change over time.

The analysis's second measure of institutional complexity is differentiation and specialization of units within prime ministerial branches. The concept of institutionalization also suggests that units contribute to the institutional scope of prime ministerships. As Huntington suggests, differentiation and specialization of units strengthens and reflects the ability of organizations to adjust and adapt to changing circumstances: the more institutions do, the more valuable they become. This is essentially the functionalist premise that if an institution performs socially valuable functions, it is normatively desirable: activity confers legitimacy. In order to measure differentiation and specialization, we need to know the types of units that are created and their pattern of creation. Thus, I articulate a typology of units, examine the types of units created in prime ministerial branches, and how use of various types changes over time.

Measuring institutional complexity in these ways - the number and types of units - is also quite closely indicative of prime ministerial intent, given that such changes are very closely connected to the prime minister's prerogatives over the machinery of government. Moreover, the priorities of prime ministers are arguably revealed more directly in organizational change than in budget appropriations and staff resources, especially when the latter are measured in the aggregate. Although appropriations and staff are reasonable measures of the overall institutional capacity of the Westminster prime ministerships, examining internal structures allows a richer, more explicit account

of how prime ministers direct their resources to particular ends. It demonstrates the extent to which prime ministerships have developed into multifaceted, multipurpose organizations at the centre of government.

### 7.1.1 Measuring Complexity: Units in Prime Ministerial Branches

My classification of unit types is adapted from Ben-Gera (2009), as explicated in Alessandro et al. (2013). They list sixteen functions performed by centre of government units.[96] Because I am interested less in minute details of institutional activity than in the broader patterns of institutional change, I amalgamated these functions into six generic types of prime ministerial branch units: administrative; policy-specific; advisory; implementation; "ad-hoc limited"; and communications. I describe each of these types of units in turn; they are summarized in table 7.1.

Table 7.1
*Types of Units in Prime Ministerial Branches*

| *Type* | *Description* | *Example* |
|---|---|---|
| Administrative | Logistical and bureaucratic coordination & oversight; cabinet support | Cabinet Secretariat (UK Cabinet Office) |
| Policy-Specific | Policy coordination & support within distinct policy areas | Social Policy Division, Office for Women (Australian DPMC) |
| Advisory | General policy advice & support | Policy Advisory Group (NZ DPMC) |
| Implementation | Policy implementation oversight & strategy | Cabinet Implementation Unit (Australian DPMC) |
| Ad-Hoc Limited | Temporally-bounded, reactive / urgent government response | Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (NZ DPMC) |
| Communications | Public information & media relations | Government Communications Group (UK Cabinet Office) |

Source: Author, adapted in part from Alessandro et al. (2013) and Ben-Gera (2009).

[96] These are: preparation of meetings; planning and monitoring; policy coordination; communications; administrative support; political cabinet (advisors); EU coordination legislative secretariat; chief executive's direct support units; strategy units; policy coordination; performance monitoring; press, communications and speechwriting; policy advice; legal counsel; and internal management.

Administrative units perform the logistical and bureaucratic oversight and coordination functions of prime ministerial branches, ranging from corporate support units to civil service agencies. If a unit is generically a "Cabinet Secretariat", it is classified as administrative, although it performs a variety of other functions. Administrative units form the backbone of prime ministerial branch institutions: they fulfill necessary core functions. They are generally perpetuated throughout the institution's life and they change very little. Thus, they can be seen as the "baseline" level of complexity. While a step removed from an exclusively personal office, a hypothetical prime ministerial branch with only administrative units is not institutionally complex, relatively speaking.[97]

Policy-specific units are those whose functions range over a discrete, identifiable policy domain such as national security or social policy. These units may perform any number of particular policy functions, from advice to coordination to monitoring, as long as they pertain to a specific policy area only. This type of unit is key to understanding growth in complexity. The proliferation and specialization of policy-specific units directly reflects a prime ministerial branch expanding its institutional ambit. Policy-specific units in most cases could just as well be established in relevant line departments. There is little reason, for example, that the current DPMC in Australia should have a robust Industry, Infrastructure and Environment Division, when there are three ministries with responsibilities in these areas. That such a division exists reflects the imperatives of prime ministers to have the institutional capacity to drive policy change from the centre, coordinate departmental activity to ensure prime ministerial priorities are met, and access independent sources of policy advice. Thus, policy-specific units are central to tracing

[97] None of the prime ministerial branches in this study has administrative units only.

how organizational changes in prime ministerial branches reflect the changing "face" of prime ministerial power.

Similarly, advisory and implementation units speak to the growing complexity of prime ministerial branches. Advisory units are units that furnish policy advice to prime ministers but are not specific to a policy sector. A typical example is the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, established by Prime Minister Blair in 2003 (Burch and Holliday 2004, 12).[98] The output of this Cabinet Office unit included reports and seminars in a broad range of policy areas, from urban transportation to anti-social behaviour.[99] The activities of advisory units often resemble a kind of 'in-house' policy think tank. They are often staffed by non-career civil service experts, such as academics and policy advocates. Like policy-specific units, but with a broader mandate, advisory units reflect prime ministerships that actively seek to drive policy change from the centre. However, it may also be the case that advisory units are supplanted or bypassed in favour of policy-specific units as institutions become more complex.

The fourth type of prime ministerial branch unit is implementation. These units are tasked specifically with oversight of policy and programme delivery: working to make policies decided upon actually come to fruition. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scholars of public administration have paid increasing attention to the way that policy decisions can be "diverted, deflected, dissipated, and delayed" as those decisions are disseminated through the machinery of government (Lindquist 2006, 311). However, the innovation of formal implementation units began much later. The first such unit was the

[98] The PMSU was an amalgamation of two prior units: the Performance and Innovation Unit in the Cabinet Office and the Forward Strategy Unit in no. 10.

[99] http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100125070726/http://cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/publications/archive.aspx

Prime Minister's Delivery Unit established by Prime Minister Blair in 2001; the Cabinet Implementation Unit was established in the Australian DPMC in 2003, by Prime Minister Howard (Lindquist 2006, 312).[100] Lindquist suggests a variety of rationales for the establishment of such units, but these rationales are thematically similar. They suggest a growing need for prime ministers to closely monitor and set clear targets and standards for how policies are actually delivered by measuring outcomes and setting expectations of accountability for results in the civil service, especially for politically salient policy goals (Lindquist 2006, 315-316).

Ad-hoc limited units are a fifth type of prime ministerial branch unit. I refer to these units as "ad-hoc" because they are established in response to a specific policy (or political) problem, and are limited in duration. In general, units established as 'task forces' or 'reviews' are of this nature. For instance, in New Zealand, the Y2K Task Force was established in 1997/98 to assess the preparedness of government for the potential threat to technological infrastructure caused by the change in year to 2000. This unit produced a report in August 1998 and then disbanded.

Such units, in my view, speak to the ambit of prime ministers but in a different way than the policy-specific or policy advisory units described above. They are not reflective of institutionalization so much as they are short-term political responses to pressing, publicly salient policy issues. They speak to the well-established prerogative of prime ministers to involve themselves in any issue, or as Donald Savoie puts it, "governing by bolts of electricity" (1999, 313). They also can reflect what Lee et al.

[100] The head of the PMDU, Sir Michael Barber, is a leading proponent of what he calls "deliverology" and is an advisor to governments globally on its tenets, including consulting for Justin Trudeau's Liberal government in Canada.

(1998) call the "'Christmas tree' function" of the Cabinet office, "providing a place where decorative symbols can be hung" (187). This does not mean that they are unimportant reflections of prime ministerial power. On the contrary, the continued *use* of ad-hoc limited units suggests an active, interventionist, centralized approach to prime ministerial leadership. However, by their temporary nature, such units maintain cannot be seen as contributing to the strengthening of permanent institutional capacity in the prime ministerial branches.

Finally, communications units are those units overseeing communications and information functions. These may range from media and press units, which directly deal with the relationship between the prime minister, the public service, and the media, to information units, which are more directed towards dissemination of government information within and outside the public service. It also includes units related to government branding or messaging, although these are rare in the civil service prime ministerial branches.

I include communications units as a separate type of unit, even though they are not especially prevalent in the departments under discussion, for two reasons. First, and most importantly, where they have been established they speak to a particularly modern set of problems for these offices. Traditionally, the public service in the Whitehall tradition was inward-oriented. Ministers spoke for departments; while parties and elected officials spoke for the government. Communications therefore traditionally were internal and focused on the administrative flow of information, not on 'packaging' for external public consumption. The fact that communications units have been created in some instances attests to the public nature of modern politics. Second, as a more general

characterization of organizational structure, differentiating communications units is useful because their function is quite different from the policy and administrative functions performed by the other types of units.

To summarize, this chapter and the next assess two dimensions of institutional complexity: proliferation of units and functional differentiation or specialization of units. The indicator of proliferation is a count of units within each prime ministerial branch. As a measure of complexity, the indicator is simple: the more units, the more institutional complexity exists. The indicator of differentiation and specialization is the types of units that are created and perpetuated through time. I identified six types of organizational units: administrative, policy-specific, advisory, implementation, ad-hoc limited, and communications. These types reflect institutional complexity in a number of ways.

Administrative units, while providing core functions of these offices, represent only a baseline level of institutional complexity. Although administrative capacities of prime ministerial branches may be quite extensive, they predominantly serve the prerogatives of prime ministers: the "activities that are the responsibility of the minister as a minister", including legislative process, management of cabinet business and machinery of government arrangements (Hamburger et al. 2011, 379). When the prime ministerial branches were small, these were, almost exclusively, its functions.[101] On the other hand, changes in advisory, policy-specific, and implementation unit types are primary indicators of changes in institutional complexity with regard to prime ministerial branches. They represent significant changes in the institutional capacity of prime

[101] Indeed, in its most embryonic stages, prime ministerial branches were often not concerned even with these things, since the prime minister might have had, at most, a handful of private secretaries dealing primarily with correspondence and logistics. Prerogatives were managed personally by the prime minister, cabinet, and political parties.

ministerial branches to actively initiate, coordinate, and implement policies across a range of governmental activity, and to attend to priorities of prime ministers, not only their administrative duties.

The use of ad-hoc limited units – units that are inherently temporary, usually narrow in scope, and often set up in response to an urgent policy or political problem – does not necessarily contribute to institutional complexity. However, they are helpful reflections of what kinds of problems prime ministers deem important to bring within their offices. Finally, communications units are rare in these cases but do also reflect a prime ministerial branch that is expanding in scope and specializing in function. They are more readily found, and indeed have somewhat proliferated, in the political offices of prime ministers. The communications, media relations, and public engagement aspects of PMOs in these countries have seen significant growth in both size and importance to the overall operations of prime ministerial branches.

As in the rest of the study, these chapters focus on the central civil service office as the bureaucratic extension of prime ministerial authority and source of policy advice and support. These are the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia and in New Zealand, the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Cabinet Office in the UK. As discussed in chapter one, while these offices are not the entirety of the 'prime ministerial branch', they still constitute the bulk of the substantive policy advice and support that prime ministers receive. Moreover, while they are less publicly visible than their political counterparts, they are, in my view, more central to the story of prime ministerial leadership within the core executive and the policy process.

As noted in earlier chapters, this narrower focus probably underestimates the extent to which the prime ministerial branches, as a whole, have institutionalized. Clearly, other elements of these branches, i.e., prime ministers' political offices, have also undergone institutional change, most in the direction of greater institutionalization of resources and support (Peters et al. 2000). Certainly, there is available information about the structures of the respective PMOs in Australia, Canada, and the UK cases, in particular. However, the information is less complete than information about the civil service offices, and thus not ideal for investigating change over time.[102] Such information merits further examination beyond the scope of this study. Analytically, I also want to maintain consistency with previous chapters and within the cases in these chapters.

### 7.1.2 Empirical Approach

This chapter takes a different approach to empirical assessment of the overall institutionalization model compared with the chapters examining institutional resources. In those chapters, five and six, the approach to theory testing was primarily quantitative. This was straightforward in principle, if not always in practice. While the same approach could be applied in this chapter, it is not the primary mode of analysis. This is because of the nature of the dependent variables. First, the "number of units" variable is a count variable, meaning that its values are generated by a counting process. It can thus only take on non-negative integer values. If a count variable has a large enough mean and non-integer values are plausible, treating a count variable as a continuous variable is acceptable.[103] Indeed, the staff resources variable in chapter six is technically a count

[102] This is because prime minister's offices are not as formally institutionalized as their civil service counterparts and are thus not required to report on their operations as a matter of course.
[103] Treating a count variable as continuous may still require the use of techniques other than ordinary least squares for regression analyses, since OLS can produce negative estimates.

variable, but is treated as a continuous variable.[104] The "number of units" variable does not have a large enough mean and in some cases has low variance; the yearly observations are also highly dependent on temporally adjacent observations. Treating it as a continuous rather than discrete variable is also less plausible than in either the appropriations or staff resources case.

Second, the "types of units" measure is a qualitative measure that is best described qualitatively, although numeric description is also useful in order to get a basic sense of trends. The problem of low variation is also more acute when differentiating between types of units: in some cases, the number of administrative units, for example, is constant. As well, in many instances, there are no units of a particular type at all. Thus, drawing these data into a regression model, even with techniques designed to account for these violations of the classical linear model, undermines the usefulness of this information.

Instead, these two case study chapters take a more holistic, qualitative approach. This means, firstly, that there is a much greater descriptive element. Each case study begins with a review of the historical context of each institution. Second, although still primarily based on quantitative information, the analysis qualitatively describes trends in the proliferation and specialization of units for each case.[105] Third, I examine the relationships between the theoretical explanatory factors and measures of institutional complexity descriptively, and I consider these relationships in terms of congruence of time periods, not single-year observations. Analytically, this means that I do not depend

[104] Actually, since the measure used in chapter six is staff Full-Time Equivalents, it does allow for non-integer values, but the data is still generated by a counting process, which are then manipulated to give the FTE number.

[105] The section discussing the Cabinet Office in the UK takes a slightly different approach, for reasons given in that section.

on regression estimates of effects that control for the effects of other variables, as in previous chapters. Thus, the findings here are less 'precise' and less exacting than in previous chapters, though still as rigorous as possible. This rigor is evident in at least two ways.

First, the collection of data on prime ministerial branch units was as complete as was feasible. I counted and categorized every unit, for each case, in every year for appropriate lengths of time (particular to each case, as described in detail below).[106] While obviously not all of this evidence is explicitly discussed, the totality of the data informs my conclusions. Second, in keeping with the overall research design of the study, the chapter identifies hypotheses prior to data collection and analysis and assesses support for these hypotheses in the data. This constrains and clarifies the analysis, guarding against ill-defined conclusions and 'fishing' for significant findings.

Structurally, the two chapters on institutional complexity also differ from previous chapters in consisting of short case studies. Because the analysis employs much qualitative description and narrative, focusing on institutional change in one case at a time enables clearer and more coherent analysis. This case-oriented approach also provides a level of context-specific depth that complements the variable-oriented approach of earlier quantitative analyses.

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[106] This is different from other studies in the area, which are often selective in data collection and presentation, constructing narratives out of a small number of time points.
In all references to specific years where I am discussing my own data collection from the departmental reports and other organizational structure sources, years refers to fiscal years. For example, 1991 refers to FY1991, i.e., July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1991 in Australia and New Zealand, and April 1, 1990 to March 31, 1991 in Canada and the UK. Often the organizational information is explicitly as of June 30 of the respective year; in some cases, it is as close as was available to that date.

### 7.1.3 Hypotheses

In line with the chapters on institutional resources, chapters seven and eight assess institutional complexity in relation to the three types of explanations introduced in chapter three: the Theory of Public Expectations; economic trends; and political conditions. While the empirical strategy is different, the hypotheses are the same. In this section, I state these hypotheses as they relate to the subsequent case studies of institutional complexity.

The Theory of Public Expectations argues that shifts in political culture in recent decades, from allegiant to assertive orientations, generate a favourable context for prime ministerial branch institutionalization. Thus, the overarching empirical expectation is that increases in assertive orientations will tend to be associated with increases in institutionalization. Within these case studies of institutional complexity, this expectation implies the following hypothesis: units within prime ministerial branches proliferate and functions become more differentiated and specialized during periods of increased assertive citizenship. In other words, assertive citizenship generates increasing institutional complexity. As in the previous chapters, assertive citizenship is operationalized in terms of aggregate political interest, strength of party identification, and an index of assertive attitudes. Since the analysis is more descriptive in approach, the conclusions I draw are based more on congruence of trends within certain periods rather than the granular annual observations of previous chapters. For example, if both proliferation of units and assertive attitudes trend together over a five-year period, this is taken as positive evidence for the hypothesis.

Here, I also examine the importance of two other potentially determinative factors in producing changes in institutional complexity. The first concerns long-term economic trends. As with assertive citizenship, economic trends also are expected to co-vary positively with levels of institutional complexity over time. As we have already seen, the two specific factors examined, globalization and central government activity, generally increase over time and all measures of these factors are serially correlated.[107] The question, then, is whether the trends in these economic indicators are reflected in unit proliferation and specialization over time. Thus, my expectations for the effects of these variables mirror the assertive hypotheses above: when globalization and government activity are higher relative to their trends over time, institutional complexity in prime ministerial branches will tend to increase correspondingly.

The second alternative explanation for change in institutional complexity is the impact of political conditions. As in previous chapters, I examine three political contexts that seem especially relevant to prime ministerial decisions to induce institutional change. First, when this decision takes place, relative to the whole of a prime ministerial term, could be important; we have called this a term effect. Second, the legislative support a prime minister is able to command may affect a prime minister's ability or priorities with regard to making changes in his branch: the expectation is that greater legislative support will be associated with greater institutional complexity. Third, prime ministers of different ideological orientations may choose to institutionalize differently. Specifically, prime ministers of more liberal orientations will be more likely to increase institutional complexity, and conservatives less likely. There are a number of putative reasons for this

[107] The correlations of each variable with its one-period lag are: the KOF Index 0.99, openness 0.97, government consumption 0.98.

expectation, including a greater likelihood of policy activism and belief in the efficacy of government on the part of more liberal prime ministers. It is hypothesized that these factors tend to incentivize centralizing policy coordination mechanisms, among other things.

7.1.4 Data Sources

Examining the foregoing hypotheses about institutional complexity requires data on the institutional structures of prime ministerial branches over time. These data come from a variety of sources. The primary sources are annual departmental reports published by the respective organizations themselves. Within these reports, I extracted information about the organizational structure of the departments, usually in the form of charts visually depicting the department's unit and reporting structure. For the first case study, New Zealand, data prior to 2002 comes from an access to information request, by the author, to the New Zealand DPMC. This data listed all staffed units since 1990 on a year-by-year basis, along with information on salary levels. Data on the DPMC's structure after 2002 was gleaned from the department's annual reports.

Organizational information for the Canadian Privy Council Office was obtained from several sources. Separate annual performance reports of the Privy Council Office begin in 1996-97. Prior to this date, data about PCO structure was obtained from Part III of each year's budget main estimates, which provide additional details for each department, such as program activity and organizational structure.[108] Some of the PCO annual reports do not provide full and consistent information about the unit-level organization of the department. Thus, several organizational charts and other sources of

[108] Part I is the Government Expenditure Plan, an overview of the government's fiscal position and goals as reflected in the budget. Part II provides the line item departmental spending.

evidence (particularly the sporadically updated "Role and Structure of the Privy Council Office" document) were obtained from archived versions of the PCO website on the Internet Archive, and Library and Archives Canada's own stored versions, particularly for years after 2008.[109]

In the United Kingdom, the Cabinet Office has produced a separate, online departmental report since 1997/98. Information on the Office's organizational structure prior to 1998 was collected from two sources. First, I consulted the Government's Expenditure Plans, published alongside annual budgets. Similar to part III of the budget estimates in Canada, these documents provide a more detailed account of each department's activities and resources. Second, I used the Cabinet Office entry in the Civil Service Yearbook, which is an annually published directory of government officials. The Cabinet Office entry lists senior officials by unit, from which a picture of unit structure can be assembled.

Finally, the Australian case study relies heavily on departmental reports of the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which began publication in 1979. The reports to 1997 were obtained in electronic form via the author's request to the National Library of Australia, while the remaining reports were available online. However, from 2010 to 2015, the reports did not always provide explicit, full depictions of the DPMC's unit structure compared to previous reports. Thus, for these years I accessed organizational charts from archived versions of the DPMC website on the Internet Archive, as in the Canadian case. The versions used were those captured as near

[109] As in other cases, the shift in public management accounting and reporting expectations from describing inputs to organizational activity to outputs measured against strategic objectives undermines this researcher's ability to compare organizational information consistently across time.
The Internet Archive is a website that captures and stores websites as they were at various points in time, and can be found at https://archive.org/index.php

in time to the end of the fiscal year (in Australia, June 30) in order to align with the annual reports, which are tied to the fiscal year.

*7.2 New Zealand: The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1990-2015*

The preceding explication is put to the test first in the case of the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. As earlier chapters suggest, this case stands out among the four by the relative absence of institutional change observed. The case demonstrates that prime ministerial branch institutionalization is not a universal process. My analysis suggests that, until recently, there has been very little growth in institutional complexity within the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC). This supports the characterization of the New Zealand case as a case of institutional 'drift'. The New Zealand DPMC has not faced the same external pressures of increasing public expectations and structural economic change, and has thus not incentivized actors (i.e., prime ministers) to seek reorientation of institutional rules and norms.

The case study focuses on the period since the DPMC's establishment in 1990. Prior to 1990, the prime minister was supported by a small Prime Minister's Department (PMD), established in 1926. Like its counterparts in the other cases, the PMD began as a small office with mostly clerical duties (Boston 1988, 9). Since most prime ministers also were the minister responsible for foreign affairs, their main source of policy advice and support was the External Affairs department. In addition, Boston characterizes the post-war prime ministers as generally passive policy actors, with "less need for a large personal staff or a high-powered, multi-disciplinary team of professional advisers" (1988, 9).

In line with currents in other Westminster systems, the 1960s and 1970s saw an increasing recognition that prime ministers "needed help". This resulted in significant reorganization of the PMD in 1975. The department now consisted of five units: the private office, the Cabinet Office, the Press Office, the Advisory Group, and the External Intelligence Bureau (Boston 1988, 10). In 1987, after some controversy over the appointment of a non-career civil servant to head the Advisory Group, the PMD was divided into a Cabinet Office, staffed by civil servants, and a Prime Minister's Office, staffed by partisan appointees as well as civil servants. This arrangement, however, did not endure. A formal review of the prime minister's support system resulted in the establishment in 1990 of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. This review recommended a single department for all civil service policy and coordination support, essentially hiving off the purely political functions from the policy functions (Palmer and Palmer 2004, 75). The arrangement was quickly implemented and it remains the basis for the contemporary DPMC. The rest of this case study traces the New Zealand DPMC's institutional development since 1990 and assesses the factors driving this development.

### 7.2.1 Proliferation and Specialization in the New Zealand DPMC

The proliferation of units in the New Zealand DPMC since 1990 does not exhibit a high degree of institutional change. On this measure, the office has not become markedly more institutionally complex over time, although it is more complex in 2015 than it has ever been. The number of total units in the organizational structure of the DPMC is shown in figure 7.1, for the period 1990 to 2015.

Figure 7.1

*Units in the New Zealand DPMC, Total and by Type, 1990-2015*




Source: 1990-2002: DPMC (New Zealand) Request for Information by author. 2003-2015: DPMC Annual Reports.

In the first year of its existence, the DPMC contained five units: the Office of the Chief Executive; the Cabinet Office; Corporate & Support; the Policy Advisory Group; and the Domestic and External Security Secretariat. These units formed the core of the DPMC's work, and all have been retained, mostly unchanged. The number of units initially rises quickly, up to ten in 1992-93. After this initial build-up, the overall trend in the proliferation of units resembles the trends in the department's budget appropriations and staff levels. After an initial rise, relative stability characterizes the next two decades, from 1992. In the most recent two years, the number of units has increased steadily to thirteen in 2015. This pattern suggests that outside of an initial burst of activity and more recently, New Zealand prime ministers in the last twenty years have not regularly manipulated the organizational structure of the DPMC to expand the scope of their

activities. Throughout this period, the DPMC has remained a relatively small organization, with little change from year to year.

I turn now to examining differentiation and specialization within the New Zealand DPMC. I do so by examining changes in the types of units that are created and perpetuated. The number of units for each of the six types is depicted above, in figure 7.1, and the name, duration, and type of each unit is provided in table 7.2, below.[110] At its establishment in 1990, the configuration of units in the New Zealand DPMC closely resembled that of the Prime Minister's Department before 1987. It had three administrative units (Office of the Chief Executive, the Cabinet Office, and Corporate & Support), a policy advisory unit, and one policy-specific unit, the Domestic and External Security Secretariat (DESS). There is negligible change in the number of administrative units from 1990 to 2015, and no change at all in advisory units: the Policy Advisory Group remains the only such unit.

Table 7.2
*Units in the New Zealand DPMC, 1990-2015*

| Unit | Years | Type |
|---|---|---|
| Office of the Chief Executive | 1989/90 – present | Administrative |
| Policy Advisory Group | 1989/90 – present | Advisory |
| DESS / DESG (2004) / SRG (2010) | 1989/90 – 2013/14 | Policy-Specific |
| Cabinet Office | 1989/90 – present | Administrative |
| Corporate & Support / Corporate Services | 1989/90 – present | Administrative |
| Government House | 1990/91 – present | Administrative |
| Change Team on Targeting Social Assistance | 1990-91 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Communications Unit | 1991/92 – 1999/00 | Communications |
| EAB / NAB (2010) | 1991/92 – present | Policy-Specific |
| Crown Health Enterprise Establishment Unit | 1991/92 – 1992-93 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Health Reforms Directorate | 1991/92 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| National Interim Provider Board | 1991/92 | Ad-Hoc Limited |

[110] There have been no units in the New Zealand DPMC specifically tasked with policy implementation, so this type is not represented here.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Coordination and Communications Group | 1992/93 | Communications |
| Crime Prevention Unit | 1993/94 – 1999/00 | Policy-Specific |
| Employment Taskforce | 1993/94 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Task Force for Positive Ageing | 1995/96 – 1996/97 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Y2K Task Force Secretariat | 1997/98 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Climate Change Project | 2001/02 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Foreshore and Seabed Group | 2003/04 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Corporate – Government House Project | 2007/08 – 2013/14 | Administrative |
| ICG / ICG and NCPO (2013) | 2010/11 – 2013/14 | Policy-Specific |
| National Cyber Policy Office | 2013/14 – present | Policy-Specific |
| MCDEM (from DIA) | 2013/14 – present | Policy-Specific |
| Intelligence & Assessments | 2014/15 – present | Policy-Specific |
| National Security Systems | 2014/15 – present | Policy-Specific |
| National Security Policy | 2014/15 – present | Policy-Specific |
| National Security Communications | 2014/15 – present | Policy-Specific |
| CERA | 2014/15 – present | Ad-Hoc Limited |

Abbreviations: DESS: Domestic and External Security Secretariat. DESG: Domestic and External Security Group. SRG: Security and Risk Group. EAB: External Assessments Bureau. NAB: National Assessments Bureau. ICG: Intelligence Coordination Group. NCPO: National Cyber Policy Office. MCDEM: Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management. CERA: Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority.
Source: 1990-2002: DPMC (New Zealand) Request for Information by author. 2003-2015: DPMC Annual Reports. Categorized into type by author.

The trend over time in policy-specific units demonstrates both the limited institutional growth in the New Zealand case and the focus of prime ministerial priorities. New Zealand prime ministers have clearly not turned to policy-specific units in the DPMC for policy coordination in a broad field of government activity. Rather, policy-specific units have been almost entirely focused on matters of national security and foreign policy. The only exception is the Crime Prevention Unit, which only operated from 1994 to 2000. The first two policy-specific units are the DESS and the External Assessments Bureau (renamed the National Assessments Bureau in 2010), an intelligence analysis and reporting unit. The growth in the overall number of units has been driven by a proliferation of such security and intelligence units. In 2010, an Intelligence Coordination Group was established, and a unit dealing with cybersecurity, the National Cyber Policy Office, was attached to it in 2013, before the latter became a separate unit. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management was transferred to the

DPMC in 2013 from the Department of Internal Affairs. Finally, in 2014/15, a plethora of new, more specialized policy-specific units was created: Intelligence and Assessments, National Security Systems, National Security Policy, and National Security Communications.

Ad-hoc limited units have been established sporadically throughout the existence of the DPMC. They are particularly prevalent from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, when a succession of such units was established. Early ad-hoc units tackled health and welfare policy, tied to market-oriented reforms to New Zealand's health care system in the early to mid-1990s (McAvoy and Coster 2005).[111] Subsequent units have largely been responses to pressing public problems, such as The Y2K Task Force Secretariat (1997/98), Climate Change Project (2001/02), and Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (2014/15). Thus, throughout the DPMC's existence, ad-hoc units have played some part in signalling the public responsiveness of prime ministers to urgent concerns. However, their use has not been as widespread or as systematic as in other cases.

The areas in which New Zealand prime ministers have chosen to expand the institutional complexity of their departments and, equally as revealing, where they have not chosen to do so, speaks to the uniqueness of the New Zealand case among the Westminster systems. Change in the institutional complexity of the New Zealand DPMC is most evident in areas at the core of prerogative prime ministerial power: foreign policy and national security. The use of policy-specific units to oversee domestic policy coordination and drive domestic policy change from the centre is almost entirely absent in the New Zealand case. There has been no institutionalized drive towards policy

[111] These were the Change Team on Targeting Social Assistance (1990/91), the Crown Health Enterprise Establishment Unit (1991-1993), the Health Reforms Directorate (1991/92), and the National Interim Provider Board (1991/92).

implementation. Communications units have also been largely absent, although this is in line with the other Westminster cases.

Overall, then, change in the institutional complexity of the New Zealand DPMC is a story of limited, focused growth. In most areas, the institution has remained relatively stable. The administrative bedrock of the department has stayed constant, while the areas of foreign policy and national security have seen special interest on the part of New Zealand's prime ministers. In other policy areas and other types of units, change has been sporadic or minimal. Given this relative lack of institutional change, it is somewhat difficult to assess the competing sets of explanations for institutionalization that we have been examining. Nevertheless, I consider the extent to which these explanations fit the pattern of institutional complexity in the New Zealand case. What factors might explain change in the number and types of units in the New Zealand DPMC?

### 7.2.2 Assessing Theories of Change in Institutional Complexity

To recall, the Theory of Public Expectations implies that periods of greater assertiveness will be associated with institutional change in the direction of greater internal complexity. In terms of specific measures, this means that increasing political interest, weakening party identification, and increasing overall assertiveness, as indicated by an index of assertive value and attitudes, should be found together with increasing numbers of units and greater differentiation and specialization. In the New Zealand case, the previous two chapters have demonstrated minimal conformity to these expectations. Put simply, the impact of assertiveness on institutional outcomes in New Zealand has not been significant. Figure 7.2, below, shows the same total unit trend over time in the New Zealand DPMC as the previous figure, with the assertiveness trends superimposed.

Figure 7.2
*Assertive Citizenship and Units in the New Zealand DPMC, 1990-2015*




Overall, this evidence suggests that assertive citizenship is not a significant driver of increasing institutional complexity in New Zealand. If the hypothesis were true, periods of relatively high political interest, weak party identification and high assertive index values should be periods in which institutional complexity would be increasing. This is not evident in any of the periods shown. For example, political interest increases from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s; at the same time, party identification is weaker than it was in 1990, although it declines further later. Even though the assertive index declines throughout the entire period, we might expect that the trend in the other two factors is reflected in unit proliferation, but it is not. In the period in which there is noticeably increasing proliferation of units, from around 2007 to the present, political interest is on the decline and the assertive values index is stable at relatively low levels. Only the party identification trend aligns reasonably well with the proliferation of units; it reaches a 'local maximum' in 2008 and declines thereafter.

Similarly, the only serious indication we see of some degree of specialization of units is in the area of policy-specific unit growth, where there has been some effort in recent years to expand the national security and foreign policy apparatus of the DPMC. This does not track with a correspondingly high level of assertiveness in relative terms. Since it is a very limited, focused build-up of units, in a short period, in an area in which there are many other external pressures, it makes sense that there is little evidence it is driven by large-scale cultural change. Taken over the whole period, then, the proliferation of units in the New Zealand DPMC and the assertiveness factors appear to be unrelated.

However, although this evidence does not conform to the articulated hypotheses, it suggests a 'negative' case for the Theory of Public Expectations. Instead of directly showing that increasing public expectations drive prime ministerial branch institutionalization, the New Zealand case shows that in the absence of such expectations, incentives to institutionalize are apparently not a salient part of prime ministerial decision-making. New Zealand's prime ministers have not engaged in robust institution-building because they have not faced the level of public pressure that is stronger elsewhere. There is thus a strong correlation here, just not in the expected fashion. While observing other periods of positive change in the DPMC would strengthen this argument, it is nonetheless an illuminating contrasting case of institutional change (or lack thereof).

The evidence does not support the thesis that structural economic change, namely, globalization and government activity, has the posited positive effect on institutional complexity. For one, the index of globalization measure, which aggregates many indicators of political, economic, and social globalization, increases steadily until 2000 and remains level thereafter, which is not at all reflected in the observed proliferation of

units. Second, both the trade openness and government activity measures increase over time from the late 1990s through the 2000s, which should spur the institutional complexity of the New Zealand DPMC, but it does not. Unless there is a larger lagged effect of these trends than I would expect, there is no reason to believe that they have the posited effect. A simple significance test on the correlations between the economic measures and the unit count measure confirms the lack of evidence for these relationships.[112]

These arguments also apply to the differentiation and specialization of units measure of complexity. The economic trends are not found to align with the periods in which specialization of units occurs in the DPMC, which, again, have been limited in scope and in time to recent years. Theoretically, it is also difficult to make the case that the areas in which there has been institutional growth, national security and foreign policy, are related to these economic changes. Certainly, the notion of a greater need for policy coordination and oversight arising from increasing government activity has not been reflected in broad proliferations of advisory, policy-specific, or implementation units in the New Zealand DPMC. Neither have we seen a centralizing response to the supposed effects of globalization, such as policy fragmentation and relative degradation of state power: at least not within the prime ministerial branch. Overall, then, changes in the institutional complexity of the New Zealand DPMC are not found to be driven by structural economic changes.

Finally, our third set of explanations involves the political conditions under which institutional change occurs. In the New Zealand case, I examine the effects of two

[112] The correlations and p-values are: KOF globalization index [r = -0.09, p = 0.65], trade openness [r = -0.20, p = 0.37], government consumption [r = -0.23, p = 0.30].

political variables: the cycle of prime ministerial terms and prime ministerial ideology.[113] As above, the impact of the term cycle is based on the idea that incentives and opportunities will change during a term. Political capital is often highest at the beginning of a prime ministerial term, whether because of a general election or a leadership contest victory, but the ability of a prime minister to formulate their priorities effectively, evaluate the capacities they have to achieve goals, and arrange their support systems accordingly, often starts low and increases through a term.

In New Zealand, there have been eight full or nearly full prime ministerial terms since the establishment of the DPMC. This is too small a sample size to arrive at any firm conclusions, but there are several observations that at least suggest patterns. The evidence suggests that there is no uniform pattern of change across prime ministerial terms. We do not see a consistent trend of change across terms, as expected, and the annual changes are mostly only one or two units. It does appear that a unit increase toward the end of terms is more likely than a decrease: the most recent three terms, Helen Clark's last term and John Key's first two terms, reflect this pattern. There is also no change between the first and second years of these terms, suggesting that organizational change tends not to be a significant prime ministerial priority. Considering the relative lack of specialization in units in this case, no general conclusions can be made, but there is no evidence that specialization is tied to term cycles in any way.

Finally, our expectation is that we will see a lower level of changes in institutional complexity under more conservative prime ministers than more liberal ones. However, in this case the test is essentially a comparison between just two leaders: the Labour prime

[113] The "legislative support" variable cannot be meaningfully tested because of a lack of variation in the New Zealand case.

minister Helen Clark and the National prime minister John Key. Clearly, Key's prime ministership has seen a greater proliferation and specialization of units than Clark's, but attributing these changes to partisan or ideological differences is unwarranted. It is perhaps notable that in the other cases we saw a relatively robust and timely institutional response to the national security concerns raised by the 9/11 attacks. In the New Zealand case, however, the build-up of units specializing in national security did not occur until a change of prime ministers. However, this may reflect the relatively smaller, less central role of the prime ministerial branch in New Zealand; the response is more apparent outside of the centre of government machinery than within the core executive.[114]

### 7.2.3 Institutional Complexity and Change in the New Zealand DPMC

As revealed in earlier chapters, the New Zealand case exhibits a pattern of institutional drift, in terms of the schema presented in chapter three. There has certainly not been a high degree of institutionalization with regard to institutional complexity. Other than the notable build-up in national security units in recent years, neither proliferation nor specialization of units has been especially prevalent in the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet over its twenty-five year history. Unlike their counterparts in other Westminster countries, to varying degrees, New Zealand prime ministers have not sought to expand the scope of the prime ministerial branch. The core administrative units have remained largely unchanged, while the kinds of policy-specific,

[114] A DPMC document outlining the government's national security framework, "New Zealand's National Security System", published in May 2011, demonstrates this argument. For instance, it describes the management of national security as "managed with devolved arrangements to the greatest extent possible" (5). It points to a defence and intelligence review in 2009, eight years after 9/11, as precipitating subsequent changes. It describes a forum of government chief executives (akin to Deputy Ministers in Canada), the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination, as the predominant policy coordination mechanism. It is also telling that instead of establishing a National Security Advisor and apparatus, as Canada and other jurisdictions did after 9/11, the role remained with the chief executive of the DPMC (12).

advisory and implementation units associated with a more institutionalized capacity for policy initiation and coordination are largely absent. In addition to this relative lack of an institutionalizing trend, the complexity trend is highly continuous. It is essentially unchanging, apart from the initial build-up of units due largely to the ad-hoc health reform units and the recent increased prominence of national security.

These findings accord with the characterization of the New Zealand prime ministership and political culture in chapter two. To recall, scholars have argued that collective decision making and a "culture of consultation" largely retain their normative strength in New Zealand (Johansson and Levine 2013; McLeay 2003). Additionally, as a small unitary state, New Zealand prime ministers do not have to consider intergovernmental relations in decision-making. Neither the direct need for communication and liaison with subnational governments nor the indirect need to consider federal fiscal and structural arrangements in policy-making are present in New Zealand. Finally, as shown above, political culture in New Zealand is ambiguous in its embrace of assertive values. Many of the assertive indicators involve questions of trust, political efficacy and government responsiveness; Banducci et al. (1999) show that the switch to a proportional representation system in 1993 significantly shifted attitudes in these areas. They found that "more voters came to see that their votes really mattered, fewer thought that their MPs did not care or were out of touch, and fewer thought that government was run by a few big interests" (550-551). This is another point of contrast between New Zealand and the other Westminster cases, and also an interesting example of feedback between institutional change and sociocultural change.

In terms of institutional complexity, then, I characterize the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet as a case of institutional drift since its establishment in 1990. Institutionalization has been relatively low and institutional continuity relatively high, although the department may currently be in a period of increasing complexity. Since the department in its current incarnation is relatively new, however, caution in characterizing its development is warranted. To date, there has been relatively little institutional change, and there are distinctive factors militating against change, as just discussed. But it may be premature to definitively characterize the case. In contrast, the DPMC's counterpart in Canada, the Privy Council Office, has a long institutional history, arguably predating Confederation in some sense (Dutil 2017, 53).[115] The next section examines this case.

*7.3 Canada: the Privy Council Office, 1984-2015*

This section explicates the study's second case of institutional complexity: the Privy Council Office (PCO) in Canada. It focuses on the period from 1984, when organizational information is first detailed in the budget estimate documents.[116] Unlike the New Zealand case, the literature suggests that the institutional growth of the PCO is closely linked with the growth of prime ministerial power in Canada (Aucoin et al. 2011, 121; Savoie 1999, 2010). This has involved not only institutional growth but also a reorientation of institutional values and functions. As Graham White (2005) and others have long noted, the idea that the PCO's master is cabinet collectively is not tenable.

[115] The Privy Council Office was established at Confederation in 1867, but many of the initial staff also worked as clerks for the various Executive Councils (cabinet) that existed in the province of Canada and Upper Canada prior to 1841. This included the first Clerk of the Privy Council.

There is, suggest Peters and Savoie (2000), "little question that above all it serves the prime minister" (47). The PCO has become in function and purpose the "prime minister's department", with the Clerk of the Privy Council the "prime minister's deputy minister" (White 2005, 66). The office itself has recognized this in its values statements since at least the early 1990s. For example, the 2001 departmental report states that the office

> provides professional, non-partisan advice, information, and support services to the Prime Minister on a range of policy, management, and operational issues… PCO advises and supports the Prime Minister as Head of Government on Government policies and priorities, on the Government's organization and its relations with Parliament, the provinces and other institutions, and on the planning and operations related to Canada's representation in the international community. PCO also provides support to the Prime Minister as the Chair of Cabinet. (Canada 2001, 2)

Moreover, Campbell's observation in 1983 that the PCO "maintains virtual control of policy advice to the prime minister" suggests that the Office is not only *a* prime minister's department but *the* prime minister's department (1983, 83). It is helpful to understand that though the Prime Minister's Office has also grown institutionally and is responsible for much of the perception of growing prime ministerial power, it does not yet have the policy expertise and depth of institutional knowledge that the PCO has, nor should it necessarily. The PMO is more the external face of the prime ministerial branch and its role is more politically charged, but the PCO provides the prime minister with the crucial levers operating the machinery of government. Moreover, prime ministerial priorities are the priorities of the PCO. As Savoie puts it, "if the prime minister expresses an interest in any given matter, that is reason enough for the Privy Council Office to bring it into its own office" (1999, 154). Thus, though the PCO performs several functions that

serve the cabinet collectively or its committees, its basic orientation is to the prime minister, not only because of her position as ‘chair of the cabinet’ but in her own right.

As the prime minister’s department, the PCO has a distinctive policy coordination role that outstrips its administrative origins. It also extends beyond putting “six goalies on the ice” (Savoie 1999): a defensive counterbalance to departmental interests rather than an active player in policy initiation (134). The idea that the PCO is simply a bulwark against aggressive departmentalism is in tension with the notion that it is the prime minister’s department, and is belied by its own institutional structure. If the office serves the prime minister’s priorities, it would be a poorly functioning institution if it did not engage actively in areas of prime ministerial interest. Policy coordination itself is not devoid of substantive policy implications; that the PCO primarily serves the prime minister in coordinating and managing the flow of information and cabinet business gives it much more than a simply defensive role. This is to say that the Privy Council Office plays an active, robust role in projecting prime ministerial power within the core executive and the broader machinery of government.

The PCO is the only one of the four prime ministerial branches to be in continuous existence since the nation’s ‘founding’ in 1867. As mentioned earlier, the first Clerk of the Privy Council was also Clerk of the Executive Council in pre-Confederation Canada (Dutil 2017, 53). However, to repeat a common theme in these case studies, the Privy Council Office’s duties from Confederation until the ensconcement of a Cabinet Secretariat in 1940 were “formal and legalistic” (Robertson 1971, 488). Dutil describes the work of the small PCO staff as tracking ministerial requests, drafting Orders in Council, arranging meetings of Cabinet, recording Cabinet deliberations, and following

up with line departments (2017, 269). While undoubtedly crucial to effective functioning of government, these are prototypically administrative functions. Indeed, as Peters and Savoie (2000) note, the shift to more robust centralized coordination machinery was resisted much longer in Canada than in the United Kingdom; the latter's cabinet secretariat was created in 1916 as a response to wartime pressures (48).

Arnold Heeney became the first titled Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet in 1940. Still, compared to the Prime Minister's Department in Australia, for example, the Privy Council Office was, and remained, a rudimentary unit. It grew somewhat with the greater institutionalization of cabinet committees under Prime Minister Pearson (1963-68), but the signal change is the onset of Pierre Trudeau's prime ministership in 1968 (Savoie 1999). As was demonstrated in earlier chapters, the path of growth in institutional resources at the centre of government in Canada is marked from this point. The organizational structure of the PCO accords with these other institutional trends.

Robertson (1971) includes in his exegesis of the PCO's work an organization chart showing the structure of the office in 1971, arguably at the height of Prime Minister Trudeau's organizational restructuring (494). This chart shows that the lines of the modern PCO had already been established at this time. There are three branch-level units, each headed by a Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet: Operations, Plans, and Federal-Provincial Affairs. Each of these branches has a significant number of secretariats and divisions within it, covering a broad range of areas. Peters and Savoie's (2000) observation that the PCO is "organized to cover virtually every area of government

activities" is already apparent (50).[117] There is also an Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Security) and an Administration & Personnel section.

Notwithstanding a few significant changes, such as the establishment of a separate Federal-Provincial Relations Office in 1974/75 and an expanded foreign policy and national security apparatus, a key finding is that the organizational core of the Privy Council Office has remained largely the same. As Savoie argues, the PCO's organizational structure has changed only "at the margins", the core of planning, operations, and machinery of government branches remaining in place (1999, 122). In addition, the PCO has carved out a large role in two particular policy areas: foreign policy and intergovernmental relations (Savoie 1999; Peters and Savoie 2000). This is not surprising, since the first is traditionally seen as a core prime ministerial prerogative while the second reflects the omnipresence of federalism in policymaking in Canada, and the particular variant of executive federalism so prominent from the 1960s to the 2000s.

### 7.3.1 Unit Proliferation and Specialization in the Privy Council Office

The previous section described, in broad strokes, the historical origins and context within which the Privy Council Office has changed. The rest of this case study examines and analyzes, in further detail, change in the office's institutional complexity, particularly since 1984-1985. I first make note, however, of two issues with the data underlying the case study. First, synthesizing information on the Privy Council Office's organizational structure is somewhat complicated by how it is reported in some of the documents,

[117] Within Operations: Government Operations, Economic Policy, External Policy and Defence, Science, Culture and Information, and Social Policy. The Plans branch is actually further subdivided into a Planning section, consisting of the Priorities and Planning and Legislative and House Planning Secretariats, and the Machinery of Government section, consisting of the Communications, Government Organization, and Senior Personnel units. There is also an Assistant Clerk in charge of Orders in Council and legal units.
The Federal-Provincial Affairs branch consists of a Federal-Provincial Relations Secretariat, a Director of constitutional review, and a research and policy development section.

particularly in the expenditure plans section of the budget estimates. The PCO itself is only one "business line" presented under the umbrella of the 'Privy Council program', which includes the Prime Minister's Office, offices of ministers who report to the Clerk of the Privy Council, the Federal-Provincial Relations Office (from 1975 to 1995, when it was re-incorporated into the PCO), commissions of inquiry and task forces, and administration.

While these are undoubtedly important to the overall scope of the Canadian prime ministerial branch, I do not consider these elements to be part of the core organizational structure of the PCO, though they all have certain reporting relationships to the Clerk and the prime minister. For instance, among the "commissions of inquiry and task forces" business line are several royal commissions, such as the Krever inquiry into tainted blood and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. These are listed under the Privy Council program because the PCO provided administrative support to them, but they are not recognized by the PCO itself as institutionally part of the office.[118] In other words, they do not appear on PCO organizational charts. Thus, I consider only the organizational elements that are directly and explicitly a part of the PCO itself.

A second data issue concerns the fact that, for some periods, information was only available for 'branch-level' PCO units, not the subdivisions within them. Branch-level units are those whose heads report directly to the Clerk of the Privy Council and who are typically Deputy Secretaries to the Cabinet. Listings of subunits of these branches, typically headed by Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet, were not directly available for 1984 to 1994 and from 2001 to 2004. This means, of course, that any units which existed

[118] This is in contrast to the Australian case, for example, where the DPMC has explicitly recognized units whose mandates are associated with temporary projects such as White Papers or commissions.

solely between 2001 and 2004 are not captured, nor can we directly account in many cases for when units existing in 2005, but not in 2000, were established, and vice versa. Instead of inferring the existence of units in this period, I simply treat them as missing data. This is unfortunate but not too problematic, as the branch-level change in this period elucidates important changes in the PCO's organizational structure reasonably well. Thus, the analysis of institutional complexity in the PCO relies much more heavily on examining change in the top-level branch units than on change within these units.

The overall trend in the branch-level units in the Canadian Privy Council Office has been one of increasing proliferation, at least through 2012. However, the trend is not strictly linear: there seems to be a cycle of growth in units followed by periods of retrenchment and consolidation. The PCO consistently housed five branches until 1993: Plans, Operations, Security and Intelligence, Machinery of Government and Senior Personnel, and Corporate Services. This increased to nine by 1998, with new branches for Foreign and Defence Policy, Intergovernmental Affairs, and Millennium Planning. After declining for a number of years, the number of branches rises and falls dramatically in, and after, 2005, under Paul Martin. It recovers somewhat, but then decreases quite substantially after 2012. Figure 7.3, below, plots the trend line in the number of branch-level units in the Privy Council Office from 1985 to 2015, with prime ministerial tenures indicated.

Figure 7.3

*Unit Proliferation in the Privy Council Office, Canada, 1985-2015*




Sources: Canada, Main Estimates, Part III. Privy Council Office Departmental Reports. Kim Campbell's prime ministership is not represented because of its extremely short duration.

The figure makes clear that, to a significant extent, changes in the trend line have much to do with changes in prime ministers. The number of branches in the PCO is stable during Brian Mulroney's tenure (1984-1993), but begins to increase under his successor, Jean Chrétien (1993-2003). After a decline in the latter half of the Chrétien prime ministership, the number of branches spikes under Liberal prime minister Paul Martin (2003-2006), reaching a peak of eleven in 2005. In Stephen Harper's first year as prime minister, 2006, the PCO undertook a reorganization "aimed at placing a stronger emphasis on the traditional responsibilities" of the office (Privy Council Office 2006, 35). However, in the remainder of Harper's first term, 2006 to 2008, the number of PCO branches rises again, and remains at ten through most of his second term. After 2012, there is a decline in the number of branches, a function of reorganization – branches being subsumed and a new reporting arrangement.

The pattern observed here paints a somewhat different picture than the trends in PCO budget and staff resources observed in earlier chapters. While those trends demonstrated a high degree of continuity and incremental growth, the more volatile character of the PCO's institutional structure, per figure 7.3, suggests that change along this dimension of institutionalization is more responsive to short-term factors, and less institutionally path dependent than other dimensions. One explanation for this may be that concrete resources such as budgets and staff are normally more entrenched; it is arguably more disruptive to radically expand or cut budgets and staff than it is to rearrange the structure within which those resources operate. Prime ministers may also view alterations in organizational structure to be a more flexible, effective way of furthering their priorities than other means.[119]

A second indicator of change in institutional complexity is specialization and differentiation of units, particularly in terms of the establishment of more specialized policy units, advisory units, implementation units, and units dedicated to communications. Growth in these kinds of units speaks to a greater role for prime ministerial branches in policy coordination and support, and prime ministers' need for enhanced advisory and control structures. Table 7.3, below, lists and categorizes all units by type in the PCO at the "branch" level from 1985 to 2015.

Table 7.3
*Units (Branches) in the Privy Council Office, Canada, 1985-2015*

| *Unit* | *Years* | *Type* |
|---|---|---|
| Plans | 1984-present | Administrative / Policy-Specific[#] |
| Operations | 1984-present | Administrative / Policy-Specific[#] |

[119] For example, it seems a much clearer signal to establish a separate Intergovernmental Affairs branch, as the current prime minister, Justin Trudeau has, than to simply increase funding ostensibly for that purpose within existing structures. Formal demarcation can be a powerful tool.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Security and Intelligence | 1984-2003 | Policy-Specific |
| Senior Personnel | 1984-present | Administrative |
| Communications and Consultation | 1993-94 | Communications |
| Government Renewal | 1995 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Office of Federal Economic Development (Ontario) | 1995 | Policy-Specific |
| Intergovernmental Affairs | 1996-2012 | Policy-Specific |
| Foreign and Defence Policy | 1997-2012 | Policy-Specific |
| Corporate Services* | 1997-present | Administrative |
| Deputy Clerk of the PC & Counsel | 1998-2001 | Administrative |
| Millennium Planning | 1998 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Machinery of Government | 2002-05 | Administrative |
| National Security Advisor | 2004-present | Policy-Specific |
| National Science Advisor | 2004-05 | Policy-Specific |
| Counsel | 2005 | Administrative |
| Expenditure Review Secretariat | 2005 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Legislation & House Planning, Machinery of Government | 2006-present | Administrative |
| Public Service Renewal | 2007-08 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Afghanistan Task Force | 2008-12 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Office of the Coordinator for 2010 Olympics and G8 Security | 2008-10 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Administrative Services Review | 2012 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Business Transformation & Renewal Secretariat | 2013 | Ad-Hoc Limited |
| Counsel | 2015 | Administrative |

*Note:* Years refer to fiscal years, e.g., 1996 means that the unit was started or existed in fiscal year 1995/96. Several units have undergone minor name changes; the names listed are the original forms.
# As described in the text, the Plans and Operations Branches can be described as "catch-all" units which encompass many functionally different subunits.
*Corporate Services branch is not listed prior to 1997 but is a part of the PCO. It is found on Lalonde's (1971) organizational chart showing the PCO in 1971. It is therefore included in the unit counts for analysis.

This information reveals that Donald Savoie's observation about the unchanging organizational core of the PCO largely is borne out. While the administrative branches of Plans, Operations, Senior Personnel, and Corporate Services have been essentially stable, the creation of new policy-specific branches has been sporadic and minimal. The Security & Intelligence secretariat existed from 1985 to 2003, when it was folded into the National Security Advisor's responsibilities. In 1996, after the dissolution of the separate Federal-

Provincial Relations Office, an intergovernmental affairs unit was established in the PCO; this unit was shuttered in 2012, with its attendant policy areas subsumed into the Plans division. In 1997, a Foreign & Defence Policy branch was created, also remaining as a unit until 2012.

The Privy Council Office arguably reached its peak in unit specialization under Prime Minister Paul Martin (2003-2006). Figure 7.4, below, shows PCO structure as it was in 2005. The aforementioned National Security Advisor unit was established in 2004 and a National Science Advisor unit was established in the same year. The former remains a key policy-specific branch of the PCO while the latter lasted only two years, being disbanded in Stephen Harper's first year as prime minister. Neither has there been a significant degree of specialization within the branches; the Plans and Operations branches, which have housed a small number of policy-specific subunits since the 1960s, look much the same internally in 2015 as they do in 1995.

Similarly, specialization of units in the PCO has not been evident in terms of communications, advisory, or implementation functions. Until Prime Minister Justin Trudeau established a Results and Delivery Unit within the PCO in 2016 (after the period of this case study), there were no specialized implementation units in the office. The PCO has also not witnessed growth in communications units, nor has it established any kind of distinct advisory group within the office. There have been a limited number of ad-hoc units set up, such as the Expenditure Review Secretariat (2005), the Afghanistan Taskforce (2008-2012) and Office of the Coordinator for 2010 Olympics and G8 Security (2008-2010), but the number of ad-hoc units created within the core PCO organization is comparatively small. Thus, in comparison to other prime ministerial branches, the extent

of institutional specialization in the Canadian Privy Council Office is low, although greater than in the New Zealand case.

Figure 7.4
*Organizational Structure of the PCO, 2005*




Source: PCO Departmental Performance Report 2004-05, 55.

These findings are somewhat surprising, given the distinctive incremental institutionalization in the Canadian case evident in budget appropriations and staff resources, and the general view of the Canadian prime ministerial branch as among the most robust. Certainly, the Privy Council Office has increased in size and specialization to some extent; it houses much more institutional capacity than it did in 1867 or 1940. The modern PCO is a sprawling bureaucratic organization in its own right. This is evident in Figure 7.5, below, which depicts the organizational structure of the PCO as of August 2015.

Figure 7.5
*Organizational Structure of the PCO, 2015*



However, while the PCO of 2015 is more institutionally complex than it was in 1985, its core structure has been altered very little: it retains the key Operations, Plans and Consultations, and Senior Personnel branches with minimal changes. In fact, comparison with the office in 1971 (see Robertson 1971, 494) suggests that the PCO at the end of Stephen Harper's tenure as prime minister is *less* complex in some ways. Its policy subunits are less specialized and its coordination of intergovernmental affairs less prominent. Some of this is clearly explained by very different political contexts: Pierre Trudeau's PCO prominently houses a Constitutional Conference Secretariat, something closely associated with the era of "mega-constitutionalism" in the 1960s and 1970s, . Where the PCO in 2015 has become more complex, it reflects similar concerns to what we saw in the New Zealand case: the national security role of the PCO has noticeably become more institutionalized.

The narrative of complexity in the PCO may have been different if, counterfactually, Paul Martin had continued to serve as prime minister; his short tenure witnessed a number of innovations that may have been continued had he not been replaced. As discussed above, the PCO arguably reached its peak in both unit proliferation and specialization during Martin's term. Although outside of the scope of this study, the current prime minister, Justin Trudeau, has also taken steps towards increasing the institutional complexity of the Privy Council Office. As of 2017, he has re-established Intergovernmental Affairs as a separate branch, created a secretariat devoted to youth issues, and as mentioned, established a Results and Delivery unit, with a focus on policy implementation.

To conclude, the Privy Council Office has not exhibited a level of specialization comparable to its other institutional resource trends. In part, this may be due to focusing only on the core PCO's organizational structure; doing so may underplay change in other parts of the prime ministerial branch. Certainly, in the Canadian PMO there has been a degree of specialization with regard to communications and policy to some extent. This suggests that while the PCO is obviously an active, robust organization, the two-headed nature of prime ministerial power is stronger in Canada than is perhaps the case elsewhere. Still, although there has certainly been specialization in the PCO, the "fascination with central coordination" in Canada does not match the kind of restless institutional rearrangement we observe in other cases. Specialization of units in the Canadian Privy Council Office has been muted.

### 7.3.2 Explanations for Change in Institutional Complexity

In the previous section, I elucidated the extent to which the Canadian Privy Council Office has become more institutionally complex. Overall, the totality of the evidence points to only a moderate level of institutional change, and it has been sporadic and halting rather than consistent over time. While we observed proliferation in Jean Chrétien's first two terms, his shortened third term (2000-2003) saw no change. Under Paul Martin, there was a large spike in the number of PCO units and some movement in the direction of specialization, but under his successor, Stephen Harper, there was a reversion, and indeed, after 2011, a significant decline in the number of branches through consolidation. In this section, I assess evidence for the hypotheses relating three factors – public expectations, economic trends, and political conditions – to change in the institutional complexity of the PCO.

The Theory of Public Expectations is captured in the hypothesis of a correspondence between periods of change in the assertiveness of Canadians and change in institutional complexity. These trends should co-vary in a positive way over time. Figure 7.6, below, shows the number of PCO branches over time along with an averaged assertiveness trend, from 1985 to 2015. The correspondence between the two trends is evident when considered over the whole period. Assertiveness generally increases until the mid-2000s and declines thereafter; the unit proliferation trend is roughly similar, also peaking in the mid-2000s. The correlation between the two trends is 0.58 ($p = 0.00$), which indicates a relatively strong positive correlation: higher assertiveness is associated with higher unit proliferation.

Figure 7.6
*Unit Proliferation and Assertiveness, Canada, 1985-2015*




Note: Assertiveness is the yearly average of political interest, party identification (reversed), and the assertive index.

On shorter time scales, the relationship between assertiveness and institutional complexity encounters both controverting and supporting evidence. Canadians became

dramatically more assertive in the 1980s while the branch structure in the PCO was static. Another increase in assertiveness from 2000 to 2005 is not accompanied by a parallel increase in PCO units, although the distinctive proliferation and specialization under Paul Martin follows thereafter, perhaps suggesting a lagged effect. On the other hand, the build-up under Jean Chrétien in the 1990s and the reversals under Stephen Harper are reflected in the assertiveness trend. The latter, in particular, proves an interesting case in point. Canadians have evidently become less assertive from 2005 onwards, and have remained at relatively low levels of assertiveness since 2010. As I discussed in the New Zealand case study earlier, while this does not necessarily speak to the core thrust of the Theory of Public Expectations, it does suggest that in the absence of increasingly assertive citizenship, prime ministers may be less driven to pursue institutionalization.

The second set of explanations for changes in institutional complexity involves the impact of economic trends. I examine two major structural changes that have been observed in Canada and other industrialized countries in the post-war period: globalization and growth in government activity. The empirical expectation is that both of these trends are positively associated with institutional complexity. I hypothesize that when globalization and government activity are higher relative to their time trends, institutional complexity in prime ministerial branches will tend to increase. Conversely, when these economic trends are not increasing, I expect that the PCO will tend not to become more complex.

It does not appear that these economic trends are related to institutional complexity in any significant way. Globalization, as measured by the KOF Index, rises sharply in the 1990s, and declines slowly thereafter. Government activity, i.e., social

spending by the central government as a proportion of GDP, declines dramatically in the 1990s, in part because of the Liberal project of deficit elimination, and does not really recover. These trends are not reflected in the PCO's proliferation trends. Moreover, to the extent that there has been specialization in the PCO, it has not seemingly been focused on goals that concern responses to changing economic trends. Overall, then, I conclude that the economic hypotheses are not supported.

Finally, I examine three hypotheses about the impact of political conditions on institutional complexity. The first hypothesis is that there is a "term effect": a correlation between years of a prime ministerial term and change in institutional complexity. The second hypothesis concerns legislative support. The claim here is that prime ministers with greater legislative support are more likely to increase institutional complexity than prime ministers with less support. The third political hypothesis is that party or ideology matters: liberal prime ministers are more likely to increase institutional complexity than conservative prime ministers.

Is there a term effect in Canada for institutional complexity? It does not appear as though there is a consistent pattern over prime ministerial term years. On average, proliferation is greater in the first two years as compared to the third: in the first and second years, the mean changes in branches are 3.1 and 1.1 percent, respectively, dropping to -3.4 percent in the third year. In the fourth year the mean change increases to 8.3 percent. However, the number of observations is small and the variance is very large, rendering the differences not statistically significant.

It is also not apparent that legislative support has a significant effect on institutional complexity. Under the Mulroney majority governments, the PCO's top-level

organizational structure was essentially static, while in the first two Chrétien majorities the PCO does become more institutionally complex. The majority government that Stephen Harper finally achieved in 2011 marks a period of decreasing institutional complexity. A similar lack of consistency is evident with regard to minorities. The notable proliferation and specialization that Paul Martin undertook was in the context of a minority government, while the minority governments of Harper from 2006 to 2011 evince institutional retrenchment and consolidation rather than growth. Statistically, the difference of means in branch proliferation (change in units) is not significant; again, the variation within majority and minority governments swamps any variation between the two.

Finally, the foregoing discussion heavily implies that there is a partisan, ideological component to change in institutional complexity. The significant periods of unit proliferation and specialization correspond mostly to Liberal governments, while under Stephen Harper the evidence points generally to intentional downsizing and consolidation. Moreover, arguably the qualitative character of change is linked to ideological positions. While under Liberal prime ministers the Privy Council Office emphasized the prime minister's role in managing the Canadian federation and in such 'liberal' priorities as science policy and regional economic development, the emphasis under Stephen Harper was on national security. Although not listed in table 7.3, above, because they were not formally constituted PCO units, Harper also brought into the PCO several special advisors on such things as human smuggling and border security (these positions are shown in figure 7.5). And again, though outside of this study's scope, the incumbent prime minister, Justin Trudeau, appears to be following in the footsteps of his

Liberal predecessors rather than Harper in terms of increasing the institutional complexity of the Privy Council Office. Although no general conclusions can be drawn because of the limited sample size, there does appear to be some role for ideology in explaining increasing and decreasing institutional complexity.

*7.4 Discussion and Conclusion*

This chapter is the first of two that examine institutional complexity in the prime ministerial branches. I introduced the concept of complexity and described how the concept is operationalized in the four case studies that follow. In this chapter, I explicated the New Zealand and Canadian cases: two cases that have developed low to moderate degrees of institutional complexity. The New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet case exhibits a kind of institutional stasis. From its establishment in 1990 until very recently, there has been minimal proliferation of units and little in the way of unit specialization. Since the New Zealand case is characterized by very high continuity in organizational structure and a relatively low level of institutionalization, it is categorized as a case of "drift" in our typology of incremental institutional change. However, it may be more accurate to describe it as a case in which institutional change has essentially been absent altogether. Part of what has militated against change may be the lack of external forces, such as an increasingly assertive public, in New Zealand.

In the case of the Canadian Privy Council Office, the observations of Donald Savoie and others that the office's core organizational structure has been quite stable is borne out. While certainly the PCO has become more institutionally complex in the last thirty years, what is surprising is the relatively low level of unit proliferation and, especially, specialization. As with the New Zealand case, the Canadian case is somewhat

at odds with the typology of institutional change that I have posited. As far as the dimensions of continuity and institutionalization, the Privy Council Office falls into the "layering" mode of incremental change: comparably high continuity and moderate institutionalization. However, the layering of new institutional rules, norms and functions onto existing ones in the PCO has been more sporadic and less robust than was expected theoretically. Finally, in examining potential explanatory factors, I found that there is some evidence pointing to the strength of assertiveness and of party ideology in driving change in institutional complexity. There was minimal evidence for other explanations.

In both of the New Zealand and Canada cases, determining the robustness of these explanations is somewhat hindered by the relative lack of institutional change to begin with. While the Privy Council Office in Canada has certainly grown in the direction of institutionalization more than was the case in the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, both cases contrast starkly with the cases in the next chapter, the United Kingdom and Australia. As the next chapters depict, in both these cases the prime ministerial branches have become incredibly complex, though in very different ways.

# Chapter 8
# Institutional Complexity in the UK and Australia

This chapter continues my assessment of change in institutional complexity within the prime ministerial branches. In theory, increasing institutional complexity is a key response to the pressures that modern politics places on prime ministerial leadership. However, the cases of New Zealand and Canada presented above, in chapter seven, demonstrated empirically that the process of change is more complex than theory predicts. Both cases exhibited less institutional change in this regard than was expected. In New Zealand, there has been minimal change in institutional complexity. Canada's prime ministerial branch is certainly more internally complex than it was fifty years ago, but institutional change has been sporadic and tied to particular prime ministers. The Canadian Privy Council Office has become more complex over time, but not markedly more specialized.

In contrast to those cases, the British and Australian prime ministerial branches examined in this chapter exhibit significantly more robust change in institutional complexity. They also offer illustrative, contrasting patterns of institutional change. The story of the British Cabinet Office centres on its abrupt, dramatic conversion under Tony Blair into a robust, institutionally complex, policy-oriented office. In the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, however, successive prime ministers have periodically reoriented the office by layering new and enhanced functions onto existing ones. While taking different paths, both offices demonstrate significant and enduring growth in institutional complexity, which differentiates them from the New Zealand and Canadian cases.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I reiterate the main conceptual and operational discussion in chapter seven. I then continue the series of case studies, focusing now on the United Kingdom's Cabinet Office and Australia's Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The final section of the chapter summarizes the chapter's findings, and concludes this set of studies.

*8.1 Concepts and Methodology*

This section reiterates, briefly, the conceptual and methodological discussion in section 7.1, above (pgs. 246-263). Institutional complexity is a key dimension of institutionalization. Along with institutional autonomy, complexity is important to an institution's ability to adjust and adapt to changing contexts. An institution gains value by growing and expanding its functional ambit. As discussed there, my empirical analysis of institutional complexity is based on identifying units found in prime ministerial branches, and tracing change in unit structures over time. I examine two measures of complexity: first, the proliferation of units, and second, specialization of units. The first simply refers to counting the number of units, while the second indicates the extent to which institutional functions are differentiated and narrowed.

In order to classify units, I identified six types of units: administrative; advisory; policy-specific; policy implementation; ad-hoc limited; and communications. Administrative units perform logistical and bureaucratic coordination and oversight functions, and general support to operations. In Australia, the Government division, which has been a permanent institutional feature, is one such unit.[120] Advisory units provide broad policy advice and support, akin to 'in-house' think tanks. The Central

[120] The Government Division, within the 'Governance' Group, houses four internal branches: Honours, Symbols and Legal Policy; Parliamentary & Government; Parliamentary Liaison Officer (House of Representatives); and Parliamentary Liaison Officer (Senate).

Policy Review Staff in the UK Cabinet Office, one of the earliest innovations in unit specialization when it was created in 1971, was a unit of this sort. In contrast, policy-specific units are organized around a specific, more or less exclusive policy area. Within this area, these units perform various policy-related functions. A recent new example of this is the Cities division in the DPMC, transferred from Environment in early 2016 after Prime Minister Turnbull deemed municipal affairs a priority.

The fourth type of prime ministerial branch unit is implementation: units with generally broad mandates to monitor and evaluate government performance. These units reflect a general ideational shift in public administration towards measuring results within a framework of strategic policy objectives. The prototype and paradigmatic example is the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit, established in the Cabinet Office by Tony Blair. Ad-hoc limited units are the fifth type of unit. These are units set up to manage particularly urgent issues, often in response to external events or significant policy reforms. Taskforces, which have been especially prevalent in the Australian case, are a typical example. By definition, such units are temporary; if they become institutionalized, they would be considered policy-specific or administrative units. Ad-hoc limited units respond to or support specific projects or policy initiatives and then are disbanded. Examples from the Australian DPMC and the UK Cabinet Office include the "White Paper on Federalism" unit in the former and the Olympic and Paralympic Legacy Unit (2012) in the latter.

Finally, communications units perform media and public relations, as well as internal government communications functions. While both the Cabinet Office and Australian DPMC have housed units dealing with government information for decades,

such units have not proliferated consistently compared to other types of units. Their presence is more evident in the political offices of prime ministers than in the bureaucratic offices. Still, change in this regard does reflect innovation in these offices, shifting from the traditionally insular Whitehall mould towards more modern concerns with public engagement. A revealing example is the build-up of communications operations in Tony Blair's first term, discussed further in the case study below.

As in the previous chapter, the empirical approach in this chapter is predominantly qualitative and descriptive. In each case study, I narrate changes in institutional complexity over time and assess the extent to which our theoretical factors correspond to these changes. The analysis is thus more impressionistic and less precise than in the earlier quantitative chapters, but more grounded in details and case-oriented. The hypotheses, however, are the same. As discussed in-depth in chapter seven, these two case studies elucidate the robustness of three types of explanations for explaining change in institutional complexity: Public Expectations; economic trends; and political conditions.

The Public Expectations explanation is empirically supported if we observe that units within prime ministerial branches proliferate and functions become more differentiated and specialized during periods of increased assertive citizenship, as indicated by political interest, party identification, and an assertive attitudes index. This is the primary theory of interest in this study. However, I also assess the impact of two long-term economic trends, globalization and change in central government activity. I test the hypothesis that when globalization and government activity are higher relative to their trends over time, institutional complexity in prime ministerial branches will tend to

increase correspondingly. Finally, I assess the impact of political conditions, namely, term effects (when during a term change occurs), legislative support, and ideology. I expect that greater legislative support will be associated with greater institutional complexity and that prime ministers of more liberal orientations will be more likely to increase institutional complexity, and conservatives less likely. We now move on to the two case studies of the chapter, beginning with the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom.

*8.2 United Kingdom: the Cabinet Office, 1978-2015*

The British Cabinet Office, our third case study of institutional complexity, is very well documented compared to the other Westminster prime ministerial branches. Many aspects of the office have been assessed thoroughly (for example, Blackstone and Plowden 1988; Blick and Jones 2010; Burch and Holliday 1996, 2004; Burnham and Jones 1993; Fleischer 2009; Lee et al. 1998; Richards and Smith 2006; Seldon 1990). Vigorous debates about prime ministerial versus collective cabinet government since the 1960s were renewed in part by the extensive changes made by Prime Minister Blair in his first two terms. In addition to academic work, the Cabinet Office was the subject of a 2010 inquiry by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution. Indeed, the question of centralization of power because of the creation of the cabinet secretariat was the subject of parliamentary debate as early as 1922 (Burch and Holliday 1996, 17). This attests to the level of public and political concern about the distribution of power in the centre of government in the UK, and the continuing strength of the ideal of collective cabinet government and the ‘Whitehall’ model of administration.

More than in any other case, the role of the Cabinet Office and its relationship with the prime minister vis-à-vis cabinet has been contested. The question of whether the

Cabinet Office is a "prime minister's department", and whether it should be, is comparatively unsettled (Blick and Jones 2010, 138-142). Colin Campbell reports that as of the early 1980s, the senior officials' view was that the office, unlike the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, serviced the prime minister but not exclusively (1983, 58). Blick and Jones (2010, 147) conclude that the Blair prime ministership, in particular, heralded the definitive move in this direction. They argue that Prime Minister Blair "enlisted the CO more extensively and explicitly for prime-ministerial purposes" (2013, 290). This was reflected in both organizational change within the Cabinet Office and a reform strategy that emphasized "joined-up government", accountability for policy delivery, and the centre's predominant role in driving cross-cutting policy change (Select Committee on the Constitution 2010, 64; Blick and Jones 2013). Something close to a scholarly consensus exists that Blair's tenure marks a crucial period in the institutional development of the Cabinet Office. However, as Graham Thomas argues, the general if uneven trend of institutional change in the Cabinet Office, especially since the 1960s, has been growth in both size and specialization, while its head, the Cabinet Secretary, has become "the Prime Minister's Chief adviser" (1998, 165). As will become clear below, the UK Cabinet Office is an exemplary case of institutional 'conversion' that has succeeded, in some ways, in institutionalizing prime ministerial leadership, but has also seen a degree of reversion. In order to understand this conversion, an exegesis of the Cabinet Office's origins and development is necessary.

### 8.2.1 The Cabinet Office: Origins and Development

The proximate cause of the Cabinet Office's creation in 1916 was the installation of David Lloyd George as prime minister and the exigencies of war. The British prime

ministerial branch originates in the wartime cabinet secretariat and the ‘garden suburb’ of close political advisors in Downing Street. The cabinet secretariat centralized policy coordination and information management: as Burch and Holliday (1996) report, prior to the secretariat’s establishment, cabinet processes were “comically inefficient” (13). However, this innovation was challenged by the Treasury, which in the interwar period was able to enshrine its permanent secretary as head of the civil service and incorporate the Cabinet Office into its operational purview (Burch and Holliday 1996, 17).

The office was recognized as a standalone part of the central government machinery only in 1968, when it was split from the Treasury and given its own expenditure line (Helms 2005, 67). In the interceding years, its development was piecemeal. Burch and Holliday (1996) note that there was some expansion of policy functions under Harold Wilson (1964-70, 1974-76), particularly in foreign and defence policy (22). Ted Heath’s prime ministership (1970-1974) saw a further trend in this direction. As Thomas (1998) reports, Heath was “one of the most managerially-minded Prime Ministers” of the century, as a former civil servant (166). His creation of the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) in the Cabinet Office, a small ‘think-tank’ of both civil service officials and outside experts, reflects his “planning-and-priorities” style (Campbell 1983, 72).

However, the CPRS’s role in strengthening the prime minister’s position is contested. Helms (2005) argues that it worked primarily for the prime minister (66), while Clifford (2000) suggests that the CPRS was a source for collective policy advice (36). Burch and Holliday (1996) report that the abolition of the CPRS in 1983 actually strengthened the prime minister’s hand (36). In any case, the Cabinet Office in the mid to

late 1970s was still relatively small. It contained the Cabinet Secretariat itself, with subunits devoted to Economic, Home, Overseas and Defence, and European policy areas, along with intelligence assessment staff (Seldon 1990, 107). It also housed an array of administrative units (Central Statistical Office, Establishment Division, and Historical Section), the CPRS, and a Chief Scientific Advisor.

The Cabinet Office under Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) has received particular attention from scholars. However, the prevailing argument is that while Thatcher made extensive use of personal power resources, the prime minister's institutional capacity did not significantly expand during her tenure (Helms 2005). Anthony Seldon (1990) argues that the Thatcher period is mostly an "unexceptional period during which the machine operated along lines already established" (120). Relative to her efforts in economic and social policy, Thatcher's restructuring of the core executive is much less radical (Clifford 2000, 38). Thomas attributes this in part to contrasting leadership styles. Heath was "managerial", while Thatcher's style was "eclectic" and personal (1998, 167). Helm (2005) characterizes this style as the prime minister believing that she was "by far the most able person in her government to deal with any major political problem" (80). The combination of personal competence and strong ideology suggests that institutional sources of policy advice and support were less important for Thatcher's pursuit of her agenda than for other prime ministers.

Nonetheless, two major changes occurred between 1979 and 1990. The first was the abolition of the Civil Service Department in 1981, with its functions transferred to the Cabinet Office and the Treasury (Seldon 1990; Burnham and Jones 1993). This change strengthened the Cabinet Office's position and put the prime minister and the Cabinet

Secretary more directly in control of the civil service. The second major change, as mentioned earlier, was the demise of the Central Policy Review Staff, the Cabinet Office's in-house "think tank" (Seldon 1990, 107). Burnham and Jones (1993) argue that this event, in fact, strengthened the prime ministerial position: the CPRS, they argue, had a collective purpose and was "less driven by the PM's priorities and immediate concerns", and thus could no longer serve as a source of information for other cabinet ministers or cabinet collectively (302).[121] Under John Major (1990-1997) and his successors, particularly Tony Blair (1997-2007), further changes in organizational structure of the Cabinet Office took place, as discussed in detail in the rest of this case study. We now turn to tracing these changes in institutional complexity.

8.2.2 Institutional Complexity in the Cabinet Office since 1978

This section describes changes in the institutional structure of the Cabinet Office since the 1980s. Tracing these changes is somewhat more difficult than in the other cases. Reporting arrangements are more complex and structural hierarchies more fluid and more convoluted. While there is arguably less overall complexity in the UK's Cabinet Office than in some other cases, there has certainly been more change in the overall structural framing. In the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, for example, the division-branch structure has been relatively consistent through time, and reporting relationships kept relatively simple: all division-level officials report to the Secretary of the DPMC. The UK Cabinet Office structure introduces many more complications. For example, in the 1990s, the Office of Public Service and Science (OPSS) grouped many

[121] Smaller changes during the period included the creation of a Chief Scientific Advisor, heading a Science and Technology Secretariat in the Cabinet Office (Seldon 1990, 107; Burnham and Jones 1993, 301). As part of broader civil service reforms, an efficiency unit was established in the Cabinet Office in 1979 (Clifford 2000, 26). Security and intelligence information became more highly coordinated in 1983 (Burch and Holliday 1996).

units together that had been separate Cabinet Office units previously. The OPSS was eventually reintegrated into the Cabinet Office, but subsequent prime ministers pursued a strategy of organizing units into 'groups'. In addition, at times there have been Parliamentary Secretaries and Deputy Prime Ministers to whom certain CO units report directly, bypassing the Cabinet Secretary. Tony Blair instituted the position of Minister for the Cabinet Office. In general, the Cabinet Office structure has been more flexible and its institutional boundaries less well defined than in other cases.

Moreover, "agencification" in the 1980s and 1990s was pursued further in the British civil service than in the other Westminster cases (Moynihan 2006, 1035). This New Public Management trend involved disaggregating executive functions and hiving them off to quasi-autonomous agencies, based on performance-based contracting and management deregulation and decentralization (1029). This affected not only ministerial departments but also the core executive and the Cabinet Office, in particular.[122] The inconsistency and amorphousness of the Office's unit structure means that there is more uncertainty and discretion when counting and classifying units here than in the other cases. In order to account for these complications, the discussion in this section is more descriptive and narrative than in previous cases, and its analysis less granular in terms of examining trends over time.

My examination of the units in the Cabinet Office in the 1980s supports the characterization of other scholars. I find minimal growth in the complexity of the Cabinet Office during the Thatcher prime ministership. In 1979, when Thatcher took office, there

[122] The available information is somewhat inconsistent in terms of how executive agencies are depicted in the Cabinet Office's organizational structure; for the most part, I consider such agencies to be outside of the office's ambit.

were four administrative units and one advisory unit. The four administrative units were the Cabinet Secretariat (with subunits servicing cabinet committees), the Central Statistical Office, the Historical Section, and the Establishment Division; the advisory unit was the Central Policy Review Staff, discussed earlier. This administrative framework remained the same through the next decade.

Thatcher also brought in an efficiency advisor, and a small Efficiency Unit arose subsequently. This unit was intended to target waste and mismanagement in the civil service. Its work culminated in the *Next Steps* report (1988), which laid the groundwork for 'agencification' and adoption of New Public Management practices (Haddon 2012). The Cabinet Office was also involved in the rearrangement of civil service management in the 1980s, with the Management and Personnel Office added to the office in 1983, morphing into the Office of the Minister for the Civil Service in 1988. Notwithstanding these changes, the 1980s were a period of relative institutional stasis in the UK Cabinet Office; neither proliferation nor specialization of units is especially evident. Institutional change was largely limited to administrative change in the service of broader civil service reform. The organization of the Cabinet Office in 1991, at the end of Thatcher's prime ministership and the beginning of John Major's tenure, is shown in figure 8.1, below. This demonstrates that the predominant function of the office was public administration and reform. Other than the Women's National Commission, which was an external organization to which the Cabinet Office provided support, all of the office's units serve administrative and civil service functions.

The Major prime ministership (1990-1997) was a continuation of Thatcher's in focus. It emphasized broader civil service reform and exhibited a relative absence of

interest in increasing the institutional complexity of the Cabinet Office itself. Most of the structural changes in the Cabinet Office during this time involved reorganization of civil service management functions and the creation of units dedicated to efficiency-seeking reform in public service delivery. One such change was the Citizen's Charter Unit in 1992. The Citizen's Charter was meant to be a signature prime ministerial initiative aimed at generating a more efficient and responsive public service, through the establishment of customized service guidelines in all public service agencies (Pollitt 1994, 9). The unit was charged with approving each agency's "charter".

Figure 8.1
*Organizational Structure of UK Cabinet Office, 1991*




Source: Government Expenditure Plan, 1991-92 to 1993-94. "Cabinet Office, Privy Council Office, and Parliament". 1991.

In 1993, the Office of the Minister for the Civil Service became the Office of Public Service and Science (OPSS). The OPSS, in addition to its machinery of

government, appointments, management, and administrative units, also housed an Office of Science and Technology (OST). Although a Chief Scientific Advisor in the Cabinet Office had existed since the 1970s, the new office was institutionally robust, with its own secretariats and internal structure. Outside of the policy coordination functions of the subunits in the Cabinet Secretariat, this change marks an increasing role for the Cabinet Office in overseeing substantive policy areas. In 1996, however, another restructuring of the civil service management structure resulted in the disbandment of the OST and a slate of new units within the renamed Office of Public Service.[123]

The secretariats within the Cabinet Office structure included the Overseas and Defence, Economic and Domestic, Telecommunications, and European Secretariats, and the Joint Intelligence Organisation. All but the telecommunications unit existed in the mid to late 1970s (Seldon 1990, 107). Thus, the subsequent two decades saw minimal proliferation of policy-specific units, nor further specialization of secretariats. The overarching thrust of institutional change in the Cabinet Office during the 1980s and 1990s, under Margaret Thatcher and John Major, was a focus on civil service reform and finding the optimal role for the office in driving such reform. This preoccupation with reforming Whitehall continued in subsequent Labour prime ministerships. However, it is overshadowed by a dramatic shift in both structures and norms concerning the Cabinet Office's role in making and implementing substantive public policy change.

Tony Blair's prime ministership (1997-2007) marks a clear turning point in the institutional apparatus of the Cabinet Office, the core executive, and the underlying philosophy of political leadership and the role of the centre, so much so that it constitutes

[123] The Competitiveness and Information Divisions, a Deregulation Unit, and an Efficiency and Effectiveness Group.

a paradigmatic example of institutional 'conversion'. The intention was explicit. Blair stated even before becoming prime minister that a Labour government would "govern from the centre". Labour leaders saw the Conservative pursuit of deregulation, decentralization, and agencification as significantly undermining government's ability to pursue directed, strategic, and coordinated policy change (House of Lords 2010, 64).

Blair's desire to strengthen the capacity of the centre to drive policy change was not immediately implemented, however. It required both time in office and the establishment of the underlying ideational arguments. In particular, the new Labour government published two reports explicating the broad approach and introducing concepts such as "joined-up government" and "cross-cutting" policies, meant to evoke the idea that policy needed to be considered more strategically and coherently.[124] In Blair's first year as prime minister, unit change in the Cabinet Office was not dramatic, although still notable. A new secretariat, the Constitution Secretariat, was established to provide advice and support for the devolution processes in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The Social Exclusion Unit, focusing on the issue of anti-social behaviour, was also formed, the first of a number of formally recognized "cross-cutting issues" units set up in the Cabinet Office throughout Blair's tenure.

Changes in the institutional complexity of the Cabinet Office continued more robustly in the remainder of Blair's first term, to 2001. A snapshot of the office's organizational structure is provided in figure 8.2, which shows the Cabinet Office in the 1999-2000 year. The figure illustrates the dramatic changes in complexity that Blair instigated in his first term (as well as the byzantine reporting relationships among units).

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[124] These reports are Modernising Government (1999) and Wiring it Up: Whitehall's Management of Cross-Cutting Policies and Services (2000).

Figure 8.2
*Organizational Structure of the UK Cabinet Office, 2000*




*Source:* Government's Expenditure Plans 2000-01 to 2001-02.

These changes demonstrate growth in institutional complexity both in the types of units created and in the sheer number of units. In terms of administrative units, further change to the role of the Cabinet Office in civil service management was directly motivated by Blair's policy reform agenda and the perception of a lack of strategic competence in the bureaucracy (Haddon 2012, 8). This manifested itself in three ways.

First, the Office of Public Service was merged into the Cabinet Office, bringing civil service management more directly within the ambit of the prime minister, as minister for the civil service, and senior Cabinet Office officials. Second, the Centre for Management and Policy Studies was established as an in-house "think tank" to increase the strategic capacity of the civil service. Third, a number of new coordination and implementation mechanisms were introduced. The Performance and Innovation Unit, set up in 1999, had a mandate "to improve the capacity of Government to address strategic, cross-cutting issues and promote innovation in the development of policy and in the delivery of the Government's objectives" (Cabinet Office 2001, 32); it became the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit in 2003. New and established units dedicated to public service delivery were collected into an eponymous group.[125] These changes, while focused on civil service administration and management, are clearly in service of policy implementation and coordination, and thus indicate an important shift in the office's institutional complexity.

Figure 8.2 also demonstrates significant expansion in policy-specific units within the Cabinet Office during Blair's first term, particularly in areas of social policy and security. In 1999, two new social policy units, the UK Anti-Drugs Co-ordinating Unit and the Women's Unit, were created, adding to the Social Exclusion Unit established earlier. The Joint Intelligence Organisation, the Cabinet Office's intelligence agency, was bolstered in 2000 by a Co-ordination Unit and in 2001 by a Drugs Unit. The Cabinet Office also saw significant growth in terms of communications units and focus on digital technology. A new overarching Cabinet Office group, the Government Information and

[125] These included the Better Regulation Unit, the Better Government Team, the Service First Unit, the Regulatory Impact Unit, and the Modernising Public Services Group and Secretariat.

Communications Service, was established in 1999. This group included a Media Monitoring Unit, in 2000 a formal secretariat, and in 2001, a News Co-ordination Centre. The drive to digitize government services and information was also co-ordinated in the Cabinet Office, through a New Media Unit and the Office of the E-Envoy, which became the E-Government Unit in 2004.

Thus, Prime Minister Blair's first term was a period of significant growth in the institutional complexity of the Cabinet Office. Although he continued the push for civil service reform, the focus was on modernization, equity and responsiveness rather than efficiency and deregulation. The modernization agenda was intended to improve Whitehall's strategic coherence and policy implementation capacities and was driven by units at the centre of government, especially in the Cabinet Office. Implementation and strategy units were created, and specialized policy and communications units were established. This shift in the types of units constitutes a signal disruption in the Cabinet Office's basic institutional orientation, a conversion of the office from a predominantly administrative, inward-looking organization to a policy-oriented, activist, and outward-looking one.

This focus on reorienting the Cabinet Office to drive strategic policy-making and policy implementation continued into Blair's second term. While Blair's first term introduced many new, specialized units into the prime ministerial branch, his second term is characterized as much by the reconfiguration of existing structures as by the creation of entirely new units. Administratively, the ongoing task of public service modernization was centralized in the Office of Public Services Reform. On the strategy and policy implementation front, a new Strategy Unit was created in 2002 as a merger of existing

units.[126] Modernization driven from the centre was also evident in the establishment of a Government Communication unit, the Office of Public Sector Information, and the E-Government Unit. These units served two purposes: to modernize the interfaces between the public service and the public, and to ensure a whole-of-government strategic approach to government communication. This emphasis on how government relates to the public is also reflected in the establishment of the Office of the Third Sector in 2006, which aimed to foster civil society efforts and encourage social enterprise (renamed the Office for Civil Society in 2010).

The most consequential of the new units in this period, however, is the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU), an implementation unit. The establishment of the PMDU in 2002 reflected a perception that Blair's first term had made significant social policy changes legislatively, but had not seen desired results "on the ground" (Richards and Smith 2006, 333). The PMDU institutionalized the emphasis on measurable outcomes, setting targets, and accountability for results, ideas that had precursors in the efficiency exercises of the 1980s but which reached its zenith here. The institutionalization of centralized control over policy implementation represented by the PMDU has been adapted in other Westminster countries and subnational jurisdictions, as Lindquist (2006) shows.[127]

Rearrangement in the policy-specific functions of the Cabinet Office continued on a number of fronts. As in other cases, the post-9/11 context provided an impetus to

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[126] The Performance and Innovation Unit and the Prime Minister's Forward Strategy Unit within the Prime Minister's Office.

[127] As we will see, Australia's DPMC began strengthening its implementation capacity with the Cabinet Implementation Unit in 2003 and the building of the Strategy & Delivery Division under the subsequent Rudd and Gillard governments. The Australian states of Queensland and New South Wales and the Canadian province of Ontario have also adapted the model originated by the PMDU.[127]

strengthen the capacity to coordinate national security policy and decision-making at the centre. This took the form of additional Intelligence & Security and Civil Contingencies Secretariats. On the social policy front, the Women's Unit became the Women and Equality Unit. Two other units provided support for policy coordination: a Regional Co-ordination Unit and a Central Policy Group, attached to the Deputy Prime Minister's Office (Cabinet Office Departmental Report 2002, 14).

However, soon after these policy units were established, a further rearrangement transferred many of these units to other departments: the Deputy Prime Minister's Office was made a separate department and the units dealing with women and equality were transferred to Trade and Industry. These kinds of rearrangements are a core feature of Blair's second term. Arguably, they demonstrate a lack of institutional coherence, attesting to a prime minister who wanted transformative institutional change but struggled against the normative context of changing roles in the centre of government and a lack of clarity in implementation. Despite the constant innovation and restructuring within the Cabinet Office during Blair's first two terms, Helms' (2005) argument that it is "difficult to identify a clear direction of institutional reform" is essentially correct (69). Nonetheless, Blair can be credited with creating the institutional precedents and normative bases for much of the subsequent argument for centre-driven approaches to strategic policymaking and implementation; its reflections are evident cross-nationally. Thus, the Blair 'revolution' in the centre of government is clearly a case of institutional conversion. The Cabinet Office in 2003, at the height of institutional change, was a much larger, more specialized organization than it had been just five years prior, and it became the "prime minister's department" in all but name. This transformation in institutional

norms was permanent, though Blair's enthusiasm for change declined as foreign policy struggles mounted.

Blair's successor, Gordon Brown, did not pursue centralization or civil service reform with the ardour of his predecessor. His prime ministership (2007-10) was dominated by the response to the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the uncertainty of the government's electoral prospects.[128] To the extent that changes in the Cabinet Office took place, the most notable are the establishment of the National Economic Council and a taskforce to tackle the issue of social exclusion (National Audit Office 2009, 8-9). The first was a cabinet committee that served as an 'economic war council' in direct response to the financial crisis in 2008, with a secretariat housed in the Cabinet Office. Both of these units were ad-hoc and limited in nature, responses to pressing policy problems rather than decided efforts to grow the institutional complexity of the Cabinet Office. Brown also transferred the Delivery Unit to the Treasury because he thought it too closely associated with Blair's prime ministership; without proximity to the prime minister, it was weakened considerably (Harris and Rutter 2014, 65). Overall, much like his prime ministerial tenure more generally, Brown's use of the institutional resources at his disposal was relatively unsuccessful and lacked a coherent sense of direction.

Brown's successor, David Cameron, was a more active institutional engineer, but the coalition government of his first prime ministerial term was a period of restructuring and consolidation rather than growth per se in the Cabinet Office's institutional complexity. Cameron's initial goal was to 'undo' much of the perceived centralization of

[128] Arguably, Brown also had a less sure-footed and more mercurial prime ministerial leadership style that militated against active institutional change. Observers, opponents, and some colleagues viewed Brown as an indecisive micromanager who, having spent ten years trying to replace Blair, did not have a clear vision of what to do with power once achieved (for a lucid account of Brown's leadership style and personality, see Rawnsley 2010, 520-527).

power in the core executive that Blair instigated, attesting to Blick and Jones' (2010) notion of 'zigzag' – the idea that change in prime ministers tends to encourage reversions of operational tendencies (121). An important factor in this shift was necessity: the coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats meant a greater formal role for the deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, leader of the junior coalition partner. To this end, the Deputy Prime Minister's Office was re-established as a unit of the Cabinet Office in 2010, with significant responsibilities for constitutional issues and a range of responsibilities in other policy areas (see Harris and Rutter 2014, 26).

Additionally, the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit, having been moved to the Treasury under Gordon Brown, was completely disbanded. Cameron also responded to the perception of an overly powerful Cabinet Secretary by splitting its functions among three officials.[129] However, many of these decisions were short-lived, suggesting that political goals had to succumb to exigencies of governance. Cameron re-created the PMDU in the form of an Implementation Unit in the Cabinet Office in 2012, and the positions of Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service were quickly recombined. The organizational structure of the Cabinet Office at the height of Cameron's prime ministership, in 2013-14, is shown in figure 8.3, below.

[129] The Cabinet Secretary's duties were split between the Cabinet Secretary, a Head of the Civil Service, and the Permanent Secretary of the Cabinet Office. Thus, the Cabinet Secretary's responsibilities for the day-to-day management of the Cabinet Office and the civil service were reduced.

Figure 8.3
*Organizational Structure of UK Cabinet Office, 2014*




Figure 8.3 shows three other areas of notable restructuring under Cameron. First, the security coordination capacity of the Cabinet Office was strengthened through the establishment of the National Security Secretariat, which collected much of the national security apparatus within the Cabinet Office unit. Second, several units were grouped under the banner of Government Innovation in 2012, including units focused on Civil Society, Analysis and Insight, Open Policy Making, and Transparency. The Behavioural

Insights Team, a unit dedicated to the application of "behavioural science" to public policy, is also a part of this group.[130] Third, the structure of units dealing with civil service management was streamlined in 2013: two overarching groups, Civil Service Reform and Efficiency and Reform, were created. The latter, in particular, involved reducing twenty-three separate reporting lines to four 'clusters': major projects, transformation, efficiency, and corporate. Overall, then, the Cabinet Office under David Cameron was characterized mostly by restructuring and streamlining rather than institutional growth. It did not seriously reverse or undermine the office's enhanced institutional complexity as it had grown since Blair's reforms, but it did not noticeably increase it.

8.2.3 Unit Proliferation and Specialization in the Cabinet Office

The foregoing account of changes in institutional structure within the UK Cabinet Office suggests several conclusions about the extent of unit proliferation and specialization. First, the unit proliferation trend agrees with the discontinuous pattern of institutional change observed in chapter five: abrupt, transformative change in a short period of time. Tony Blair's prime ministership, especially the first and second terms, marks a signal change in the unit structure of the office. The disruption is pronounced. During Margaret Thatcher and John Major's tenures, there was minimal proliferation. Despite some rearrangement and creation of units dedicated to civil service reform, the Cabinet Office in 1996 is essentially the same size as the office in 1979. However, Prime Minister Blair's first term saw a dramatic expansion in the size of the Cabinet Office's

[130] This unit is part of a larger movement applying behavioural economics to politics, specifically, the notion of "nudge", that people can be induced to make better choices by changing their "choice architecture", rather than by coercion or banning. This was popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2008); Cass Sunstein, a legal scholar, headed the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs under Barack Obama.

unit structure, and the beginning of his second term saw additional, if not as dramatic, expansion. Both of his successors, Gordon Brown and David Cameron, reshaped the office in small ways, but largely kept the office's footprint as it was established under Blair. So, the Cabinet Office has become significantly more institutionally complex, in terms of proliferation, since 1978, but the process has been highly discontinuous.

Specialization in the Cabinet Office follows a similar pattern of change over time. Before 1998, the office consisted of a relatively stable mix of traditional administrative units and policy-specific secretariats. Many of the policy-specific units themselves had quite broad mandates: in 1996, for example, there were "Overseas and Defence" and "Economic and Domestic" secretariats. Other types of units are minimally present; in fact, there are no implementation units and, as far as I could gather, no ad-hoc limited or communications units.[131] The Central Policy Review Staff, established in 1971, was disbanded early in Margaret Thatcher's term, and no similar advisory unit replaced it. Thus, there was very little specialization in the Cabinet Office prior to Tony Blair's first term.

Prime Minister Blair's first term constituted an ambitious reorientation in the ambit of the Cabinet Office. This reorientation was both ideational and material, demonstrated in the increasing normative acceptability of the Cabinet Office as an extension of prime ministerial authority, and its reflection in the significant build-up of more specialized units. This period witnesses increasing specialization on all fronts, as discussed in detail above. Many policy-specific units dealing with areas of prime ministerial priority were set up. An implementation unit, the Prime Minister's Delivery

[131] The Central Office of Information was an agency that produced public information campaigns. It reported to the Minister for the Cabinet Office but was somewhat at arms-length from the Cabinet Office itself.

Unit, was established. The Cabinet Office's communications apparatus, which had been minimal, became a much more robust operation, with media monitoring and 'whole-of-government' coordination of public relations more evident. The rest of Blair's prime ministership and the terms of his successors, Gordon Brown and David Cameron, do not, and could not, match the extent of institutional change that took place between 1998 and 2002. In small ways, both Brown and Cameron undertook degrees of consolidation and restructuring rather than institutional growth, but the core functional complexity of the modern Cabinet Office has been thoroughly institutionalized. Because of the innovations undertaken during Blair's prime ministership, the relatively small, administratively oriented Cabinet Office has become a sprawling, 'all-purpose' centre of government institution, with significant and specialized policy capacities and enhanced roles in driving policy coordination and implementation.

### 8.2.4 Explaining Change in Institutional Complexity in the Cabinet Office

What explains this transformative change in institutional complexity? To recall, the study posits three sets of explanations for changes in institutional complexity: increasingly assertive citizenship; economic trends; and political conditions. Under the Theory of Public Expectations, the assertive citizenship hypotheses predict that the shift towards assertive attitudes and values, and away from allegiant attitudes and values, drives increasing institutional complexity. This means that proliferation and specialization in the Cabinet Office should tend to trend along with changes in assertiveness in the British public.

The big takeaway from the narrative of complexity in the UK Cabinet Office is that the office was relatively small and undifferentiated until Prime Minister Blair

instituted a dramatic shift in its roles and responsibilities. In short, there is a "pre-Blair" Cabinet Office and a "post-Blair" Cabinet Office; the evidence gathered here confirms the scholarly consensus around the importance of Blair as an institutional innovator. This discontinuity, however, is not really reflected in the assertive citizenship trends, so it is difficult to make the case that assertive citizenship is a causal factor.

While the British public has become more assertive in the last fifty years, this shift has been more incremental than has change in institutional complexity. None of the assertive citizenship trends align with the pattern of discontinuous change observed here. Britons became significantly more assertive concurrent with and after these changes, in the early to mid-2000s, and have remained so since. Therefore, there is little to suggest that changes in assertive orientations have produced corresponding changes in the Cabinet Office's institutional complexity. While there is a parallel between the increase in assertive citizens and institutional growth during Blair's second term, it is difficult to make the case that the former caused the latter. The change in values is contemporaneous with institutional change and the latter is clearly a continuation of the innovations and reforms that marked Blair's first term.

However, arguably many of the Cabinet Office changes pursued by Blair in both his first and second terms were transparent responses to, or anticipations of, heightened public expectations of government to deliver policy change. This is evident in the mandates of units that were created during this time. Units such as Social Exclusion, the Women's Unit, the Office of the Third Sector, the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit and the PMDU, and the media relations and e-government units, speak directly to the perceptions of Blair and his government that the Cabinet Office needed to be reoriented towards

servicing an increasingly assertive public. While this is not necessarily borne out in the quantitative indicators of assertiveness, my reading of the evidence gathered above is that heightened public expectations of leaders was clearly one of the factors that drove change during Blair's prime ministership.

An alternative to the public expectations explanation looks to the significance of economic trends, namely, the rise of globalization and levels of central government activity. Globalization of the British economy has increased steadily and incrementally since the 1970s, plateauing after 2000. Thus, the stark discontinuity of the institutional complexity trend is not evident here, suggesting that globalization cannot be considered a direct, proximate cause of change. However, there is some suggestive evidence for the association between government activity and institutional complexity. In terms of trend, central government activity, that is, government social spending as a proportion of GDP, declines precipitously from 1980 to the late-1990s under Thatcher and John Major, but increases rapidly under Blair and Gordon Brown. As with assertive citizenship, this could suggest a contemporaneous effect whereby increased government spending is accompanied by new centre of government units that enable the prime minister to engage more robustly in coordination and implementation of policy. Certainly, the kinds of units that were created could also be read as directed towards these ends. The totality of the evidence suggests that a significant driver of the rapid proliferation and specialization in the Cabinet Office was the perceived need for enhanced institutional capacity in anticipation of dramatic growth in social spending.

Finally, throughout the study I consider whether political conditions have impacts on the direction of institutionalization. First, I hypothesize that there is a 'term effect' at

play. If this effect were evident, there would be systematic differences in the extent of institutional change over the duration of prime ministerial terms. Again, because of the discontinuous nature of the changes in the complexity of the Cabinet Office, it is difficult to assess the evidence. In John Major's case, his first two years, playing out the remainder of the 1987 mandate, saw no major change, but upon being re-elected, the introduction of the Citizen's Charter and the creation of the Office of Public Service and Science followed shortly thereafter. Thus, this is some evidence of a 'new government mandate' effect: the idea that new governments will want to undertake change as quickly as possible after an electoral victory.

Blair's reforms also began in earnest in the year following his election in 1997. In Blair's case, change continued throughout the first term and continued with renewed intensity after the 2001 election. While tapering off somewhat towards the end of the second term and into his third term, institutional change was a relatively consistent feature of the Blair prime ministership. Finally, Prime Minister Cameron implemented some reorganization of the Cabinet Office upon entering office and for his first two years or so. Thus, while based on only three cases, the general trend is of British prime ministers capitalizing on electoral victories to undertake restructuring of their offices in the first few years of their mandates, with noticeable declines in such efforts as the mandate goes on.

The second and third political conditions that are hypothesized to have an impact on institutional complexity are legislative support and ideology. Because the indicators of these factors are constant throughout prime ministerial terms, it is difficult to draw any broad conclusions about their effects. The radical changes that took place under Blair

occurred in the context of a huge Labour majority in Parliament, which may have eased the way for institutional change, but may have been irrelevant given Blair's clear intentions and enthusiasms about enhancing the centre of government. Thatcher's majorities resulted in minimal institutional restructuring within the Cabinet Office, while David Cameron's reorganization had much to do with the necessities of coalition government. What seems clear is that individual prime ministerial leadership style and goals override these political conditions in the British case. Change in the Cabinet Office's institutional complexity seems to be highly dependent on the idiosyncrasies of the particular prime ministers who have inhabited the British prime ministership.

As a case of institutional change, the UK Cabinet Office is almost prototypically one of conversion. The office has undergone significant institutionalization with regard to its internal unit structure, but the process has been highly discontinuous. The conversion period and the institutional entrepreneurs who generated this change are transparently evident: Tony Blair's first, and to some extent second, terms, roughly from 1998 to 2002. Before this period, the Cabinet Office remained roughly in the mould of a traditional cabinet secretariat: the changes that did take place in the 1980s and 1990s were mostly concerned with altering the office's role in civil service management. The Blair prime ministership converted the Cabinet Office into a fully formed arm of the prime ministerial branch, with a much more active role in driving policy change and implementation from the centre of government. While there had been some indications of increasing complexity before Blair's prime ministership, and the office has continued to evolve since, this turning point is clear. As discussed earlier, the normative attachment to traditional cabinet government and the power of the Whitehall model of bureaucracy has

been stronger in the United Kingdom than it has been in other Westminster systems. This may be part of the explanation for why, if institutional change happened, it was likely to look like institutional conversion in the British case. In Australia, these forces have arguably not been as salient, allowing prime ministers over time to shape the prime ministerial branch in more gradual ways. We turn now to this final Westminster case.

*8.3 Australia: The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1978-2015*

The Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) constitutes the final case of institutional complexity in prime ministerial branches. The case study examines institutional change since 1978, in particular, when the first departmental report was produced. I introduce the case by providing a historical and scholarly summary of the institution. Then, changes in the institutional complexity of the DPMC are described. The third section of this case study assesses the evidence for the hypotheses concerning public expectations, economic trends, and political conditions. Finally, I discuss the characterization of the Australian case as a process of 'periodic' institutional layering.

8.3.1 The Australian DPMC prior to 1978

In this section, I provide a brief history of the DPMC and the relevant literature. The department was established only in 1971, but it was preceded by the Prime Minister's Department (PMD), established in 1911. The PMD's role for its first thirty years, according to Mediansky and Nockles (1975, 205), was largely administrative: the small PMD staff administered the prime minister's business and acted as an intergovernmental liaison with state governments (Australia's subnational jurisdictions) and foreign governments (the British in particular). Its role is described as a "postbox" (Weller et al. 2011). However, although it had no serious policy coordination or

development functions, it was given an array of diverse, relatively specific, and often ad-hoc responsibilities.[132]

Two small but telling developments during World War II and the post-war period signalled an expanded role for the PMD in policy coordination. In 1940, the secretary of the department was first invited to attend and record minutes of cabinet meetings (Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 205). In 1950, PMD inherited an Economic Policy division from the shuttered department of Post-war Reconstruction, which gave it substantive policy capacity for the first time (Yeend 1979, 134). However, under Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1949-1966), this burgeoning role for the PMD did not develop further, attributable to the personalities of both the prime minister and his Secretary to the Cabinet, which favoured informal consultation and process rather than active policy formulation and intervention (Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 206).

A pivotal period in the early development of institutional complexity was the prime ministerships of John Gorton (1968-1971), Gough Whitlam (1972-1975), and Malcolm Fraser (1975-1983). All three prime ministers are characterized as policy activists by scholars, in contrast to Menzies. Gorton depended more on the PMD because he did not have the same level of authority over the party as his predecessor and he had a "centralist and urban orientation" which put him at odds with many in his party and in the Country party (Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 207).[133] The scope of departmental activity grew accordingly. In 1970, then, the PMD contained four substantive units: Economic,

[132] A chart summarizing the responsibilities of the PMD / DPMC since 1911 was included in the first departmental report, in 1978. This shows that in addition to its administrative and liaison functions, the PMD was responsible for such entities as a Historic Memorials Committee (1912), the Commonwealth Government Line of Steamers (1918-1927), and the Commonwealth Literary Fund (1938) (DPMC 1979, 42-43).

[133] The Country Party, now the National Party, are a small, rurally-based party that has traditionally been the junior coalition partner during Liberal governments.

External Relations and Defence, Parliamentary and Government, and Social Welfare and Education, as well as administrative and ceremonial units (209). This structure demonstrates already relatively well-developed and broad-reaching institutional capacities in the prime ministerial branch. Under Gorton, the PMD was also reconstituted as the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Prime Minister Whitlam maintained and expanded these institutional capacities. Whereas Gorton's chief difficulty was in party relations, Whitlam's was with a bureaucracy that had been under Liberal governments since 1949. Whitlam and the Labor party intended to "assail the virtual monopoly" of the bureaucracy on the policy process, restoring control to ministers (Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 210). This meant bringing in to the bureaucracy many outside experts, increasing the number and importance of political ministerial advisors, and expanding the DPMC. By 1973, the department had grown to seven substantive policy divisions in addition to its ceremonial and administrative divisions (215).[134] Subsequent additions under Whitlam, such as a Policy Coordination Unit and an Information and State Relations Division, reflect concerns that, in the scope of prime ministerial branch development, are surprisingly modern.

These trends continued under Whitlam's successor, Malcolm Fraser. Hamburger et al. (2011) argue that the DPMC, under Fraser and subsequent prime ministers, pushed further into policy initiation and development, not simply passive policy coordination. The department became a "primary policy player", actively pushing prime ministerial priorities, not just their prerogatives (380-381). Finally, Anne Tiernan (2006) argues that John Howard's prime ministership (1996-2007) saw the further development of a "large,

[134] Economic, Protection Policy, Development, Welfare, External Relations and Defence, Cabinet and Legislative Programming, and Government

active, interventionist and personalized" support system for Australian prime ministers (322).

This summary of the development of the PMD and DPMC in Australia reveals that the Australian prime ministership had already developed relatively robust institutional capacities by the 1970s, which have only continued since. The Australian prime minister, by the end of that decade, had a supporting organization in the DPMC encompassing a broad scope of policy coordination and other responsibilities. The department had also established a unique role as an "incubator" of new government activity. This refers to a process whereby new organizations and policy interventions would enter the public service as a part of the DPMC, often subsequently being hived off to other portfolios (Hamburger et al. 2011, 384; Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 204). These new entities would thus have to prove their value at the centre of government before transferring their experience outward to line departments. Finally, the robust development of the Australian DPMC suggests that norms constraining institutionalization of support for the prime minister are less salient compared to the Canadian and, especially, UK cases. This relative lack of constraint might be a partial explanation for the 'layering' pattern of institutional change that is evident in the next section, which traces unit proliferation and specialization within the Australian DPMC.

### 8.3.2 Unit Proliferation and Specialization in the DPMC

Having outlined the early development of the DPMC, this section closely describes changes in institutional complexity in the Australian department since 1979. Figure 8.4, below, provides an overview of the number of "divisions" and "branches" in

the Australian DPMC, from 1979 to 2013.[135] Divisions in the DPMC context are top-level units, headed by officials at the rank of First Assistant Secretary (FAS). Divisions themselves are usually groupings of more specialized units, called branches, typically headed by Assistant Secretaries.

Figure 8.4
*Units in the Australian DPMC, 1979-2013*




Source: Australian DPMC Annual Reports, 1978-79 to 2012-13, and organizational charts on DPMC website. Compiled by author.

In terms of proliferation, the graph suggests two distinct trends. The number of divisions has been relatively stable, with some proliferation occurring in recent years. The absolute number of divisions in the department has until recently remained relatively stable, although not constant. The average number of divisions between 1979 and 2008 is less than ten, fluctuating slightly between seven (from 2001 and 2003) and thirteen

[135] The most recent two years, 2014 and 2015, are excluded from the figure because they involve a dramatic increase in both divisions and branches in the DPMC, due to the addition of a slate of new units dealing with indigenous affairs. The number of divisions jumps from 14 in 2013 to 26 in 2014, while the number of branches jumps from 35 to 65. Including these years thus visually obscures some of the temporal variation in the rest of the period.

(during Paul Keating's tenure in the early to mid-1990s). As well, the breadth of the divisions in the DPMC has not changed significantly. In 1979, there were nine divisions, encompassing a range of administrative and policy functions.[136] Figure 8.5, below, shows this organizational structure.

Figure 8.5
*Organizational Structure of the Australian DPMC, 1979*




In 2008, three decades later, the DPMC also had nine divisions, and its structure is not markedly different.[137] There is also no consistent over-time trend: the number of divisions is greater in the first half of the 1990s, under Paul Keating's prime ministership (1991-1996) but lower under Keating's successor, John Howard. However, since 2008 there has been a marked increase in the number of divisions. Indeed, as of 2015, there are more than twenty-five identifiable divisions in the Australian DPMC. A key period of change is 2008 to 2009, when the number of divisions increases by fifty-six percent. This

[136] Parliamentary and Government, Cabinet, Operations, International, Ceremonial and Hospitality, Welfare, Economic, Resources & Development, and Trade & Industries.
[137] : Industry, Infrastructure & Environment, Economic, Social Policy, Office of Work and Family, People, Resources & Communications, Government, Cabinet, International, and the Office of National Security.

increase involved a significant proliferation of national security units and a new Strategy and Delivery division which enfolded the Cabinet Implementation Unit, previously a branch in the Cabinet division. As referenced earlier but not shown in figure 8.4, 2014 also saw a dramatic increase in the number of units in the department, almost entirely due to the addition of a plethora of new units dealing with indigenous affairs.

Turning now to the 'branch' subunits within the DPMC, proliferation is both more extensive and more variable, with a particular increase in the last decade. In the 1979 organizational structure of the Australian DPMC, per figure 8.5, there were only eighteen branches. Through the 1980s, under the Labor prime minister Bob Hawke (1983-1991) especially, proliferation is incremental but steady. By 1992, the DPMC was fifty percent larger than it was in 1979, and it stabilized in this range during John Howard's tenure. This branch proliferation involved both branches in new divisions and growth in existing divisions. A revealing example of trends was the Hawke and Keating (1991-1996) governments' creation of a plethora of "offices" in specific policy areas, such as Youth and Multicultural Affairs.[138] Existing divisions also exhibited internal branch proliferation.[139] This proliferation of more specialized branches within existing divisions is evident across the various divisions.

As per figure 8.4, the Labor governments of Kevin Rudd (2007-10) and Julia Gillard are a further period of branch proliferation, especially during Rudd's tenure. The number of branches reaches a peak of forty in 2010, a more than two-fold increase over

[138] In full: the Office of the Status of Women (1984), the Office of Youth Affairs (1986), the Office of Multicultural Affairs (1988), the Office of the Chief Scientist (1991), and the Office of Indigenous Affairs (1994).

[139] For example, the Welfare division in 1979 consisted of three branches: Community Affairs, Welfare Services, and Social Security. By 1992, the renamed Social Policy division consisted of five branches: Income Support & Community Services, Employment, Education & Culture, Social Justice, Aboriginal Reconciliation, and a branch responding to a Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.

the number of branches in 1979 and a greater than fifty percent increase since 1992. Proliferation here mostly involved adding branches within new divisions, since many branches within established divisions were 'upgraded' to divisions in their own right.[140] Finally, there has been a dramatic shift in the numbers of both divisions and branches in the DPMC in the most recent two years (which are not shown in figure 8.4). This is almost entirely because of the addition of eight new divisions under the umbrella of indigenous affairs, covering many aspects of indigenous policy, from health and safety to reconciliation to economic development. As of 2015, the DPMC consists of twenty-six divisions and sixty-five branches: in terms of absolute units, the DPMC of 2015 is roughly three times larger than it was in 1979.

Overall, the proliferation of divisions and branches between 1979 and 2013 exhibits periods of steady, incremental growth in institutional complexity, particularly with regard to branch proliferation, along with periods where growth has retreated. There has been a fair degree of incremental but noticeable layering of new and adaptive institutional functions onto the core of the department's administrative work. Since divisions are high-level units which tend to cover broad areas of activity and which in 1979 already had wide-ranging scope across the areas of government activity, it is not surprising that there has been less evident proliferation of divisions. The fact that there has been more pronounced proliferation of branches is a consequence of this initial robustness in divisions, and suggests, on the face of it, increasing differentiation and specialization. Within these broader divisions, units have become more differentiated and

[140] For example, the Social Policy division of 2010 has been reduced to three branches - Health Programs, Health Systems & Governance, and Indigenous Policy & Citizenship – but arts, culture, and work and family have been organized into their own divisions.

specialized in the work they do, and new divisions with specialized branches have consistently sprung up from within.

This implied specialization is supported in closely examining the types of units in the Australian DPMC. To recall, each prime ministerial branch unit is classified into one of six types: administrative, policy-specific, advisory, implementation, ad-hoc limited, and communications. Growth in institutional complexity is demonstrated in terms of not only proliferation of units but also increasing differentiation and specialization of units. In the case of prime ministerial branches, I argue that differentiation and specialization are particularly indicated by change over time in policy-specific, implementation, advisory, and communication types of units. To explore this question, I categorized and tallied each division and branch in the Australian DPMC from 1979 to 2015. The results of this are shown in figure 8.6, for divisions, and figure 8.7, below, for branches. Each figure shows the count over time for each type of unit.

Figure 8.6

*Types of Divisions in the Australian DPMC, 1979-2015*



Figure 8.6 demonstrates three notable patterns of unit specialization in divisions. First, the department has for the most part been constituted almost exclusively by administrative and policy-specific units. Other types of units collectively never constitute more than around twenty percent of the departmental divisions. However, administrative divisions underwent relatively little change until a decline and subsequent increase, beginning in the mid-1990s. The core Government and Cabinet Divisions remain unchanged.

Second, increasing specialization, hence complexity, has been driven by growth in policy-specific units rather than implementation or communications units. However, when the latter types have been created underlines the importance of the Labor period in government from 2007 to 2013. Implementation divisions, for instance, are not present at all until 2008, when the Strategy and Delivery Division is established; a separate Implementation Division is also created in 2012. These developments correspond to a rise in policy-specific divisions, showing that the period, particularly the first three years, is a significant period of increasing divisional specialization. Interestingly, under Gillard and her Liberal successor, Tony Abbott, there is also a dramatic rise in the use of ad-hoc limited divisions on a range of pressing policy areas, as figure 8.6 shows.[141] This use of ad-hoc limited divisions is reminiscent of the kind of 'clearing house' roles that the Prime Minister's Department had often played in its earlier history, but with a more activist, interventionist bent. The continued, robust use of such divisions by successive Australian prime ministers is an institutional innovation in the Australian core executive.

The third pattern of unit specialization in the Australian DPMC is the periodicity

[141] Specifically, three dedicated to White Papers on Northern Australia, Agriculture, and Federalism, and others on industrial competitiveness and renewable energy.

of the policy-specific trend in particular. Instead of consistent, incremental specialization, there have been distinct periods of growth and retrenchment. I identify three distinct periods of growth in institutional complexity in the trend in figure 8.6, above. First, from 1983 to the early 1990s we see increasing specialization, both in new policy divisions and in separate offices dealing with more targeted policy constituencies. The second period is from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, corresponding with John Howard's tenure. Here, the number of policy-specific divisions declines, mostly due to shuttering or consolidation of all of the special offices into subunits of other divisions, mainly Social Policy. The 2005 DPMC is noticeably more streamlined than its earlier iterations. However, this decline should not obscure one important institutional addition to the DPMC in the period: the National Security Division, assembled in 2004 from several pre-existing units. The third distinct period of specialization is the dramatic increase in policy-specific divisions after 2007, more than doubling by 2010. In part, this exhibited a return to the earlier proliferation of targeted, specialized units.[142]

Examining unit specialization in the DPMC branches reveals similar patterns of institutional change to those for divisions, discussed above. The number of branches of each type from 1979 to 2015 is shown in figure 8.7, below. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of branches in the Australian DPMC have been administrative and policy-specific units, with the latter constituting the bulk of units. Commensurate with the growth in divisions, the number of policy-specific branches increases through the 1980s, peaking in the early 1990s. After declining through the early years of the Howard prime

[142] Examples include the Office of Work & Family (2008), offices for Arts & Sport (2011), the G20 (2012), and as mentioned earlier, Indigenous Affairs (2014). There is also a bolstering of the DPMC's national security coordination role established under Howard, with the creation of separate Defence & Intelligence and Homeland & Border Security divisions, and a deputy National Security Advisor, in 2009.

ministership, the number of policy-specific branches begins to increase in the latter part of the decade and continues to do so in the 2000s, particularly after 2005.[143] As mentioned, the large spike in both administrative and policy-specific branches in 2014 is due to the creation of the Indigenous Affairs division within the DPMC, which contained a plethora of new subunits.

Figure 8.7
*Types of Branches in the Australian DPMC, 1979-2015*




Branch specialization in the Australian DPMC has occurred not only through the creation of new divisions but in specialization within established policy-specific divisions such as Social Policy and Trade & Industries. For instance, the Social Policy Division had only two branches originally: Income Security and Taxation, and Education and Employment. Subsequently, the division has housed an array of units dedicated to areas

[143] Branch data is missing from 1993 to 1997, but in 1992, the number of policy-specific branches was 20; in 1998, the number was 12.

like health, ageing, aboriginal reconciliation, immigration, and social inclusion. Another example is the Trade & Industries division consisting of, fittingly, a Trade branch and an Industries branch. In the late 1980s, units dealing with infrastructure and transport emerged, while resource management, water policy, and climate change and energy policy emerged as policy coordination priorities in the 2000s. While some of the individual branches have been short-lived, this general pattern of branch specialization is evident within all of the longstanding DPMC policy divisions.

Overall, then, these indicators of unit proliferation and specialization suggest that the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has become more institutionally complex since 1978. This is so even considering that the DPMC had already developed a relatively complex internal structure. In terms of proliferation of units, the number of divisions has increased, though not dramatically, while the increase in the number of branches within these divisions has been more marked. This suggests a degree of specialization within divisions, which was indeed found in examining changes in the types of units within the DPMC. The number of divisions and branches dedicated to specialized areas of public policy has grown, although not linearly but in distinct periods. Having examined the extent of change in institutional complexity in the Australian DPMC, I turn now to the potential explanations for the observed change.

### 8.3.3 Explanations for Change in Institutional Complexity

The foregoing discussion shows that the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has incrementally become more institutionally complex since the late 1970s; the contemporary DPMC houses a structure of robust and wide-ranging units. In this section, I assess the validity of several hypotheses about the drivers of this change, which

are explained fully in chapter three. The first set of hypotheses derives from my primary theory of institutional change, the Theory of Public Expectations. The expectation is that we observe a correspondence between periods of higher assertive citizenship and periods of growth in complexity; that is, periods in which units proliferate and become more specialized.

Overall, the claim that assertiveness is associated with change in institutional complexity is reasonably well supported. In figure 8.8, below, I plot the unit proliferation measures over time, relative to a base year of 1979, along with an aggregated measure of assertiveness (the average of the three measures).[144] This demonstrates that the branch proliferation trend tracks assertiveness over time quite well, not only in general direction of change but in the correspondence of particular periods in which change is most prominent. The correspondence between division proliferation and assertiveness is less evident.

Figure 8.8
*DPMC Units and Assertiveness, Australia, 1979-2013*




[144] In more detail: the assertiveness measure is the average of political interest, the assertive index, and party identification, the latter reversed because in the original measure negative values of party ID (i.e., weaker party identification) indicate greater assertiveness.

The correspondence between the assertiveness trend and branches trend is pronounced. The proliferation of branches in the first Hawke government (1983-1987) is mirrored in a rise in assertiveness through the 1980s, and the proliferation of branches in the 2000s is accompanied by an attendant increase in assertiveness. Aside from the fact that assertiveness is somewhat more volatile, the two trends mirror each other very closely. Moreover, the branch trend seems, at important points, to follow rather than lag behind the assertiveness trend. This is evident, in particular, in the period of increasing branch proliferation from the mid-2000s forward. Disregarding the temporal dimension for a moment, the bivariate correlation between the trends is also very high. The branch-assertiveness correlation is 0.57, where zero indicates no association between variables and one, perfect association. The very close correspondence of these trends is strong evidence that the two trends are associated. At both short and long time scales, the relationship between assertive citizenship orientations and one measure of institutional complexity, proliferation, is demonstrable.

Earlier, I identified three distinct periods of institutional specialization in the Australian DPMC. From 1983 to the early 1990s, there was significant growth in the number of policy-specific units within the institution. Assertiveness during this period broadly increases as well, although not consistently: it declines slightly in the middle of the period before increasing again. Subsequently, from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, corresponding with the bulk of John Howard's tenure, there was both consolidation and disbandment of many of the social policy units set up by earlier Labor governments. In this decade, public assertiveness declines and then remains low. It begins to increase again after the mid-2000s, and especially after 2007, which parallels the third period of

specialization. Since 2007, the DPMC has undertaken renewed specialization both in policy units and in units focused on strategy and implementation. Thus, the existence of a relationship between assertiveness and unit specialization is indicated.

While the individual disaggregated indicators of assertive citizenship do not track changes in the institutional complexity of the Australian DPMC closely, both political interest and the Assertive Index are broadly in line with the complexity trend. Political interest in Australia increases throughout the 1980s until the mid-1990s, then plateaus, increasing somewhat in the mid-2000s. According to the Assertive Index, Australians were more assertive in the mid-1980s than they were in 1990; assertiveness begins to increase consistently from the early-1990s to 2010. Broadly speaking, this pattern of change over time is what the division and branch trends also show. Indeed, the linear association between political interest and the proliferation measure, and between the assertive values generally and proliferation, is relatively strong and statistically significant. The correlations between political interest and the division and branch counts are 0.42 ($p = 0.01$) and 0.60 ($p = 0.00$), respectively, and for the Assertive Index, 0.42 ($p = 0.01$) and 0.63 ($p = 0.00$). If there were no correlation, the values would be nearer to zero, as they are with party identification, and the p-values would be larger.[145] Again, this is suggestive, if not dispositive, evidence for the Public Expectations hypotheses.

Thus, the hypotheses relating assertiveness to institutional complexity receive broad, consistent support in the Australian case. Considered over the whole time period, the Australian DPMC has become increasingly institutionally complex at the same time as Australians have become more politically interested, less tied to parties, and more

[145] For party identification, the Pearson's R values are 0.19 ($p = 0.25$) for divisions and -0.14 ($p = 0.44$) for branches.

assertive in their values and attitudes. As well, although the assertiveness and institutionalization trends do not precisely align, contemporaneously they move in similar directions; in fact, changes in assertiveness precede institutional change at many crucial points. Therefore, I argue that the hypothesized relationship clearly is supported in this case.

As alternative explanations of change in the institutional complexity of prime ministerial branches, the impact of economic trends, specifically the rise of globalization and changes in the size of government activity, and short-term political conditions, are examined. In terms of economic trends, I hypothesize that when the level of globalization and the level of government activity are higher relative to other periods, institutional complexity in prime ministerial branches will increase. However, compared to growth in DPMC units, especially in branches, both the overall level of globalization and overall government activity have changed little in the relevant period. Australia's most recent score on the globalization index, for 2014, is twenty percent higher than in 1979, versus an increase of 94 percent in the number of branch-level units. Government activity is only seventeen percent higher in 2012 (the most recent data point) than in 1979. Both of these measures increase consistently over time, but very slowly and incrementally, and both peak around 2000. Thus, it does not appear that the economic trends correspond to changes in institutional complexity, either overall or with reference to specific periods of institutionalization.

As well, I examine the extent to which short-term political conditions play a role in change in institutional complexity in the Australian DPMC. It is quite plain in the above discussion that political factors play a crucial role in determining the extent of

change. Changes in government consistently delineate periods of change in unit proliferation and specialization. The two periods of Labor government, from 1983 to 1996 under Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating and from 2007 to 2013 under Rudd and Gillard, were periods of growth in the DPMC, with new units being created, the institutional scope broadened, and the unit structure more specialized. The Howard government from 1996 to 2007 and the partial evidence from the earlier Fraser government to 1983 demonstrate that, under Liberal government, institutional change has been low, characterized more by consolidation and retrenchment than by growth and innovation. Although only a partial term, the Abbott prime ministership of 2013-2015 followed the same pattern. Thus, the hypothesis that party and ideology of Australian prime ministers has an impact on change in institutional complexity is supported.

Another political condition that I hypothesize to have an impact is legislative support. The hypothesis is that the greater legislative support a prime minister has, the more likely institutional complexity is to increase. The only minority government in Australia since 1979 was the 2010-2013 Julia Gillard term (Labor held 48 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives). Moreover, the variation in majority government seat share is quite narrow, ranging from 53 percent to 63 percent; thus, whatever impact legislative support has, its real-world import is perhaps not that large. The evidence indicates that this is true. The association between legislative support and change in institutional complexity is absent. Prime ministers with a greater proportion of seat share do not appear to be more likely to increase the complexity of their offices than those with less legislative support.

Finally, I examine whether there is a "term effect" on institutional complexity. This is the idea that there is a systematic effect of time itself during prime ministerial terms: that change is more likely at the beginning of terms than at the end of terms, or vice versa. There is no evidence for a simple term year effect in the Australian case, at least in terms of proliferation of units. Comparing average change by year demonstrates that there is no clear linear trend but that the final years of prime ministerial terms do seem to show a marked increase in unit proliferation. However, a statistical test for the significance of differences in means across groups, ANOVA, does not find that the difference between years is significant. Thus, while there is some descriptive evidence to suggest an effect, there is no statistical support.

In this section, I examined the veracity of hypotheses relating various explanatory factors to unit proliferation and specialization, i.e., institutional complexity. I found that the assertiveness measures were quite clearly associated with changes in institutional complexity, both on average and for individual indicators of political interest and assertive values. The evidence suggests both broad over time parallels – the long-term trends in assertiveness and institutional complexity track each other closely – and correspondence of particular periods where complexity is specifically increasing or decreasing. Notwithstanding the obvious concern that "correlation is not causation", I argue that there is a good case for the assertiveness hypotheses in relation to institutional complexity, at least as far as associations between the trends.

In terms of alternative explanations, there was far less evidence to substantiate the hypotheses about economic trends in globalization and government activity. None of these trends appeared to co-vary with changes in institutional complexity over time to a

significant degree. However, the impact of party as a political condition is clearly manifest. The story of change in the Australian DPMC's internal organizational structure since 1978 is in large part tied to changes in government. Under Labor prime ministers, proliferation and unit specialization are much more evident than under Liberal prime ministers. Given the small sample size, this is only a tentative claim, but the connection between which party governs and when institutional change occurs is quite striking in the Australian case.

### 8.3.4 Institutional Complexity and Change in the Australian DPMC

How does this case study of institutional complexity in the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet fit into our broader investigation of institutional change? As has been suggested throughout, I argue that the Australian case exhibits a "layering" mode of incremental change. Compared to the other case study in this chapter, the UK's Cabinet Office, the structure of the Australian DPMC has been relatively continuous, and it has undergone a high degree of institutionalization. The unit structure of the Australian DPMC is arguably the most robust and wide-ranging of the four cases. However, when compared to the institutional layering we examined in the Canadian case, the process in the Australian DPMC has, in my view, been more distinctly periodic in nature. To a greater degree than in the Privy Council Office case, one can clearly identify periods of intense layering, where many new institutional roles and functions were added to existing ones, along with periods of relative stasis and consolidation. Overall, then, I characterize the Australian case as a case of "periodic layering": incremental institutionalization that occurs mostly within distinct periods, rather than gradually and consistently over longer periods.

*8.4 Discussion and Conclusion*

This chapter elucidated two case studies of institutional complexity in prime ministerial branches, the United Kingdom Cabinet Office and Australia's Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. I characterized and explained patterns of change, examining both proliferation of organizational units and differentiation and specialization in the types of units created. In addition to revealing how the structures of these institutions have changed in recent decades, I assessed evidence for the study's theories about prime ministerial branch institutionalization.

I found that the Cabinet Office is a paradigmatic case of institutional 'conversion'. Under Prime Minister Blair, the Cabinet Office increased in complexity dramatically and abruptly. It was converted from a relatively small, administratively oriented organization into a sprawling policy oversight, coordination, and implementation centre. Its focus also changed to serve more explicitly and more clearly prime ministerial priorities. By contrast, the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is a case of institutional layering. This process of change, however, has not been consistent and gradual across time but has mostly occurred in periods of intense, sustained change, such as under the Hawke government (1983-1991) and the Rudd and Gillard governments (2007-2013).

The chapter also suggests several conclusions about the causes of change in the institutional complexity of the prime ministerial branches. First, in both case studies there was some evidence for the hypothesis that assertive citizenship and institutional complexity are associated. In Australia, the trends generally were observed to co-vary over time and in specific periods where institutionalization was most pronounced, while

in the UK, the qualitative character of the units created under Tony Blair, especially, testify to a concern with responding to public expectations. Contrastingly, there was minimal evidence that the economic trends of globalization and government activity are related to change in institutional complexity. There is some evidence that suggests that ideology matters to institutional change, particularly in Australia. Finally, in both cases, I consider the 'null hypothesis' to have a great deal of validity with regard to institutional complexity. In every case study, the idiosyncratic leadership styles, goals, and skills of individual prime ministers seem to have a determinative effect on whether they choose to engage in institution building.

The value of the preceding case studies is in explicating a certain dimension of institutional change, institutional complexity, over time. This analysis complements the austere quantitative analysis in chapters five and six by providing a more grounded, detailed picture of the prime ministerial branches in these countries, and by offering an alternative approach with which to 'triangulate' the study's overall conclusions. The preceding discussion of institutional complexity in the prime ministerial branches concludes the empirical portion of the study. In the following concluding chapter, I take account of the study as a whole, summarize its findings, and reiterate its contributions.

# PART THREE: CONCLUSION

# Chapter 9
# Public Expectations and Institutional Change in the Prime Ministerial Branches

It is a feature of modern politics that nothing gets done if not driven from the top. This was never popular with the traditionalists. There was a lot of talk of centralising government; wanting to be a president; overweening (even manic) desire to have absolute power. It was complete tosh, of course. The fact was you couldn't get the job done unless there were clear procedures and mechanisms in place to implement the programme.

Tony Blair (2010, 337-38)

This study began with the purpose of empirically assessing Prime Minister Blair's claim: that modern prime ministerial leadership, driven by modern politics, requires centralization of power. Have prime ministers sought to centralize power in the prime ministerial branches? How have these institutions changed to serve prime ministers in 'getting the job done'? And what is it about modern politics that drives these changes? In addressing these questions, the study offers an innovative, systematic comparative analysis of institutional change in the prime ministerial branches of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. This concluding chapter takes stock of what we have learned. It summarizes the study's approach and findings, and discusses its contributions and limits. The last part of the chapter suggests directions for future research.

## *9.1 Summary of the Study*

After introducing the study's main themes and questions in chapter one, chapter two described the study's historical, institutional, and scholarly context. First, I summarized the historical development of the Westminster prime ministership. Here I argued that at many key points in its evolution the prime ministership has become more powerful precisely because of democratizing processes. I then elaborated the central roles that prime ministers play in Westminster systems and, more broadly, in modern politics.

These roles have only become more significant as prime ministers have seemingly become "presidentialized" in many parliamentary democracies. Finally, I described the literature on sociocultural change within the assertive citizenship framework, since it plays a central role in the study's primary theory of institutional change. The thesis of this framework is that there has been a shift, evident worldwide, from predominantly "allegiant" values, beliefs, and expectations to a more "assertive" set of public values and attitudes.

Chapters three and four built on chapter two's context-setting to explicate the theoretical approach of the study and the substantive empirical theories of institutional change. I situate the study within historical institutionalism. It is predicated on the assumption that institutions are central to understanding prime ministerial power and it emphasizes processes of change over time in the Westminster prime ministerships. It also adapts a typology of institutional change proposed by Streeck and Thelen (2005), which suggests four ways in which institutions can change because of gradual processes: displacement, drift, layering, and conversion. In addition to these patterns of change, I introduced and explicated a theory about what drives institutional change in the real world: the Theory of Public Expectations. This theory locates the source of institutional change in changes within the political cultures of democracies. The theory is rooted in the idea that citizen orientations in advanced democracies have gradually shifted from materialist to postmaterialist concerns (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) and from predominantly "allegiant" to predominantly "assertive" attitudes towards politics and politicians (Dalton and Welzel 2014). These changes have the consequence of incentivizing prime ministers to institutionalize their offices.

Chapter four described the overall research design and methodological choices and how they serve the purpose of theory testing. I reviewed the literature with regard to methodology in order to show that an opportunity exists for more rigorous, systematic work in the study of prime ministerships. I then articulated the overall causal model of prime ministerial branch institutionalization. The model depicts the outcome of institutionalization as dependent on a combination of changes over time in political culture and economic trends and periodic changes in political conditions. I also described the overall structure of the study's parallel mixed methods design and its usefulness in testing the causal model. After discussing case selection, I identified certain limitations that the research design imposes on the study.

The second part of this study, chapters five through eight, constitutes the empirical analysis of the theories discussed earlier. It utilized a variety of quantitative and qualitative tools to test hypotheses derived from these theories. In chapters five and six, I examined two indicators of institutional autonomy of the prime ministerial branches: budget resources in chapter five and staff resources in chapter six. These chapters employed primarily quantitative methodology, including descriptive statistics and regression techniques for time series data. In chapters seven and eight, I traced change over time in the internal structures of the prime ministerial branches, conceived as a measure of institutional complexity. The chapters analyzed data on the number and types of organizational units within the branches in a series of short case studies of each country. These investigations produced a plethora of findings, many surprising and unexpected. The next two sections provide summary assessments of what these chapters

found: first, in terms of empirical theory, and second, in terms of observed patterns of institutional change.

*9.2 Theoretical Assessment*

An important goal of this study was to articulate and empirically assess a theory of institutional change in prime ministerial branches, namely, the Theory of Public Expectations. The theory represents an original effort to connect changes in political culture and citizen orientations to institutional change. In doing so, it addresses significant gaps in both the behavioural and institutional literatures. In political behaviour research, there is a relative lack of theory and analysis about how public values and attitudes cause change in political institutions.[146] Conversely, in the institutional literature, behavioural change is not generally emphasized in theory building, which instead emphasizes specific actors, interests, and interactions among them. Where it does identify sociocultural change as important, it is associated more with institutional creation and stability than change. In short, the Theory of Public Expectations is both an institutional theory and a theory of political behaviour, in some sense, and thus bridges two approaches to understanding politics that have been relatively disconnected.

To summarize the theory briefly, it begins with the baseline assertion of a shift in values and attitudes among democratic citizens, from "allegiant" to "assertive" orientations. Allegiant citizens were traditionalist, materialist, deferential to authority, satisfied democrats; assertive citizens are secular, post-materialist, critical of and antagonistic to authority, dissatisfied with democratic performance. As citizens become more assertive, they have higher expectations of government performance while

[146] This is particularly true with regard to incremental change over time, rather than abrupt institutional restructuring. As well, political culture and values are most often associated with explanations for stable, enduring patterns of institutional interaction rather than change.

expecting political power to be dispersed more broadly. This generates a basic tension: governments are increasingly accountable and responsible for more and more, but are not trusted with the tools or political space to deliver. To use Schumpeter's phrase, it is difficult for political leaders to get anything done when the public is constantly "knocking at the door". To resolve this tension, some power will have to be delegated to actors who have the legitimacy to claim it, and who are most burdened with heightened public expectations. The theory claims that these actors are generally prime ministers in parliamentary democracies.[147] If prime ministers are rational actors, as I argue they should be, they should respond to these incentives. One such response is to accrue institutional capacity within their offices, the better with which to manage, coordinate, and drive policy change.

Overall, the Theory of Public Expectations was most often supported where theoretical assumptions about how the key variables changed over time were met. Where gradual centralization of power is evident in the institutional resources and structures of the prime ministerial branches, it is often driven by an increasingly assertive public, on some measure. Where such centralization is not evident or is more erratic than expected a priori, the theory does not produce significant results. For example, one of the most startling results just in the raw data is that Canada is the only case of a prime ministerial branch showing a gradual over-time increase in both budget and staff resources. Equally surprising was the lack of institutional growth in the New Zealand prime ministerial branch. In Canada, centralization of power is evident; in New Zealand, it is not. Correspondingly, the Theory of Public Expectations fits the first case very well, while its

[147] I would argue that the theory is as applicable in presidential democracies, notwithstanding the structural constitutional differences. As discussed in chapter three, an important theoretical source for the Theory of Public Expectations is Theodore Lowi's diagnosis of the "plebiscitary presidency" in the United States.

application to the second case is less appropriate. This lack of theoretical congruence with empirical observation is, in the end, not all that surprising. It is worth appreciating that the theory crafts an entirely new framework for conceptualizing, measuring, and assessing institutional change in prime ministerships, and thus inherently is much more uncertain and challenging than a theory making an incremental contribution to well-established arguments.

This pattern also emerges in the case studies of institutional complexity in chapters seven and eight. Unlike in its budget and staff resources, the Canadian Privy Council Office has not undergone a sustained, incremental process of institutional specialization. Its basic organizational structure has not undergone significant transformation towards being more policy and implementation oriented, although this has evidently started to change somewhat under the current prime minister, Justin Trudeau. In New Zealand, again we see little evidence of centralization in the form of growing robustness in prime ministerial branch structure. Thus, in both cases, to differing extents, the basic assumptions about institutional change of the Theory of Public Expectations are not satisfied.

By contrast, both case studies in chapter eight, of the United Kingdom and Australian prime ministerial branches, generally support the theory because they both exhibit a much greater degree of internal structural remaking and transformation, which is crucial to the theory. In the case of the UK Cabinet Office, much of the apparatus built during Prime Minister Blair's first and second terms, a critical period in the office's development, was responsive to heightened public expectations of leaders and government. In Australia, the periodic increases in institutional complexity of the

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet tracked quite closely with changes in assertive citizenship, both over long and shorter time periods. Overall, then, in the cases where the prime ministerial branches have become comparably more internally complex, the association of change with assertive shifts is discernible.

In conclusion, then, the Theory of Public Expectations succeeds best when centralization of power through institution-building in the prime ministerial branch is observed. It clearly does not succeed everywhere in these cases; as acknowledged earlier, the theory's exploratory nature and a priori selection of cases accounts for some of this lack of fit between theory and empirics. However, that it does not succeed everywhere is an important finding in itself, because it shows that the steadily creeping centralization of power in centres of government is not, in fact, a consistent, universal phenomenon across all parliamentary democracies. Even within this subset called the Westminster systems, the extent of centralization in prime ministerial branches varies markedly across cases and over time. Empirical assessment of the Theory of Public Expectations also suggests that the effects of modern politics on prime ministerial leadership and power are not, contra Prime Minister Blair's claims and my own preconceptions, pervasive and uniform. In fact, there is a great deal of contingency and space for actor's agency in the story, in addition to the broader macro-level processes of cultural and institutional change.

In my view, then, the study's articulation and assessment of the Theory of Public Expectations successfully and compellingly synthesizes two opposing views of what the modern prime ministership represents. On the one hand, the modern prime ministership is seen as a transformational break from the past. Advocates of the centralization and presidentialization arguments see the modern office as fundamentally different from that

of earlier periods. The alternative view sees the modern prime ministership as being in a contingent phase, gradually established and reversible, subject to political agency. Within its analytical scope, the study supports the latter view in several areas, many surprising. We discovered that the centralization of power in the prime ministers of Westminster systems is not uniform, consistent or inevitable. Indeed, in cases like New Zealand, there is little indication that centralization has occurred at all. Even in Canada, where Donald Savoie's (1999) concentration of power argument has been widely accepted, the study showed that institutionalization of authority in the prime ministerial branch is incomplete.

Still, the study also shows that the Westminster prime ministerships, to varying degrees, have been reshaped: not so much in its roles and functions but in the way that it performs these roles and the ways in which political leadership is exercised. In its institutional aspects, this change is not easily reversible, even if incremental, because of path dependence and learning: institutional resources and processes, once entrenched, are difficult to dismantle, and prime ministers learn that they are very useful. Modern prime ministers have come to rely on the institutional support of the organizations, political and bureaucratic, that serve them; this is indeed a significant change in the long sweep of institutional development. This reliance, though, is as much a matter of 'keeping the show on the road' as it is a plain assertion of dominance over other political actors.

The study also confirms the argument, given in the introductory chapter, that the actual exercise of prime ministerial power is a combination of personal and institutional factors, encountering an external reality of political circumstance. While institutional capacity is a reasonable indicator of the ability of prime ministers to project power within the core executive and broader political system, it is not the be-all and end-all of such

power. A prime ministership with a more robust, institutionalized base of support is a stronger office than a prime ministership without such support, all else equal, but this does not mean that *prime ministers* with robust branches serving them are always more powerful, or that power to 'get what they want' cannot be effectuated by other means.

Finally, more broadly the place of the prime ministership in modern politics is not a fundamental 'break' from the past but the most recent iteration of a familiar story. This story is the one told in chapter two: the role of democratization in driving institutional change in the Westminster prime ministership. The passage of power from British monarchs to parliaments led to the rise of cabinet government and the prominence of prime ministers as cabinet-makers and as ultimate arbiters of collective cabinet decisions. Mass enfranchisement in Britain in the 19th century expanded the scope of prime ministerial leadership from the parliamentary arena to the public at large, and centralized political party operations. The decline in the power of the House of Lords and other upper chambers cemented the notion that the democratically elected popular assemblies, with prime ministers at their head, should be the predominant locus of power. The imperatives of wartime leadership also contributed to the institutionalization of prime ministerial branches, and new communications technologies such as radio and television generated a more direct, immediate relationship between citizens and the prime minister. The direction of institutional development has thus generally been to strengthen prime ministerial authority and enshrine the pre-eminence of the prime ministership in the Westminster constitutional structure. This constitutes what could be called a 'paradox' of democratization. The Theory of Public Expectations is only the most recent iteration of this paradox. In modern politics, it is often the force of heightened public expectations,

generated by assertive, critical citizens and an aggressive media, which continues the centripetal, though uneven, development of the Westminster prime ministership.[148]

In addition to the Theory of Public Expectations, the study posited two other explanations for institutional change: economic trends and political conditions. Overall, the economic hypotheses were not supported by the empirical analysis in the study. In neither chapter five nor chapter six did we find substantial, consistent evidence that globalization or government activity has positive effects on prime ministers' institutional resources. The case studies in chapter seven and eight also did not produce strong evidence of economic effects, except that institutional specialization in Australia and the UK is attributed in part to governments taking on significantly more economic responsibility in modern politics.

My analysis suggests that political conditions are not significant moderators of prime ministerial branch institutionalization. However, the case studies point to an important role for ideology in determining whether prime ministers engage in unit-building. In both Australia and Canada, "centre-right" prime ministers (Liberals and Conservatives, respectively) consistently were associated with retrenchment and reversion, to some extent, in the complexity of their civil service offices. "Centre-left" prime ministers (Labor and Liberals) were consistently the leaders under which notable unit proliferation and specialization occurred. In the UK, as well, Prime Minister Blair is the crucial institution builder in the Cabinet Office, while Prime Ministers Thatcher, Major and Cameron, all Conservatives, were not especially enthusiastic about building

[148] This is not to say that there have not been "centrifugal" forces impinging on prime ministerships also. The rise of local nationalisms, small parties and populist movements, and networked governance and societies have also affected the development of prime ministerial leadership.

the office's institutional capacity. While based on a small sample, this finding of a role for ideology in institutional change is intriguing and merits further attention.

*9.3 Institutional Change in the Westminster Democracies*

The preceding discussion summarized the study's findings in terms of empirical theory. A second set of findings relates to the broad patterns of institutional change in the prime ministerial branches. To recall, the study adopts a historical-institutionalist framework for studying institutional change developed by Streeck and Thelen (2005) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010). In this framework, there are four typical patterns of gradual, endogenous change over time in institutions: displacement, layering, drift, and conversion. I constructed a typology whose dimensions are institutional continuity and the extent of institutionalization, and located the four patterns of change within the typology. Here, I provide concluding assessments about the patterns of institutional change observed in the four Westminster cases. These assessments are summarized in table 9.1, below.

My initial theoretical expectation was that 'layering' would be the predominant pattern of institutional change in the cases, with 'conversion' being a secondary phenomenon. There are several reasons for this. First, as traced in chapter two, the "Westminster prime ministership" as a historical concept, transplanted to the settler colonies, has a long, entrenched institutional history. This history means that the rules and expectations of behaviour are also well entrenched, and the basic institutional logic highly constrained. Moreover, substantively there is also reason to expect that institutional change would be layered. My primary theory of change in the prime ministerial branches, the Theory of Public Expectations, strongly suggests that layering

should be the dominant mode of institutional change. This is because it posits that a strong determinant of institutional change is the gradual shift in democratic publics from allegiant orientations to assertive orientations: a gradual shift cannot easily explain abrupt, convulsive change. For these reasons, it seemed likely that institutional change would involve gradual accumulation of new institutional roles, that is, layering, rather than the more dramatic change involved in other patterns in the typology.

Just as in the testing of the Theory of Public Expectations, the study's empirical analysis found that processes of institutional change in the Westminster cases are more complex and more varied than initially expected; this is a key finding of the study. The cases exhibited quite contrasting patterns of institutional change, though the patterns are generally consistent within the cases across the different measures of institutionalization. In Australia, the dominant pattern of institutional change is layering. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is relatively institutionalized in terms of resources and organizational structure and the process has been marked by relative continuity rather than disruption. I qualified these processes in different ways. With regard to both appropriations and unit structure, the process of layering has been periodic, proceeding in distinct periods of growth and decline along an overall upward trajectory. In terms of staff, the layering has been less periodic throughout its institutional history and more confined to the period since the mid-2000s. Overall, patterns of institutional change in Australia indicate that the department is moderately responsive to external changes such as changes in public values and attitudes. However, this responsiveness is constrained by the fact that its expansive role in enabling prime ministerial authority across a wide range of government activity was already well institutionalized, even at the point of creation of

the department in 1971. Thus, individual prime ministers have layered new institutional roles and functions onto an already existing, robust institutional structure.

Table 9.1
*Summary of Institutional Change in the Westminster Cases*

| | *Appropriations* | *Staff* | *Institutional Structure* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Australia* | Periodic Layering | Compressed Layering | Periodic Layering |
| *Canada* | Incremental Layering | Incremental Layering | Sporadic Layering |
| *New Zealand* | Drift | Drift | Drift |
| *United Kingdom* | Conversion | Displacement /Conversion | Conversion |

In Canada, the narrative of institutional change also is characterized by institutional layering. Indeed, the Canadian case, with regard to budgets and staff resources in particular, is a paradigmatic case of gradual, incremental layering. The contemporary Privy Council Office is much more well-resourced than it was in the mid-1960s, but this change has proceeded slowly and consistently over time, rather than in waves as was more evident in Australia. In terms of institutional complexity, this pattern was less evident; instead, we observed isolated moments of unit proliferation and specialization rather than continuous change. I argue that this pattern shows that the Privy Council Office is, relative to the Australian case, more responsive to the gradual, cumulative force of external changes, and somewhat less responsive to the intervention of particular prime ministers, at least since Pierre Trudeau instituted the modern office in the

late 1960s. Moreover, both the incremental layering and the 'sporadic' change in institutional complexity suggest several unique institutional characteristics.

One potential explanation for these differences is that, arguably, the Whitehall model and the institutional stability of the civil service operate more strongly in Canada than in Australia. Whereas Australian prime ministers have routinely been able to expand and contract the resources and complexity of their offices as they see fit, within the constraint of already being well institutionalized, Canadian prime ministers seem to be more constrained by traditions of neutrality and non-politicization. In other words, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia seems much more to be an explicit, malleable tool for prime ministers to pursue particular changes, while Canadian prime ministers, since the late 1960s, have tended to operate within existing institutional arrangements, modifying their offices incrementally and on the margins. Perhaps because of the strength of this norm, it seems to be the case that the personal, political office of the Canadian prime minister, the Prime Minister's Office, is much more present in the policy roles that in Australia are played by the DPMC to some extent. Whatever the case, although both Australia and Canada are characterized by institutional layering, the particular patterns of institutional change are different in interesting ways.

Both the New Zealand and British cases also exhibit a good degree of consistency across dimensions of institutionalization, and contrasts with other cases. The New Zealand case is repeatedly shown to be a case of institutional drift. I characterize drift in terms of a relative lack of change in the direction of institutionalization and a high degree of continuity. Simply put, its pattern of institutional change is that of a lack of institutional change. After a period of initial institutional growth subsequent to the

formation of the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1990, the department existed in relative stasis for two decades. Appropriations and staff resources were essentially constant, varying little from year to year and not trending in any particular direction, and there were very few significant organizational changes. There are several explanations for this pattern.

First, the New Zealand DPMC is a relatively new institution, although it was predated by a similar department. It may be the case that it simply has not reached a point in its institutional development where growth in resources and complexity becomes imperative. However, a more trenchant explanation is that the prime ministership in New Zealand is simply not the centre of the political system in the way that it is in other Westminster systems. As was mentioned earlier, New Zealand scholars often suggest that politics in New Zealand is more consultative, more collegial, and more dispersed than the more centralized politics elsewhere. This is partly cultural and partly institutional. For example, the New Zealand prime ministership does not face the same intergovernmental pressures that exist in federal systems such as Australia and Canada, or, perhaps, the national security pressures that operate in all three of the other cases more acutely. Moreover, empirics showed clearly that public expectations, as measured by indicators of assertive citizenship, are not operative in New Zealand in the same directions as in other countries: assertiveness has not increased, which theoretically is a factor that drives institutionalization. Overall, then, the New Zealand prime ministership is shown to be a distinct, atypical case relative to the other Westminster countries.

Finally, the Cabinet Office in the British system is also a contrasting case, in that it most clearly exhibits a pattern of institutional conversion. Conversion is a pattern of

institutional change whereby the roles, functions, and purposes of an institution are re-oriented to the point of transformation, in a relatively abrupt manner. This is often brought about by institutional 'entrepreneurs' who take advantage of the gap between institutional rules and their operation to convert an institution towards their goals. In this case, the evidence is clear that Tony Blair is this entrepreneur. During Blair's prime ministership, especially his first term and beginning of his second term, the Cabinet Office was transformed from a still largely traditional, administratively oriented office into a policy-oriented office. This post-conversion office more explicitly and robustly served the political and priority policies of the prime minister. Since this period, the Cabinet Office has continued to operate largely in this mould, although under both Gordon Brown and David Cameron it has withdrawn from some activities somewhat.

In the British case, then, institutional change is largely driven by an individual political actor who perceived that his institutional capacity was inadequate to his political needs, and who saw in the Cabinet Office an institution that could be made to operate much more like a 'prime minister's department' than it had been. In cases like Australia and, to a lesser extent, Canada, the normative resistance against a 'prime minister's department' had long been undermined by practice. This resistance against institutional change was arguably far more salient in Britain; the power of the 'permanent government', the British civil service, is much vaunted and well entrenched. This makes the conversion pattern of institutional change much more likely than more incremental change: the strength of norms holds until the dam breaks, so to speak. Thus, the British case offers another distinctive pattern of institutional change: not incremental or periodic

layering, not drift, but a period of wholesale conversion from one set of institutional rules and norms to another.

*9.4 Contributions and Limits*

This study's comparative analysis of the prime ministerial branches in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom elucidates the extent and causes of institutional change therein. Its contributions are substantial and surprising. Overall, the study demonstrates that institutional change in the prime ministerial branches has been far from certain: not all prime ministerships have developed consistently in the same direction of growing institutional capacity and centralization of power. Where institutionalization is evident, empirical evidence for the Theory of Public Expectations is certainly present but modestly so. Both the extent of increasing assertive citizenship and the institutional responses of prime ministers to the pressures of modern politics have varied considerably more than the theory assumed.

The study contributes to scholarship and broader public discourse in four specific areas. First, it advances the study of prime ministerships conceptually by treating institutional change in prime ministerships as a general phenomenon with general causes. In service of this conceptual ambition, I originate the concept of the "prime ministerial branch" to create an analogy between presidents, prime ministers, and the institutions that support them. There is just as much an apparatus of policy and political support and advice serving prime ministers in parliamentary systems as there is the expansive institutional support for, say, the American or French presidents. These prime ministerial branches can be studied in the same way that the executive branches in different kinds of constitutional systems are. Conceptualizing prime ministerships in this way also draws

attention to the fact that prime ministerships in Westminster systems are much more than just individual prime ministers; they are sprawling, living institutional organisms that constitute a central feature of modern democratic politics.

Second, the study introduces and tests specific theories about change in prime ministerial institutions and characterizes observed patterns of institutional change from a historical institutionalist perspective. It brings theoretical depth to a somewhat atheoretical, descriptive literature. This depth can be found in the Theory of Public Expectations, which is an original and innovative effort to bring together the behavioural and institutional literatures. As discussed earlier, the empirical evidence for the Theory of Public Expectations is sufficiently clear, where its assumptions are met, to demonstrate that the enterprise has merit. Future research can build on this theoretical advancement to generate new and innovative theories of institutional change in the prime ministerial branches. As well, the specific relationships examined in this study provide benchmarks for elaboration, refutation and replication in future. The field lacks a coherent research agenda with a clear set of research questions, so the identification and assessment of clearly testable hypotheses is ideal fodder for building such an agenda. In this way, it builds a theoretical foundation for tying together the disparate literatures on executives.

Third, the study adds to the methodological toolkit used in the study of the prime ministerships in these countries and studies of political executives and leadership generally. Compared to many areas of political science, these literatures have not yet built robust theories and have not tested their claims in empirically rigorous ways. In particular, the literature on prime ministers and prime ministerial leadership is almost universally qualitative, historical, or single case-based, and lacks interest in specifying

concrete, testable empirical theories with systematic data analysis. In contrast to its cousin, the voluminous literature on the US presidency and executive branch development, it has yet to embrace, and even actively rejects, quantitative approaches to the subject. This is not a virtue. My study addresses this methodological deficiency in the prime ministerial literature by subjecting the development of prime ministerial branches over time to quantitative and mixed-method approaches.

Finally, this study is rooted in an interest in how political leadership has evolved to cope with the demands of modern politics and societal transformations. I began the study with Prime Minister Blair's observation that modern politics demands a different form of prime ministerial leadership. The study then assesses how this has played out concretely in the institutions that support them. Although this thesis is empirical, its normative implications are clear. My goal was to identify, and test, reasons for the 'growth' of prime ministerial authority that emphasize its reactive, responsive nature. It is an act of statecraft for prime ministers to enable their offices to lead in an increasingly 'unleadable' environment. As with any institutional change, there are trade-offs to be made and constraints not to be bypassed carelessly. But the study urges consideration of the role that citizens play in conditioning how leaders behave: the kinds of demands and expectations we place upon leaders and what kinds of political leadership these pressures produce. It also suggests a closer examination of the thesis that centralization of power is a universal, robust phenomenon in parliamentary systems; the study shows that centralization, while certainly present, is also uneven and contingent on context and on leaders themselves.

As with any study, there are limits. Because of the theoretical and empirical originality of the study, its limits are arguably more apparent. Three limits, in particular, deserve mention. First, the study's empirical design constrains the extent to which deep contextual evidence and interpretation are considered. This is particularly true of the quantitative chapters, but is also evident in the tight focus of the case studies on counting and classifying prime ministerial branch units. This relatively austere approach underplays the impact of norms, values, and internal understandings of salient actors in shaping prime ministerial power.

Second, practical data and resource limitations constrain the study's ability to assess comprehensively its theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization. These theories are general in nature and thus the universe of cases extends beyond Westminster; indeed, they are really theories about change in political executives generally. Comparisons to other parliamentary democracies with different constitutional and historical traditions, as well as to presidential and semi-presidential systems, would provide richer and more robust conclusions about empirical support for these theories. It would also increase the number of cases, which has statistical benefits, and allow for interesting cross-sectional, multilevel analysis. In short, the study is limited in how well it captures all of the variation in both outcomes and in explanatory factors.

The third limit is the narrowness of the study's conceptual and empirical scope. The goal of the study is to examine institutional change in the "prime ministerial branches". However, many ways in which these have changed are not addressed in the study. For example, to what extent has politicization of the civil service occurred within prime ministerial branches specifically? Scholars have argued recently that bureaucracies

have undergone politicization: that the traditional role of prime ministers' civil service office in providing "politically-sensitive policy advice" has become more "promiscuously partisan" (Aucoin 2012, 179). The offices are increasingly pressured to subordinate their distinctive views of the public interest to the political interests of the government of the day. From the perspective of political leadership, we could ask an equivalent question: to what extent have prime ministers' civil service offices become an extension of prime ministerial power, rather than the kind of 'check' on prime ministers by the "permanent government" exemplified by Sir Humphrey Appleby in *Yes Prime Minister*? The study does not address this and other kinds of important changes in the prime ministerial branches.

### *9.5 Directions for Future Research*

These limits point to several directions for future research extending the study. First, in-depth qualitative case studies would enhance our understanding of the complexities of institutional change I observed. The purpose of this approach would be to capture as much contextual evidence as possible, which would help to elucidate the norms and values operating at the prime ministerial level. Such work would also elaborate the specific causal mechanisms operating in these cases. Furthermore, case studies could assess how subjective perceptions and beliefs of key actors reflect and modify the observational analysis in this study through interviews of these actors.

Second, future research could directly address the second limit identified above by expanding the number of cases and re-analyzing the study's hypotheses. This would introduce greater variation in the data and allow the testing of certain factors that could not be included here. More importantly, from a theoretical perspective it would allow us

to assess the generalizability of the study's theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization. Westminster systems are characterized by a greater degree of executive dominance than other parliamentary systems, so testing these theories in non-Westminster systems would provide a 'harder' test. Where prime ministers are more constrained, how do they respond to the pressures of public expectations and others?

Third, future research could consider the study's findings in the context of closer examination of individual prime ministers and their leadership. In chapter three, I discussed the idea that prime ministerial branch institutionalization is driven primarily by personal and idiosyncratic attributes of each prime minister. Rather than being a primarily exogenous, contextual phenomenon, prime ministers decide whether to enhance the institutional resources of their offices or make them more complex based on psychologically-based factors such as leadership style, personality traits, and personal goals. An account of particular episodes of institutional change that focused on individual prime ministers is certainly warranted. Such an account might find that, although based on idiosyncrasies and personal traits, there are commonalities in prime ministers that generate common kinds of institutional changes. For instance, some prime ministers are more activist than other prime ministers. Some are content just to "keep the show on the road" (King 2015, 225). This "active" versus "reactive" dimension might partially depend on context – there may be periods in which policy or institutional change is simply more pressing and politically salient – but it is also temperamental. Another promising application of political psychology pertains to prime ministers' "operational code". Operational code analysis is a classic characterization of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs that guides leaders' decision-making, and would illuminate certain

episodes of institutional change considerably (Leites 1951; George 1969). A prime minister who believes that they have a great ability to control events is more likely to engage in institutional change than one who does not. Similarly, it could be hypothesized that a prime minister who has an acceptance of risk will induce change more than one who is risk-averse. A rigorous study of how prime ministers' personalistic traits contribute to institutional change is waiting to be written.

To conclude, this study presents a comparative institutional analysis of prime ministerships in the Westminster systems of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. It develops and tests an original theory explaining institutional change in these prime ministerships since the 1960s, the Theory of Public Expectations. The theory argues that institutionalization in the prime ministerial branches occurs when prime ministers choose to expand their institutional capacities in response to heightened expectations from citizens. Empirical analysis provided some support to the theory when its assumptions of institutional centralization and increasing assertiveness were met. Equally importantly, the study found that centralization of power in prime ministers, at least in terms of institutional support, is not a universal, consistent phenomenon; instead, it varies significantly across cases and over time in interesting and surprising ways. This study is a first effort of its kind but it should serve as a catalyst for further refinement and contestation. It advances the important goal of setting out robust theories of institutional change in prime ministerships and testing them empirically. The centrality of prime ministerial leadership to politics in modern democracies demands nothing less.

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# Appendices

## *Appendix 1 - Prime Ministerial Terms from 1945 to 2015*

Appendix 1 describes the study's differentiation of prime ministerial terms. It also serves as a reference list for the various mentions of prime ministers throughout the study. Table A1 lists all prime ministerial terms since 1945 in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. For each term, the prime minister, the prime minister's party, term years, majority status, seat share, and ideology are given. These variables are described in appendix 2, which discusses all of the explanatory variables used in the study.

Prime ministerial terms are differentiated in two ways. First, any general election begins a new term, whether the incumbent wins or not or whether the prime ministership changes parties. Second, any change in the prime ministership between elections begins a new term. This happens, typically, through voluntary resignation, successful leadership challenges (especially in Australia), or, rarely, death of the incumbent prime minister.

When necessary, prime ministerial terms are specifically demarcated according to the outcome in question. For instance, in chapter five the outcome is appropriations to prime ministerial institutions. Thus, the commencement dates of the prime ministerial terms were checked against the budget timeline, particularly the dates of royal assent for the relevant appropriations bills, to determine which annual budgets "belong" to which prime ministers. Thus, the first *Year in Term* data point for each prime ministerial term is the first budget for which the particular prime minister was responsible, the last data point, the final budget. This means that the prime ministerial terms in our dataset do not always correspond exactly to actual prime ministerial tenures as they are usually known.

Table A1

*Prime Ministerial Terms since 1945*

| | *Prime Minister* | *Party* | *Term* | *Status* | *Seat Share* | *Ideology* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Australia* | Ben Chifley | ALP | 1946-1949 | Majority | .581 | -16.4 |
| | Robert Menzies | Liberal | 1949-1951 | Majority | .611 | 25 |
| | Robert Menzies | Liberal | 1951-1954 | Majority | .570 | 53.9 |
| | Robert Menzies | Liberal | 1954-1955 | Majority | .529 | 17.9 |
| | Robert Menzies | Liberal | 1955-1958 | Majority | .615 | 30.7 |
| | Robert Menzies | Liberal | 1959-1961 | Majority | .631 | 14.4 |
| | Robert Menzies | Liberal | 1961-1963 | Majority | .508 | 38.8 |
| | Robert Menzies | Liberal | 1963-1966 | Majority | .590 | -10.7 |
| | Harold Holt | Liberal | 1966-1967 | Majority | .508 | -20 |
| | (John McEwen) | Country | 1967-1968 | | | |
| | John Gorton | Liberal | 1968-1971 | Majority | .528 | 0.2 |
| | William McMahon | Liberal | 1971-1972 | Majority | .528 | 6.8 |
| | Gough Whitlam | ALP | 1972-1974 | Majority | .536 | -24.3 |
| | Gough Whitlam | ALP | 1974-1975 | Majority | .519 | -34.8 |
| | Malcolm Fraser | Liberal | 1975-1977 | Majority | .709 | 31.1 |
| | Malcolm Fraser | Liberal | 1977-1980 | Majority | .685 | 18.9 |
| | Malcolm Fraser | Liberal | 1980-1983 | Majority | .584 | 27.5 |
| | Bob Hawke | ALP | 1983-1984 | Majority | .600 | 6.9 |
| | Bob Hawke | ALP | 1984-1987 | Majority | .554 | 8.6 |
| | Bob Hawke | ALP | 1987-1990 | Majority | .581 | -4.5 |
| | Bob Hawke | ALP | 1990-1991 | Majority | .527 | -14.9 |
| | Paul Keating | ALP | 1991-1993 | Majority | .527 | -0.2 |
| | Paul Keating | ALP | 1993-1996 | Majority | .544 | -0.2 |
| | John Howard | Liberal | 1996-1998 | Majority | .628 | 22.6 |
| | John Howard | Liberal | 1998-2001 | Majority | .540 | 48.5 |
| | John Howard | Liberal | 2001-2004 | Majority | .540 | 33.0 |
| | John Howard | Liberal | 2004-2007 | Majority | .573 | 31.9 |
| | Kevin Rudd | ALP | 2007-2010 | Majority | .553 | 5.7 |
| | (Julia Gillard) | ALP | 2010 | | | |
| | Julia Gillard | ALP | 2010-2013 | Minority | .480 | -34.1 |
| | (Kevin Rudd) | ALP | 2013 | | | |
| | Tony Abbott | Liberal | 2013-2015 | Majority | .533 | 23.0 |
| | (Malcolm Turnbull) | Liberal | 2015-2016 | Majority | .533 | n/a |
| | (Malcolm Turnbull) | Liberal | 2016- | Majority | .507 | n/a |
| | *Prime Minister* | *Party* | *Term* | *Status* | *Seat Share* | *Ideology* |
| *Canada* | W.L. Mackenzie King | Liberal | 1946-1948 | Majority | .510 | 7.1 |
| | Louis St. Laurent | Liberal | 1949-1953 | Majority | .725 | 8.0 |
| | Louis St. Laurent | Liberal | 1954-1957 | Majority | .645 | -5.1 |
| | John Diefenbaker | PC | 1957-1958 | Minority | .423 | 1.5 |
| | John Diefenbaker | PC | 1958-1962 | Majority | .785 | -2.9 |
| | (John Diefenbaker) | PC | 1962-1963 | | | |
| | Lester Pearson | Liberal | 1963-1965 | Minority | .487 | -3.8 |
| | Lester Pearson | Liberal | 1965-1968 | Minority | .494 | -13.8 |
| | Pierre Trudeau | Liberal | 1968-1972 | Majority | .587 | -6.5 |
| | Pierre Trudeau | Liberal | 1972-1974 | Minority | .413 | -10.4 |
| | Pierre Trudeau | Liberal | 1974-1979 | Majority | .534 | 3.4 |
| | Joe Clark | PC | 1979-1980 | Minority | .482 | 17.1 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pierre Trudeau | Liberal | 1980-1984 | Majority | .521 | -2.4 |
| | (John Turner) | Liberal | 1984 | | | |
| | Brian Mulroney | PC | 1984-1988 | Majority | .748 | 12.3 |
| | Brian Mulroney | PC | 1988-1993 | Majority | .573 | 18.3 |
| | (Kim Campbell) | PC | 1993 | | | |
| | Jean Chretien | Liberal | 1993-1997 | Majority | .600 | 4.0 |
| | Jean Chretien | Liberal | 1997-2000 | Majority | .515 | 6.3 |
| | Jean Chretien | Liberal | 2000-2003 | Majority | .571 | -12.2 |
| | Paul Martin | Liberal | 2003-2006 | Minority | .438 | -12.2 |
| | Stephen Harper | CPC | 2006-2008 | Minority | .403 | 16.2 |
| | Stephen Harper | CPC | 2008-2011 | Minority | .464 | 9.1 |
| | Stephen Harper | CPC | 2011-2015 | Majority | .539 | 26.3 |
| | (Justin Trudeau) | Liberal | 2015- | Majority | .544 | n/a |
| | *Prime Minister* | *Party* | *Term* | *Status* | *Seat Share* | *Ideology* |
| *New Zealand* | (Peter Fraser) | Labour | 1945-1946 | Majority | .562 | n/a |
| | Peter Fraser | Labour | 1946-1949 | Majority | .525 | -32.2 |
| | Sidney Holland | National | 1949-1951 | Majority | .575 | 5.6 |
| | Sidney Holland | National | 1951-1954 | Majority | .625 | 38.5 |
| | Sidney Holland | National | 1954-1957 | Majority | .562 | -3.3 |
| | (Keith Holyoake) | National | 1957 | | | |
| | Walter Nash | Labour | 1957-1960 | Majority | .512 | -35.3 |
| | Keith Holyoake | National | 1960-1963 | Majority | .575 | 1.0 |
| | Keith Holyoake | National | 1963-1966 | Majority | .562 | -2.4 |
| | Keith Holyoake | National | 1966-1969 | Majority | .550 | -2.1 |
| | Keith Holyoake | National | 1969-1972 | Majority | .536 | -2.5 |
| | Jack Marshall | National | 1972 | Majority | .536 | -8.4 |
| | Norman Kirk | Labour | 1972-1974 | Majority | .632 | -19.6 |
| | Bill Rowling | Labour | 1974-1975 | Majority | .632 | -17.2 |
| | Robert Muldoon | National | 1975-1978 | Majority | .632 | 5.3 |
| | Robert Muldoon | National | 1978-1981 | Majority | .554 | -4.7 |
| | Robert Muldoon | National | 1981-1984 | Majority | .511 | 3.5 |
| | David Lange | Labour | 1984-1987 | Majority | .589 | -9.8 |
| | David Lange | Labour | 1987-1989 | Majority | .588 | -22.0 |
| | Geoffrey Palmer | Labour | 1989-1990 | Majority | .588 | -22.0 |
| | (Mike Moore) | Labour | 1990 | | | |
| | Jim Bolger | National | 1990-1993 | Majority | .691 | -4.9 |
| | Jim Bolger | National | 1993-1996 | Majority | .505 | -6.4 |
| | Jim Bolger | National | 1996-1997 | Coalition | .367 | -7.2 |
| | Jenny Shipley | National | 1997-1999 | Coalition | .367 | 37.1 |
| | Helen Clark | Labour | 1999-2002 | Coalition | .408 | -23.3 |
| | Helen Clark | Labour | 2002-2005 | Coalition | .433 | -28.1 |
| | Helen Clark | Labour | 2005-2008 | Coalition | .413 | -29.7 |
| | John Key | National | 2008-2011 | Coalition | .475 | 37.5 |
| | John Key | National | 2011-2014 | Coalition | .488 | 25.0 |
| | (John Key) | National | 2014- | Minority | .496 | n/a |
| | *Prime Minister* | *Party* | *Term* | *Status* | *Seat Share* | *Ideology* |
| *United Kingdom* | Clement Attlee | Labour | 1945-1950 | Majority | .614 | -31.3 |
| | Clement Attlee | Labour | 1950-1951 | Majority | 0.504 | -28.1 |
| | Winston Churchill | Conservative | 1951-1955 | Majority | 0.514 | -1.4 |
| | Anthony Eden | Conservative | 1955 | Majority | 0.514 | -30.6 |
| | Anthony Eden | Conservative | 1955-1957 | Majority | 0.546 | -30.6 |
| | Harold Macmillan | Conservative | 1957-1959 | Majority | 0.546 | -23.3 |
| | Harold Macmillan | Conservative | 1959-1963 | Majority | 0.579 | -23.3 |
| | Alec Douglas-Home | Conservative | 1963-1964 | Majority | 0.579 | -7.8 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Harold Wilson | Labour | 1964-1966 | Majority | 0.503 | -23.8 |
| | Harold Wilson | Labour | 1966-1970 | Majority | 0.576 | -14.8 |
| | Edward Heath | Conservative | 1970-1974 | Majority | 0.524 | 8.2 |
| | Harold Wilson | Labour | 1974 | Minority | 0.474 | -48.5 |
| | Harold Wilson | Labour | 1974-1976 | Majority | 0.502 | -48.5 |
| | James Callaghan | Labour | 1976-1979 | Majority | 0.502 | -26.6 |
| | Margaret Thatcher | Conservative | 1979-1983 | Majority | 0.534 | 24.4 |
| | Margaret Thatcher | Conservative | 1983-1987 | Majority | 0.611 | 29.0 |
| | Margaret Thatcher | Conservative | 1987-1990 | Majority | 0.578 | 30.5 |
| | John Major | Conservative | 1990-1992 | Majority | 0.578 | 27.9 |
| | John Major | Conservative | 1992-1997 | Majority | 0.516 | 27.9 |
| | Tony Blair | Labour | 1997-2001 | Majority | 0.636 | 8.1 |
| | Tony Blair | Labour | 2001-2005 | Majority | .627 | 5.6 |
| | Tony Blair | Labour | 2005-2007 | Majority | .549 | -3.1 |
| | Gordon Brown | Labour | 2007-2010 | Majority | .549 | -1.5 |
| | David Cameron | Conservative | 2010-2015 | Coalition | .471 | 17.5 |
| | (David Cameron) | Conservative | 2015-2016 | Majority | .508 | -1.6 |
| | (Theresa May) | Conservative | 2016- | Majority | .508 | n/a |

*Note***:** Terms in parentheses are listed for completeness but are not included in analysis because of their short length or current status. PC: Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (1942-2003). CPC: Conservative Party of Canada (2003-present). ALP: Australian Labor Party.

*Appendix 2 - Summary Statistics and Explanatory Variable Description*

Appendix 2 provides the summary statistics for all explanatory variables used in the dissertation and briefly describes their construction and characteristics, except for the assertive citizenship measures, which are treated separately in both chapter four and appendix 3. Table A2 shows the summary statistics, with variable mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, number of observations, and time period given.

Table A2
*Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables*

| Variable | Mean | SD | Range | N | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Theory of Public Expectations* | | | | | |
| Assertive Index | | | | | |
| Australia | 0.40 | 0.05 | (0.33,0.51) | 38 | 1978-2015 |
| Canada | 0.50 | 0.02 | (0.42,0.63) | 50 | 1966-2015 |
| New Zealand | 0.46 | 0.03 | (0.43,0.52) | 25 | 1991-2015 |
| United Kingdom | 0.35 | 0.05 | (0.27,0.45) | 52 | 1964-2015 |
| Political Interest | | | | | |
| Australia | 0.70 | 0.03 | (0.63,0.74) | 38 | 1978-2015 |
| Canada | 0.50 | 0.06 | (0.40,0.61) | 50 | 1966-2015 |
| New Zealand | 0.63 | 0.03 | (0.53,0.69) | 40 | 1976-2015 |
| United Kingdom | 0.50 | 0.03 | (0.42,0.53) | 52 | 1964-2015 |
| Strength of Party Identification | | | | | |
| Australia | 0.56 | 0.03 | (0.51,0.61) | 38 | 1978-2015 |
| Canada | 0.54 | 0.06 | (0.42,0.63) | 50 | 1966-2015 |
| New Zealand | 0.44 | 0.08 | (0.31,0.57) | 40 | 1976-2015 |
| United Kingdom | 0.60 | 0.08 | (0.46,0.75) | 52 | 1964-2015 |
| *Economic Factors* | | | | | |
| KOF Index of Globalization (0 low to 100 high) | | | | | |
| Australia | 74.22 | 8.49 | (53.34,83.80) | 45 | 1971-2015 |
| Canada | 81.84 | 5.60 | (69.25,89.65) | 45 | 1971-2015 |
| New Zealand | 68.91 | 9.08 | (52.59,79.98) | 45 | 1971-2015 |
| United Kingdom | 80.86 | 8.30 | (63.13,90.03) | 45 | 1971-2015 |
| Trade Openness | | | | | |
| Australia | 0.32 | 0.12 | (0.18,0.68) | 65 | 1951-2015 |
| Canada | 0.56 | 0.16 | (0.34,0.86) | 65 | 1951-2015 |
| New Zealand | 0.49 | 0.12 | (0.32,0.76) | 65 | 1951-2015 |
| United Kingdom | 0.44 | 0.14 | (0.26,0.74) | 65 | 1951-2015 |
| Central Government Consumption | | | | | |
| Australia | 0.12 | 0.02 | (0.08,0.16) | 65 | 1951-2015 |
| Canada | 0.14 | 0.02 | (0.09,0.18) | 65 | 1951-2015 |
| New Zealand | 0.17 | 0.02 | (0.14,0.21) | 65 | 1951-2015 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 0.18 | 0.02 | (0.14,0.23) | 65 | 1951-2015 |
| *Political Conditions* | | | | | |
| Term Year (mean term length indicated) | | | | | |
| Australia | 1.80 | 0.81 | (1,4) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| Canada | 2.43 | 1.26 | (1,5) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| New Zealand | 1.97 | 0.93 | (1,4) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| United Kingdom | 2.31 | 1.26 | (1,5) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| Legislative Support (Seat Share) | | | | | |
| (0 no seat share - 1 all seat share) | | | | | |
| Australia | 0.57 | 0.05 | (0.48,0.71) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| Canada | 0.57 | 0.10 | (0.40,0.78) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| New Zealand | 0.54 | 0.08 | (0.37,0.69) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| United Kingdom | 0.55 | 0.05 | (0.47,0.63) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| Legislative Support (Majority % obs) | | | | | |
| Australia | 95.71 | | | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| Canada | 77.14 | | | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| New Zealand | 74.29 | | | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| United Kingdom | 91.43 | | | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| Ideology (MARPOR) | | | | | |
| (-100 extreme left to +100 extreme right) | | | | | |
| Australia | 10.27 | 23.72 | (-34.8,53.9) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| Canada | 3.69 | 10.73 | (-13.8,26.3) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| New Zealand | -4.51 | 21.71 | (-35.3,38.5) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| United Kingdom | -0.02 | 23.05 | (-48.5,30.47) | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| Ideology (Prime Ministerial Party) | | | | | |
| (0 centre-left, 1 centre-right: % centre-right) | | | | | |
| Australia | 61.43 | | | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| Canada | 34.29 | | | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| New Zealand | 62.86 | | | 70 | 1946-2015 |
| United Kingdom | 58.57 | | | 70 | 1946-2015 |

Note: Years correspond to their coding in the datasets, which refer to fiscal years, e.g., "2015" refers to values for the 2014/15 fiscal year.

*Explanatory Variables: Descriptions and Measures*

Economic Trends

*Globalization.* Globalization, defined as the growing interconnectedness of economies, societies, and political organizations across and above state borders, is measured in two ways: a comprehensive measure, the KOF Index of Globalization, and a minimal, direct measure, trade openness. The KOF index of globalization is an aggregative index measuring economic, social, and political globalization separately, compositing these scores into an overall measure which theoretically ranges from 0 to 100, where larger

values means more globalization.[149] It has a coverage range of 207 countries annually from 1970-2015. As a secondary measure and a way to estimate the effect of globalization across a longer time period, I use a measure of *Trade Openness* from the Penn World Tables 8.1, which provides annual data from 1951-2015 (Feenstra et al. 2015). Trade openness is measured as the ratio of merchandise exports plus imports to real GDP, in current PPPs. In other words, it indicates the proportion of total GDP constituted by international trade (exports and imports), thus ranging from 0 to 1.

*Government Consumption.* Government consumption is a measure of total central government spending on administration, education, and health, as a share of total real GDP in current PPPs, from 1951-2015. It is extracted from the Penn World Tables 8.1. It measures the proportion of economic activity in a country taken up by these key government activities.

Political Conditions

*Year in Term*. This variable is the point in a prime ministerial term when the observation occurs. This variable ranges from 1, the first year of a term, to 5 (the fifth year of a term, but only observed in the British and Canadian cases). As discussed in appendix A1, the coding of this variable is tied to prime ministerial terms and their demarcation relative to elections and the budgetary process, not necessarily to 'real-world' time.

*Legislative Support.* My primary measure of legislative support is seat share: simply the share of seats held by the governing party in the lower house of the legislature, according to the most recent general election (thus, it varies only between terms and not within-

[149] The overall index weighs each sub-indicator unequally: economic globalization is 36% of the index, social globalization 38%, political 26%. Within each category a similar unequal weighting aggregation scheme is used, with eight variables for economic globalization and eleven and four for social and political globalization, respectively (Dreher 2006).

term). Theoretically, the variable ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that the party holds none of the legislative seats and 1 indicates that the party holds all of them. Of course, in order to be the governing party, the seat share will never be close to zero, and in practice the governing party's seat share will tend to be close to or above the bare majority mark of half the seats plus one (> 0.5). There is thus not a lot of variance: seat share is highly clustered around means with 'thin' tails. Alternatively, in some cases I use a dichotomous majority status variable, which is coded 0 if the prime minister had minority or coalition support and 1 if the prime minister had majority legislative support (greater than fifty percent). Majority governments have been the norm in these countries, as indicated in the summary table above.

*Ideology.* Ideology is measured in two ways. The first, *Prime Ministerial Ideology*, is given by the score for the governing party in the relevant general election, according to the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) data. The MARPOR dataset consists of manually coded scores of party election manifestos in 56 countries since 1945. The scores range from -100 (extreme left) to 100 (extreme right). The relevant general election is the one in which the incumbent prime minister was elected, unless there was a change of prime minister between elections. In this case, to reflect the idea that different prime ministers will have different ideological positions, the ideology score is the MARPOR score of the prime minister's party in the general election that that prime minister contested, i.e., the next election.

Alternatively, I compare the effects of different ideological orientations simply by coding the party of the prime minister in power: the variable *Prime Ministerial Party*. In all four Westminster countries only two parties have ever governed and are coded as

"centre-left" and "centre-right". In Australia, the governing parties have been the Australian Labor Party (ALP), the "centre-left" party, and the Liberal Party, the "centre-right" party. In Canada, the Liberal Party is the less conservative, essentially centrist party; the Progressive Conservative Party and its successor, the Conservative Party of Canada, are the "centre-right" party. In New Zealand, the Labour Party is the "centre-left" party and the National Party the "centre-right" party. Finally, the UK Labour Party is "centre-left", the Conservatives "centre-right". Overall, between 1946 and 2015 there have been slightly more country-years under "centre-right" parties (54.5%) than "centre-left" parties (45.5%); only in Canada is this pattern reversed, wherein the Liberals have governed for 65.7% of the period.

Stationarity Tests

Our main test for stationarity in our variables is the KPSS test, in which the null hypothesis is the absence of a unit root, i.e., that the variable is stationary. Table A3 provides the results of testing for stationarity in all of the 'dynamic' variables, i.e, those that are allowed to have short-run and long-run effects in the error correction models and that theoretically covary with time.

Table A3
*Stationarity Tests for Dynamic Variables*

| | KPSS Stat |
|---|---|
| Australia | |
| Appropriations | 0.288* |
| Staff | 0.146* |
| | |
| Pol. Interest | 0.459* |
| Party ID | 0.496* |
| Assertive Index | 0.671* |
| | |
| Global. Index | 0.668* |
| Trade Openness | 0.906* |
| Govt Consumpt | 0.490* |

| | |
|---|---|
| Canada | |
| Appropriations | 0.278* |
| Staff | 0.313* |
| Pol. Interest | 0.364* |
| Party ID | 0434* |
| Assertive Index | 0.472* |
| | |
| Global. Index | 0.533* |
| Trade Openness | 0.728* |
| Govt Consumpt | 0.431* |
| | |
| New Zealand | |
| Appropriations | 0.528* |
| Staff | 0.107 |
| | |
| Pol. Interest | 0.174* |
| Party ID | 0.270* |
| Assertive Index | 0.319* |
| | |
| Global. Index | 0.476* |
| Trade Openness | 0.620* |
| Govt Consumpt | 0.667* |
| | |
| UK | |
| Appropriations | 1.24* |
| Staff | 0.28* |
| | |
| Pol. Interest | 0.513* |
| Party ID | 0.227* |
| Assertive Index | 0.820* |
| | |
| Global. Index | 0.828* |
| Trade Openness | 0.676* |
| Govt Consumpt | 0.484* |

Note: Entries are the calculated test statistics for the KPSS Test for stationarity. Asterisk indicates that the test statistic meets the critical value at the 5% level, suggesting rejection of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis for the KPSS test is stationarity. Thus, a stationary variable should be indicated by a failure to reject the KPSS null hypothesis.

*Appendix 3 - Measuring Assertive Citizenship*

Appendix 3 describes the construction of the Assertive Index and the two other measures of assertive citizenship, political interest and strength of party identification, in more detail than was provided in chapter four. These indicators are used throughout the study to quantify the shift from "allegiant" to "assertive" citizenship that was adapted from the work of Dalton and Welzel (2014). These measures were constructed in a four-step process, as follows:

1) Identify and extract data on assertive values from election study datasets.
2) Aggregate data within each election study dataset and create overall scores for each election study year.
3) Impute values for missing data (that is, between election study observations).
4) Decompose the time series to differentiate the 'true' trends from irregular components.

Step one involves the identification and extraction of relevant survey items in all of the election studies in each case. Chapter four provided a table of all election studies used (pg. 125). For political interest and party identification, these were simply the traditional "general interest in politics" question and the two-question sequence asking about party identification, first, and strength of that identification, second. These questions have been relatively consistent in wording and application across the election studies. For reasons explained below, the marginal responses were coded dichotomously. For political interest, responses of "fairly" or "very" interested were coded as 1, and other responses coded as 0. For party identification, "not very strong" or no party identification (in response to the first question) were coded as 1, and "fairly" or "very strong"

identification coded as 0. This corresponds to theory, where high political interest and weak attachments to parties are symptoms of assertive behavioural orientations.

For the Assertive Index, I extracted all survey items that I considered probed attitudes related to assertive citizenship and postmaterialism, as these concepts are explicated in Dalton and Welzel (2014) and related work. Besides this substantive element, the most important criterion for inclusion is that the question was asked in more than one election survey, because of the way the algorithm in step (2) works. Appendix A4, below, lists every survey item identified and extracted for the four countries, along with exact question wording and response coding. The questions fell into one of seven categories: trust/cynicism, political efficacy and voice, equality attitudes, secular vs. traditional attitudes, law and order, environmental attitudes, and authority vs. individualism. I considered questions to be the same when they were identically worded and had identical response coding. In order to be input into the step (2) algorithm, the responses were dichotomized into assertive and non-assertive responses, as the rightmost column in table A4.1, below, indicates. Assertive responses were coded 1, non-assertive responses were coded 0. In total, the number of unique identical questions and the number of times the questions are asked in each country are, respectively: Australia, 44 and 173, Canada, 37 and 175, New Zealand, 29 and 139, and the UK, 42 and 160.

The second step is to aggregate the data to give an overall score for each measure in each country for each election study year. For political interest and strength of party identification, the aggregated scores for each survey year are simply the mean response, i.e., a proportion between 0 and 1. Aggregation for the Assertive Index is more complex. The goal is to create an overall indicator that plausibly measures the underlying latent

concept: assertive values and attitudes. I adapt Stimson's (1999, 2015) 'dyad ratios' approach to creating a smoothed time trend when aggregating partial data collected over time. Stimson's method measures a latent aggregate characteristic of a population from a set of surveys across time. He describes the method in detail in chapter three and appendix one of his 1999 book, and in documentation for the algorithm's software implementation *Wcalc6.1* (1999, 37-66, 133-137; 2015). His purpose in creating the algorithm is to measure the "policy mood" in the United States over time, construed essentially as the amount of policy liberalism in the polity at any given time. Measuring policy liberalism over time is difficult because surveys, in this case specifically American National Election Study data, do not always ask the same questions in the same way, and only take place every two or four years. This incompleteness and inconsistency undermine the ability to generate a valid time series.

Stimson's solution begins with the collected data in step (1): aggregate proportions of assertive responses on many survey questions over time. We can then compare these proportions for identical questions by taking their ratios, which gives us a relative indicator of the concept, to the extent that the question measures the concept. For instance, if at time $t$ the proportion of assertive responses for item $i$ is 0.50 and at $t + 1$ is 0.60, then, if we fix assertiveness at 100 at time $t$, $t + 1$ has a score of 120: assertiveness is higher at $t + 1$ than $t$ measured by $i$. For each time point, we can calculate such a ratio for any questions included at that time point and neighbouring time points.

We then need a systematic process to combine these ratios, which we do by both backward recursion and forward recursion. In backward recursion, we fix the last time point $t$ at 100, then compute and average all ratios between $t$ and $t - 1$. This gives us an

aggregate estimate of the underlying concept at *t-1*, relative to *t.* We repeat this process for *t-1* and *t-2*, and so on, until the initial time point. Because the backward recursive process privileges later time points, the algorithm repeats the process in the forward direction. Instead of assuming that each item should be weighed equally in computing the estimate of the latent concept at each point in time, items are weighted according to their validity, i.e., the proportion of variance in the item that is shared with the concept (Stimson 2015, 13). Thus, we end up with two estimates, forward and backward, for the latent concept for each point in time.

Rather than simply averaging the two estimates, Stimson argues that sampling theory offers a better alternative. We should expect that even if change in assertive attitudes and values were relatively smooth, estimates of it would be more noisy, i.e., more "abrupt and jumpy", because of sampling error (2015, 12). Thus, to more accurately represent the underlying time series, instead of simply averaging the algorithm applies an exponential smoother to the raw time series. The result is a time series that is an exponentially weighted moving average of forward and backward values at each time point. In software terms, the survey marginal proportions were input into *Wcalc6.1*, a software implementation of Stimson's algorithm, available at Stimson's website.[150]

The third step in the procedure is to impute (fill in) the missing data for the years between election studies. This is a particularly acute issue here because the election study surveys are conducted only periodically (corresponding to elections); there are more missing observations on country-years than not. Using only the years in which elections were held reduces the number of observations drastically and eliminates the possibility of testing some of the political conditions variables. In fact, considering the number of

[150] http://stimson.web.unc.edu/software/

parameters in the error correction models and the reduced periods because of estimating lagged effects, a degrees of freedom problem would exist for estimating regression models for only the time points with 'real' data. In order to make the analysis feasible, we need as complete a time series as possible, even if it means including imputed values.

I impute values for the missing observations using Honaker et al.'s (2012) software program Amelia II. Amelia II performs a "multiple imputation" procedure in which all variables that appear in the regression model are used to produce a posterior distribution for the complete data set via maximum likelihood. Multiple draws from this distribution are then taken to produce a specified number of complete data sets (10 in this case), which are then combined by averaging the estimates for the missing data. This produces a more data-driven approach to imputation of missing values, as compared to mean or linear imputation.

Finally, the data are transformed in order to better differentiate the trends in assertive citizenship from the irregular components of the time series. This is done through exponential smoothing of the time series. This variable construction procedure results in a time series of country-year observations for the three variables: political interest, strength of party identification, and an overall assertive values index.

*Index Validity*

How valid is the assertive index as an overall measure of assertive citizenship orientations in these four countries across the time period? There is no simple answer to this question. Conceptually, I argue that aggregating as many potential indicators of assertive values and attitudes produces a more robust estimate of the concept of assertiveness than simply one or a few indicators. By aggregating we also create a

smoother, more stable measure because averaging across many values will even out aberrant fluctuations in particular items.

Empirically, the time series that are created generally correspond to our theoretically-derived expectations. In three countries, the assertive index exhibits a relatively smooth, incremental increase over time. In New Zealand, this pattern is not as evident, but as the study itself shows throughout, the case deviates in most ways from the other cases. The index also exhibits relatively high correlation, in the appropriate directions, with the simpler measures of political interest and party identification, as is shown in table A4, below. The index is positively correlated with political interest in every case but New Zealand, and is negatively correlated with strength of party identification in every case but, again, New Zealand. This provides some evidence that all of these indicators are measuring a similar latent concept, but are also distinct enough to merit using all three separately.

Table A4
*Assertive Index Correlation with other Measures of Assertive Citizenship*

| | | Party ID | Assertive Index |
|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | Pol Interest | -0.56 | 0.46 |
| | Party ID | | -0.52 |
| Canada | Pol Interest | -0.69 | 0.82 |
| | Party ID | | -0.83 |
| New Zealand | Pol Interest | -0.39 | -0.73 |
| | Party ID | | 0.57 |
| United Kingdom | Pol Interest | -0.87 | 0.20 |
| | Party ID | | -0.39 |

Finally, the output of WCalc6.1 itself produces an estimate of the index's validity in terms of how well the overall index accounts for all of the variation in the items with which it is constituted. We might also think of this as how much information is lost in aggregating all of the survey question data into a single index (instead, say, of a more

multi-dimensional approach). Since the dyad ratios algorithm is essentially a principal components analysis, the software output displays the eigenvalue estimates of the extracted factor (the total variance accounted for by the factor), the total variance, and the percent of total variance in the items explained by the factor (the first divided by the second). These figures are shown in table A5, below. They show that there are differences across cases in the adequacy of the index but that generally the index does a decent job of accounting for the variance in all of the assertive survey items. The percent of variance explained is highest in Australia, and lowest in New Zealand, which is not surprising.

Table A5

*Assertive Index, Eigenvalue Estimates and Percent of Variance Explained*

| | Eigenvalues | % of Variance Explained |
|---|---|---|
| Australia | 2.80 / 3.66 | 76.52 |
| Canada | 2.19/ 3.68 | 59.48 |
| New Zealand | 3.18 / 5.56 | 57.13 |
| United Kingdom | 1.67 / 2.91 | 57.51 |

*Appendix 4 - Assertive Citizenship Index: Survey Items*

This appendix is a list of the survey items used to construct the assertive citizenship index, as above. The items are given, by country, in appendix table A6, below. The number of unique questions and total item administrations are, respectively: Australia, 44 and 173, Canada, 37 and 175, New Zealand, 29 and 139, and the UK, 42 and 160. The time period for the data is: Australia, 1967-2013, Canada, 1965-2011, New Zealand 1990-2014, and UK, 1963-2015. For each item, the following information is given: a short variable description, the exact question wording, the survey years in which it was asked, and the response categories. As the variables were dichotomized into assertive/non-assertive responses, the assertive responses are bolded.

Table A6

*Items used to construct the Assertive Citizenship Index*

| *Country* | *Topic* | *Question* | *Years Asked* | *Response Coding (assertive in bold)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | Censorship of Media | Do you think that there should be some censorship of books and films, or do you think that people should be able to read and see what they like? | 1967, 1969, 1979 | Some Censorship, **Read what I Like** |
| | Censorship of Media | Do you think that there should be some censorship of books and films, or do you think that people should be able to read and see what they like? | 1987, 1993 | Some Censorship, It Depends, **None** |
| | Nudity and Sex in Media | Please say whether you think the change has gone too far, not gone far enough, or is it about right? The right to show nudity and sex in films and magazines. | 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Much Too Far, Too Far, **About Right, Not Far Enough, Not Nearly Far Enough** |
| | Traditional Right and Wrong | How important is preserving traditional ideas of right and wrong? | 1998, 2001 | Very important, somewhat important**, not important** |
| | Death Penalty | Do you want to see the death penalty kept or abolished? | 1967, 1969, 1979 | Kept, **Abolished** |
| | Death Penalty | Please say whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: Bring back the death penalty. | 1987, 1990 | Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree |
| | Death Penalty | The death penalty should be reintroduced for murder | 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree |
| | Stiffer Sentences | People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. | 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree |
| | Abortion | Do you think that women should be able to obtain an abortion easily when they want one, or do you think abortion should be allowed only in special circumstances? | 1979, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Not Under any Circumstances, Special Circumstances, **Obtain Easily** |
| | Homosexuality | There has been a lot of discussion in the last few years about homosexuality. Do you think that homosexual acts between consenting adults should be legal or should they be prohibited by law? | 1979, 1987 | Should be Prohibited, It depends, **Should be Legal** |

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| Satisfaction with Govt, Politics | On the whole, how do you feel about the state of government and politics in Australia? Would you say that you were very satisfied, fairly satisfied, or not satisfied? | 1969, 1979 | Not, Fairly, Very Satisfied |
| Satisfaction with democracy | On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Australia? | 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Satisfied, Fairly Satisfied, **Not very satisfied, Not at all satisfied** |
| Confidence: Federal Govt | How much confidence do you have in the following organisations? Federal government in Canberra. | 2001, 2010 | Great deal, Quite a lot, **Not very much, none at all** |
| Confidence: Parties | How much confidence do you have in the following organisations? Political Parties | 2001, 2010 | Great deal, Quite a lot, **Not very much, none at all** |
| Confidence: Parliament | How much confidence do you have in the following organisations? Parliament | 2001, 2010 | Great deal, Quite a lot, **Not very much, none at all** |
| Confidence: Public Service | How much confidence do you have in the following organisations? Public Service | 2001, 2010 | Great deal, Quite a lot, **Not very much, none at all** |
| Confidence: Political System | How much confidence do you have in the following organisations? Political System | 2001, 2010 | Great deal, Quite a lot, **Not very much, none at all** |
| Trust to do Right Thing | In general, do you feel that the people in government are too often interested in looking after themselves, or do you feel that they can be trusted to do the right thing nearly all the time? | 1969, 1979 | Do Right Thing, Look after Self |
| Trust to do Right Thing | In general, do you feel that the people in government are too often interested in looking after themselves, or do you feel that they can be trusted to do the right thing nearly all the time? | 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | **Usually look after themselves,** Sometimes look after themselves, Sometimes can be trusted to do the right thing, Usually can be trusted to do the right thing |
| Government benefits everyone / big interests | Do you think that the people running the government in Canberra give everyone a fair go, whether they are important or just ordinary people, or do you think some of the | 1969, 1979, 1987 | Give a Fair Go, Big Interests |

| | | | |
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| | people in the government pay more attention to what big interests want? | | |
| Government run by big interests or all | Would you say the Federal government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? | 1993 | For benefit of all, Depends**, Run by Big Interests** |
| Government run by big interests/all | Would you say the government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? | 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | **Entirely run for big interests, mostly run for big interests,** half and half, mostly run for benefit of all, entirely run for benefit of all |
| Government knows what it's Doing | Do you feel that the people running the government are usually pretty intelligent people who know what they are doing, or do you feel that there are too many people who don't seem to know what they're doing? | 1969, 1979 | Know what Doing, Don't Know what Doing |
| Difference who in power | Some people say it makes a big difference who is in power. Others say it doesn't make any difference who is in power. Using the scale below, where would you place yourself? | 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | It makes a big difference who is in power – doesn't make any difference |
| Parties care what people think | Some people say that political parties in Australia care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in Australia don't care what ordinary people think. Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5? | 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Care what think – Don't care what think |
| Parties make system work | Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means that political parties are necessary to make our political system work, and 5 means that political parties are not needed in Australia? | 1996, 1998 | Make System work – not needed |
| Parties do good job | In general, do you think political parties are doing a very good job, a good job, neither a good nor a bad job, a bad job or a very | 2001, 2004 | Doing a very good job, doing a good job, neither good nor bad, **doing a bad job, doing a very bad job** |

| | | | |
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| | bad job for the people of Australia? | | |
| Politicians know what people think | Some people say that Federal politicians know what ordinary people think. Others say that Federal politicians don't know much about what ordinary people think. Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5? | 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Know what people think – Don't know what people think |
| Politicians Corrupt | How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in Australia? | 2001, 2004 | It hardly happens at all, not very widespread, **quite widespread, very widespread** |
| Public Servants Corrupt | How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst public servants in Australia? | 2001, 2004 | It hardly happens at all, not very widespread, **quite widespread, very widespread** |
| R could do good job in office | I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people. | 1993, 1998, 2001 | Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree |
| R good understanding of issues | I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing Australia. | 1993, 1998, 2001 | Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree |
| Government Trust | How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Canberra to do what is right? | 1987, 1993 | Just about always, Most of the Time, **Some of the Time, Not at all** |
| Tax Money Wasted | Do you think that people in the Federal Government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it? | 1987, 1993 | Don't Waste Much, Waste Some of It, Waste a Lot |
| Women: Job Opportunities | How about job opportunities for women - do you think that they are, in general, better or worse than job opportunities for men with similar education and experience? | 1987 | Much Better, Better, No Difference, **Worse, Much Worse** |
| Women: Equal Opportunity | Please say whether you think the change has gone too far, not gone far enough, or is it about right? Equal opportunities for women. | 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Much Too Far, Too Far, About Right, **Not Far Enough, Not nearly far enough** |
| Women: Preferential Treatment | Women should be given preferential treatment when applying for jobs and promotions. | 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree |
| Women: | The government should | 1993, 1996, 1998, | Strongly Disagree – |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Increase Opportunities | increase opportunities for women in business and industry. | 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 | Strongly Agree |
| | Gender equality | How important is it to guarantee equality between men and women in all aspects of life? | 1998, 2001 | Not important, Somewhat important, **Very important** |
| | Environment: Cherish Nature | I cherish nature and preserve it as one of the most precious things in life. | 1990, 1993, 1998 | Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree |
| | Environment: Increase Spending | Increase government spending to protect the environment | 1993, 1996, 1998 | Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree |
| | Global Warming | How serious a threat do you think global warming will pose to you or your way of life in your lifetime? | 2010, 2013 | Not at all serious, Not very serious, **Fairly serious, Very serious** |
| | Respect Authority | How important is it to strengthen respect and obedience for authority? | 1998, 2001 | Very important, somewhat important, **not important** |
| | Emphasize freedom or conformity | In our society today, too much emphasis is placed on: freedom, conformity, neither/undecided | 1998, 2001 | Freedom, neither/undecided, **Conformity** |
| | Emphasize Institutions or Individuals | In society today, too little emphasis is placed on: respect for established institutions, rights of the individual, neither/undecided | 1998, 2001 | Institutions, Neither, **Individuals** |
| *Country* | *Topic* | *Question* | *Years Asked* | *Response Coding (assertive in bold)* |
| Canada | Death Penalty | Capital punishment is never justified, no matter what the crime. | 1993, 1997 | Strongly Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, **Somewhat Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| | Death Penalty | Do you favour or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? | 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011 | Favour, **Oppose** |
| | Abortion | Which is closest to your own opinion: abortion never permitted, permitted after need established, woman's personal choice | 1988, 1993, 1997 | abortion never permitted, permitted after need established, **woman's personal choice** |
| | Abortion | And now a question on abortion: do you think it should be: very easy, quite easy, quite difficult, very difficult for women to get an abortion? | 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008 | very difficult, quite difficult, **quite easy, very easy** |
| | Satisfaction w/ Democracy | On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not | 1993, 1997, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011 | Very satisfied, fairly satisfied, **not very satisfied, not satisfied** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | satisfied at all with the way democracy works in Canada? | | **at all** |
| Confidence in Fed Govt | For each of the following institutions, please tell us how much confidence you have in them: the federal government | 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | A great deal, quite a lot, **not very much, none at all** |
| Crooks in Govt | Do You Think That Quite A Few Of The People Running The Government Are A Little Crooked, Not Very Many Are Crooked, Or Do You Think Hardly Any Of Them Are Crooked? | 1965, 1968, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008 | Hardly Any, Not Very Many, **Quite a Few** |
| Tax Money Wasted | Do You Think That People In The Government Waste A Lot Of The Money We Pay In Taxes, Waste Some Of It, Or Don't Waste Very Much Of It? | 1965, 1968, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | Not Much, Some**, A Lot** |
| Tax Money Wasted | People in the federal government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes. | 1984 | Strongly Disagree, Disagree Somewhat, **Somewhat agree, Strongly Agree** |
| Trust Govt to do right | How Much Of The Time Do You Think You Can Trust The Government In Ottawa To Do What Is Right: Just About Always, Most Of The Time, Or Only Some Of The Time? | 1965, 1968, 1988, 1993 | Always, Most of the Time, **Some of the Time** |
| Trust Govt to do right | Most of the time we can trust people in the Federal Government to do what is right. | 1984 | Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, **Disagree Somewhat, Strongly Disagree** |
| Attention to Interests | Do You Think That All People Who Are High In Government Give Everyone A Fair Break, Whether They Are Big Shots Or Just Ordinary People, Or Do You Think Some Of Them Pay More Attention To What The Big Interests Want? | 1965, 1968 | Give Everyone a Fair Break, **Pay Attention to Big Shots** |
| Govt knows what it's doing | Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to | 1965, 1968, 1988, 1993 | All know, **Quite a few of them don't know** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | know what they are doing? | | |
| Govt knows what it's doing | Most of the people running the Fed Govt are smart people who usually know what they are doing. | 1984 | Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, **Disagree Somewhat, Strongly Disagree** |
| Govt Doesn't Care | I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think. | 1965, 1968 | Disagree, **Agree** |
| Govt Doesn't Care | I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think. | 1974, 1979, 1984, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011 | Strongly Disagree, Disagree, **Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| Parties Care | Some people say that political parties in Canada care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in Canada don't care what ordinary people think. Using the scale below, where would you place your own view? | 1997, 2000 | 1 Care to 5 Don't Care **4,5** |
| No Say | People like me don't have any say about what the government does. | 1965, 1968 | Disagree, **Agree** |
| No Say | People like me don't have any say about what the government does. | 1974, 1979, 1984, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | Strongly Disagree, Disagree, **Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| MPs lose touch | Generally those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people. | 1965, 1968 | Disagree, **Agree** |
| MPs lose touch | Generally those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people. | 1974, 1979, 1984, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | Strongly Disagree, Disagree, **Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| Politics too Complicated | Sometimes Politics And Government Seem So Complicated That A Person Like Me Can't Really Understand What's Going On. | 1965, 1968 | Agree, **Disagree** |
| Politics too complicated | Sometimes Politics And Government Seem So Complicated That A Person Like Me Can't Really Understand What's Going On. | 1974, 1979, 1984, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | Strongly Agree, Agree, **Disagree, Strongly Disagree** |
| Difference who is in Power | In your opinion, do you think it makes a great deal of difference, some difference, or no difference, which political party runs this country? | 1965, 1968 | Great Deal, Some Difference**, No Difference** |
| Women stay w/ Children | Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children. | 1993, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008 | Strongly agree, somewhat agree, **somewhat disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Job Gender | Discrimination makes it | 1993, 1997, 2000, | Strongly Disagree, |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Discrimination | extremely difficult for women to get jobs equal to their abilities. | 2004, 2008, 2011 | Disagree, **Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| Equal Rights | We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. | 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | Strongly agree, somewhat agree, **somewhat disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Homosexual Couples Marry | Homosexual couples should be allowed to get legally married. | 1993, 1997, 2000 | Strongly Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, **Somewhat Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| Same-sex marriage | Do you favour or oppose same-sex marriage, or do you have no opinion on this? | 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011 | Oppose, **favour** |
| Protect Environment over Jobs | Protecting the environment is more important than creating jobs. | 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | Strongly Disagree, Disagree, **Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| Duty to Vote | It is the duty of every citizen to vote. | 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008 | Strongly agree, agree, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Respect for Authority | Respect for authority is one of the most important things that children should learn. | 1993, 1997 | Strongly agree, agree, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Children Learn | Here are some qualities that children can be encouraged to learn. Which one do you think is more important? Independence, or respect for authority. | 2008, 2011 | Respect for authority, **Independence** |
| Children Learn | Here are some qualities that children can be encouraged to learn. Which one do you think is more important? Obedience or self-reliance. | 2008, 2011 | Obedience, **Self-Reliance** |
| Lifestyles | Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society. | 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | Strongly agree, agree, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Adapt Morals to Change | The world is always changing and we should adapt our view of moral behaviour to these changes. | 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | Strongly Disagree, Disagree, **Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| Emphasize traditional values | This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family values. | 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 | Strongly agree, agree, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Down to Earth vs. Experts | I'd rather put my trust in the down-to-earth thinking of ordinary people than in experts | 1993, 1997, 2008, 2011 | Strongly Disagree, Disagree, **Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| People have | Most people have enough | 1993, 1997, 2000, | Strongly Disagree, |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | sense | sense to tell whether the government is doing a good job. | 2004, 2008, 2011 | Disagree, **Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| | Grassroots | We could probably solve most of our big national problems if decisions could be brought back to the people at the grass roots. | 1993, 1997, 2000, 2008, 2011 | Strongly Disagree, Disagree, **Agree, Strongly Agree** |
| *Country* | *Topic* | *Question* | *Years Asked* | *Response Coding (assertive in bold)* |
| New Zealand | Death penalty | The death penalty for murder should be reintroduced. | 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| | Stiffer Sentences | People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. | 1996, 2005, 2008 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| | Satisfaction w/ Democracy | On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in New Zealand? | 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 | Satisfied, Fairly Satisfied, **Not very satisfied, not at all satisfied** |
| | Confidence in Parliament | How much trust and confidence would you say you have in Parliament? | 2002, 2005, 2008 | 0-8 (**0-3)** |
| | Big Interests | The New Zealand government is largely run by a few big interests. | 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| | Trust Govt to do Right | You can trust the government to do what is right most of the time. | 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| | No difference who in power | If 1 means that it makes a difference who is in power, and 5 means that it doesn't make a difference who is in power, where would you place your view? | 1996, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 | 1-5 (**4-5)** |
| | MPs lose touch | Most Members of Parliament are out of touch with the rest of the country. | 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| | No Say | People like me don't have any say about what the government does. | 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| | Politicians Care | I don't think politicians and public servants care much about what people like me think. | 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| | Understand Issues | I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the issues facing New Zealand. | 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| | Could do as good a job | I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people. | 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| | Politics | Sometimes Politics And | 1993, 1996, 1999, | Strongly agree, agree, |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Complicated | Government Seem So Complicated That A Person Like Me Can't Really Understand What's Going On. | 2002, 2005, 2008 | neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Referendum | Be able to make government hold a binding referendum if enough people want one on a particular issue? | 1990, 1993, 1996 | Definitely No, Probably No, Can't Say, **Probably Yes, Definitely Yes** |
| Referendum | Referendums are too complicated for the average voter. | 1999, 2002 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Referendum | Citizens-initiated referendums enable citizens to get politicians' attention. | 1999, 2002 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Referendum | Results of citizens-initiated referendums should automatically become law. | 1999, 2002 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Parliament final say | Parliament, not voters, should make final decisions on law and policy. | 1999, 2002 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Environment | Some people say we should concentrate more on protecting the environment, even if it leads to considerable lower living standards for everyone. Others think that we should safeguard our living standards before we seek to protect the environment. | 1990, 1993 | Protection of the environment should not be increased if it leads to lower living standards – Increase protection of the environment (1-7, **1-3)** |
| Environment | On this scale, ONE means that we should concentrate more on protecting the environment, even if it leads to considerably lower incomes, and SEVEN means that we should safeguard our income levels before we seek to protect the environment. | 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 | Should not protect environment if it leads to lower in comes to Should protect environment even if it leads to lower incomes (1-7, **1-3)** |
| Workers more say | Workers should have more say in running the places they work. | 1990, 1993 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Abortion | Abortion is always wrong. | 2008, 2014 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Homosexuality | Homosexual relationships are always wrong. | 1993, 1996, 2005, 2008 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |

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| | Homosexuality | It should be illegal to refuse to employ someone because they are homosexual. | 1993, 1996 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| | Strong leaders | A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk. | 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| | Young need discipline | What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents. | 1993, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| | Duty to Vote | It is a citizen's duty to vote. | 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| | Gender pay difference | There should be a law to further reduce pay differences between women and men. | 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| | Women stay home w/ children | Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children. | 1999, 2002 | Strongly agree, agree, neutral, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| *Country* | *Topic* | *Question* | *Years Asked* | *Response Coding (assertive in bold)* |
| United Kingdom | Death Penalty | Would you like to see the death penalty kept or abolished? | 1963, 1966, 1970 | Kept, **abolished** |
| | Death Penalty | Britain should bring back the death penalty? | 1992, 1997 | Strongly agree, agree, not sure either way, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| | Death Penalty | The death penalty, even for very serious crimes, is never justified. | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, **agree, strongly agree** |
| | Sentences | People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. | 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010 | Agree, not sure, **disagree** |
| | Elections Responsiveness | How much do you think that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think? | 1963, 1964, 1966 | Good deal, some, **not much** |
| | Parties Responsiveness | How much do you feel that having political parties makes the government pay attention to what the people think? | 1963,1964,1966 | Good deal, some, **not much** |
| | Satisfaction w/ democracy | On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Britain? | 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 | Satisfied, fairly satisfied, **not very satisfied, not at all satisfied** |
| | Trust Parliament | How much do you trust the Parliament at Westminster? | 2005, 2010 | 0 no trust – 10 great deal of trust **(0-4)** |
| | Trust Politicians | How much do you trust British politicians generally? | 2005, 2010, 2015 | 0 no trust – 10 great deal of trust **(0-4)** |
| | Trust Civil | How much do you trust | 2005 | 0 no trust – 10 great |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Service | the civil service? | | deal of trust **(0-4)** |
| Respect Parliament | How much respect you have for each of the following: the Parliament at Westminster. | 2001 | 0 no respect – 10 great deal of respect **(0-4)** |
| Respect Politicians | How much respect you have for each of the following: Politicians generally. | 2001 | 0 no respect – 10 great deal of respect **(0-4)** |
| Respect Civil Service | How much respect you have for each of the following: the Civil Service. | 2001 | 0 no respect – 10 great deal of respect **(0-4)** |
| Duty to Vote | It is every citizen's duty to vote in an election. | 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 | Strongly agree, agree, neither, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Elections | Elections help to keep politicians accountable for the promises they make. | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly agree, agree, neither, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Elections | Elections allow voters to express their opinions but don't really change anything. | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Elections | Elections give voters an opportunity to tell politicians what they think is really important. | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly agree, agree, neither, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Elections | All things considered, most elections are just a big waste of time and money. | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Govt treats people | The government generally treats people like me fairly. | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly agree, agree, neither, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Active Benefits | Being active in politics is a good way to get benefits for me and my family. | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly agree, agree, neither, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Active Effort | It takes too much time and effort to be active in politics and public affairs. | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Voting waste of time | Most of my family and friends think that voting is a waste of time. | 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Homosexuality | Homosexual relations are always wrong. | 1992, 1997 | Strongly agree, agree, neither, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Tolerance of Lifestyles | People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives. | 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Too far: gender equality | How do you feel about the attempts to ensure equality for women? | 1974,1979,1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2015 | Gone much too far, gone a little too far, is about right, **not gone quite far enough, not gone nearly far enough** |
| Wife's job home | A husband's job is to earn | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly agree, agree, |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family. | | neither, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Too far: homosexual equality | Attempts to give equal opportunities to homosexuals – that is, gays and lesbians. | 1987,1992, 1997 | Gone much too far, gone too far, is about right, **not gone far enough, not gone nearly far enough** |
| Too far: nudity/sex in media | How do you feel about the right to show nudity and sex in films and magazines? | 1974,1979,1983, 1987,1992 | Gone much too far, gone a little too far, **is about right, not gone quite far enough, not gone nearly far enough** |
| Censorship | Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards. | 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 | agree strongly, agree, neither, **disagree, disagree strongly** |
| Too far: Show respect for authority | How do you feel about people showing less respect for authority? | 1974,1979,1983 | Gone much too far, gone a little too far, is about right, **not gone quite far enough, not gone nearly far enough** |
| Too far: availability of abortion | How do you feel about the availability of abortion on the NHS? | 1974,1979,1983, 1987,1992, 1997 | Gone much too far, gone a little too far, is about right, **not gone quite far enough, not gone nearly far enough** |
| Too far: right to protest / demonstrate | The right to have protest marches and demonstrations. | 1983,1987 | Gone too far, about right, **not gone far enough** |
| Organise protest | People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government. | 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Workers more say | Giving workers more say in the running of the place where they work? | 1974,1979,1983 | Very important that it should not be done, fairly important not done, doesn't matter, **fairly important should, very important should** |
| Workers more say | Government should or should not give workers more say. | 1983,1987, 1992, 1997 | Should not, doesn't matter, **should** |
| No say | People like me have no say in what the government does. | 1987,1992, 1997, 2001, 2015 | Disagree strongly, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, **agree, agree strongly** |
| Govt doesn't care | Government does not care much what people like me think. | 1992, 2001, 2015 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Lose Touch | Those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people. | 2001 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Politics complicated | Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on. | 1987,1992, 2001, 2015 | **Strongly disagree, disagree,** neither**, agree, strongly agree** |
| Could do job | I feel I could do as good a job as an MP or Councillor as most other people. | 1992 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Parties are same | It doesn't really matter which party is in power, in the end things go on much the same. | 1987, 1997 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Parties are same | The main political parties in Britain don't offer voters real choices in elections because their policies are pretty much all the same. | 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Parties vs. Groups | Being involved in a group… is a better way of influencing government than being active in a political party. | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Parties interest in votes | Parties are only interested in people's votes, not in their opinions. | 1987, 1997, 2001, 2005 | Strongly disagree, disagree, neither, **agree, strongly agree** |
| Environment | Industry should be prevented from causing damage to the countryside, even if this sometimes leads to higher prices OR industry should keep prices down, even if this sometimes causes damage to the countryside | 1987,1992 | |
| Environment | The countryside should be protected from development, even if this sometimes leads to fewer new jobs OR new jobs should be created, even if this sometimes causes damage to the countryside | 1987,1992 | |
| Environment | We worry too much about the environment today and not enough about people's jobs | 2001, 2005, 2010 | Strongly agree, agree, neither, **disagree, strongly disagree** |
| Traditional Values | Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values. | 1987,1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 | agree strongly, agree, neither, **disagree, disagree strongly** |

## Curriculum Vitae

**Name:** Kenny William Ie

**Post-Secondary Education:**

Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC, Canada
2005-2008 B.A.

McGill University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
2008-2011 M.A.

The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
2011-2017 Ph.D.

**Honours and Awards:**

Ontario Graduate Scholarship
2013-2014, 2014-2015

Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
Doctoral Scholarship
2015-2016

Canadian Study of Parliament Group Doctoral Fellowship
2016-2017

**Related Work Experience:**

Teaching Assistant
McGill University
2009-2010

Teaching Assistant
The University of Western Ontario
2011-2015

Research Assistant
The University of Western Ontario
2013-2015

Instructor
University of British Columbia
2017